Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw (54 page)
Read Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw Online
Authors: Norman Davies
Tags: #Non-Fiction, #War, #History
Few signs of this activity were visible in the British press. The first serious comments about the Rising surfaced on 10–11 August. ‘The third battle for Warsaw’, wrote the
Scotsman
, ‘is being waged without the Allies, and without the material support that could have been expected. The situation is desperate but not beyond repair. The inhabitants of Warsaw are right to ask “where are our friends?”’ The left-wing
New Statesman
opined that ‘true to their Romantic traditions’, the Poles were ‘probably’ inspired by ‘the hope of liberating the capital before the Russians’.
On 11 August, debates in the world press took a new turn when an article in the Vatican’s
Osservatore Romano
stated baldly that the Russians’ approach to the Rising was a purely political game. The
News Chronicle
quickly dismissed this view as a blatant attempt to split the Alliance. For the time being, other British journalists held their tongues.
The first serious piece to analyse sources of public information and to criticize the gullibility of the British press was written by the diplomatic correspondent of the
Manchester Guardian
and published on 22 August. Headlined ‘The Warsaw Rising: the Question of Responsibility’, it poured scorn on the notion that the Allies had not been aware of the impending Rising:
It has been argued recently that it was impossible to organise the provision of adequate supplies to Warsaw because the battle arose spontaneously – or, at any rate, not in synchronisation with the Russian military plans. Such statements seem surprising in view of the systematic appeals for armed Resistance broadcast from Russia . . . long before and during the first stages of the battle from Warsaw. These appeals can hardly have escaped Allied military attention.
There followed a series of long quotations from broadcasts transmitted in Polish by the Communist-run ‘Ko
ciuszko Station’ in Moscow between 2 June and 30 July. One of the quotes, from 15 June, talked of alleged ‘discontent’ with the orders of the Commanderin-Chief and of Gen. Boor, who were supposedly out of step with the popular will. ‘The will to fight has grown within the home army [sic]’, it said, ‘it is generally believed that it is time to act.’ Two weeks earlier,
i.e.
two whole months before the outbreak of the Rising, the voice from Moscow had argued unequivocally for action:
The armed Resistance movement has saved tens of thousands from death, and has inflicted great losses on the Germans. These battles have shown that a mass armed Resistance movement is possible, and that the losses are smaller than in submitting passively to terrorism. Today, no one should dare to say that the Poles are mad.
49
The persistence of the Warsaw Rising placed the British and American Governments in a bind. If the insurgents had been defeated quickly, they would have been lavishly praised for their courage, but would not have become a major embarrassment. As it was, they fought on inexplicably, forcing issues into the open which many Allied leaders would have preferred to ignore. Sensitive people squirmed uncomfortably.
All the indications are that Churchill was genuinely alert to the desirability of giving the Rising all possible assistance. So, too, were many
British officials, especially in the RAF, SOE, and War Ministry. But the same cannot be said of Stalin, of Roosevelt, or of key American advisers; and it cannot be said of the Foreign Office. Immense frustrations ensued.
Certainly, the British Military Mission in Moscow kept up a stream of daily requests, pressing their Soviet counterparts to help Warsaw. Whilst informing the Soviets that RAF flights were being sent from Italy, they pointed out that Rokossovsky’s forces were in ‘a much better position’. On 9 August, Col. Brinkman mentioned Capt. Kalugin’s appeal, and passed on detailed instructions from the Polish Commanderin-Chief about the exact locations for airdrops and artillery fire. On 10 August, the British Ambassador, Clerk Kerr, reminded Molotov of Stalin’s promise to the Polish Premier, whilst his Counsellor, ‘P. M. Krostveit’ (Crosthwaite), provided exact map references for the village of Truskav, where a reception committee was waiting to receive a Soviet liaison officer.
Examination of these files provides many surprises. One is that, as is evident from the place names used, the British Military Mission was using German maps. Another shows how repeated translations of the same documents distorted their meaning significantly. For example, writing in English, a British official would use the term ‘Polish Home Army’. After the first translation into Russian, this becomes the ‘Polish Internal Army’. By the time it reaches Stalin, it has become the ‘Polish Illegal Army’.
50
After re-authorizing RAF flights from Italy, Churchill repeated his earlier request to Stalin. ‘I expect from you’, he wrote on 12 August, ‘the greatest efforts in this respect.’
51
He also expressed his suspicions to Eden. ‘It is certainly very curious that at the moment the Underground Army has revolted, the Russians should have halted that offensive against Warsaw and withdrawn some distance. For them to send in all the quantities of machine-guns and ammunition required by the Poles for their heroic fight would involve a flight of only 100 miles.’ He smelt a rat. He was equally disappointed by ‘the lukewarm telegram’ which the US Chief of Staff had sent to Gen. Eisenhower and by the question of American overflights to Warsaw and of landing them in the bases on Soviet territory where the USAAF was already operating. [
SAVAGERY
, p. 299]
At a lower level, Britain’s relations with Poland were experiencing a number of severe shocks. Polish officials in London were outraged not only to find that their desperate appeals inspired little sense of urgency but also to discover that different British agencies had been following different policies and issuing contradictory advice. Gen. Tabor, for example, must have been mortified to learn that SOE’s assurances of 29 July concerning the ‘absolute priority’ to be given to the Rising had already been contradicted by the Foreign Office even before they were given. Eden’s negative letter of 28 July had apparently been delivered to the Count on the same day that Gen. Gubbins made such positive noises to Tabor. The resultant confusion could not have been sorted out quickly, especially as the sluggishness of the Foreign Office seemed to be winning out. The bitter pill became still more bitter when SOE abandoned its initial optimism, and began to spout the Foreign Office line. Gen. Gubbins had left London for Normandy on French Section business, and was not to be seen again for some weeks; and his deputy Lt.Col. Perkins strangely lost his former sympathy for Poland’s predicament. Meeting Tabor and other Polish generals on 16 August, Perkins delivered a tirade of recriminations which placed all the blame on the Poles and none whatsoever on the British:
SAVAGERY
A wounded insurgent nurse escapes a massacre at the very last minute
The German tanks were approaching Kilinski Square. Thirteen-and fourteen-year-olds were throwing petrol-filled bottles, and managed to set fire to a tank almost every time. On the 18th, the Germans deliberately left a tank loaded with explosives in the square. Our boys had no idea. When they approached it, there was an explosion causing many deaths, especially amongst the youngsters . . .
Hatred of these villains grew with every atrocity. They would round up Poles and place them in front of the tanks, so that the insurgents couldn’t shoot. It was a ghastly sight – you couldn’t fire at your own, and it was even worse to see the bastards pressing on ahead. They would kill the poor wretches, despite sustaining many casualties themselves. That’s how it was on Leshno Street, where both the hostages and the tank and its crew were destroyed. The Germans often went through a routine of running over several dozen hostages at a time with their tanks.
One evening at around eight we were sitting by the entrance to our courtyard. It was a safe collection-point and we kept a well-staffed night shift there. Suddenly we heard the drone of an aeroplane. We realized that it must be a British Wellington bomber, the so-called ‘flying coffin’, which was circling Kilinski Square and waiting for the signal to drop weapons. Thousands of smoke trails in the darkness made an indescribable sight. The barrage looked like a firework display. The Germans were firing furiously. They turned on the spotlights . . . Eventually the plane’s wing clipped a chimney, and it came down somewhere in the Old Town. We were badly affected. Both of the airmen were Canadians serving in the RAF. They had wanted to help us with all their hearts, taking the long, long road to our city and to their graves.
The Germans and Ukrainians fell on the insurgent hospital, kicking and beating the wounded who were lying on the floor and calling them sons of bitches and Polish bandits. They dashed the heads of those lying on the ground with their boots, screaming horribly as they did it. Blood and brains were spattered in all directions . . . A contingent of German soldiers with an officer at its head came in. ‘
Was ist hier los?
’ the officer asked. After driving out the murderers, he gave orders to clear up the dead bodies, and calmly requested those who had survived and could walk to get up and go to the courtyard. We were certain they would be shot.
After an hour or two another German-Ukrainian horde came in. Once again they started screaming and this time ran out again. One older German remained, wandering here and there in quite a state. Knowing German, I said:
‘Can you tell me what is going to happen us? We’re seriously ill.’
‘Are you German by birth or are you a
Volksdeutsch
?’
‘I’m Polish.’
‘How come your German is so good?’
‘I studied in Vienna.’
‘Are you from Vienna? I am too. Which district are you from?’
‘Hutteldorf XV.’
At this the German broke down and started shouting like one demented:
‘My dearest, get out of here, get out quickly!’
Yanek picked me up and I hung on to his neck. The German walked the other side of me and together they took me to the exit where I was able to clutch a handrail on the staircase. Other Germans were arriving, carrying straw. One of them poured some petrol over it . . . There was a blast, and a terrible cry – the fire was right behind us. The Germans had torched the hospital and were shooting the wounded. Were it not for my conversation with the German soldier, I would have shared their fate.
1
Kamila M.
I gave them as my personal opinion that it was criminal for them to plan the supply of relief to Warsaw on such risky operations as they were doing at present . . . I told them quite plainly that I considered it their duty to inform Gen. [Boor] exactly what the situation was and to stop leading him any further up the garden path. I myself am convinced that they have passed all sorts of promises to [Boor] . . . and now, when their promises are not being fulfilled, they are
blaming the British to cover themselves . . . The outcome of the meeting was that the Poles were left in no doubt regarding the difficulties of the situation and the futility of continually making approaches and demands for the impossible.
52
The use of the word ‘criminal’ at this early date is curious. It suggests that Perkins had been in touch with the Foreign Office, which in turn was in touch with Moscow. At all events, the British historian who has analysed these documents in detail has characterized Perkins’s outburst as ‘remarkably arrogant and unsympathetic.’
53
Throughout this stage of the proceedings, President Roosevelt’s entourage was largely concerned with trying to establish the facts. They were repeatedly in touch with the Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow. The information was conflicting. A cable from Harriman dated 4 August threw doubt on earlier assurances which FDR had received about Stalin’s readiness to help the Poles (e.g. from Oskar Lange). Subsequent cables seemed to rectify the impression. On 10 August, Harriman reported that Stalin had promised the Polish Premier to organize airdrops. The next day he related a long conversation with Molotov, who, whilst bemoaning the unilateral nature of the Rising, looked forward both to airdrops and to an offensive by the Soviet Army. Molotov said that the authorities had been unable to identify Capt. Kalugin. US military intelligence was not helpful. On 12 August, it advised the President that ‘the Polish Underground . . . is believed to be slowly disintegrating.’ Stettinius took another tack. ‘If it is militarily feasible, I feel we have moral and other obligations to do what we can to help get aid to the Polish Underground in full battle against the Nazis.’
54
Then the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that American aid was ‘almost impracticable’.
55
Yet none of these differences prevented the President from urging Stalin to make provision for shuttle flights over Soviet territory.
