Reagan: The Life (59 page)

All the same, Habib’s leverage was no greater than Reagan allowed him to apply. And Reagan, for all his impatience with Begin, refused to risk a rift with Israel, America’s most important partner in the Middle East.

T
HE SITUATION GREW
tenser when Israeli forces approached Beirut. Israel’s occupation of rural Lebanon had angered Arabs and much of the rest of the world, but a takeover of an Arab capital would almost certainly produce an emotional and political explosion of far greater force. Yet from the Israeli view, Beirut was a legitimate target, for the PLO had retreated from southern Lebanon into the city.

Reagan tried to forestall the attack. Judging that private warnings had lost their force, the president came close to lecturing Israel openly. A reporter asked him, ahead of a meeting with Israeli foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir, if he was going to get tough with the Israeli government for violating the cease-fire. “
Let me say I’ll be firm,” Reagan replied. “This must be resolved, and the bloodshed must stop.” The reporter asked if he was losing patience with Israel. “I lost patience a long time ago,” the president said.

On August 4, Reagan convened the National Security Council to assess the situation and devise a plan. He commenced the meeting by asking for the latest news from the front. He said he had been awakened that morning by an aide with a report that an “
all out assault” on Beirut had begun. Was this true?

George Shultz said the Israeli activity fell short of a full assault. But the Israeli shelling made it impossible for Phil Habib to continue
cease-fire talks. Shultz relayed Habib’s request for “a very strong letter that would threaten sanctions if the Israelis did not provide him with the amount of time and quiet that he needed to conclude the negotiations.” Shultz supported the request, adding that sanctions might include another suspension of arms sales and a resolution by the UN Security Council condemning the Israeli attacks.

Jeane Kirkpatrick objected to the anti-Israel tone of Shultz’s remarks. “We should not lose sight of the fact that the PLO is not a bunch of agrarian reformers,” the UN ambassador said. “They are international terrorists who are working against U.S. interests and committing acts of violence throughout the world supported by the Soviet Union.” Israel’s aim in Lebanon was America’s, Kirkpatrick said. “The U.S. should not throw away the possibility of getting rid of the PLO by taking measures against Israel which will inhibit, if not eliminate, the prospects of achieving our objectives. Clearly, once we have removed the PLO from Lebanon we can make fast progress in the peace process.”

Reagan agreed with Kirkpatrick and asked, “How do we inform the PLO of the situation and the need to get out?”

Caspar Weinberger didn’t answer the president’s question; instead, he returned to the issue of how to deal with Israel. The defense secretary concurred that the PLO should leave Lebanon, but he thought Israel was going too far. “The U.S. must let Israel know of the cost to Israel of its nightly activities,” Weinberger said, referring to the bombardment of West Beirut, the Muslim section of the city, where the PLO had taken refuge.

Reagan preferred to pressure the Palestinians. “We have to let the PLO know that their games must stop,” the president said. Thinking aloud, he suggested working through Saudi Arabia. “Perhaps the best way to do this would be to communicate something along the following lines to King Fahd: We have continued to hold back the Israelis, and I am again in communication with Prime Minister Begin. But the intransigence of the PLO, who all of us agreed should move out, is causing problems and leading the Israelis to resume their activities. It is time for the PLO to move out.”

None of Reagan’s advisers contradicted the president, but his suggestion received no second, and the matter was dropped. Discussion turned to what Reagan should say to Begin. Bill Clark had drafted a letter, which he presented to Reagan. The president studied the letter for several minutes. A frown creased his face as he read the final section, which he proceeded
to revise on the spot. “Last night we were making significant progress toward a settlement that would result in the removal of the PLO from Beirut,” the president wrote. “That progress was once again frustrated by the actions taken by your forces. There must be an end to the unnecessary bloodshed, particularly among innocent civilians. I insist that a ceasefire-in-place be reestablished and maintained until the PLO has left Beirut. The relationship between our two nations is at stake.”

Reagan proposed to address Begin in the letter as “Menachem.” But the consensus among the NSC members and staff was that this would vitiate the otherwise stern tone of the letter. Reagan reluctantly agreed to commence the letter “Dear Prime Minister.”

S
TRONGER LANGUAGE PROVED
necessary. The Israeli bombardment of Beirut intensified, prompting Reagan to telephone Begin.
Geoffrey Kemp, the top Middle East expert on the NSC staff, silently monitored the call but nearly gasped aloud when Reagan dropped the rhetorical
h
-bomb on Begin. “
Menachem, this is a holocaust,” Reagan said.

“Begin bristled,” Kemp remembered. “You could almost feel it on the telephone.” The prime minister spoke slowly and bitterly: “Mr. President, I know all about a holocaust.”

Reagan’s call had the desired effect; the attacks on Beirut diminished. But it deeply offended Begin, whose parents and brother had died at the hands of the Nazis.

Habib worked out a deal. The principal points were a new cease-fire, the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon, and the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon. A multinational peacekeeping force would supervise the PLO withdrawal; American troops would be included. “
Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese armed forces in carrying out their responsibility for ensuring the departure of PLO leaders, officers, and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions,” Reagan explained in a Rose Garden statement. “The presence of United States forces also will facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government over the Beirut area. In no case will our troops stay longer than thirty days.”

Reagan had told reporters before his statement that he would not answer questions. Secretary of State Shultz was about to convene a news conference, he explained. But reporters shouted at him anyway. “Mr.
President, how can you be sure that American troops will stay safe?” one asked.

“That will be covered,” Reagan replied, referring to Shultz’s news conference.

The reporter persisted. “If they’re shot at, will they be withdrawn, sir, immediately?” he said.

“What?”

“If they’re shot at, will they be withdrawn immediately?”

“Yes, yes,” Reagan said.

Larry Speakes broke in. “We said no questions,” he reminded the reporters. He hustled Reagan off.

T
HE
PLO
EVACUATION
proceeded without major incident, allowing Reagan on September 1 to tell the American public, “
Today has been a day that should make us proud. It marked the end of the successful evacuation of PLO from Beirut.” The president congratulated
Philip Habib for his tireless efforts, and he recognized the several hundred U.S. marines who had helped supervise the operation. “Our young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks. They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction, and we can all be very proud of them.”

The president expressed hope that the Lebanese settlement could lead to a larger resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Suggesting a framework for such a resolution, he issued three calls. “I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision, and courage. I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel’s right to a secure future. And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel—and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.”

Elaborating on his peace vision, Reagan explicitly rejected an independent Palestinian state in the
West Bank and
Gaza, but he also rejected permanent retention by Israel of those territories. He proposed Palestinian self-government in association with
Jordan. He declared America’s opposition to the construction of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. And he embraced the concept of giving the Palestinians land in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. “We base our approach squarely
on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace,” he said.

Reagan wasn’t surprised when Begin rejected his proposal. The Israeli prime minister regularly proclaimed that the
West Bank was Israeli and would forever remain Israeli. “
What some call the West Bank, Mr. President, is Judea and Samaria,” Begin wrote to Reagan. “Millennia ago there was a
Jewish kingdom of Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth a vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rich civilization which we took with us in our hearts and in our minds on our long global trek over eighteen centuries, and with it we came back home.” Though Jordan had governed Judea and Samaria after 1948, Israel’s people never forgot them. “In a war of most legitimate self-defense in 1967 after having been attacked by King Hussein we liberated with God’s help that portion of our homeland. Judea and Samaria will never again be the West Bank.”

R
EAGAN WAS DISAPPOINTED
at Begin’s hard line, which the president feared would produce only more violence. His fears proved true sooner than he anticipated. On September 14 a bomb blast killed Lebanon’s president-elect,
Bashir Gemayel. The assassination alarmed the Israelis and prompted them to occupy West
Beirut. Four days later, Lebanese militiamen entered two Palestinian refugee camps in the sector now controlled by the Israeli army and slaughtered hundreds of men, women, and children. The Israeli forces stood by.

Reagan was appalled and said so publicly. “
I was horrified to learn this morning of the killing of Palestinians which has taken place in Beirut,” the president declared. “All people of decency must share our outrage and revulsion over the murders, which included women and children.” He didn’t directly blame the Israelis for the killings, but he asserted their complicity. “During the negotiations leading to the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, we were assured that Israeli forces would not enter
West Beirut. We also understood that following withdrawal, Lebanese Army units would establish control over the city. They were thwarted in this effort by the Israeli occupation that took place beginning on Wednesday. We strongly opposed Israel’s move into West Beirut following the assassination of President-elect Gemayel, both because we believed it wrong in principle and for fear that it would provoke further fighting. Israel, by yes
terday in military control of Beirut, claimed that its moves would prevent the kind of tragedy which has now occurred.”

Reagan decided that the only way to get Israel out of Lebanon was to put America more firmly in. He convened the NSC for consideration of next steps. The discussion didn’t move fast enough for him. “
I finally told our group we should go for broke,” he recorded that evening. He advocated sending the multinational force, including the American contingent, back into Lebanon to prevent further violence. The administration would pressure the Israelis to leave Lebanon and would rely on various Arab states to talk Syria into withdrawing. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government would build up its military to the point where it could defend the country. “No more half way gestures,” Reagan wrote. “Clear the whole situation while the MNF is on hand to ensure order.”

George Shultz and Jeane Kirkpatrick enthusiastically endorsed the president’s proposal. No one at the meeting expressed opposition. Reagan was pleased. “The wheels are now in motion,” he wrote.

T
HE STRENGTH OF
Reagan’s approach to foreign policy as a whole was his weakness in policy toward the Middle East. Reagan kept his eye on the big picture, meaning the struggle with Soviet communism, and in that realm he eventually succeeded beyond any other president. But his big-picture orientation diminished his ability to deal with smaller issues, such as the war in Lebanon. He lacked expertise in the personalities and prejudices that made that country one of the most complicated and vexed on earth. Success in Middle Eastern diplomacy required attention to detail Reagan was simply incapable of. It was no coincidence that the one president to make a lasting mark on the Middle East was Reagan’s polar opposite in temperament and approach: Jimmy Carter. Carter was often derided, by Reagan among many others, for micromanaging policy. But without that attention to detail, Carter would never have achieved the breakthrough
Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Reagan nonetheless hoped for something similar. And he hoped the return of American forces to Lebanon would make it possible. The landing and deployment went smoothly, encouraging Reagan to bring several Arab leaders to Washington. “
The big day!” he wrote on October 22. King Hassan of Morocco led the delegation. Hassan knew that the American government had consistently said it would not deal directly with the PLO until the PLO acknowledged Israel’s right to exist. Hassan thought he could get PLO head
Yasser Arafat to utter the required words. “He offered a sample of what Arafat should say,” Reagan noted. “And I agreed it was good enough. Then he indicated he thought he could deliver that in three weeks or a month.”

The Israelis provided less encouragement. Begin refused to withdraw Israeli forces from
Beirut, contending that the PLO would simply return. Reagan met with Phil Habib, who was growing more frustrated with Begin by the day. The Israeli occupation of Lebanon—now opposed by the government of
Amine Gemayel, brother of the murdered
Bashir Gemayel—confirmed Arab skepticism of Israel’s intentions. And it played into the hands of Palestinian extremists. Reagan sent Habib back to the Middle East with a message for Israel’s government: If Israel failed to leave Lebanon, it might lose America’s support.