Slave Next Door (49 page)

international victims—as per the provisions of the TVPA—with mini-

mal focus on U.S.-born victims. “Training and funding,” she states,

“are framed to look at foreign citizens. It all gets stove-piped.”78

Turman speaks freely on her department’s involvement in the federal

antitrafficking task forces. “We encourage our OVA victim specialists to

be members,” she says, although she sees the same weaknesses in the

task force system described by others: “Although they are useful out in

the field, some of them are more useful than others. Members often

don’t speak the same language—law enforcement and NGOs, agencies

who don’t trust each other. Somehow they have to break down barri-

ers.” A frequent NGO complaint, she says, is the need for better FBI

and ICE training on how to “address and interview victims, especially

when they’re from countries where the police are to be feared.

Investigations require time to get to know the victims and earn their

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trust. We want to treat these people well; they’re not tissues to be dis-

carded.” Turman’s department handles all continued presence victims,

ensuring they get help finding jobs, housing, ESL classes, and counsel-

ing. Working with ICE, it also addresses visa issues.79

Turman believes in her department’s work; however, there are things

she would see changed: “We need better training, and lots more of it.

‘What are victims? How did they become victims?’ Many don’t even

believe they’re victims of slavery—it’s a survival skill. Both NGOs and

government need greater awareness as to the nature of victims. It’s a

multifaceted problem.” Turman recalls a time when coordinating coun-

cils, mandated by Congress, met regularly and coordinated policy and

training. “It forced the various agencies to work together. With DOJ

guidance, each task force could become more of a model and give people

a process to problem solving.”80

Not surprisingly, Turman echoes the generic call for additional man-

power and funding. “These cases take a lot of time and require many

more services than are needed for a straightforward gun or drug case.”

It would be beneficial to have an “emergency fund to help in cases of

trafficking victims when we need to fly in services, do TB testing, find

housing, and so on.”81

C I V I L R I G H T S U N I T

The Civil Rights Unit of the FBI is responsible for the “guidance and

direction” of the bureau’s Civil Rights Program. The unit oversees four

programs, of which Human Trafficking ranks third in order of impor-

tance, behind Hate Crimes and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement

but ahead of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE). But, we are

assured, Human Trafficking is growing in importance, having climbed

to 20 percent of the unit’s cases in 2007, up from only 1 to 2 percent in

2002.82

While Kathryn Turman speaks for OVA, Unit Chief Carlton Peeples

was assigned to speak for the bureau’s Civil Rights Unit. It is impossible—

gender aside—to confuse the two. Both are clearly professionals; how-

ever, where Turman does come across as slightly “warm and fuzzy,”

Peeples has a straight-on, no-nonsense federal agent’s delivery. “Our

role,” he states, “is to investigate credible cases of human trafficking.”

He echoes Turman’s statement concerning the small number of cases

and victims found but points to a slow but steady increase: “In 2002,

we opened only 58 cases, we made 65 arrests, and obtained 15 convic-

tions; In fiscal 2006, the number of cases opened grew to 216, the

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number of arrests to 125, and convictions to 63.” Peeples has an inter-

esting take on why there are still so few cases uncovered. Aside from the

standard response that trafficking is a hidden crime, he believes that vic-

tims have no incentive to come forward, largely because “their state of

captivity is still better than their lives in the country they’re coming

from. Part of it,” he adds, “is psychological trauma as well—and fear of

harm to their families in the country of origin.”83

In describing the bureau’s involvement with other agencies involved

in the antitrafficking campaign, Peeples makes no bones about the ten-

sion between ICE and the FBI. “Our relationship with ICE needs some

work.” While he describes ICE’s function as “protecting the borders,”

he points to a “territorial war at the upper levels” that, he perceives,

“comes down to funding. Foreign-born victims come through ICE’s

domain. There’s an intelligence gap between ICE and FBI to work for

the greater good and to provide victim assistance through both agen-

cies.” He states, however, that this is mainly an administrative conflict

and that “on the ground we tend to get along.”84

In discussing the issue of foreign-born as opposed to U.S. citizen vic-

tims, Peeples “can’t concur” with former HHS director Steve Wagner’s

estimate of two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand American

child victims per year. “Of the 216 cases opened in 2007, only 11 per-

cent involved U.S. citizens. The numbers speak for themselves.” Of the

cases the bureau has opened in the past six years, about half involved

“recruitment for the commercial sex industry”; of the remaining half,

the most prevalent number involved domestic servitude. “Domestics,”

says Peeples, “are given more freedom than other types of victims. They

have the opportunity to build relationships, and sometimes that other

person helps get them out of their situation. In other forms of traffick-

ing, the ‘Big Eye’ is always watching you.” Peeples sees the Good

Samaritan as the victims’ best—and sometimes only—hope for rescue.

“I don’t know how these government programs are reaching [the vic-

tims]. It’s the Good Samaritans who play the big role. Maybe they’ve

seen an NGO’s public service announcement or awareness campaign.”85

Peeples sees the need for interservice communication in addressing

trafficking cases. “We encourage the agents at our fifty-six field offices

to build relationships. When we have a takedown, or need to relate to

victims, we need to outreach to NGOs. They are in a unique position to

provide intelligence and victim services.” Most leads, he states, come

directly from the victims, through the NGOs. Peeples agrees with

Turman that agency training is vital but states that FBI training is strictly

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internal, with no training given either by the federal government or by

the various NGOs. “Since 2002, we’ve trained 650 agents and 1,200

local officials on what constitutes a human trafficking violation and

how to investigate a case.”86 (In fact, the FBI’s agents and field offices

have attended various training programs since the passage of the TVPA,

some of which were given by the Freedom Network and the Coalition of

Immokalee Workers.) He also believes that local police are in the best

possible position to find victims.

On questions of victim services, Peeples defers to OVA but says, “We

need the victim to cooperate, so we need the victim to be comfortable.

We have to overcome the victim’s perception that police are bad; for this,

we rely on OVA and the NGOs.” The NGOs, he adds, “are bringing

awareness to the public,” and he concedes that “there needs to be a

better relationship between FBI and the NGOs.”87

NGOs give the FBI a mixed report card. Some service providers point

to situations in which agents were constantly on site, offering help to both

the NGO and the victim and working in close conjunction with other fed-

eral and local agencies. Others express frustration and anger over

instances when FBI agents have been unavailable and uninterested. When

asked about agent accountability, Peeples insists that a review process

makes all agents accountable. “It’s extremely important for Americans to

know that the FBI takes human trafficking and civil rights very seriously.

We will vigorously investigate any possible human trafficking situation. If

an allegation is made by an NGO, it would go to the management of that

agency in the field.” Sometimes, however, the field office itself has received

the criticism. Peeples places some of the responsibility for agent nonre-

sponse on the fact that “not every case brought forth by an NGO is

human trafficking. Each agent makes that determination. That might be

taken as uncooperative; but if we make a decision not to proceed, it’s

because we don’t see a case. And we don’t make that determination

lightly; we talk to DOJ Civil Rights before making that decision. And if

an NGO brings us too many of these, they will lose the trust of the agent,

who will be a lot more skeptical next time.”88 While there is, no doubt,

validity to this scenario, many NGOs feel that some agents are simply

better at the job than others, that some “get it” while others lack a grasp

of—and a commitment to—the issue of human trafficking.

Another factor is at work here. In
The War on Human Trafficking:

U.S. Policy Assessed,
Anthony M. DeStefano compares the number of

potential trafficking cases reported to the DOJ by such agencies as

the FBI and ICE with the number prosecuted. The disparity is staggering.

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In case after case, the DOJ declined to bring criminal charges. The

impact this can have on even the most dedicated of agents is obvious:

Why pursue human trafficking cases when they are almost certain to

be denied prosecution? As to why the government rejects the large

majority of cases brought it, DeStefano states that “prosecutors in all

federal court districts declined to proceed to criminal charges for rea-

sons that seemed constant from year to year: lack of evidence of crim-

inal intent, weak or insufficient admissible evidence, ‘office policy’

(which was not defined), problems with jurisdiction or court venue,

no evidence of a federal offense, ‘minimal’ interest of prosecutors

because a prosecution wouldn’t have deterrent value, and problems

with witnesses,” such as fear, inability to identify their traffickers,

and failure to remember all the details of their experience.89 Although

the federal government is proud of its record of convictions based on

the TVPA, by selecting the slam-dunks and weeding out the doubtful

cases, the DOJ mathematically increases its chances of success. As

DeStefano points out, “Clearly . . . if prosecutors do not decline a

referral, there is a strong likelihood that the resulting prosecution will

lead to a conviction.”90

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

The events of September 11, 2001, changed many things and led to the

formation of ICE. For decades there had been two distinct agencies, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs

Service. Before 9/11 both agencies had taken steps to develop antitraf-

ficking and antislavery strategies. They came at this work from very dif-

ferent perspectives. For the Customs Service, antislavery work centered

on the enforcement of the laws forbidding the importation of slave-

made goods that are described in chapter 6. The INS was primarily con-

cerned with the control of people entering the country, and that

naturally included concerns about smuggling and human trafficking.

The new visa for trafficking victims was just being brought into force in

September 2001 when the world changed.

In the aftermath, the Department of Homeland Security was formed

and a reorganization of agencies began. In these changes the INS and

the U.S. Customs Service were combined to form ICE. The “shotgun

marriage” of the two agencies required major adjustments. And for

both agencies work on slavery and trafficking slowed to a crawl as staff

were reassigned to border security and antiterrorism jobs.

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In some ways the difficult transition to a combined agency has been

good for ICE’s antislavery and antitrafficking work. By late 2007 it was

possible to point to three types of antislavery work done by ICE. The

first was the interdiction of goods or commodities made by slaves or

prison labor. Stopping the flow of slave-made goods into the country is

difficult. Many of the products discussed in chapter 6 are the subjects of

ongoing ICE investigations. The second is Operation Predator, ICE’s

comprehensive initiative to safeguard children from pedophiles, inter-

national sex tourists, Internet child pornographers, and human traffick-

ers. The December 2007 conviction of a Maryland man to fifty years’

imprisonment for the production of child pornography was typical of

the joint operations ICE does with local law enforcement and the Postal

Service to bring down child sex abusers. Finally, ICE has its own pro-