Resistance (5 page)

Extreme nationalist Jews, Zionists, and Bundists alike, intent on preserving Jewish national rights, viewed the UGODA as a near-betrayal of the national Jewish principle and appealed to the wider Jewish public for support in the controversy. But the public was indifferent and disappointed in the results of its political and parliamentary efforts.

In the early days of the revived Polish state, the Jews had great hopes. But these hopes faded away. Fiery speeches in the Sejm had no power to sway the authorities or to alter patterns of economic discrimination. UGODA was also little help and was not even implemented.

In the first years after independence, the minorities bloc, to which the Jews belonged, temporarily held the balance of power between right and left. After impressive initial successes in 192.2, the minorities bloc lost strength in the subsequent elections. There was also a marked fall in the standing and popularity of the main Zionist faction led by Itzhak Gruenbaum. The Jewish population learned that the parliamentary struggle had little tangible impact on their daily life and that the operative and decisive power in economic life was concentrated in the hands of the government and the ruling administration.

In May 1926, with the help of a group of officers and some loyal units of the army, Jozef Pilsudski organized a bloody coup d'état. A socialist in his youth, Pilsudski had founded the national armed forces in World War I and led the Polish army in the 1920 campaign that overthrew the Bolsheviks, who had penetrated deep into Poland and nearly reached the outskirts of Warsaw. The masses saw Pilsudski as a hero symbolizing the renaissance of Poland. He was greatly admired in leftist circles, but he chose to leave the political scene when he realized that he could not dominate it. The right, which had gained the majority's support in the elections, viewed him with suspicion. But Pilsudski's "retirement" was short-lived. He was merely biding his time in anticipation of the appropriate moment in which to take the helm and impose his authority.

Polish political thinking concerning the structure of an independent Polish state moved in two contrary directions. The rightist conception was that there should be a complete identification of the state with the Polish nation, while the left and the center were inclined toward a wider partnership in the state. Ethnic Poles were the first among equals, but Poland was to become the fatherland of many nationalities.

Endecja opted for a Polish Catholic state—a state that would be the domain solely of the ethnic Poles. They considered minorities as tolerated citizens or people who assimilated into the Polish state. Jews were seen as aliens who had no legitimate right to be in Poland—as unnecessary, even harmful. In contrast, Pilsudski and his supporters wanted to see Poland as a political power and the focus of a federated alliance of the smaller states in the region, rather than as a state exhibiting the expansionist tendency of Russia and Germany.

Rather obscure outlines of territorial autonomy for the minorities were drawn up, particularly in the eastern Slavic sector. What to do with Jews was a more complicated matter, for they were dispersed. Nothing definite was contemplated for them, but it was commonly believed that Pilsudski was interested in the integration of the Jews into Polish society.

With regard to the Jews, the attitude of Pilsudski's administration was positive and heartening, particularly at its outset. Marshal Pilsudski centered most of his attention on matters of defense and foreign affairs. He did not show any special interest in the Jewish question, nor did he display any anti-Jewish sentiments in either his public or his political statements, and he evidently curbed antisemitic leanings among his supporters. He was not prone to using the Jews as a scapegoat for his failures or his administration's errors, which was a common phenomenon not only in Poland but also in other European countries. Apolinary Hartglas, one of the Zionist leaders in Poland, wrote that the first year or so was a time of genuine change:

 

That period was like a real "springtime among the nations." Anti-semitic propaganda ceased ... no one dared to publish blacklists of Poles who dared to buy in Jewish shops, no one assaulted or beat up the Jews. The governors of outlying regions forgot about the existence of restrictions that were valid in the Czarist times ... Jewish secondary schools began to receive official recognition, committees were set up to assess matriculation results, and there were even some examiners who knew Hebrew. New Jewish lawyers were being registered while some Jews were even accepted into the ranks of the civil service. And the Jews stopped complaining about the heavy burden of taxes imposed on them.

 

The hope that Pilsudski would impose a multinational concept never materialized. The idea of a federation was not at all practicable because at the very outset of the new Poland's existence, there were tensions and claims regarding the regions in dispute, the dictated boundaries, and the areas taken over by force.

But even in the smaller area under Poland's authority, the assumption that, with Pilsudski at its head, Poland would experience greater liberality and democratic order was not realized. The new leader believed that the source of Poland's weakness lay in its excessive number of political parties and in its anarchic parliamentary structure, spreading corruption and generating a faulty order of priorities. He therefore strove to undermine parliamen-tarianism, to free the political establishment of its class interests and corruption. He did not look to the left for support; on the contrary, he turned toward the aristocracy organized in the conservative movement and to big business.

Pilsudski's authoritarian rule did not display the cast of a fascist regime, although it took quite a few steps that were brutal deviations from a democratic order. In its first years, the regime enjoyed certain helpful economic proposals, but after the profound crisis that resulted from the
1929
crash the state was subjected to a deep depression and mass unemployment. Planned reforms were set aside in view of the need to cope with troubled daily pressures.

No real analysis was made of the minority question, no plans were made for improving their situation, and eventually there was a regression in the attitude of the authorities and on occasion the brutal use of force. In time, the Pilsudski camp changed from a concept of statehood encompassing all the country's citizens to a nationalist ideology.

The perceptible weakness of Parliament and the entire democratic structure did not lead to a revolt, nor did it work to the advantage of the Jews. Discrimination against the Jews was hesitantly renewed, but until the marshal's death in 1935 a measure of restraint was maintained. His passing undoubtedly marked a turning point. The Jews were well aware of the fact that Pilsudski's strong personality, even during his illness, had restrained sharp anti-Jewish outbursts, and they felt a sense of bereavement and apprehension for the future. During the first year after his death, an interim government ruled under the aegis of the president, Ignacy Moscicki. Because of its weakness or genuine intention, this government tried halfheartedly to guide the state along democratic lines, but increasing economic difficulties and social tensions overwhelmed it. In the government that was established in 1936, power was divided between the president and Pilsudski's heir to the high command of the army, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, who had not shown any marked ability in his country's military and defensive preparations. The results were miserable. The regime moved in a totalitarian-populistic direction and rejected out of hand any attempt to create a united front out of the various currents of opinion in view of the growing danger from Nazi Germany.

During the post-Pilsudski period, hatred of the Jews increased and an anti-Jewish policy was adopted by the administrative system as well as by the right-wing opposition. Pilsudski's death seemed to unleash all the forces he had restrained. From June 1935 onward, violent disturbances were carried out in a number of places on the initiative of extremists of the Endecja and radical right. At universities and schools, where anti-Jewish quotas were imposed, Jews were pushed increasingly onto separate "ghetto benches" despite objections voiced by Jewish students and the solidarity of their fellow Christian students and some members of the academic corps. This process of discrimination ended in most cases in the imposition of racial separation and the introduction of quotas. Proposals of an anti-Jewish and even racial nature were introduced in the Sejm, but these were never passed. Radical anti-Jewish proposals were soon overshadowed by the political crisis presaging the advent of the war.

Nevertheless, the anti-Jewish trend continued to spread among the ruling camp, and their leadership assumed a slightly different tone. In Pilsudski's day, the Jews were part of the large range of supporters within his camp. In the elections to Parliament, Jews, who were excluded as representatives of bodies supporting the Pilsudski faction, appeared on the lists of the broad nonpartisan body of government supporters and the nonpartisan bloc for collaboration with the government. Shortly after the death of Pilsudski, the "bloc" was dissolved and Walery Slawek, the man who stood at its head and had been close to Pilsudski, was ousted from the political scene.

At the beginning of 1937, a new body was formed that helped the ruling Diadochi (the successors)—the OZN, the "camp of consolidated nationalists." Within the OZN, emphasis was placed on totalitarian principles and Catholic ties. In its early stages, the new "party" tried to attach itself to the ranks of the antisemitic and profascist radicals who had left the Endecja because they found it insufficiently extremist. The leaders of OZN stated that they would not accept Jews because they considered the Jews a separate national entity, and that their organization was open only to Christians. In May 1938 the supreme council of this party was busy formulating its position on "the Jewish question" in Poland which would ban Jews from certain professions. The solution of the Jewish problem would be achieved by getting rid of a major part of the Jewish population. Antisemitic propaganda had reached its peak.

During the early years of the republic, antisemitism had been an accepted, albeit restrained, fact camouflaged by the formal pretense that everything was as it should be. By 1938 antisemitism united both the opposition and the government. The government refrained from using violence and physical terror—riots, assaults, and forced eviction—and insisted that the antisemitic policy must function through quasi-legal channels. The government was cautious—street violence directed by a totalitarian-inclined opposition could easily redirect the anger of the masses against it. The radical right spoke of the wholesale expulsion of the Jews and claimed that this could not be achieved without the use of pressure and violence. On the other hand, the spokesmen of the government feverishly sought out places that would accept Jews as immigrants. The emigration of Jews to Madagascar was even considered. Jews were described as a real handicap to Poland's progress. Many socialists on the left and the liberal circles opposed antisemitism and came to the defense of the Jews. There were also those who held liberal opinions, especially those who were sympathetic to Zionism, who spoke warmly of Jews' emigrating to Palestine, but they always made a point of stating that emigration or integration was a choice to be made by the Jews themselves and was not a matter to be dictated or forced from without. In the various polemics that occupied the press and public opinion in those days, there were active socialists who pressed for a large Jewish emigration for economic and social motives. Among the Jews themselves, some leaders called for a mass exodus of the Jews from Poland. Understandably, these outcries unwittingly added fuel to the antisemitic fires.

For example, in 1936 Zev Jabotinsky, the charismatic leader of the Zionist Revisionists, publicly broadcast his "evacuation" plan for Polish Jews. Government circles and the Enjecja were enthusiastic about the plan, but this proposal also encountered sharp criticism and anger from most Jewish journalists. The loudest protests came mainly from among the Bund and Agudath Israel, who, no matter how much they differed with one another, both sought to secure Jewish life in Poland. Yet even most of the pro-Zionist press considered Jabotinsky's views impractical, for they presumed the mass emigration of the Jews of Poland depended primarily on the Jews themselves.

The social tensions in Poland, the increasingly anti-Jewish mood, and the growing public demand to bring about the mass emigration of Jews undoubtedly spurred on the desire to emigrate. Prior to World War I, the Jews numbered 30 percent of the emigrants from Poland, Poles were 5 5 percent, and the Ukrainians 15 percent. This pattern changed during 1921—25. During the first years of Poland's independence, Jewish emigration was 69 percent of the total. In absolute numbers, some 270,000 Jews left Poland, of whom 190,000 went to the United States and 30,000 to Palestine, which was then at the very beginning of its development as the Jewish national homeland. After 1926, the percentage of Jews emigrating decreased somewhat (in 1926, some 40 percent of the total number of emigrants), but the absolute number of Jewish emigrants was still rising. The slowdown did not reflect an essential weakening of their desire to emigrate from Poland but could be ascribed to the increasingly difficult conditions devised by the countries that were their potential destinations. For the Jews to leave, they needed a place to go. In reality, the number of applicants eager to emigrate from Poland and other countries was in reverse proportion to the number of requirements and immigration laws imposed by the governments of their intended destinations. Foremost on the list of urgent international priorities at the time was the need to find a solution for the refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany. During these years the United States placed limitations on immigration by introducing a quota system that discriminated against applicants from Eastern Europe. Other spacious and underpopulated countries followed the American lead and refused to accept immigrants. The severity of the Great Depression and the pressure of unemployment brought with it the fear of low-priced immigrant labor. Those countries prepared to permit controlled immigration wanted farmers, and the Jews could not offer them much in the way of experienced farmhands. In the heated atmosphere of anti-Jewish incitement in the 1930s, many countries did not hesitate to declare their unwillingness to accept Jews.