Steeped in Blood (39 page)

5  The allegations of a cover-up and uncertainty about the cause of the fire prevented families of victims from putting the matter to rest. Individual submissions were made to this Commission by Mr Peter Wills, twin brother of John Wills who was killed in the crash, Mr Rod Cramb, brother of a crew member; Mr Pieter Strijdom, whose wife died on board; and Ms Michelline Daniels, who lost her brother. The Commission also received a submission from Friends of the Victims of the
Helderberg
, urging the Commission to find the cause of the destruction of the plane.

6  The Commission began an investigation in late 1997 despite the fact that it was unclear whether the crash was politically motivated, a criterion for an enquiry by the Commission. Although extensive enquiries were conducted and circumstantial evidence collected, the Commission was unable to determine the cause of the fire. It is hoped, however, that the Commission’s efforts will assist any future investigations into the matter.

METHODOLOGY

7  An enormous amount of documentation about the incident was made available to the commission by an investigative journalist. Documents included cargo manifests, submissions to the Margo Commission, newspaper reports, reports by independent scientists and engineers and a report by the Flight Engineers Association, amongst others.

8  Investigators analysed the documentation and identified individuals who could provide additional information to the Commission. These included families of victims and former SAA employees. Once these individuals had been interviewed, the Commission decided to approach a further group of people. Many of these represented the interests of the implicated parties, such as SAA and Armscor. It was decided that the Commission should utilise its section 29 powers to hold an
in camera
investigative enquiry to canvass the views of these people. This would provide them with an opportunity to answer questions in the presence of their legal representatives and would
enable a panel of Commissioners to evaluate the information gained at first hand. The following people appeared as witnesses at the hearing:

•   Mr Joseph Braizblatt, SAA cargo manager at Ben Gurion airport, Tel Aviv, Israel;

•   Dr David Klatzow, an independent forensic scientist;

•   Mr Richard Steyl, an Armscor employee in the shipping department;

•   Dr J Steyn, a former Armscor employee and MD of Altech Electronic Systems, which had two loads of cargo on the
Helderberg
;

•   Mr John David Hare, a former Armscor employee who joined SAA;

•   Mr Brian Watching, a former SAA employee;

•   Mr Tinie Willemse, a lawyer who was chief director : international relations of SAA at the time of the incident;

•   Mr Gerrit Dirk van der Veer, chief executive officer of SAA at the time of the incident;

•   Mr Thinus Jacobs, manager of SAA in Taipei between 1987 and 1991;

•   Mr Mickey Mitchell, chief of operations for SAA at Jan Smuts (incorporating Springbok Radio Tower) at the time of the incident;

•   Dr André Buys, Armscor general manager: planning

9  Others who were interviewed included:

•   Mr Japie Smit, director of civil aviation;

•   Mr Leslie Stokoe, an expert on dangerous goods;

•   Mr Vernon Nadel, duty officer at the Springbok Radio centre on the night of the incident;

•   Mr Rennie van Zyl, current chief director of civil aviation;

•   Mr Jimmy Mouton, SAA flight engineer and friend of the flight engineer killed in the crash.

INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS

The cause of the fire

10 Nothing in the cargo inventory could have resulted in a ‘self-promoted’ fire. However, the original cargo manifests were not part of the record of the Margo Commission, and it is uncertain whether those in the possession of the Commission are authentic. There is therefore no reliable list of what cargo was being transported by the
Helderberg
when it crashed.

11 It was suggested to the Commission that Armscor may have had a goods consignment on the
Helderberg
that could have been responsible for causing the fire. Armscor conducted an internal investigation after the incident and denies having had any items on the flight.

12 The Commission believed that two Armscor employees from the company Somchem, which was producing rockets and missiles during the apartheid years, could provide important information. Armscor could not assist the Commission in locating either Dr JJ Dekker, who was the MD of Somchem, or Mr François Humphries, who was procurement officer at the time. 13 Interviews with SAA pilots indicated that there was a belief amongst pilots that passenger flights were frequently used to transport armaments and components for Armscor.

The timing of the fire

 14 Much time has been spent attempting to determine the exact time the fire broke out. The conclusion reached by the Margo Commission was that the fire started just before the descent to land in Mauritius.

15 This conclusion is questionable because of the fact that there is no overlap between the conversation of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR, commonly
known as the black box) and the conversations between the
Helderberg
and Mauritius air control an hour before the crash and again four minutes before the crash. This could indicate that the CVR stopped recording before the descent for landing, and the recorded conversation could therefore have taken place at any time on the nine-hour flight from Taipei.

16 The conversation on the CVR was analysed by the Flight Engineers Association, which concluded that the discussion was likely to have taken place within three hours of the flight leaving Taipei. This would indicate that something stopped the recording at this early stage of the flight. The flight engineers presented the Margo Commission with a submission indicating that they believed there had been two fires on board.

17 The Margo Commission ruled most of the CVR recording inadmissible because it was irrelevant and too personal. Analysts have argued that this decision by Justice Margo prevented his commission from accurately placing the conversation and may therefore have led to incorrect conclusions.

18 The theory of two fires on board was impossible to test adequately, since the recording of the conversations between the
Helderberg
and South African air traffic control went missing shortly after the incident and was never recovered.

In a letter to the Commission, a United States marine said that the CIA had a recording of this conversation. The Commission wrote to the director of the CIA asking him to confirm this and to make a copy available. No response was received.

The fire

19 The Margo Commission did not find a cause for the fire on board the
Helderberg
, but said that it might have been caused by ‘ordinary packaging material’. This Commission’s investigation indicates that ordinary
packaging material is unlikely to have been the cause, for the following reasons:

•   The fire was contained, and burnt fiercely at a high temperature.

•   A packaging material fire causes a great deal of smoke, which would have set off the smoke alarms before the fire threatened the structure of the plane. The indications are that the smoke detectors were not activated until the fire had reached dangerous proportions.

•   A promoted fire could reach very high temperatures (far in excess of 1000 degrees Celsius) without setting off smoke alarms.

•   A promoted fire could cause packaging materials to catch alight if they were to be exposed to the flames.

20 The possibility of a ‘self-promoted’ fire is raised in a submission to the Margo Commission by Mr Greg Southeard, a chemist working for Burgoyne and Partners of the United Kingdom. Southeard indicated that he believed that the fire could have been caused by an incendiary device or a hazardous substance.

21 The director of civil aviation, Mr Japie Smit, told this Commission that most of such fires the world over are caused by illegal substances on board, and said that, when they simulated the fire, they were unable to put it out without the assistance of the fire brigade.

22 A letter from a Somchem employee to a journalist working on the matter stated that:

South Africa’s ammonium perchlorate (APC) production facility was set up in the 1970s at Somchem. Around the time of the Helderberg crash, South Africa was involved in military operations in Angola, Namibia and on the home front. The operational demand for solid rocket fuels was high. Somchem was not keeping up with the demand. A decision was made to double the capacity. This involved shutting down the plant for the duration of the extensions. Because
of the ongoing demand, it was impossible to stockpile APC prior to the shutdown. Obviously a large quantity of APC had to be sourced outside the country for a period of several months in defiance of prevailing military sanctions. This was difficult and expensive, and I believe that initially the necessary APC was sourced from America and that it was brought in on SAA passenger planes as an integral part of the necessary deception (Commission’s summary).

23 Ammonium perchlorate is used mainly in military Class One applications, and as such is forbidden on all aircraft. Class Five, for commercial/technical application, could be carried by air in limited quantities depending on the type of aircraft (passenger or cargo) and packaging instruction. Supplier countries include the United States, China, Japan and France.

The investigation

24 Questions raised throughout the investigation process indicated that the investigators of the Margo Commission had not followed correct procedures. The matters raised are summarised in the finding below.

CONCLUSION

25 This Commission’s investigation into the
Helderberg
crash raised significant questions about the incident itself as well as the subsequent investigations that were conducted.

26 The matter is still under investigation by the special investigation team of the Gauteng Attorney-General.

THIS COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF THE
HELDERBERG
ON 28 OCTOBER 1987 SHOWED THAT MANY QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS REMAIN UNANSWERED, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

•   THE DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION (DCA) NEGLECTED TO SECURE ALL DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDINGS AS REQUIRED BY THE FLIGHT ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION (FEA) REGULATIONS:

•   THE CARGO MANIFESTS WERE MISSING

•   MR JIMMY MOUTON OF THE FEA ALLEGES THAT THE FEA WAS REQUESTED BY THE LAWYER ACTING FOR THE DCA, AS WELL AS BY JUSTICE MARGO HIMSELF AT A LATER STAGE, TO WITHDRAW ITS SUBMISSION INDICATING THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN TWO FIRES ON BOARD.

•   THE TAPE WHICH WOULD HAVE RECORDED CONTACT BETWEEN THE
HELDERBERG
AND SPRINGBOK RADIO CONTROL REMAINS MISSING.

•   EYEWITNESSES OF THE CRASH WERE NOT CALLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MARGO COMMISSION.

•   THE MARGO COMMISSION DID NOT CALL MEMBERS OF ARMSCOR TO GIVE EVIDENCE.

27 It is clear that further investigation is necessary before this matter can be laid to rest.

– Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Special Investigation:
Helderberg
Crash, Volume Two, Chapter Six

HITMAN TELLS HOW HE BOTCHED ‘ASSISTED SUICIDE’ TWICE BEFORE SUCCEEDING

‘HOW I KILLED KEBBLE’

Natasha Marrian

Sapa

Johannesburg: Boxer Michael Schultz yesterday told the South Gauteng High Court here how he twice botched mining magnate Brett Kebble’s ‘assisted suicide’.

Schultz, the State’s first witness, called by Gauteng deputy director of public prosecutions Dan Dakana, described how he shot and killed Kebble.

‘I leaned out the car window, pointing the firearm at him. He just lifted his shoulder, his right shoulder, and looked in front. I aimed at his head and pulled the trigger, but the weapon did not discharge,’ Schultz said, describing the night of September 27, 2005. He was testifying as State witness in the trial of convicted drug trafficker Glenn Agliotti, who faced four charges, two related to Kebble’s murder.

After the gun failed to discharge the first time, he and accomplices-turned-State-witnesses Faizel Smith and Nigel McGurk drove off. After inspecting the weapon they returned and found Kebble in his vehicle. ‘I leaned out of the window and pointed the firearm. Once again the gun did not discharge.’

Schultz said he then told Kebble to wait for him. The trio drove away for the second time. He inspected the gun. They made a U-turn and returned to where they had left Kebble.

However, Kebble had driven off. They stopped their car and saw him coming towards them. They flashed their headlights at him. He made a U-turn and ‘stopped hard’ next to them.

‘I could see the disappointment in his face; he gave me a look like to say ‘get this over with, you’re putting me through hell’,’ Schultz said.

He leaned out of the window and aimed for Kebble’s body. ‘I pulled the trigger – this time the gun fired. I kept firing.’

Schultz could not remember how many times he shot, but said he had been instructed Kebble should not suffer. The three then drove away. Schultz looked back and saw Kebble’s car rolling forward and hitting the pavement. They sped from the scene in Melrose Street in Johannesburg to Smith’s panel-beating business, where Smith cut the gun into pieces and said he would dispose of it.

The next morning Schultz got up and went to gym.

During cross-examination, Agliotti’s lawyer Laurence Hodes SC put it to Schultz that his client ‘never ever conspired with you to aid the murder of Roger Brett Kebble’. To which Schultz replied: ‘No, he didn’t.’

Hodes then asked Schultz whether he agreed that Agliotti had not ‘in any manner’ killed the mining magnate. To which Schultz replied: ‘I agree.’

He asked Schultz whether Agliotti had received part of the R2 million offered by Kebble to help him die. ‘Not from the R2 million, no, not to my knowledge,’ he replied.

The only time Schultz was contacted by Agliotti about the murder was on September 22 when Kebble was to have been killed. Schultz was phoned by (Kebble’s former security head) Clinton Nassif’s wife with a message from him that the ‘meeting’ was off. He received a call from Agliotti to ‘call the boys off’.