Shake Hands With the Devil (14 page)

We met in the house of the manager of an expansive tea plantation. From the veranda, which commanded a spectacular view of the surrounding terraced hills and terra cotta cottages, I watched with fascination and disbelief as members of the opposing delegations strolled hand in hand, in informal discussion. Veterans of the Cyprus mission had regaled me with stories of the histrionics employed by the Greek and Turk Cypriots during their negotiations; at one point they insisted on meeting rooms with separate entrances so they wouldn't have to share the same doorway. At the negotiating table, these men were cold and aggressive, but at breaks and lunch, they were nothing less than fraternal.

Not all delegates partook in these goodwill gestures. Notable exceptions were Bagosora and the chiefs of staff of the
RGF
and the Gendarmerie.

During the formal sessions, I had both parties explain to me aspects of the peace accords that I did not understand or that required clarification. This strategy enabled me to make sure that everyone understood the meaning of each article in the accords. We ranged from discussing obscure points of order to debating the composition of the
RPF
light battalion of six hundred soldiers that would be stationed in Kigali to protect their dignitaries during the establishment of the
BBTG
. That portion of the meeting took a very long time, as every detail was hammered out, from the size of weapons to ammunition loads. The question of air-defence systems was raised by Bagosora. Only heavy machine guns with special mounts for air-defence fire were permitted. No missiles were authorized. The
RPF
had declared itself to be in possession of a number of Eastern Bloc short-range missiles, while the
RGF
claimed no missile capability at all, although I knew they had a number of anti-aircraft guns at Kigali airport and an unreported number of SA-7 missiles. The fact that we had to find a site in the heart of Kigali for an
RPF
battalion and that both sides had to agree to it, never raised an eyebrow. The
RGF
claimed that they placed their confidence in the neutral peacekeepers to control the situation.

The biggest problem that I could see was how to handle the demobilization of the armies and the Gendarmerie, and the creation of a new national force. It would not be enough to disarm them and then just let
them go. We had to ensure that each soldier was provided with the pensions promised in Arusha and with retraining so they could find other employment. Demobilization was supposed to begin as soon as the
BBTG
was put in place on September 10, which was only thirteen days away. It was unlikely we would even have the technical report finished by then.

I raised the question of where to find the resources to pay for a safe demobilization and reintegration again and again in the meetings I had with the various diplomatic missions, but got no takers. What frustrated me beyond belief was the inability of anybody at the
UN
to supply me with information on how other missions had dealt with the problem. I was being forced to reinvent the wheel in a crucial arena under such a tight deadline. Amadou Ly, with his usual optimism, suggested that I try to get the International Monetary Fund (
IMF
) and the World Bank on board, and then use their backing to leverage a roundtable of potential donor governments. Failing that, the only other option was to somehow link up demobilization with the overall aid plan proposed by the humanitarian groups who would operate under the umbrella of the
UN
for the life of the mission.

To that end, we devoted time during the last days of our technical mission to bringing ourselves up to speed with the major humanitarian organizations in Rwanda. This was a feat in itself, since each of these organizations tended to march to the beat of its own drummer and resisted integration into any outside body's overall plan. Rwanda was one of the most densely populated nations in sub-Saharan Africa. While Arusha had guaranteed the right of return of refugees, none of the terms of their resettlement, such as land ownership and compensation for expropriated property, had been addressed, even by the
UNHCR
.

As each day passed, bringing with it another debriefing of my team of experts, it became more and more evident that this mission was going to need a lot more money than the initial estimate of $50 million (U.S.). At these daily meetings I insisted that we were not going to leave Kigali until the first draft of the entire report was done. I set such a pace partly to ensure that we covered all the bases while we were in Rwanda and obtained as much information as possible.
But I also knew that all my experts would be returning to their regular jobs; I didn't want to have to chase slippery bureaucrats around the
UN
for their portions of the report—they knew the building better than I did and therefore knew where to hide. So I held them all to my deadline despite the innovative reasons they offered for pulling out early or for delaying the writing of the report, reasons such as “I'm too tired” or “Can't we go see the gorillas?” or—my absolute favourite—“I need time to reflect.”

Our meeting room at the Mille Collines had a large rectangle of tables in the centre and workstations around three of the walls. Brent and a few others had finally acquired a very large military map, and it hung on the fourth wall. The demilitarized zone, new minefields, military camps and some of the displaced persons camps were plotted on the map as more information came in every day.

On August 28, four days before we were due to leave the country, Brent, Miguel Martin, Paddy Blagdon, Tiko and Marcel Savard, an ex–Canadian Forces logistics officer who was the leader of the Field Operations Division team, helped me put to paper my concept of operations for a chapter-six mission in Rwanda. I wanted to present three options. Brent and Miguel had finished a clear estimate of the situation—what we'd need to get the job done if we were operating in an ideal world and could get all the troops and resources we asked for. The two earlier technical missions, the first headed by Colonel Cameron Ross from Canada, and the second under Maurice Baril's direction, had estimated the necessary force initially at 8,000 and then at 5,500 personnel. Our “ideal” recommendation was at the 5,500 level: three battalions (each numbering 800) in the demilitarized zone and two to secure Kigali, with rapid reaction force capability; 350 unarmed military observers to roam the country as the mission's eyes and ears; full logistical support, helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, vehicles, hospital, the works. I knew from my talks with Maurice that this recommendation would never leave the
DPKO
.

We called our next estimate the “reasonable viable option.” It called for a significantly smaller force of about 2,500 personnel and required the mission to take more risks as a result, but it was more likely to be approved
and eventually deployed. It was the one we spent the most time refining. Talking it over with Maurice on the
UNDP
's secure line, he suggested that we work out how to deploy the troops in stages so that we would cause the least burden to the
UN
and the troop-contributing nations.

The final option was designed to address the concerns of the United States, France and Russia, whose ambassadors had all insisted that the mission needed a force of only five hundred to one thousand personnel. We did not really see how this could work, and concentrated on laying out in the draft all the risks such a course would entail.

We anticipated that, with the support of Maurice, the “reasonable viable option” would be approved. Even before we left Rwanda, Brent and the others began working on how we could accelerate the approval of the mandate and be ready for rapid deployment.

At my meeting with the French ambassador the day before I left, I took the opportunity to run some of my findings past him. The ambassador thought my report reasonable, but as soon as I started to talk actual figures, the French military attaché leapt into the fray. He said he couldn't understand why I needed so many troops. France had a battalion of only 325 personnel stationed in the country and the situation seemed to be well in hand. There was an awkward moment as the ambassador reiterated his support for my plan and the attaché sat back in his chair silently fuming. The attaché's position made no sense to me, and I concluded that he was being deliberately obstructive. The incident alerted me to an outright split between the policy being followed by France's foreign affairs department and its ministry of defence. Another thing to ponder.

I was alarmed that I still hadn't had a meeting with President Habyarimana. He and his regime had signed the accords under some duress. Habyarimana finally sent word that he would see me at the palace on the last day I was to be in Rwanda. The junior political officer from the
DPA
and Ly were to accompany me; we dressed for a formal meeting.

The presidential palace was a modern condominium complex, understated but elegant, with what looked to be expensive art on the walls. We were ushered out to a patio area where we found the president, dressed in a short-sleeved, open-necked shirt, seated under a
Cinzano umbrella. With him was his chef de cabinet, Enoch Ruhigira; Nsabimana, the
RGF
's chief of staff; Ndindiliyimana from the Gendarmerie; another
RGF
colonel; and Bagosora, whom I'd met during the two days of talks between the
RGF
and the
RPF
. Surprisingly neither the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the minister of defence nor the minister of justice were present.

Habyarimana must have been a very handsome man when he was younger, and his stature and appearance were still impressive. He welcomed us warmly, and I gave him a short briefing on my findings and recommendations. He listened intently and seemed to find no fault with my report. He pressed me to get a
UN
force on the ground as soon as possible—no move to install the
BBTG
could happen without peacekeepers in Kigali. We talked for about forty-five minutes while the others remained quiet. Habyarimana smiled easily and spoke sincerely of the problems of the displaced persons and the drought. He indicated that the country had now embarked on a very complex road to peace and that the international community needed to respond favourably to my report urging the earliest deployment of a
UN
peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. It still worried me that he had not publicly embraced the mission, but I had no reason not to take him at face value.

As we prepared to leave Rwanda, nothing I had seen or heard swayed me from my initial assessment that a mission was both possible and essential. Brent and the rest of the reconnaissance team were flying back to New York. I was continuing on to Tanzania to meet with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the facilitator of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and then to Ethiopia to see Salim Ahmed Salim, secretary-general of the
OAU
. Both of these men had been key to the Arusha accords, and I was hoping that they could confirm my impressions and give me a sense of the bigger picture. We also had to iron out whether the
OAU
wanted to continue to play a role in the implementation of the accords, as the
RPF
certainly wished.

To my surprise, Pédanou, who had recovered nicely from his emergency surgery, joined me in Dar es Salaam. He immediately assumed his position as Head of Mission, treating me as his number two. I tried
to shrug this off, reasoning that he already knew Mwinyi well from the Arusha process. It made sense for him to take the lead, but it rankled.

We met with the Tanzanian president at the old governor's palace, which was opulent. I was a little awed by the surroundings and expected an arrogant, high-handed African despot. I couldn't have been more mistaken. Mwinyi was every inch the elder statesman, dignified and courteous, yet with a warmth and charm that immediately put you at ease. He listened attentively to my briefing and judged it to be a reasonable assessment of the situation. He was the first person to tell me that the September 10 milestone had been picked with great care as it marked the beginning of the school year and of the planting season. It was vital to take advantage of the sense that change was in the air, that this movement toward a new unified, democratic Rwanda was natural and inevitable. I was beginning to feel almost ebullient, taking Mwinyi's official blessing of my proposed operational plan as a very good sign.

The following day, we flew on to Addis Ababa and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, a palatial building with more black Mercedes in its parking lot than I had ever seen in my life. The
UN
staff waltzed around in expensive tailored suits and couture dresses as if they were in downtown Geneva rather than smack in the middle of the Third World; it seemed to me that they were inured to the poverty around them. If you had the temerity to raise the issue with them, they would look at you with a world-weary cynicism so cold it could freeze your heart.

At our meeting with Salim, Pédanou presented himself as the reconnaissance expert. In Dar es Salaam I had been patient, but the time had come to shut him down. I waited for him to take a breath, and in that brief pause I just started talking and didn't stop until I had thoroughly briefed the
OAU
secretary-general on my proposed operational plan. Salim listened attentively to my briefing and then stated quite baldly that though he was most concerned about Rwanda, the
OAU
didn't have the resources, cash or equipment to sustain beyond the end of October the fifty-five unarmed
OAU
military observers and the light Tunisian infantry company who were currently monitoring the ceasefire in the demilitarized zone. He was scrambling to put together a three-hundred-member force
for Rwanda, but he couldn't do that without
UN
assistance. He was eager to hand the whole works over to us as soon as possible.