State Violence (30 page)

This Shoot-to-Kill policy has already been outlined in
The SAS in Ireland 1969–1989
(Raymond Murray) and in a pamphlet entitled
State Killings
(Raymond Murray) published by Relatives for Justice. The policy became a virtual campaign in the 1980s.

From the time of Sam Marshall's death in Lurgan on 7 March 1990 until John O'Hanlon's death on 1 September 1994, loyalist paramilitaries have killed 185 people (3 others not in these figures were killed by an RUC member in a Sinn Féin office in Belfast in 1992). Of the 185 killings 168 of them were sectarian or political in motive. The remaining 17 deaths were internal and non-sectarian. There were also over 300 attempted killings and other attacks during the same period. In 103 of the sectarian/political type killings there is evidence of some form of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces.

The RUC informed some of the victims that their personal details, contained in official British Intelligence files, were in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. Some victims were killed by loyalist gangs with members of the security forces in their ranks. Some were killed by weapons reportedly stolen from members of the security forces before their deaths. Some were killed by weaponry acquired by loyalist paramilitaries with the assistance of a number of British Intelligence agents, Brian Nelson being the best known of these. Nelson, when he appeared in court in January 1992, was suspected to have played a vital role in 10 murders and the targeting of a further 16 people who were later murdered or wounded. An apparent deal was made and he was convicted of less serious offences.

Brian Nelson received a 10-year sentence in February 1992 for his role in loyalist violence. He was a British military agent. He was also the UDA's intelligence officer, responsible for setting up people to be killed. He had unlimited access to security forces intelligence documents on nationalists and republicans. Such information was supplied to the UDA by himself or by security forces sympathetic to loyalist paramilitaries. The effects of Nelson's work in refining the UDA's intelligence department is still being felt.

‘The legacy is that since Nelson's arrest another 6 people have been killed and 3 injured. These people's names were among the 369 found in Nelson's possession at the time of his arrest'. (BBC Panorama Programme
The Dirty War 1992.)

The role of Nelson and other British agents in assisting loyalist paramilitaries to acquire an arms shipment from South Africa has had a great impact on loyalist violence. The significance of the South African weaponry to loyalist death squads, and how they acquired it, was exposed in a report on BBC's
Insight Ulster
on 28 January 1993. British intelligence services alleged a breakdown of their own intelligence and surveillance. The shipment, it was reported, had been monitored by British Intelligence from South Africa to the north of Ireland, but a breakdown occurred when it arrived and they lost trace of it. The report pointed out how the South African weapons have enhanced the killing capacity of loyalist paramilitaries, revealing that before the arrival of such sophisticated weapons loyalist killers were more likely to have used home-made machine-guns, sawn-off shotguns and old revolvers.

The murders in Cappagh, at the mobile shop in Craigavon, the Hyster factory in Lurgan, the Ormeau Road and Oldpark ‘bookies', and Castlerock, the pub massacres at Greysteel and Loughinisland, were all carried out by loyalists using weaponry imported from South Africa. They also used them in many individual killings. In fact from the Milltown killings in March 1988 to the slaughter of six men watching a football match on television in a public house at Loughinisland, County Down, in June 1994, all loyalist multiple killings have been carried out with South African weaponry.

Note the following comparison. In the six years before the arrival of these weapons, from January 1982 to December 1987, loyalist paramilitaries murdered 71 people of whom 49 were sectarian/political. In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalists murdered 229 people, of whom 207 were sectarian/political.

Brian Nelson was arrested in January 1990, following the investigation of Cambridgeshire Chief Constable John Stevens into the leaking of security forces' intelligence files. The UFF had boasted that they used security forces' intelligence files in the murder of Loughlin Maginn in August 1989. Stevens ended his inquiry in May 1990. In his report he was able to conclude ‘that members of the security forces have passed on information to paramilitaries' and that ‘there was no organised campaign of leaks'.

But, if his recommendations were introduced, he said, ‘then there is every hope that future collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups will be eradicated'.

Among the 83 recommendations of John Stevens were the blurring of copies of files when files were photocopied and a system to identify user access to computer records on suspects. Amnesty International in a statement following the release of people charged with possession of leaked files in October 1990 said, ‘It is obvious from all the evidence that collusion remains a fact of life and that the government is not prepared to confront it'.

The belief of Amnesty International that the Stevens inquiry was a failure can be seen in the continuing evidence of security forces' intelligence files going missing and ending up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries.

The continuing flow of security forces' intelligence files to loyalist paramilitaries led to the return of (now Northumbria) Chief Constable John Stevens to Northern Ireland in August 1993. As in September 1989, the content of his investigation was not disclosed. A report on the second investigation was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in February 1994. In July 1994 the DPP asked Mr Stevens to make further inquiries. The DPP's request, it was reported, was made following an examination of the findings of Mr Stevens' recent inquiry. To date there has been no indication of charges being brought.

Amnesty International in reports published in 1993 and 1994 again criticised the British government and the RUC for their handling of the collusion issue and for their failure to establish an independent inquiry.

The Nelson case focused on another suspicion of the nationalist community, namely, that British troops patrolling nationalist areas have had on occasions a role in loyalist attacks. In the murders of Gerard Slane and Terence McDaid in 1988, both of whom were set up by Nelson, relatives claimed there was suspicious activity by the security forces near their homes prior to the loyalist attacks. Gerard Slane's home was raided by the security forces two weeks before his death. Both families believed the activity of the security forces was a reconnaissance in preparation for the loyalist killings.

The most common accusations of collusion concern the removal of checkpoints, some of which were in place before loyalist attacks. Some areas where loyalist attacks have taken place have witnessed saturation levels of security forces patrolling and searching prior to attacks. The suspicion of collusion was supported in January 1993 by remarks made by their commanding officer in the north, Sir John Wilsey. When asked what was his attitude to employing agents like Nelson and the morality thereof, he replied that he was ‘certainly not ashamed of Nelson's role'.

Information and weaponry are not the only forms of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. During the period covered by this article, 51 serving and former security forces' members were charged or convicted of terrorist-related offences ranging from illegal possession of arms to murder.

Political and clerical leaders in the Catholic community and their local press have criticised the security forces' lack of response to appeals for adequate protection. Loyalist death squads have used the same routes again and again to enter nationalist areas and to flee after murders. Lanark Way off the Springfield Road in west Belfast was opened in the summer of 1986 and, despite it being used as an escape route by loyalists in eight murders and numerous attempted killings, it was not closed until the murder of Philomena Hanna in April 1992. She was the ninth victim of loyalist violence. North Howard Street, Rosapenna Street and the Donegall Road are other examples where persistent pleas for closure of thoroughfares used by loyalist death squads have been ignored.

A recent example of security forces ignoring requests by Catholics for protection occurred on the night of 27 April 1994 in west Belfast. Paul Thompson and a friend were in a car and were making a U-turn at the bottom of Springfield Park, which is a cul de sac. Unknown to both men, loyalist gunmen had gained access to the street through a hole in the pallisade fencing which was part of the ‘peace line'. The gunmen opened fire on the vehicle killing Paul Thompson and wounding his friend who saved his life by driving away. One of the first on the scene was a woman resident of Springfield Park. She had noticed the hole in the fencing earlier that day and, realising the danger (there had been at least 16 murder attempts in the Upper Springfield Road area in the previous three and a half years), telephoned the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office immediately. She was told by those who received the calls that the matter would be looked into and resolved as soon as possible. But the fence was neither repaired nor security in the area increased. Several hours after her plea, as she stood at the front door, she witnessed what she feared might happen, the murder of an innocent person.

This inadequacy of the security forces in protecting nationalists was revealed again in the failure of British army and RUC bases, despite sophisticated surveillance equipment, to detect, deter or arrest loyalist murder gangs. The murders of Sam Marshall in Lurgan and Thomas Hughes, Martin O'Prey, James Carson, Kieran Abrams, Joseph McCloskey and Seán Monaghan in Belfast, are examples where the gangs responsible could have been observed by security forces in their bases. There are other examples of this situation in a number of attempted killings.

Another persistent complaint of nationalists concerns the failure of the security forces to respond promptly to some killings and attempted killings by loyalists. When they arrive on the scene their reaction has been misdirected. It is often nationalist areas which feel the brunt of follow-up operations rather than the areas to which the killers escaped. There have been murders and attempted murders where there have been no follow-up operations. Relatives and friends of the victims of loyalist violence have complained about the bad behaviour of security forces arriving in the aftermath of a murder or attempted murder. Their conduct at the scene of the Sinn Féin office killings, the Peter McTasney killing in Bawnmore estate, the Seán Anderson murder near Pomeroy, and the murder of Theresa Clinton in Belfast was insulting and oppressive. Funerals of some of the victims of loyalist violence have been disrupted by an undue heavy force of RUC and British army presence either around the family home while the body was waked or at church and graveyard. Mourners have been stopped, searched and on occasions abused. Mourners at the funerals of Thomas Donaghy, Kilrea, Kevin McKearney, Moy, and Conor Maguire and Mark Rodgers in Belfast were severely harassed.

RUC forensic teams investigating killings and attempted killings have sometimes failed to remove all relevant material from the scene of the incident. The bag, with spent shells inside, used by the RUC member who murdered three people in the Sinn Féin office on the Falls Road, was found in the office after the forensic team left the scene. Similarly, after the forensic team left the home of teenager Gerard O'Hara, having spent a number of hours in the house, bullets fired by the gunmen were found in the living-room where the young man was killed. One of the bullets had blood on it.

RUC forensic teams have been reluctant to disclose the ballistic history of weapons used by loyalists. In the mid-Ulster and north Armagh areas demands for this information by nationalist politicians and others have been ignored. When information has been released, it has tended to be general rather than specific. For example, following the murder of four men in Cappagh, County Tyrone, on 3 March 1991, the RUC confirmed that the weapons had been used before in seven killings in two years in the Lurgan, Stewartstown and Cookstown areas, but they did not specify which killings. ‘It is not our policy to give the history of firearms for evidential reasons' was how an RUC spokesman responded to a demand for information on the weapons used to kill Tommy Casey in October 1990 near Cookstown. This attitude contrasts with the release of the ballistic history of weapons used by republican groups. The most recent example followed the shooting of Jimmy Brown in Belfast by the IPLO in August 1992. Within hours of his death the media had a full record of the weapon used to kill Brown and previous victims.

Catholic complaints about the British army and the RUC in regard to their attitude to loyalist violence may be summarised as follows:

1.
Failure to respond to nationalist demands for protection.

2.
How do RUC and British army bases fail to detect or deter loyalist murder gangs when they enter Catholic areas since they are equipped with sophisticated surveillance apparatus?

3.
The response of the RUC after loyalist attacks is slow and complacent.

4.
Injury is added to injury when the RUC and British army oppress Catholic areas following loyalist attacks. They do not direct their attention to the areas into which the loyalists have escaped.

5.
There have been incidents when there have been no follow-up operation of the RUC.

6.
British army and RUC have sometimes insulted and abused the families of the victims and have beaten and insulted mourners at funerals of their murdered relatives even when the funerals have had no paramilitary trappings.

7.
RUC forensic teams have been wilfully negligent or incompetent in gathering evidence at the scene of murders carried out by loyalists paramilitaries.