Reagan: The Life (50 page)

Casey’s campaign to resurrect the CIA would define much of Reagan’s foreign policy, for good and ill. His appointment of Max Hugel proved part of the ill, at once. “
It was the appointment from hell,” Robert Gates recalled. Gates agreed that the agency was ingrown and required outside ideas and energy. But he thought the operations division was a bad place to put such an extreme novice. Gates wasn’t alone, and the veterans of the division deliberately made Hugel’s life difficult. “Leaks to the press about Hugel’s mistakes, mannerisms, and faux pas began nearly immediately,” Gates said. Hugel didn’t help himself by his ignorance. “Everyone was embarrassed to have him go to the Hill to testify or to the White House for meetings, and all kinds of stratagems were employed to keep him out of sight.” Casey eventually agreed that the appointment was counterproductive, and a minor scandal involving allegations of earlier insider trading gave him an excuse to let Hugel go. The allegations proved to be inaccurate, but Casey had no desire to bring him back.

Casey learned a lesson from the affair, Gates observed, but the wrong one. “It was the first and last time Casey would challenge the DO”—Directorate of Operations—“institutionally. Badly burned, from then on he would work around the operations bureaucracy rather than try to
change it. This would have dreadful consequences. Now he would indulge his instincts and play Donovan”—
William Donovan, the legendary chief of the wartime OSS. “He would reach down into the clandestine service to kindred spirits and work directly with them.” And he would keep his own people in the dark, treating them as though they were the enemy.
Bobby Ray Inman, Casey’s first deputy director, put it bluntly: “
He customarily lied.”

R
EAGAN LET
C
ASEY
play Donovan. But he insisted that his intelligence director meanwhile provide information on the Soviet Union. Reagan’s foreign policy, from the beginning of his administration, was dedicated to combating Soviet communism. Whatever contributed to the fight, he encouraged, though he didn’t always supervise it. What did not contribute, he rejected or ignored. Reagan instructed Casey and the CIA to compile the best estimates of the American intelligence community on the actions and motives of Soviet foreign policy. The exercise took several months; in the summer of 1981, Casey delivered his report.

“
We believe that Soviet military leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR’s status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying Soviet foreign policy,” the secret report asserted. “As it enters the 1980s, the current Soviet leadership sees the heavy military investments made during the last two decades paying off in the form of unprecedentedly favorable advances across the military spectrum, and over the long term in political gains where military power or military assistance has been the actual instrument of policy or the decisive complement to Soviet diplomacy.” The Soviets had been especially active in the nonaligned world, supporting leftists in
Angola and
Ethiopia since the mid-1970s and invading Afghanistan in 1979. “This more assertive Soviet international behavior is likely to persist as long as the USSR perceives that Western strength is declining and as it further explores the utility of increased military power as a means of realizing its global ambitions.” The Kremlin’s ambitions might provoke a confrontation with the United States. “Moscow still views such a prospect as extremely hazardous. However, in light of the change in the strategic balance and continued expansion of general purpose forces, the Soviets are now more prepared and may be more willing to accept the risks of confrontation in a serious crisis, particularly in an area where they have military or geopolitical advantages.”

Yet Moscow was not uninterested in better relations with the West.
“The Soviets will continue to stress the importance of the arms control dialogue with Washington as the key to bilateral relations,” the intelligence report declared. “And they will seek to resuscitate
détente as the most promising way of constraining US military policies, of advancing their military and political objectives, and of controlling the costs and risks of heightened international tensions.” If their overtures succeeded, they would continue on this path. If not, they would alter course. “If they conclude that there is no prospect in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, they may decide to go beyond the SALT II constraints, seeking to place the onus for failure on the United States and to exploit the breakdown to widen cleavages in the Atlantic Alliance.”

The Kremlin perceived an opening in Europe, the intelligence paper said. “The Soviets see a lack of Western consensus—for example, in implementing NATO’s program to modernize its
long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). They seek to exploit these differences with a dual purpose: to pursue certain economic and political interests with the Europeans even if Soviet relations with the United States deteriorate, and to generate pressures on West European governments to influence Washington toward greater flexibility in its dealings with the USSR.”

Yet the troubles in Poland surrounding the rise of the Solidarity movement offset some of the Soviet advantage farther west. “Poland presents the USSR with the most threatening and complex challenge to its vital interests to emerge in Eastern Europe in the postwar period. Soviet leaders are prepared to use military force to preserve Soviet domination if they become convinced that changes taking place in Poland jeopardize the USSR’s hegemony over Eastern Europe. However, because they know that the political, military and economic costs of intervention would be extremely high, they may bring themselves, so long as Poland’s commitment to the
Warsaw Pact is assured, to live with a much-modified Communist system in Poland.”

M
UCH OF BEING
a big-state governor prepares a person to be president: staffing, budgets, relations with the legislature and the media. But governors get no preparation in the crucial realm of foreign policy. The occasional senator who finds his way to the White House has an edge on the governors, as the Senate ratifies treaties and joins the House in funding foreign policy. Governors who become president have to learn foreign policy on the job.

Reagan had an advantage over some other governors elevated to the White House, in that he had to run three times before being elected president. His first race, in 1968, being tardy and timid, gave him little grounding in foreign policy. But he studied, thought, and spoke a great deal about international affairs in preparing for and conducting his campaigns in 1976 and 1980.

Even so, making decisions on foreign policy was a different matter from making promises or critiquing the decisions of others. Reagan’s on-the-job training took place primarily in meetings of the National Security Council and the smaller, more focused
National Security Planning Group. Reagan was an apt pupil, though not uniformly attentive.
Bobby Ray Inman recalled that Reagan often sat silently through the first fifty minutes or so of an hour-long meeting. The president would nod occasionally, but Inman noticed that the nods didn’t always follow comments calling for assent or disagreement. His mind was clearly wandering. Yet several minutes from the end, he would perk up as Ed Meese began asking a series of short, sharp questions designed to elicit the views of the participants. Reagan would take this in, then adeptly summarize the meeting on the basis of the questions and answers.

At the start of his foreign policy training, however, Reagan was fully engaged. His first NSC meeting involved the Caribbean basin. “
There are 33 states in the region, 19 independent and 14 self-governing,”
Richard Allen said by way of introduction. “They are small, beset by problems, and vulnerable to outside force.” The national security adviser proposed a comprehensive approach to the region. “The wisdom of a comprehensive policy is that we would thereby recognize that any action taken with respect to one country or one issue will have an impact on others in the area.”

Al Haig jumped in. “This area is our third border,” the secretary of state said. “There is no question that it is in turmoil. The middle class in the region is demanding a greater stake in societies which can’t easily cope with the need for change. Yet these countries could manage if it were not for
Cuba. Cuba exploits internal difficulties in these states by exporting arms and subversion.” El Salvador was Cuba’s principal target. “Six hundred tons of arms are going into El Salvador in various ways.” Nicaragua was Cuba’s accomplice, and because it still received some American aid, it was susceptible to American pressure. “The first order of business is to show the Nicaraguans that we will not tolerate violations”—of regional agreements not to interfere in other countries’ affairs—“as did the past administration.”

Reagan spoke up. “My own feeling, and one about which I have talked at length, is that we are way behind, perhaps decades, in establishing good relations with the two Americas,” he said. The previous administration had gone about things just backward. “We must change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we don’t bring down governments in the name of human rights. None of them is as guilty of human rights violations as Cuba and the U.S.S.R. We don’t throw out our friends just because they can’t pass the saliva test on human rights. I want to see that stopped. We need people who recognize that philosophy.”

Caspar Weinberger argued for action. “The problem stems from Cuba,” the defense secretary said. “With some covert aid, we could disrupt Cuban activities.” The covert route was necessary because the American people didn’t understand the threat to American interests from Cuba’s actions. But while the covert operations proceeded, so should an educational effort. “We need to explain to people that this is a dangerous situation for the U.S. and that we may have to move strongly.”

Reagan thought El Salvador was the place to make a stand and a statement. “El Salvador is a good starting point,” he said. “A victory there could set an example.”

William Casey suggested that time wasn’t on America’s side. The British were pulling out of
Belize; the longtime colony was slated to achieve independence in a few months. This had serious implications for regional security, the CIA director said.

Reagan repeated that El Salvador was the key. “We can’t afford a defeat,” he said. “El Salvador is the place for a victory.”

C
ENTRAL
A
MERICA AND
the Caribbean remained the focus in subsequent discussions of foreign policy. Al Haig brought home the American ambassador in Nicaragua to speak to the president and the NSC.
Lawrence Pezzullo was unimpressed by the Sandinista leadership. “
They are not men of great stature,” he said. “They fell into power after a general insurrection against Somoza was started with all sectors of Nicaraguan society participating.” The
Sandinistas had no experience in government and were doing a dismal job directing the country. As for their Salvadoran connection: “The Sandinistas were grabbed by the romance of the revolutionary process as they saw it in Central America and were swept along into helping in El Salvador. They also saw a revolutionary El Salvador being a forward defense position for their own revolution, and were probably convinced by Castro to get involved.”

Pezzullo identified essential questions for the Reagan administration: “Can we get the Sandinistas to back off in El Salvador? Can we impress on them the high cost of continuing their efforts? Can we drive a wedge between them and the
Cubans?” Pezzullo didn’t deny that strong measures might become necessary, but he thought they hadn’t yet. The administration should move carefully. “Avoid any precipitous act,” he said. “Don’t cut off aid for the moment. The evidence is there for such an action, but a sudden action on our part would lead to a very negative reaction in Managua and have a cascading effect that would cool or terminate relations.”

Haig suggested giving the Sandinistas thirty days. They should be told that if they didn’t lay off in El Salvador, the United States would suspend all assistance and perhaps take further steps.

At this meeting Reagan pondered going to the regional source of the Central American troubles. “What can we do specifically about Cuba?” he asked the group.

William Clark, Haig’s deputy at State, said the State Department was
planning to show the leaders of Congress evidence of Cuban complicity in El Salvador’s troubles.

Reagan wanted more. “What specific pressures can be placed on Cuba?” he demanded.

Caspar Weinberger replied that clandestine operations were one possibility. Economic pressure was another. The United States was already embargoing trade with Cuba, but the administration could try to persuade America’s allies to join the embargo.

Reagan asked for military options.

Haig evidently responded forthrightly to the president’s question, but his remarks were excised when the minutes of this top secret meeting were declassified.

Weinberger pointed out a problem with the military option, one not shared by clandestine operations. “The problem with military action is that as it escalates, congressional checks come into play,” the defense secretary said.

Reagan didn’t respond to Weinberger’s objection. Instead, he returned to El Salvador. “If the junta falls in El Salvador, it will be seen as an American defeat,” he said. He endorsed the thirty-day warning to Nicaragua, but he was prepared to consider escalation. “We must not let Central America become another Cuba on the mainland. It cannot happen.”

R
EAGAN HAD NEVER
been an impulsive person. His career steps had been deliberate: planned and executed with care. It took him years to make the leap from radio to films. He required a decade to shift from films to politics. He was slow even to conclude that Nancy was the love of his life.

His decisions as president were, for the most part, equally deliberate. As determined as he was to prevent Central America from becoming another Cuba, he refused to rush into anything.