Red Hammer 1994 (8 page)

After an uncomfortable silence, Laptev became the teacher. Such an attack, he declared, would throw the Americans’ entire command and control into absolute chaos. Even if the surprise were not total, the stunned Americans would refuse to believe their indicators and simply sit on their hands. He cited Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s massive offensive against Russia in the Second World War as prima fascie evidence. Human nature has not changed one iota, he had offered.

The defense minister had listened in shock. Only once did he interject that the unimaginable risks would far outweigh any marginal benefits. He considered talk of global war with the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, inappropriate and foolhardy. He had wished then and there for the courage to use stronger words, but they had frozen on his lips. The weak response had triggered a final scolding from the Russian president. He lectured the defense minister for underestimating the severity of the current crisis.

Then an incredible transformation transpired. When all had expected Laptev to press, he had leaned back, a wide smile pasted on his thick Slavic face. The gloom had given way to sunny skies and gentle breezes in the blink of an eye. He reached for a bottle of juice and flicked the top off with an opener. The defense minister had been dumfounded; he had felt squeezed by some bizarre time warp that left him panting. The others outside of Laptev’s tight inner circle reacted in varying states of incredulity.

Such an attack plan should always be available for appropriate contingencies, Laptev had said matter-of-factly. It was simply prudent planning. What if the Americans suddenly threatened Mother Russia, blustering and threatening like they are prone to do when things don’t go their way? I ask you, what would we do? He turned his mouth upside down and shrugged. No, we must be prepared. Then he had sent them all packing.

Reaching for the ornate silver box resting on the rosewood coffee table in front of him, the defense minister nervously removed an American-made cigarette, repeatedly tapping the end on the polished wood surface. He couldn’t stand Russian brands, and American cigarettes were becoming scarce. He was interrupted by a knock at the door. “It must be Marshal Ryzhkov,” he remarked, flicking the lighter cupped in his hands.

“Come in,” grunted the defense minister, taking a puff on the cigarette dangling from his lip. He glanced up to see two senior officers enter. The first was Marshal Ryzhkov, deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He didn’t recognize the second officer.

“Good afternoon, Defense Minister,” greeted Marshal Ryzhkov. “This is Colonel General Strelkov, my deputy for plans. When I received your urgent message, I felt it would be appropriate for him to accompany me.”

The defense minister nodded his approval. “Have seats.” He waited until the two were posed opposite him in overstuffed leather chairs.

“Marshal Kiselev and I just returned from a meeting of the Defense Council,” he said. “We presented various policy options prepared the last few weeks. Quite frankly, we were disappointed and shocked at how they were received.” He was frightened to reveal the entire truth.

Taking a final drag on his cigarette, the defense minister ground it into the ashtray in front of him. “I was convinced we could humiliate the Americans by bringing twenty to thirty reserve divisions to full strength in concert with a demand for total repudiation of the spaced-based laser program. We could even feint a buildup in the Crimea as a precursor to a move into Turkey. A bluff really, but the cost would be minimal, and the Americans couldn’t match our partial mobilization. Never mind that our army divisions are nowhere near combat ready.”

The defense minister leaned forward and let out a sigh. “The president has specifically directed us to develop additional plans covering a broader range of military options. That is why I called you here.”

Ryzhkov looked unconcerned, glancing casually toward Strelkov, sitting stone-faced in his chair. The defense minister took a gulp of air. Here goes, he thought.

“The president demands the formulation of an attack plan against American command and control centers and their strategic forces. A surprise nuclear attack. For further evaluation, he says.”

Ryzhkov nodded in acknowledgement. Once again, he gave no visible response. The defense minister was convinced the two officers hadn’t heard him; perhaps there was wax in their ears.

“This American laser business is dominating the agenda,” remarked Kiselev. “There is even loose talk of an American first strike once the space-based defense system is fully operational in a few years.”

“That makes no sense,” replied Ryzhkov sharply.

“Fine,” interjected the defense minister loudly. “Tell that to the Defense Council. I tried. I was crucified. So,” he said, raising his voice, “we will give them their plan. They will see the utter ridiculousness and return to their senses. My question to you, Marshal Ryzhkov, is it feasible in just four weeks?”

The marshal didn’t immediately answer. Instead he looked at Strelkov, a confident look crossing his face. Strelkov reached for his leather portfolio and removed a thin document and handed it to Ryzhkov. He gently slid it across the table in front of the defense minister.

“Your request was not totally unexpected,” remarked the marshal. “We have such a plan already.”

“What?” exclaimed the defense minster, turning to Kiselev. “Did you know about this?” His fat face turned three of shades purple. The bureaucrats were one thing, but he would not tolerate insubordination and intrigue from the general staff.

“I’m as surprised as you, Defense Minister,” Kiselev replied, holding up his hands in surrender.

“I should explain,” interjected Ryzhkov quickly. “This is not a war plan, but the result of extensive war gaming in our Plans Department. Colonel General Strelkov has been the action officer on the project. He can describe it much better than I.”

Strelkov leaned forward and positioned the document squarely in front of the defense minister then opened it to the first page. “If you will allow me, Defense Minister, I shall give an overview of the project.” A look of resignation captured the defense minister.

“Another technical brief,” he muttered under his breath. “God help me. Proceed.” It was a less than enthusiastic embrace.

“During the first START negotiations many years ago, the Strategic Rocket Forces’ Plans Department supported our team with computer analyses of different negotiating positions, both ours and the Americans. This permitted us to refine our computer models and build a database of hundreds of computer-simulation runs. Rather quickly, an obvious trend developed. With pre-START forces, the outcome of a nuclear exchange was generally independent of who launched first, or the degree of strategic warning or mobilization underta-ken by either side. Neither side could achieve decisive results.”

“You’re losing me, General, get to the point,” interrupted the defense minister. The military always talked in circles.

“In other words, before the build down, each side had such an abundance of weapons that little advantage was gained by launching a preemptive strike. A massive retaliation with surviving weapons would severely cripple the attacker. And, each side would still have sufficient weapons held in reserve for negotiation, or for threatening third parties.

“But, the force levels coming out of START I and II created a more dynamic environment. A drastic cut in the number of weapons, the shift in total force structure, and the quality of replacement systems for each leg of the triad combined to create anomalies.”

Ryzhkov frowned, sensing the defense minister’s frustration. “What the General is saying is that with little or no warning, a decisive engagement is possible. I was surprised myself, Defense Minister.”

“So,” replied the defense minister, unconvinced, rubbing his chin, “you’re stating that deterrence has actually been reduced?”

“Under certain circumstances, Defense Minister. Limited warning, even hours, negates this advantage. But absolutely no warning produces dramatic results. A window of opportunity, if you will.”

The defense minister sat attentively, painstakingly weighing the powerful conclusion. “Do you agree with this?” he asked Kiselev.

“Possibly, Defense Minister.”

“Possibly?” He was an inch from exploding. This so-called plan reeked of bullshit.

“Our war plans assume hostilities would begin with conventional forces and potentially escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. We have no plans calling for a strictly nuclear attack. To date, discussions of this nature have been nothing more than an academic exercise, useful only for understanding the interrelationships between different weapons systems.”

The defense minister loosened his tie then reached for another cigarette. Lighting it quickly, he tossed his lighter on the table. “Fine,” he said testily, easing the pressure, “tell me more.”

“Soon after the START I signing, we began serious war gaming. Within two years we had developed three proven scenarios. Satisfied, we pressed our planners to see if the attack strategies we had developed could actually be formulated into an operations plan. We were well aware of the tendency for war gamers to develop unrealistic scenarios which play well on the computer but fail miserably under the harsh light of day. It was an iterative process, forcing us to modify certain assumptions, but the basic framework remained intact. The result was an unofficial war plan, complete to the identification of specific military units, which could be implemented on short notice. Our intention was to float the plan for comment, but it ended up on the back burner.”

The defense minister nervously tapped his spent cigarette butt on the couch arm. This plan clearly met the requirement laid on him by the council, but the thoroughness, the years in development, would give it an aura of legitimacy that unnerved him. Besides, he had made a major issue of the ridiculously short timeline and the oppressive security requirements. Now he would return in a few weeks with a detailed plan.

“What specifically is called for?”

Turning to a page halfway through the document, the general pointed to a text table featuring bullets outlining the attack timeline.

“The overriding premise must be total surprise. No compromises. This means no visible preparations, steps toward mobilization, or movements of forces. The fewer people involved in the planning and execution the better. We estimated that the plan could be carried out with one hundred and fifty people, two hundred maximum. This would include handpicked planners, missile-launch crews and officers on ballistic-missile submarines. All must be carefully screened and evaluated. Any leaks could be devastating.” The defense minister’s face tightened. “Not permitting even cursory preparations for mobilization could be catastrophic. What if the attack failed? Or the Americans successfully retaliated? Our war-fighting strategy hinges on a carefully planned and implemented mobilization.”

“True, Defense Minister, the plan is not without risk. But success rests on strict operational security. There is no other way.

“The second requirement is to disrupt their intelligence and warning and the chain of command to their nuclear for-ces. This does not necessary mean a decapitation of the leadership. Destroying key communication nodes paralyzes the decision-making process. Targets would include early warning radars, land-based communications sites, satellite links, communications aircraft, and, of course, the Cheyenne Mountain complex. It is the key command center, feeding data to all the others.”

“How about Washington?” inquired the defense minister warily.

“We went back and forth, but finally eliminated targets near the American capitol. Little would be gained. An important facet is to keep the hotline communication channel unobstructed for rapid war termination. It is the command and control links to the American nuclear forces that must be destroyed.”

The defense minister shifted on the couch. “A very interesting exercise, General,” he commented, “but how could anyone have confidence in this plan? You would be gambling with the fate of the nation, a roll of the dice with millions of lives at stake—hardly the sort of action taken deliberately.” He leaned back. “I can’t believe I am taking this seriously.”

“Quite the contrary,” interjected Ryzhkov. “I held the same opinion, but I’ve since been convinced that if such a plan were ever implemented, it would succeed.”

“But the intangibles?” the defense minister scoffed. “World opinion would crucify us. Even our own people, including many in the military, would be repulsed by this action.”

“Not necessarily, Defense Minister. In the world’s eyes, the Americans would be equally to blame. Many consider them the problem. Besides, with America prostrate, who would challenge us?”

The defense minister had difficulty disguising his skepticism. “Tell me, Marshal Ryzhkov, how does this scenario play out?” Ryzhkov’s face contracted in concentration.

“A simultaneous launch of ICBMs and SLBMs would compress the American decision-making timeline to the point of paralysis. Let me explain.” Ryzhkov moved clo-ser. He spun an irresistible web. The defense minister unwittingly played his part. How many times in the past had they daydreamed about delivering a knockout nuclear blow to their implacable enemies?

“We assumed that after approximately two to three minutes, the Americans will have picked up our boosters with their DSP early warning satellite system. By five to six minutes, the warning will have been passed to Strategic Command headquarters in Omaha and to Washington. Remember, though, the attack will have come out of nowhere. It will command an uncanny presence of mind to correctly decipher the data. Given the possibility for computer error or sensor malfunction, all which will have to be checked out, the Americans may lose two to three additional minutes.

“By ten to fifteen minutes, they will have attack confirmation. Commanders will be pressing for release authority to retaliate. This is precisely the point when our first SLBMs begin to destroy their early warning and surveillance apparatus, sowing confusion through their ranks. All the command centers will be manned at peacetime levels; government officials will be spread throughout Washington. We have simulated this timeline many times in war games, and we were not physically able to link the proper players before twenty minutes, at the earliest. By then most SLBMs will have detonated on their targets, annihilating the American command and control, and our ICBMs will be bearing down on the northernmost missile bases.”