Stalin's General (44 page)

Another opportunity to denounce the plotters came in mid-July when Zhukov went to Leningrad to take part in Navy Davy celebrations. On the 15th he gave a widely publicized speech in which he criticized the antiparty group for opposing Khrushchev's commitment to overtake the United States in per capita production of meat, milk, and butter (a remark greeted by stormy applause) and for resisting decentralization of economic and political decision-making. But the bulk of Zhukov's critique was directed at the antiparty group's opposition to the campaign against Stalin's cult of personality.
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Zhukov was accompanied on this trip by “Mrs. Zhukov”—a sign that despite his relationship with Galina the marriage to Alexandra was not yet over.

In October 1957 Zhukov toured Yugoslavia and Albania, aiming to replicate the publicity and success of his earlier tour to India and Burma. Zhukov was accompanied by a large group of senior officers and, rather than flying to Belgrade, they traveled to Yugoslavia in style on board the modern Soviet cruiser
Kuibyshev
, which sailed from Sebastopol on October 5. This was Zhukov's first sea voyage and he appears to have enjoyed it, even though relations with the navy were not of the best at this time. Apart from perennial interservice rivalries, there had recently been a clash between Khrushchev and the naval chief, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, over plans to build a large surface fleet. Zhukov had backed Khrushchev's preference for a submarine-based fleet and Kuznetsov was dismissed following the accidental blowing up of a battleship at Sebastopol in October 1955 that had killed hundreds of sailors.

While sailing through the Bosporus the
Kuibyshev
came across ships from the U.S. Sixth Fleet (an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, two frigates, and several destroyers). As was customary the crews of the U.S. ships lined up on deck and messaged their greetings to the Soviet minister
of defense. Zhukov was not amused, complaining: “Why is it necessary for them to be here? Why aren't their ships in their own waters?” On a happier note, the voyage allowed Zhukov the opportunity to play his accordion and he joined in the ship's concert party.
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The
Kuibyshev
arrived in the Yugoslav port of Zadar on October 8 and there began the usual round of visits, meetings, ceremonies, and speeches. Zhukov's most important encounter was with Tito, whom he met at the Yugoslav's hometown in Croatia where they went hunting for mountain goats. “For me it was a very successful hunt,” recalled Zhukov. “I killed four goats. Tito killed only one and it was clear to me that he was not very happy with his results.”
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On October 16 Zhukov submitted to Moscow a report on his conversations with Tito that emphasized Yugoslavia's desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union and to act together on a common anti-imperialist platform. On October 17 Zhukov left Belgrade for the Albanian capital of Tirana, where he undertook a similar round of visits and met Albania's communist chief Enver Hoxha.
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But Zhukov was not happy with the limited press coverage his trip received back home. On October 12 he wrote to Khrushchev to complain that
Pravda
only carried short reports of his visit and did not publish the full texts of his and the Yugoslavs' speeches. This was creating a bad impression on the Yugoslav leadership. If the Central Committee thinks it inadvisable to publish my speeches, telegraphed Zhukov, then perhaps it should announce my departure from Yugoslavia. The Presidium replied on October 14 that there were two Soviet delegations abroad just now—a visit by parliamentarians to China and the “military” delegation to Yugoslavia. If first billing was given to Zhukov's visit, that might not go down too well with either world public opinion or the Chinese. Zhukov was not satisfied with this explanation and on October 16 he wrote to Khrushchev again, giving him a little political lecture: “We are a great country, the material and spiritual base of the world communist and workers' movement, we must not—in the interests of China—give offence to small countries.”
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It may be that this testy exchange was the last straw for Khrushchev, particularly as it came in the wake of yet another policy disagreement with Zhukov. Earlier in the year Zhukov had advocated
compromise with the United States on the question of aerial reconnaissance as a means of ensuring agreements were being kept. The Americans favored Open Skies—first proposed by Eisenhower at the Geneva summit—which meant that the USSR would be required to open its airspace to American spy planes in return for access to U.S. airspace. The Soviets initially agreed to a limited version of Open Skies, but in August 1957, when the question of a more extensive agreement on Open Skies arose, while Zhukov was in favor, Khrushchev was opposed. “I do not entirely agree with comrade Zhukov's point of view,” he told the Presidium. “The potential of the enemy is higher. Whoever has the higher potential the more interested they are in intelligence. They do not know about everything we have. I agree with comrade Zhukov that the enemy will not accept it. But what if it is accepted? That will be bad.”
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The upshot of this discussion was that the Soviet Union stuck with its existing position of limited Open Skies. However, after Zhukov was ousted from office Khrushchev rescinded even the limited Open Skies proposal and withdrew the Soviet Union from U.N. disarmament negotiations.

The drama of Zhukov's second fall from grace began while he was still in Albania. On October 17 A. S. Zheltov, head of the armed forces political administration, denounced him at a Presidium meeting. Political work in the armed forces was belittled, Zheltov told the meeting. Zhukov had said that he would make sure the military councils (i.e., the political organs of the armed forces) were subordinate to military commanders. According to Zheltov, Zhukov described political workers as “red beards” who would kill all commanders if they were given knives. Zheltov complained he was not allowed to make trips to troops without permission and that Zhukov treated him with hostility. “Why? Because I was supposedly against his appointment as minister. Because I object to his glorification.” Zheltov's denunciation must have been a setup since he would not have dared to criticize Zhukov in such terms without Khrushchev's blessing. Present at the Presidium meeting were Konev and Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, commander-in-chief of ground forces. They defended the state of political work in the army (although not Zhukov personally) but their objections to Zheltov's comments were swept aside as the meeting decided to establish a commission to examine the question of strengthening
party work in the armed forces. This commission reported to the Presidium two days later and a resolution was adopted which specified that military councils were responsible for all important decisions of the armed forces. It was also decided to convene meetings of party activists in the armed forces in Moscow and Leningrad.

Khrushchev addressed two such meetings in Moscow on October 22 and 23. His direct criticisms of Zhukov were muted but it was clear that Zhukov's days were numbered. One of Khrushchev's complaints concerned a documentary film about the battle of Stalingrad that depicted Zhukov and Vasilevsky as the main architects of the counteroffensive of November 1942, whereas the credit should go to himself and Yeremenko. Two days later the minister of culture wrote to the Central Committee detailing Zhukov's interference in the film's editing, concluding that its content “propagated the cult of the personality of comrade Zhukov.”
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At the meeting on October 23 Khrushchev made a rather ominous comment. He pointed out to his audience that he had dismissed General Shtemenko as head of Soviet military intelligence because he and Zhukov had established a special school to train military saboteurs without the permission of the party leadership. Khrushchev reminded those present that Shtemenko had previously been dismissed as deputy chief of the General Staff because of his connections with Beria. He was then posted to serve as chief of staff of the Siberian Military District. However, when Zhukov became defense minister he recalled Shtemenko to Moscow and put him in charge of military intelligence.
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Khrushchev's point was that Zhukov had shown bad judgment both in appointing Shtemenko and in authorizing the establishment of the saboteurs school without the party's permission.

News of what was happening may or may not have filtered through to Zhukov in Albania. When he returned to Moscow on October 26 he had influenza and was not in good form when he attended the Presidium meeting later that day. Nevertheless, he mounted a spirited defense of his position, denying he wanted to separate the armed forces from the party and demanding a commission to investigate the charges. He accepted that there were problems with a cult of personality around him but he denied any personal interest in glory. In his contribution to the discussion Khrushchev raised Zhukov's willingness
to accept the Americans' Open Skies proposal and it was Khrushchev who proposed that Zhukov be removed as minister of defense in a resolution that was adopted unanimously, as was the decision to appoint Malinovsky in his place.
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After the Presidium meeting Zhukov telephoned Khrushchev to ask him what was going on. When Khrushchev replied that all would be revealed at the forthcoming meeting of the Central Committee, Zhukov replied: “I consider that our previously friendly relations give me the right to ask you personally why you have become unfriendly in relation to me.” To which Khrushchev responded: “Don't get so excited, we will still have work for you.”
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On October 28 and 29, 1957, the Central Committee met to ratify the dismissal and condemnation of Zhukov. Once again Suslov was Khrushchev's chief hatchet man but he was supported by a galaxy of generals and marshals anxious to settle personal scores with Zhukov as well as to demonstrate their loyalty to the party leadership. The charges against Zhukov were that he was attempting to split the army from the party and he claimed too much credit for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Suslov also introduced a new element into the critique: that Zhukov had a tendency to accumulate power. Suslov's charges were supported by Zheltov and then Zhukov was given a chance to reply. Naturally, he proclaimed his loyalty to the party and denied any intention to undermine its authority within the armed forces. On the contrary, it had been his policy to utilize military commanders—most of whom were experienced communists as well as officers—to strengthen the role of the party within the armed forces. While he was speaking Zhukov suffered the same sort of heckling from Khrushchev that he himself had inflicted on the members of Molotov's antiparty group at the June plenum of the Central Committee.

Zhukov's fellow officers piled on with a litany of charges. In his contribution to the discussion Sokolovsky, chief of the General Staff, claimed that Zhukov had without consultation altered a General Staff document stating that the Soviet Union would never start a war to a statement that it might attack first. Marshal Timoshenko reiterated Suslov's point about Zhukov's power seeking and noted his tendency to claim infallibility. Konev, like Sokolovsky, claimed to have
defended Zhukov against Stalin's attack in 1946 but he now criticized Zhukov's cult of personality. Yeremenko, who had served alongside Khrushchev at Stalingrad, harped on the falsity of Zhukov's claims in relation to the organization of the counteroffensive there. Chuikov, another Stalingrad general, complained that Stalin's cult had been replaced by Zhukov's. Rokossovsky highlighted Zhukov's vulgarity and his insulting behavior toward fellow officers, giving as an example his dispute with Zhukov during the battle of Moscow. It wasn't that Zhukov “was just rude during the war,” said Rokossovsky. “His way of commanding was literally obscene; we heard nothing but continuous cursing and swearing mixed with threats to shoot people.” Malinovsky also stressed Zhukov's vulgarity, saying he had never heard him deliver a speech that did not contain some vulgarity. Absent from the plenum was Vasilevsky, who was ill. It is difficult to say whether he would have joined in the condemnation of Zhukov. Certainly, he would have been expected to and relations between the two men remained distant until Zhukov was rehabilitated for a second time in the 1960s.

Toward the end of the plenum Zhukov spoke again, thanking the Central Committee members for their criticism and admitting he had made mistakes. But on one point he stood firm. It had been pointed out that this was not the first time he had been hauled before the Central Committee to account for his mistakes and in 1946 he had refused to recognize the errors of his ways. Zhukov's riposte was that while he accepted the criticism leveled at him now he did not and would not accept that he had been wrong in 1946.

The last word at the plenum was Khrushchev's. In a typically rambling speech he broadened the attack on Zhukov to include aspects of his war record, especially in relation to the fall of Kiev in 1941, the Kharkov debacle of 1942, and the battle of Stalingrad. Khrushchev also accused Zhukov of not understanding modern military technology. At the end of the meeting a resolution was passed confirming the Presidium's decision to sack Zhukov as defense minister and to expel him from the Central Committee as well as the Presidium.
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He would remain a member of the party but within weeks he had been stripped of all power.

After the plenum the campaign against Zhukov was carried into
the armed forces, the party, and the wider public domain. At a meeting of party members in Moscow on October 31 Marshal Moskalenko denounced Zhukov's “vanity, egoism, limitless arrogance and narcissism,” while Malinovsky blasted his “stubbornness, despotism, ambition, and search for self-glorification.” Perhaps the unkindest cut came from his old friend Bagramyan, who reportedly said that Zhukov was “simply a sick man. Self-aggrandizement is in his blood.”
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