Spy Princess (13 page)

Noor had been asked to report to the commandant at Wanborough Manor. It was a fine Tudor house on the Hog’s Back near Guildford in Surrey with large rooms and a private park. This was the first of the Special Training Schools (STS) for F-section agents and one of SOE’s forty-one training schools spread across Scotland and England. The SOE’s collection of fine country houses had earned it the nickname ‘Stately ’Omes of England’. Training Noor at Wanborough was ex-Coldstream Guards officer, Major Roger de Wesselow, and her escorting officer was Joan Sanderson.

At Wanborough, Noor met Yolande Beekman and Cecily Lefort. In the pleasant surroundings of the manor, the three girls did not know that their fates in France would be tragically linked. Cecily and Noor would leave for France on the same day. Cecily would die in Ravensbruck concentration camp. Yolande and Noor would meet again on the fateful journey to Dachau.

Every morning the recruits were made to do a 10-minute run before breakfast with Major Wesselow himself leading them. Then they were taught to shoot, throw a hand grenade, and handle explosives. The course at Wanborough consisted of a preliminary round of military and physical training and the basics of wartime operation: the Morse code, map reading and the handling of pistols and sub-machine guns. Wanborough trainers watched them closely to assess their personality and the sort of work they would be suitable for. Yolande and Noor were chosen to be radio operators while Cecily was trained to be a courier. The bar at Wanborough was well stocked and agents were encouraged to drink in their free time. They were then watched to see if they got drunk and, if so, what they revealed. It could mean an early elimination for some if they were found to be easily inebriated. Agents who talked in their sleep were also watched over. What did they talk about and, crucially, in which language? If they were going to France they had to speak French at all times. Because the agents often carried large sums of money, the vetting process had to ensure that they were reliable and not prone to gambling.

Noor threw herself into her training, determined to do well. She enjoyed the atmosphere at Wanborough and seemed to find a renewed purpose in her life after the stagnation of Abingdon. ‘I am a busy little girl now,’ she wrote to Vilayat,
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giving him the news that Claire was well and had joined the Army Territorial Service (ATS). They had also heard recently that their brother Hidayat was safe, which was a huge relief for her. Vilayat meanwhile was at sea on HMS
Quantock
and none too happy with life on the deck. He wrote complainingly to Noor that all he did for three days was carry potatoes, that the lower deck made him ill, and that he would leave and join the Resistance if this carried on any longer. His letter alarmed Noor, who was well aware of her brother’s hot temper and impulsiveness. She was worried that if he carried out his threat and left, he would be regarded as a deserter. Her training officer, Joan Sanderson, knew Noor was fretting about her family and was struck by how close she was to them.

A report in Noor’s Personal File
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from Wanborough Manor (STS 5) by Lieutenant Tongue dated 23 February said: ‘Has been doing arthritis (SOE for radio work) for two years, is in good physical condition.’

With all the intense training she was undergoing, Noor began to improve her fitness levels. On 10 March, her instructor from Wanborough noted that Noor could run very well, something that would prove very useful to her later in the field. Her instructors also decided that Noor was ‘unsuitable for jumping’. This meant that for some medical reason, she could not train for parachute jumps. The reason why she was not considered suitable for parachute training is not mentioned, but it could be any factor from ankle injury or foot problems to an earlier operation for an inflamed appendix that she had undergone in Paris.

Although she had spent over a year in the RAF, Noor had never quite got to grips with the regimental side of being in the services. She also disliked the physical aspects of the training, having no aptitude or enthusiasm for PT. Training in explosives and demolitions was another problem. Though Noor had a full understanding of the theory and she put in her best effort, her natural clumsiness was a drawback when it came to the practical side. But she was determined not to fail. She tried very hard and to her instructors seemed ‘very keen and interested’. Handling weapons was never going to be easy for this dreamy, sensitive writer of children’s stories. It was not surprising that her instructors noted she was ‘pretty scared of weapons’. They were, however, impressed by the fact that she tried hard and had improved greatly in a few days and concluded that ‘with a little more training [she] should be quite good’.

Noor’s results on the whole were fairly balanced at this stage. It was clear to her instructors that she was finding the training very different from what she had done previously, but was slowly settling in.

Having improved her Morse in Abingdon, Noor had to now cope with all the other skills an agent needed to function in the field. She enjoyed map reading and soon became quite good at it, though she was said to be ‘useless at field sketches’. Though she had got off to a slow start, Noor gradually built up her confidence in Wanborough. Her instructor now described her as: ‘Active, [with] plenty of spirit and could be relied on to come up to scratch when the occasion arose.’

Noor’s earnestness and warmth had made an impression on everyone at Wanborough. On 11 March 1943, she received a glowing report from her training officer Lance Corporal Gordon:

She is a person for whom I have the greatest admiration. Completely self-effacing and un-selfish. The last person whose absence was noticed, extremely modest, even humble and shy, always thought everyone better than herself, very polite. Has written books for children. Takes everything literally, is not quick, studious rather than clever. Extremely conscientious.

The most important report came from her Commandant, Major de Wesselow. He was positive about Noor’s progress: ‘Hadn’t the foggiest idea what the training was going to be about. From a shaky start has developed a certain amount of confidence. Energetic. Experienced W/T operator though she dislikes the work: extremely earnest in her intentions, and despite a timid manner would probably rise to an emergency.’

The report by Major de Wesselow was sent to Baker Street, where officials monitored Noor’s progress. Both Maurice Buckmaster and Selwyn Jepson had complete faith in Noor, confident that she would pull through in the end because of her strength of character and positive attitude.

Noor had cleared the first stage of her training. To Buckmaster, Noor’s determination to overcome her weaknesses and her courage were her most important qualities. All else would fall into place since the training course for agents was rigorous. In the very first month Noor was trained in the use of codes, unarmed combat, fieldcraft, shooting, sabotage (including the use of explosive and the knowledge of where to use it to inflict the maximum damage on specified targets), methods of contact and psychological tests. It was now time to move to the next stage.

On 13 March 1943, there was a note about Noor. ‘We should like to have a vacancy for this student at STS 52.’ Noor was ready for her next move. Five days later she had her security clearance. She was now to proceed to Group B.

But first Noor had to visit her chiefs at Baker Street again. One day, probably around mid-March, Jean was sitting on a bench and reading a book in Gordon Square when she saw Noor walking up to her. Instead of her regular Air Force blue she was wearing khaki. When Jean asked her why, she said she had joined the FANY.

‘I knew Noor had done some nursing training but was puzzled about why she had moved. She then told me that “it covers a lot of things”.’
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Jean gathered that she was doing some sort of intelligence work and did not probe any further. Noor’s mother, who thought service life was too harsh for Noor, was relieved, thinking that the FANY would not involve military training but be composed of nursing and first aid.

While in London, Noor enjoyed the cosiness of domesticity. She spent her time with Jean and her mother and caught up with all the news about Claire and Vilayat. Feeling confident and happy, she wrote to Vilayat that life was full of ‘activity and interest’. She missed him and longed to see him soon. The family was getting on well: Claire had settled into an army secretarial course and Amina was expecting a promotion to the post of Red Cross Deputy Superintendent. Vilayat was proceeding to Lancing College and was on training for a commission. Noor felt that things were looking up again for the family. She spent her time reading at the British Library, discussing oriental philosophy with Jean and was keen to read modern popular German fiction (possibly to familiarise herself with German culture and the German psyche). All too soon it was time to leave for duty again.

On 29 March 1943, Noor reported to Thame Park in Oxfordshire (STS 52) for specialist signals training. She was the first of the women agents to be selected for this intensive course. She was now to spend long hours in the laboratories learning about the composition of her set, fault diagnosis and how to repair it. She also had to increase her Morse speed. Wireless operators developed a ‘fist’ or style by which those receiving their transmissions could tell who was transmitting – a kind of fingerprinting in Morse. It was, however, far less accurate than fingerprinting by police, and Abwehr agents in Holland reckoned that after listening to an SOE agent’s key-work three or four times, they could imitate it perfectly.
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The signals course was extremely technical and specialised. Agents learned about wavelengths, atmospherics and jamming, as well as basics such as how to hide radio sets and put up aerials. They were taught to incorporate certain security checks in their messages so that the receivers in England could tell whether they were genuine or sent by the Germans.
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The SOE was always chronically short of radio operators, as the post was recognised as one of the most dangerous and vulnerable in the field. Training agents in clandestine radio operations (as opposed to ordinary wireless transmission) was a difficult task, and was not helped by the fact that very few sets were available at the time. Radio operators suffered the highest casualties among agents and there was a constant demand for replacement operators. Noor was clearly ahead of the others, thanks to her previous RAF training, and she now became the focus as the first woman radio operator likely to be sent to France.

In the early years of the SOE, wireless operators were taught the Playfair code, which used a 5-by-5-letter square and a single word as the Playfair key. It was taught as a mental exercise but rarely used in the field. The key was later changed from a single word to a single line of verse which was carried by the agent as a personal code and had to be memorised. The transpositions were done on the word square on the basis of this poem code. The phrase was chosen by the agent so that it could be easily remembered. (Noor based hers on a poem that she had composed.)
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This was harder to break compared to previous ciphers. However, even these codes were eventually cracked by the Germans because if they discovered the poem or phrase it was all they needed to know to decipher the whole code. By 1942 another ciphering system called double transposition was introduced. For this the agent had to memorise two sets of random numbers. The plain text was written out under the first random numbers and then transcribed on to the second set. In 1943 a further modified version of the Playfair code, using numbers as well as letters, was used. By mid-1944 a much safer and practically impenetrable cipher had been introduced. The agent was given a number of small silk cloths, each printed with several columns of random letters or figures from which any message could be enciphered or deciphered. After the agent had used a letter he was supposed to cut it out and burn it. This ensured that he could never give the codes to the Germans since he had destroyed it and would be unlikely to remember it. The duplicate of the silk cloth was kept by the home station. This was called the one-time pad. Noor learnt to operate using the Playfair code and double transposition.

Agents also had to learn how to incorporate security checks in their transmissions. This was crucial for the operator to warn home station that he or she had fallen into enemy hands. These checks were individual to the particular operator and consisted of a deliberate spelling mistake or a series of mistakes – like getting the seventh letter of each text wrong, or replacing the twelfth letter by the letter preceding it in the alphabet. The Germans soon caught on that there was a security check and pressured captured agents to reveal them. Agents then began to carry a double security check: a bluff check which they could reveal to the enemy under pressure and a true check to keep to themselves. The deciphering staff knew which checks each operator was supposed to use. So if their notes said, ‘Bluff check present, true check omitted’ it meant that the operator had been captured and was under duress. These checks were vital for head office in London but they were often not heeded by the receiving staff, with disastrous effects on Noor and her colleagues in the field.
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Head office also checked the genuineness of an operator by sending bogus messages. An agent could be sent a message asking: ‘Have you contacted Nicole as ordered?’ where Nicole was a fictitious person and no order had been given. If the surprised agent replied, ‘Who the hell is Nicole and what order?’ head office would know he was genuine. If instead they received a reply such as ‘Where shall I meet her?’ or ‘Am arranging it, send further details’, or simply ‘will do’ they would know they were talking to the enemy.

Messages from the field would go to a specialised group of listeners – mainly the FANY – who listened out permanently for these transmissions and replied to them. Colin Gubbins called the work of the SOE wireless operator ‘the most valuable link in the whole of our chain of operations. Without these links, we would have been groping in the dark.’
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