Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (81 page)

It was crucial to have the right courier for a source. Jacob Golos
agreed to surrender control of Julius Rosenberg and his circle of engineers at least in part in response to Soviet arguments that without a technical specialist to guide them, their value would be wasted. In 1942
Martha Dodd Stern, a socialite, writer, and KGB agent, complained that
her courier was an American and politically unsophisticated. The KGB
New York station chief reported: ""`Liza" [Stern] was unhappy over the
fact that the person who was connected to her ("Chap" [Zalmond
Franklin]) was, first of all, not a Soviet operative, and second, not adequately developed politically and unqualified in her tasks and topics.
"Liza" was offended by the fact that we downgraded her work with us to
such a level.' "3

The KGB also experienced problems finding enough couriers. Not
only did the job require discretion and reliability, but it also meant that
the would-be couriers needed to break their overt ties to the Communist
movement. Finding a regular job that allowed them the flexibility to travel
at irregular intervals was not easy. KGB officers periodically considered
setting up Harry Gold with his own laboratory business to allow him more
time to visit sources to get their material and grumbled when his work obligations as a corporate chemist caused him to miss appointments. In contrast, Elizabeth Bentley ran U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation, a
cover business that arranged shipping of packages to the USSR. As its
supervisor, Bentley could take off time for her courier work as needed,
but its connections to the Soviet Union proved worrisome.

Sometimes couriers needed to relocate. Ann and Michael Sidorovich
moved from New York to Cleveland, giving up their friends and jobs, to
set up a safe house to service William Perl, a valued KGB technical avi ation source working at nearby Wright Field. The KGB gave them $500
to finance the move. Amadeo Sabatini moved from Pennsylvania to the
West Coast and then back to the East Coast at the behest of the KGB.
Years earlier Whittaker Chambers had walked away from the editorship
of the New Masses to plunge anonymously into the underground and
shuttle documents and money among Washington, New York, and points
in between.4

Ideally, couriers needed to be inconspicuous. Gold was an undistinguished and bland-looking man. Moscow considered Victor Perlo's wife
as a potential courier in 1945 but concluded that because she suffered
from Basedow's disease (a form of hyperthyroidism characterized by
bulging eyeballs), she was too conspicuous to be suitable. During World
War II able-bodied men not in the military invited suspicion. All these
caveats meant there was a chronic shortage of couriers. Searching for one
for Donald Maclean, the KGB's valuable British diplomatic source serving in Washington in 1945, Anatoly Gorsky notified Moscow: "`We undoubtedly need to find a good courier for `Homer' [Maclean]; however,
this has so far been exceptionally difficult for us."' He indicated that the
station was considering Helen Scott, then secretary for a French journalist. If she proved unsuitable "`and we don't find another candidate,
we will consider maintaining contact through `Homer's' wife"' [Melinda
Maclean], who would transmit the materials to a Soviet operative.5

Maclean's history as a Soviet source also illustrated yet another potential problem with couriers. Canadian Communist Kitty Harris had a
long career as a KGB operative. She became Maclean's courier in early
1938 while he was still stationed in London. He made frequent visits to
her apartment, where she photographed the documents he brought
along, and they eventually became lovers. While such relationships were
regarded as poor tradecraft, the KGB accepted their liaison and transferred her to Paris when Maclean was posted there in the fall of 1938.
Their affair lasted for eighteen months before ending in 1940, when
Maclean met and later married Melinda. While their affair may have
given him a logical reason to visit Kitty, it also added a volatile emotional
mixture to his espionage that made Moscow Center uneasy.'

Such complications likely contributed to Moscow Center's reaction
when Joseph Katz, one of its most devoted and effective American agent
handlers, became overwhelmed with contacts and meetings. The Washington station told Moscow in early 1945 that Katz met with five of the
station's sources: Maurice Halperin, Julius Joseph, Harry Magdoff, Victor Perlo, and Joseph Gregg. Moreover, three of them were themselves group leaders, with Perlo passing on Donald Wheeler's material, Gregg
acting as the channel for Helen Tenney, and Magdoff handling Edward
Fitzgerald. In addition, Katz also met occasionally with Elizabeth Bentley and "Zero," an unidentified agent in Washington. Katz wanted help,
and Gorsky agreed, telling Moscow:

""X's" [Katz's] requests about the need to have a courier between him, the
probationers [sources], and the group leaders are undoubtedly justified. Unfortunately, we do not have suitable candidates. Our intentions of using "Zero"
[unidentified] could not be realized, as we reported elsewhere. None of the
wives is suitable for this work. At every meeting, "X" asks us to give him
"Adam" [Eva Getzov]-with whom you are familiar-for this purpose. Considering our critical situation in this regard, we earnestly ask you to consider
once more the possibility of handing us "Adam." In the first place, a courier
like that should be used for contact between "X" and his group leaders: "Raid"
[Perlo], "Tan" [Magdoff], "Gar'' [Gregg]."

The need was clear and Moscow gave its consent, but reluctantly, telling
Gorsky: "`We agree with the proposal to use `Adam' as a courier. However, it is essential to note that `X' [Katz] lives with her, and therefore
there could be potential complications with his [Katz's] wife. You should
discuss this in earnest with `X,' noting that such behavior on his part could
have disastrous consequences for our work."''

As for "Zero," she had first worked with the KGB via the CPUSA underground in the 1930s, when she was on the staff of the Nye Committee investigating munitions manufacturers. She continued as a source,
working for various congressional committees, until 1942, when "`she left
her job for family reasons"' and the KGB New York station deactivated
her. When the KGB reestablished contact with her in 1945, hoping that
she would work as a liaison agent, Gorsky reported, "`Incidentally, `Zero'
told `X' [Katz] flat out that she knows exactly which country `X' has ties
to,"' and "`she would be happy to help."' But, "`as it turns out, `Zero' has
a husband who does not share her polit. beliefs at all and who watches his
wife's every move out of jealousy."' Given spousal suspicion, Gorsky abandoned the notion of using "Zero."8

Even after Bentley's defection had closed down most of the KGB's
American networks, there still weren't enough couriers to service the
much smaller number of sources. By 1948 some of them had also been
exposed or had defected. In 1948, for example, a KGB Washington station letter to Moscow explained that meetings with David Wahl took
place every three weeks. This was a longer interval than desired, but in tensified FBI surveillance of its legal officers had forced it to reduce the
frequency of meetings. The station wanted "to switch to a courier, but
there isn't anyone."9

Other KGB documents provide detailed evidence of the importance
of the couriers' work. For a number of them, the notes also enable us to
reconstruct a good deal about their history and the trajectory that led
them to their key roles within the espionage networks. A handful, like
Harry Gold and Elizabeth Bentley, became household names, but most
remained in the shadows, even when the FBI succeeded in uncovering
their activities.

Not all couriers remained just couriers. Some became active sources in
their own right and some sources morphed into couriers. Thomas Black,
for example, transmitted industrial secrets from laboratories at which he
worked before the KGB assigned him to infiltrate the Trotskyist movement. He later became an active courier handling several technical spies.
Harry Gold provided low-level industrial secrets before becoming one of
the KGB's busiest technical intelligence couriers and agent handlers.
(Black is discussed in chapter 6, Gold in chapter z). The most remarkable
transition was engineered by William Weisband, who began his espionage
career as a courier servicing KGB technical/scientific sources and after
World War II became the KGB's most valuable source, one who did incalculable damage to American interests and likely changed the course of
the early Cold War.

Much about William Weisband's early life remains shrouded in mystery. Although he claimed to have been born in Alexandria, Egypt, it appears more likely that he was a native of Odessa, Russia, born in 1908;
moved to Egypt with his parents; and then came with them to the United
States in 1925. He worked at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York in
the early 1930s, but what he did after that is unclear. On the basis of evidence that is not public, American counterintelligence officers believed
that he went to the Soviet Union sometime in the early 1930s, perhaps to
study at the Comintern's Lenin School. While he was in Moscow, Soviet
intelligence recruited him in 1934, and he worked in the USSR to get
some practical experience before it sent him back to the United States.
(Weisband once told Jones York, for whom he served as a courier, that he
had been a KGB operative in Soviet Central Asia.) What is clear is that
by 1936 he was working as a courier for the KGB New York station. Vas siliev's notebooks record that in 1936 "Link," Weisband's cover name at
the time, handled "Zero," the female KGB source working for the Senate Nye Committee. Expense reports for the New York station in the latter half of the 19305 list him as a regularly subsidized agent. Later FBI
investigations indicated that by 1938 his financial situation had improved
dramatically, even though he appeared to work only at low-paying jobs.10

Moscow Center transferred Weisband to California in mid-1941 to
reestablish contact with Jones York (see chapter 6), an aeronautical engineer. At their first meeting Weisband handed over half of a Shirley Temple picture, a contact protocol that York's previous liaison had arranged,
to establish his bona fides. York agreed to revive his espionage relationship but said he needed a camera; "Bill," as York knew Weisband, provided $250 to purchase one. Over the next year, Bill met with York about
ten times, delivering lists of specific aviation technical questions the Soviets wanted addressed. York later told the FBI that Bill paid him about
$1,500 for the material he delivered. The two became very friendly, meeting at York's home as well as nearby bars and restaurants. York showed
him a poem, entitled "The Vandal's Doom," that he had written about
the Nazi invasion of the USSR, and Bill, stating he was impressed, typed
out a copy to show his superiors. At one meeting, York learned that Bill
spoke and wrote Arabic, and, in a serious breach of intelligence tradecraft, Bill once mentioned his family name, which years later, when talking to the FBI, York remembered as "Villesbend." A KGB memo on York
noted that Weisband was drafted into the American Army and in November 1942 turned liaison with York over to another courier, Amadeo
Sabatini."

Weisband had a talent for languages. Russian was his native tongue,
but he spoke English virtually without accent and had picked up some
Arabic from his childhood in Egypt. The Army recognized his skills and
sent him to a language school to study Italian and to Officer Candidate
School; he received a commission and, at his request, assignment to the
U.S. Army Signal Security Agency (predecessor of the National Security
Agency). He left for Great Britain in July 1943 and later served in North
Africa and Italy. When one of its couriers or low-level sources entered
the military in World War II, the KGB usually simply deactivated him
for the duration because it was too difficult to maintain contact with peripatetic military personnel. And most servicemen in typical military jobs
were of little intelligence interest anyway. Weisband, however, was an exception, possibly because of his assignment with the code breakers of the
Signal Security Agency. A KGB New York station cable in June alerted Moscow that Weisband had finished his Italian course and suggested a
password for approaching him in Britain, stating that Weisband would
await contact each Sunday at the entrance to the Leicester Galleries in
London. While Weisband was overseas, he also kept in touch with the
KGB by writing to Lona Cohen, another KGB courier, via his brother. A
February 1945 KGB cable only partially deciphered by the Venona project suggested that Weisband had some contact with Soviet naval intelligence; this likely related to his Army assignment in Italy as liaison with
several Soviet naval officers.12

In late 1944 Semen Semenov returned to Moscow and wrote a summary report on his American tour. He had worked with Weisband and
offered this assessment: ""`Link" [Weisband]. Helped me in receiving
materials from "Emulsion" [unidentified technical source] and "Brother"
[unidentified technical source]. Was connected to agents "Smart" [oil industry source Elliot Goldberg] and "Needle" [Jones York]. Has a great desire to work with us. Shows composure and calm at work. Considering
his nice work in the West and indisputable growth during his time in the
army (Africa, Italy, Britain, France), he should be utilized upon his return
as an illegal in technology and assigned as the handler of a group."' Weisband, however, had a brighter espionage future than a return to courier
and agent-handling work. After his discharge at the end of the war, the
Army Signal Security Agency promptly rehired him as a civilian linguist
assigned to Arlington Hall, the military's super-secret code-breaking facility then in the process of shifting from breaking German and Japanese
codes to deciphering Soviet codes. With his native Russian, Weisband
became a lead translator for decrypted Soviet messages. With the exception of atomic espionage, one could hardly imagine a post of greater interest to Soviet intelligence. In October 1945, following Igor Gouzenko's
defection, Moscow issued a warning to safeguard six valuable American
agents, including Weisband, by now code-named "Zhora": "Surveillance
has been increased. Safeguard from failure: Homer [Donald Maclean],
Ruble [Harold Glasser], Raid [Victor Perlo], Mole [Charles Kramer],
Zhora [Weisband], and Izra [Donald Wheeler]. Reduce meetings with
them to once or twice a month. Minor agents should be deactivated.
Carefully check out against surveillance when going to meetings, and if
anything seems suspicious, do not go through with them." But with news
of Bentley's defection in November, Moscow Center ordered more drastic measures, and the KGB cut contact with scores of American sources,
including William Weisband.13