Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (56 page)

The Soviets were infuriated by such diplomatic moves. While they had been willing to stand back from Greece, which, according to Stalin’s agreement with Churchill, was firmly under the British and American ‘sphere of influence’, they were not prepared to accept any Western meddling in their own sphere. Stalin instructed all those countries under direct Soviet control to decline the American offer of Marshall Aid, and put concerted pressure on Czechoslovakia and Finland to do likewise. Thus, while sixteen countries did eventually sign up to the Marshall Plan, not a single future Communist state took part. Instead, under further Soviet pressure, they set up their own commercial treaties with the USSR. The split between the two halves of Europe was beginning to widen.

Perhaps the most important consequence of this chain of events was the Soviet decision to formalize their control over the other Communist parties of Europe. Just three months after the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the Soviets summoned all the Communist leaders to a meeting in the Polish town of Szklarska Por
ba. Here they reformed the Communist International, or Comintern, under the new title of the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform. At the same time they virtually instructed the western Communists to embark on a campaign of anti-American agitation – an instruction which was one of the main reasons for the sudden increase in strikes in Italy and France from the end of 1947. The age of autonomy and diversity amongst the Communist parties of Europe was well and truly over – from now on the Soviets would be calling all the shots.
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While it is quite probable that this chain of events would have happened in any case, it was the situation in Greece that proved to be the catalyst. The Greek civil war was therefore not merely a local tragedy, but an event of truly international significance. The Western powers recognized this, and seemed prepared to endorse almost any injustice as long as it held communism at bay.

For the ordinary people of Greece this merely added a new layer of misery to their experience. Not only were they caught between the extremist tendencies of their own countrymen – long after the Second World War was deemed to have finished – they had now also become a football in the new game between superpowers.

25

Cuckoo in the Nest: Communism in Romania

It is easy to criticize the actions of the Western governments in the aftermath of the war. In hindsight there were times when they seemed paranoid and overly willing to crush legitimate left-wing protest, even if it meant suspending the very democratic principles they claimed to be supporting. Injustices
did
occur. Lives
were
ruined. But the threat that faced the West was very real. Despite their heavy-handed and often badly managed approach, the Western governments truly believed themselves to be pursuing the least worst course.

In a straight choice between Stalinist communism and the flawed mix of democracy and authoritarianism espoused by the West, the latter was undoubtedly the lesser of two evils. The Communists in eastern Europe displayed a ruthlessness in their pursuit of power that made the Western governments seem like fumbling amateurs. Any of the dozen or so nations that fell behind the Iron Curtain might serve as a demonstration of this, but perhaps the best example is that of Romania, because the Communist takeover here was particularly rapid, and particularly vicious.

Romania was one of the few eastern European countries that had remained relatively untouched by the Second World War. Parts of it had been bombed extensively by the Allies, and the north-west had been ravaged by the approach of the Red Army – but in contrast to Poland, Yugoslavia and East Germany, where the traditional power structures were almost entirely swept away by the war, Romanian institutions remained largely intact. For the Communists to seize absolute power here, therefore, it was not simply a matter of imposing a new system upon a blank slate – the old system had first to be dismantled. The brutal and menacing way in which the traditional Romanian institutions were liquidated and replaced is a masterclass in totalitarian methods.

The August Coup

The story of postwar Romania begins in the summer of 1944 with a sudden and dramatic change of regime. Up until this point the country had been ruled by a military dictatorship under Marshal Ion Antonescu, and had been locked into a steadfast alliance with Germany. It had entered into the war fairly enthusiastically, and Romanian troops had fought alongside the Wehrmacht all the way to Stalingrad. Now that the tables had turned, however, it was becoming increasingly obvious that Germany was going to lose the war. Many in Romania realized that the only way to avoid devastation by the Red Army was to change sides. A broad alliance of opposition parties formed in secret and, convinced that Antonescu would stick with Hitler to the end, decided to oust him.

The driving force behind the coup was the leader of the National Peasant Party, Iuliu Maniu. It was Maniu who had first instigated the plot, and it was Maniu who was most involved in secret peace talks with the Allies. His party was by far the most popular opposition party during and after the war, and was expected to take most of the important government offices if the coup was successful. The other main plotters were politicians from the Social Democratic Party, the National Liberal Party, the Communist Party and – as the group’s figurehead – the country’s young monarch, King Michael.

After weeks of preparation, the coup was set for 26 August. The plan was for King Michael to invite Antonescu to lunch, and instruct him to open up new negotiations with the Allies. If he refused, the king would immediately dismiss him and appoint a new government made up of opposition politicians. This government would have been prepared beforehand, so that they could take over the reins of power immediately and seamlessly.

Unfortunately, events did not quite turn out as planned. The military situation had begun to deteriorate so rapidly that the marshal decided to leave for the front on 24 August, at short notice. Forced to improvise, the king decided to bring the coup forward a few days. On the afternoon of the 23rd he invited Antonescu to the palace, where, after a brief but tense confrontation, he had the dictator arrested. The move appears to have taken Antonescu completely by surprise. When the king was interviewed by a British journalist a few months later, he claimed that they ‘popped him into the palace strongroom for the night, where his language, I am told, is still remembered with admiration by the palace guards’.
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However, owing to the hurried nature of events, the plotters had not yet managed to agree how best to form the new government, so once again the king was left to improvise. After a quick conference with his advisers, he appointed a provisional cabinet on the spot. Shortly after ten o‘clock that evening King Michael announced the coup d’état on radio. A pre-prepared declaration from the new Prime Minister, Constantin S
n
tescu, was also read out. These announcements made it clear that Romania had accepted the armistice terms of the Allies; they also promised that the new government would be, in contrast to Antonescu’s dictatorship, ‘a democratic regime wherein public freedom will be both respected and guaranteed’.
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The Communists had played a fairly minimal role in events so far, but once the coup had been carried out they were by far the quickest to react. The first person to arrive at the palace after the coup was the Communist statesman Lucre
iu P
tr
canu, who immediately requested - and was granted – the post of Minister of Justice. It was not an unreasonable request: P
tr
canu had a legal background, and had helped to draft the king’s proclamation to the nation. However, since none of the representatives of other political parties were given a specific portfolio until much later, the move was nothing if not bold. It also gave the impression that the Communists were being rewarded for taking a leading role: indeed P
tr
canu later exploited this impression by claiming, falsely, that he had been the
only
representative of the opposition to be consulted on the coming coup.
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