Radical (34 page)

A year and a half before Malala's shooting, a symbol for a much different cause was also shot in the head at point-blank range. In May 2011 Osama bin Laden was found and executed by US Navy SEALS in Abottabad, Pakistan. Scenes of jubilation erupted in cities all over the United States. President Obama addressed the nation in what looked to me like a repeat of Bush's “mission accomplished” faux pas. Analysts clamored to hail the demise of al-Qaeda in sheer glee. I looked on anxiously. In this case, it was time for the Islamist idea to assert its own buoyancy beyond the life of any one person.

I knew that al-Qaeda would continue to grow long after bin Laden. With nothing but narratives as ammunition to hold the ideological frontlines against groups that believe in summary execution as a means for change, I couldn't help but feel that execution, as a method, had just received a huge boost from the United States itself. An inconvenient fact, often overlooked by we who presume to fight the “good fight,” is that bad ideas are just as bulletproof as good ones. They wear the same flak jackets, dodge the same bullets, and erect the same blast shields. You can't kill an idea.

In December 2012 I was invited to Orange County, California, by some of Quilliam's supporters to celebrate Christmas as their guest. During my stay another of their guests turned up, and I was excitedly ushered forward by my hosts to meet the man. I soon realized why. The question pervaded the air without anyone needing to utter the words: How would this former Islamist greet one of the Navy SEALS team who had gone into Abbottabad that night to kill bin Laden? Back straight, eyes firm, I suddenly found myself face to face with this elite soldier, over a surreal brunch at the Ritz-Carlton in Laguna Beach.

I felt my body becoming unreasonably tense. I had spent years of my life evading men such as this, and I had no idea he was going to be there that day. In a past life, we would have been mortal enemies. In any life, he could kill me in a split second. And though we were now essentially working for the same overall goals, I didn't believe in executing my enemies and felt uneasy about meeting someone who had just done so.

He greeted me with a gentle demeanor befitting a true professional. “I've heard a lot about you and was told we should meet,” he said, smiling. “Your work on the ground is crucial.” With this endorsement, a hardened soldier had ironically disarmed me with his words before I could even fire a shot. I quickly checked myself. My disagreement is with those who give the orders, not with a soldier who risks his life to carry them out. I let this be just a brunch at the Ritz with my American friends.

In my humble view, it would have been far more consistent to bring bin Laden to justice, as had been attempted with Saddam Hussein, who, due to fears that he was able and willing to unleash chemical warfare, was certainly deemed no less dangerous. Except there was an election on the horizon for an already embattled president, and President Obama would not take the risk of anything going wrong. Forgive me for being cynical, but I found myself agreeing with the sentiments of schoolteacher Jessica Dovey:

I will mourn the loss of thousands of precious lives, but I will not rejoice in the death of one, not even an enemy.
(Link)

In light of Jessica's words, which spread around the world and were erroneously attributed to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the street celebrations after bin Laden's execution seemed to me rather brash. As I had expected, al-Qaeda continued to go from strength to strength. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian who, like me, had spent time in Egypt's jails, was quickly appointed the head of al-Qaeda. Even George W. Bush, despite all the mistakes of his militarized neo-conservatism, had come to realize the importance of inverting his model and working to bolster grassroots initiatives during the last two years of his administration. Frustratingly, the Obama administration took its eye completely off this crucial ideas debate. Amid a policy of targeted drone killings at a frequency far higher than Bush's—including the controversial targeted killing of an American citizen, al-Awlaki, in Yemen—Obama's administration turned toward a crude, results-driven desire to secure body bags.

When tactics become the strategy, you lose sight of the overall aim. And this is how the heirs of Osama bin Laden strategically blindsided the Obama administration. Al-Qaeda deftly utilized the security vacuum created in North Africa after the Arab uprisings and moved in with the dexterity of a surgeon's hand. Soon, under their new Egyptian leader's command, the group had achieved what it had never done under bin Laden himself: control of a territory the size of France directly by al-Qaeda in sub-Saharan Mali, as the ancient city of Timbuktu was seized and razed by jihadist militants. In Yemen, the Abyan province and then chunks of land in the southwest of the country came under direct al-Qaeda control as well. In Syria, the uprising to remove that country's brutal dictator was all but hijacked by Jabhat al-Nusra, a group formed of al-Qaeda veterans who descended upon this new battlefield from neighboring Iraq.

By April 2013 al-Qaeda in Iraq had announced its merger with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, under orders from Zawahiri himself. The simple fact was that since bin Laden's death, al-Qaeda had gone from being a terrorist group to a full-blown insurgency in at least Mali, Yemen, and the Levant. You can't kill an idea. Ideas are bulletproof.

And then there was Libya. In September 2012, Noman and I were sitting in the Quilliam office in London gaping at our news screens. An unknown had uploaded a “film” to YouTube that was gratuitously insulting to the Prophet of Islam. Some hooligans across various Muslim-majority countries seized on this event to incite riots and looting. The Islamist narrative that there was a full-blown war against Islam had just received a huge boost.

Symbiotically, the right-wing narrative that Muslims were uncivilized, ungovernable thugs had also just received reaffirmation. But that was not what we were gaping at. The news was reporting that US ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens had just been killed amid mob riots in the city of Benghazi. The accepted view across all media outlets was that this death was a result of the film, and the US government confirmed this version of events.

After some brief and tense calls to our network on the ground in Benghazi, Noman turned to me and said grimly, “Maajid, this was not a spontaneous attack.”

“What are you saying, Noman?” I asked.

The reply came with Noman's characteristic confidence: “It is my belief, from the information that I have gathered, that Ambassador Chris Stevens was assassinated in a preplanned al-Qaeda terrorist attack in revenge for the US drone killing of al-Qaeda's number two, abu Yahya al-Libi.”

I stared blankly at Noman, taking in what he had just said.

“I think we should make a statement,” he continued.

“But, Noman, the entire world, the US government, CNN, the BBC, everyone is saying this was a spontaneous attack. Are they all wrong? How can we be so sure?”

Noman looked at me with steely determination and the sigh of someone who has seen too much in life. “This attack was timed to coincide with the anniversary of 9/11, and a warning had already been given by al-Zawahiri in a pre-released video. The attack was orchestrated with military precision in two waves, using RPGs, which are not found randomly among mere angry mobs. Let me draft something, and you can see if you agree.”

Instinctively knowing he was right, I let him put something together.

By the next day, while the world was still focused on the “film” and the deaths resulting from the furor surrounding it, the obvious seemed to be staring at me from a piece of paper on my desk. No doubt about it, the killing of Stevens was an al-Qaeda operation.

“Noman, if we release this, you do realize that we're putting our reputation on the line? If we're wrong, governments, the media, and especially Muslims will ridicule us.” I continued, “They'll say, ‘Here's Quilliam trying to resurrect the terrorism debate after terrorism is dead along with bin Laden.'”

Noman looked me square in the eyes. “But we're right, Maajid.”

“And if we're right, we severely embarrass the Obama administration and people lose their jobs. No one is saying what we are about to claim,” I said.

“It's the right thing to do,” he said simply. He was correct, of course.

What was happening was nothing short of a scandal. Whether deliberately contrived or negligently missed, the world's greatest power had turned away from the terrorism agenda. It was as if with a killing here or a drone strike there—all the while seeing no evil, hearing no evil—Obama had hoped that the problem would simply cease to exist. But al-Qaeda continued to spread, maturing into an insurrection with deep roots in some of the world's most troubled countries.
You can't kill an idea.
Somebody needed to shake things up.

After we sent out the press release, our phones and email accounts came alive. The allegation we had made was initially reported with skepticism and credited to Quilliam. As the East Coast of the United States awoke, the rate of press queries we were receiving started rising to fever pitch, and our phones began dancing to their own tune. Pundits who we knew for a fact had received our press release—they are on our mailing list—started repeating our words verbatim across US media outlets without crediting their source.

Eventually, experts and news outlets began realizing that they might have all made a mistake. Received wisdom had shifted; what had happened in Benghazi was now deemed a terrorist attack. It took the US government another week to finally accept the truth. The CIA eventually conceded that it had arrived at the same conclusion, and the White House issued a public admission.

The family of Chris Stevens and other victims would now know the truth and could better seek justice. “Uncivilized” Muslim mobs in Libya would no longer be made the scapegoat for a preplanned terrorist attack. Obama's administration had learned the hard way not to neglect the terrorism agenda.

From our office in central London, Quilliam had just forced the world's only superpower to change its course. That's the power of an idea.
(Link)

G
LOSSARY OF
A
RABIC
T
ERMS

(Except where indicated: Urdu/Punjabi)

Akhi
(my brother)

‘Alayhi salam
(shortened Muslim prayer for Prophets: upon him be peace)

Al-Jabbar
(The Compeller—one of the ninety-nine names of Allah)

Allahu akbar
(God is great)

Allahu musta'an
(prayer: help is sought from Allah)

Assalaamu alaykum
(greeting: Peace be upon you)

Amir
(leader)

Azan
(call to prayer)

Beta
(Urdu: son)

Bhai
(Urdu: brother)

Bi iznillah
(with Allah's permission)

Da'i
(missionary)

Daris
(student)

Dariseen
(students)

Da'wah
(mission)

Deen
(religion)

Eeman
(faith)

Fee sabeelillah
(in the path of Allah)

Ghimamah
(blindfold)

Habib
(dear friend, beloved)

Halal
(permissible)

Halaqah
(private study circle)

Hizbi
(a partisan)

Itnain
(two)

Itnain wa arba'een
(forty-two)

Kafir
(infidel)

Khilafah
(caliphate)

Kuffar
(infidels)

Kufr
(disbelief)

Muhajir
(immigrants, plural
muhajiroon
. Also the name of a banned extremist group in London founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad)

Muraja'aat
(revisions)

Mu'taqal
(the arbitrarily detained, plural
mu'taqaleen
)

Nana Abu
(Urdu: maternal grandfather)

Nani Ammi
(Urdu: maternal grandmother)

Nikah
(marriage ceremony)

Qiyadah
(leadership)

Raqam
(number)

Sall Allahu alayhi wa-salam
(longer Muslim prayer for the Prophet: May Allah's peace and blessings be upon him)

Shahadah
(martyrdom, testimony of faith)

Shaikh
(learned man, religious scholar, old man)

Shari'ah
(body of Islamic edicts)

Shaweesh
(conscripted Egyptian guard)

Sohni
(Punjabi: beautiful)

Subhan Allah
(Muslim invocation: Exalted be Allah)

Tai Ammi
(Urdu: wife to eldest paternal uncle)

Wahid
(one)

Wilayah
(province)

Wallahi
(oath: by Allah)

Ya Allah
(O Allah)

Zaabit
(officer)

Zalim
(tyrant, plural—
zalimun
)

R
ESOURCES

1. Maajid Nawaz debating Anjem Choudary on BBC
Newsnight,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BrueU4xd2w
.

2.
Telegraph
article about the arrested coup-plotters in the Pakistan army,
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1440284/Pakistan-army-officers-arrested-in-terror-swoop.html
.

3. Transcript of an exchange between Maajid Nawaz and Dr. Sa'ad al-Din Ibrahim after the former's release from prison,
www.bushcenter.com/downloads/theInstitute/human-freedom/wave-of-freedom/A_Conversation_with_Dr_Ibrahim.pdf
.

4. Maajid Nawaz and John Cornwall Amnesty International promotional video,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GpNzOBhvtoA
.

5. Profile of Gita Sahgal,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gita_Sahgal
.

6. Maajid Nawaz's BBC
HARDtalk
interview with Sarah Montague, during the last of his HT days,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/4931416.stm
.

7. Quilliam website,
www.quilliamfoundation.org/
.

8. BBC
Newsnight
featuring Maajid Nawaz's journey from HT and Islamism,

part 1:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYtP-4r4OE8

part 2:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yLZRONdIa0

part 3:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CM4pkRqL0c0
.

9. Lord Ashdown's remarks at the Quilliam launch,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KfLQ6olnwA
.

10. Jemima Khan's remarks at the Quilliam launch,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=oN0QBNXMjxQ
.

11. Survivor of 7/7 Rachel North's remarks at the Quilliam launch,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BbXckInd8Q&list=UU7fkP6rdeoTbrzlr7oXK3Vw&index=77&feature=plcp
.

12. Seumas Milne's far-left criticism of Quilliam,
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/17/islam.race
.

13. Glenn Beck's right-wing criticism of Maajid Nawaz and Quilliam,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=O_gr6FOBwOg
.

14. BBC
Doha Debate,
Maajid Nawaz hosted by Tim Sebastian arguing against politicized Islam,
www.thedohadebates.com/debates/player.asp?d=42
.

15. Intelligence Squared debate, Maajid Nawaz and Zeba Khan defending the faith of Islam from anti-Islam rhetoric against Ayan Hirsi Ali and Douglas Murray,
www.intelligencesquared.com/events/islam-is-a-religion-of-peace
.

16. Maajid Nawaz interviewed on
Larry King Live,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=IF_A02IF4Bc
.

17. Maajid Nawaz interviewed in-depth by al-Jazeera's Riz Khan,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4z1Eps1wJjQ
.

18. Maajid Nawaz profiled on CBS
60 Minutes,
www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6711907n
.

19. Maajid Nawaz's Facebook public page,
www.facebook.com/MaajidNawazFanPage
.

20. Maajid Nawaz's Twitter page,
https://twitter.com/#!/MaajidNawaz
.

21. Maajid Nawaz testifies in the US Senate,

part 1:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XJLkdCgHQc

part 2:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCF2dhtfy7k&feature=related
.

22. Maajid Nawaz's video blog response to Sayyid Qutb's
The America that I Saw,

part 1:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0qdURg4Qz0

part 2:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7mX6A27D5g0

part 3:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3JqAKi2FTU
.

23. Maajid Nawaz testifies in UK parliament,
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/uc1446-i/uc144601.htm
.

24. Prime Minister Brown cites Maajid Nawaz among reasons for not banning HT in the UK,
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071114/debtext/71114-0005.htm
.

25. Analysis of HT activity within the Pakistani army,
www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hizb-al-tahrir-a-new-threat-to-the-pakistan-army
.

26. Khudi website,
www.khudipakistan.com/
.

27. Maajid Nawaz on the TED stage launching the idea for a counter-extremism social movement,
www.ted.com/talks/maajid_nawaz_a_global_culture_to_fight_extremism.html
.

28. BBC
Newsnight
tour of Maajid Nawaz to Pakistan,

part 1:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=yixGca6zZg4

part 2:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3unCtnLVZ-4
.

29. Pakistan Lawyer's Movement,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawyers%27_Movement
.

30. Khudi youth magazine
Laaltain
's website,
www.laaltain.com
.

31. Maajid Nawaz at Google Zeitgeist,
www.zeitgeistminds.com/videos/impact-of-ideology
.

32. Maajid Nawaz interviewed by
Newsweek's
Christopher Dickey at Goa's THINKFest,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKBE9Bm8aCI
.

33. News on Bangladeshi military thwarting an HT coup attempt,
http://newagebd.com/newspaper1/frontpage/49718.html
.