Schwerpunkt: From D-Day to the Fall of the Third Reich (32 page)

I’m not sure what day it was, but it was within the first few days of August when we were finally notified that one Panzer division and six infantry divisions were on their way from Calais to relieve some of the pressure on us in Normandy. Hitler ordered some of the other divisions he had waiting there to plug some rather large gaps we find ourselves facing around the Seine River. We determined that the American General Patton is now commanding an Army Group but that it has not entered France through Calais. This news must have finally persuaded der Führer that he could now permit these divisions from up there to transfer to where we needed them down here in Normandy.

Patton’s army has been reported to be in Brittany, a good 700 kilometers, or at least a week, away. Now that we are sure there will be no Schwerpunkt, other than the one which we’ve been fighting against for the last six or seven weeks, I am confident that der Führer will reveal his masterful idea of how to stop the ever increasing number of enemy soldiers, the never ceasing air and bombing attacks and the never decreasing number of losses suffered by our armies in France. I know he is a genius, though I haven’t been reminded of that in some time. I used to hear generals saying it all the time and I can’t remember anyone saying it lately. Maybe I haven’t been listening hard enough.

We received the welcome news that General Rommel is out of danger and has made such a good recovery from his dreadful injuries that he is out of the hospital and is now recuperating at home with his wife and 15 year old son. I only hope his son is still there and has not been shipped out for combat duty yet. I’ve written Herr Rommel a letter but I haven’t yet received any response.

When I first came to serve under General Rommel, it had seemed to me that he truly respected der Führer and what he was doing for Germany. Later though, as der Führer rejected General Rommel’s recommended strategy at almost every turn in Afrika and continually rejected his recommendations again in Normandy, I started to wonder if maybe some of his admiration and respect hadn’t begun to dull. I can attest to the fact that General Rommel followed all orders from Hitler even though it was apparent he disagreed with many. Even when it became clear that the enemy could not be beaten, General Rommel still followed the orders from der Führer who issued them from his Eagle’s Nest, or from his Wolf’s Lair, or from Berlin or from wherever he happened to be. I know that he never happened to be in Normandy and I wonder if he issues the orders he does because the situation here is not explained clearly enough to him. It was General Rommel and not der Führer who closely observed the Normandy field of battle and developed strategic objectives to best repulse and defeat the enemy. Nevertheless, we’d get the Sieg oder Todt orders which meant General Rommel’s plans had to be scrapped so der Führer’s could be followed. Sometimes, though, it seemed he received orders too late for them to be properly implemented or conditions in the field made the orders impossible to follow. With Herr General Rommel injured and absent from our headquarters, General von Kluge is now in charge of the defense of Normandy and the destruction of the enemy armies. I see that he too is receiving orders that he finds difficult to follow.

Several weeks ago, General von Kluge had written to der Führer advising him that once the front was broken, the enemy would not be able to be stopped due to its superior power and forces. He commended the troops, who defended the territory assigned to them with more valor and bravery than could ever have been expected, but he said that they cannot do the impossible forever. They did the impossible for as long as they could but it is now time, he said, to recognize that we can hold no longer. He requested permission to retreat and regroup. Der Führer does not permit retreats. I could have told him that. So could General Bayerlein, General Rommel, General Hausser, General von Paulus and probably every general who served under our Commander-in-Chief, Herr Hitler.

It’s too bad that he sent the letter, because now he is on record asking for a retreat though he was smart enough to add that he and his men would die on the battlefield with dignity. I’m sure he put that part in knowing that without permission to retreat, they would all die there anyway because there was no other choice open to them. I also think that General von Kluge realizes that victory is an unattainable dream but, of course, that remains unsaid. I doubt, nevertheless, that der Führer will take these words to heart and do anything differently from what he’s done in the past two months. I think we are destined to die, with dignity of course, but to die nonetheless in this bombed out, ruined and Godforsaken country of France.

If I were General von Kluge, knowing what der Führer just went through with the attempt to assassinate him, I would never ask to retreat again under any circumstances. Der Führer has had time to recuperate, Gott sei Dank, but he’s also had time to think about who it was that tried to murder him. He’s now probably reviewing every request from his generals to see who might be foolish enough to question his military genius and who might want to adjust the orders he issues. I have no way of knowing for certain, but it might be some of those defeatist officers whose names now appear at the top of der Führer’s list of who might have attempted such a dastardly deed. In truth, all of the generals in Normandy had been asking permission of der Führer to allow a retreat while there was still time but the answer always came back refusing permission. I would think that at this time, above all others, one must be seen to be an ardent and fervent supporter of all of Herr Hitler’s orders without regard to whether they might lack some small slice of genius. I guess I am not the only one thinking this way because after General von Kluge’s request of a couple of weeks ago that he be allowed to withdraw all troops in Normandy in order to more solidly defend the German border with France (I used to have such faith that soon there would be no more border since it would have dissolved with our victory over France), I have not seen any more requests asking for permission to withdraw. Not even a centimeter.

I know the general had been hoping that his latest request for a retreat from Avranches and Mortain to the River Seine would be allowed but, of course, such a strategy was summarily rejected by Hitler. In fact, we just received the most unexpected order directly from der Führer himself. We are to launch an offensive with our remaining Panzer forces and cut the American General Patton’s forces in two by using four armored divisions to strike across the bottom of the Cotentin Peninsula. We are to divide the one salient of Americans on the west coast of the peninsula from the other salient of Americans on the east coast. We are to attack them from the rear in order to accomplish this objective. Additionally, since our front is scattered, der Führer ordered our troops to also regain the territory that had been lost. The specific orders received from der Führer were for a counter-attack to take place to trap the American General Patton from the rear and to cut off the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula to prevent further supplies from coming in. It was to start at the town of Mortain. That is a genius plan! Well, it would have been genius if we had had enough soldiers, weapons, tanks, artillery, vehicles, horses, air cover or even just enough ammunition to carry it out which, of course, we didn’t but which, of course, was immaterial to der Führer.

Many of the troops remaining in and around the Brittany Peninsula were being moved eastward towards Mortain where even more troops and Panzers were to join for a war-changing attack on the Americans. We received reports that three additional Panzer divisions were being stripped from the Fifth Panzer Army in order to reinforce the divisions at Mortain. Hitler ordered Panzer Lehr, or what was left of it, along with the remnants of 1
^st
SS and 2
^nd
SS Panzer, 2
^nd
Panzer, 116
^th
Panzer and 117
^th
SS Panzer Grenadier to launch the offensive. With these many tanks thrown into one battle, one would think that we could not lose, except that the actual number of tanks from all these divisions was about 185. This was not the average number of tanks per division. This was the TOTAL number of tanks launching Operation Lüttich, which der Führer planned in an effort to prevent the enemys’ advance from Avranches.

When der Führer came up with his genius plan to counterattack the numerically superior enemy armies around Mortain, General von Kluge now reacted with vigor and enthusiasm. He was ready to attack, he told der Führer, at essentially a moment’s notice. What surprised all of us was der Führer’s response that he wait a few more days so that the additional Panzer and infantry reinforcements could be brought to bear. Travel times were expected to vary but der Führer said we should not attack on 6. August. 44 but should wait until the reinforcements appeared. In what would have been a comical reversal of roles were it not so dire, General von Kluge argued for speed and wanted to attack immediately knowing that the enemy was bringing more and more weight and manpower to the area of our offensive. Hitler eventually relented and allowed the attack to proceed the next day but obviously, it was with less firepower than we would have had if we had waited for our reinforcements to arrive. Since surprise was critical, General von Kluge did not even order our artillery to soften the enemy defenses. Our tanks moved as quietly as tanks can move and our infantry followed. The counterattack was launched on 7. August. 44.

We were waiting anxiously for news of the destruction of at least some of the American divisions who, we were sure, had been caught completely unawares. But once again, it was as if the enemy read our minds because every time we started to bring up troops, either enemy tanks or enemy planes were there to meet them. There were aerial bombs being dropped on us almost from the start. Enemy aircraft prevented our planes from even reaching the battleground. As the news trickled in, the first reports were saying that the southern salient of the American position at Mortain was about to be overrun. News from the north was not as comforting and we later found out that one of our generals had summarily been relieved of command for dereliction of duty. Since his tanks did not reach their objective as quickly as ordered, the northern American salient was not in as precarious a position as the southern. But then news was received that the southern salient was not overrun after all and enemy artillery was causing our Panzer commanders to flounder.

I learned that our troops attacked with the few tanks still available to us, but without the necessary Armor or Luftwaffe protection, our sheer will was not enough. Our tanks were ordered to fight continuously, especially around one specific hill in the area but, without freedom of movement, they became sitting ducks for the enemy aircraft that dropped bombs on them. General Bayerlein was ordered to hold his positions. The general kept sending messages stressing that a retreat to regroup was critical but all of the Führer’s responses said that he was to hold his ground and not give a meter. As the fighting progressed, General Bayerlein was asked by Herr Hitler’s headquarters if he was holding firm. He replied that, “Everyone is holding out; each man is holding their ground; not a single man is leaving his post since they are all dead! Report that Panzer Lehr Division is annihilated. The Americans are now pouring through the countryside, just as General Rommel had predicted.” I saw he added the part about General Rommel’s prediction, maybe just to emphasize his point. General Bayerlein held firm just as he was ordered by our brilliant Führer to do. He held firm and so did Oberstgruppenführer Hausser’s Seventh Army which was also, because of der Führer’s flash of genius, collapsing from holding fast. Panzer Group West was succumbing as well. I saw reports that we lost half of the tanks that started the attack, we had less than 10 anti-tank guns left and our men ran out of fuel. General Bayerlein’s final report stated that Panzer Lehr had lost all of its tanks and over two thirds of its troops.

As bad as this news was, the worst was that Oberstürmführer Wittmann, who had so successfully held our position at Villers-Bocage two months ago, was killed by the enemy during this offensive around Mortain. The reports we received were that he was in a borrowed Tiger tank and was attacking five enemy tanks at once. His tank was eventually hit and he was thrown from the Tiger. It was reported that he was killed instantly. I have heard him referred to as the best tank commander in our German Army. I am not sure of the exact number of enemy tanks he has destroyed but I’ve heard of numbers around 150 spoken by officers who should know. With this loss, I think that 8. August. 44 will be looked back on as another one of the worst days of the war for us.

While our troops once again gave all and more than they had to give, our offensive at Mortain came to an end when we were overrun. With the heavy bombing by the enemy and without any Luftwaffe air cover to protect our troops, our attack failed and was called off much to the disgust of our Führer. However, after he surveyed the situation, Hitler foresaw that the enemy could be encircled so once again, he issued another Sieg oder Todt order along with a direct order to launch a new counter-attack. General von Kluge has been ordered to launch this second attack on 11. August. I know that he and der Führer have been discussing this (well maybe discussing is not exactly the right word) and plans were being laid to attack the American enemy who, I have heard General von Kluge say privately, “is forming a noose to strangle us from the rear while we busily prepare to launch an attack in the front.”

During these days before the second attack was ordered to proceed, we received reports that the American General Patton’s troops were Blitzkrieging their way towards LeMans which is just southeast of us not much more than 150 km away. This obviously made our General aware of the possibility of an impending encirclement. As the Americans moved faster and further and we tracked their movements, I next heard General von Kluge say that we were “soon to be cooked in a cauldron.”

No one dared move east but all remained firmly planted around the town of Mortain so that a renewed effort for an attack could be successfully mounted this time. Our brave but dispensable troops stayed around Mortain for the next couple of days, fighting where and when they could. By 11. Aug. 44 when our second offensive was to be launched, General von Kluge had seen enough and was arguing with Hitler that continuing the Mortain Offensive was useless. Therefore it was General Hausser who was ordered to lead the renewed counter-attack. The plan was to push our foe back 40 kilometers to the western seacoast town of Avranches which we had been holding, at least until the last day of July.