Tank Tracks to Rangoon (18 page)

A Sherman of the Royal Deccan Horse in action at Yewe, near Yindaw. (
Imperial War Museum
)

The Carabiniers support an infantry attack on 33 Corps’ axis of advance. (
Imperial War Museum
)

The dash to Rangoon. The tank commander is Lt. Gurchuran Singh, who rose to command 7th Light Cavalry after independence. (
Imperial War Museum
)

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Depression – 7 degrees.

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One example amongst many will suffice. During the Imphal battle, C Squadron’s mess waiter tried to put out the cooks’ fire with a can of petrol, effectively destroying the mess tent. Such goings-on were regarded as being rather more of a threat than the Japanese.

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Bread.

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Cannister ammunition has the effect of turning the tank’s main armament into a gigantic shot-gun. Even fired from the small 37-mm of the Stuart it was horribly effective – when fired against Chinese mass attacks by 20-pdr marks of Centurion in Korea it was utterly devastating.

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Internal abuse should be reserved for the inter-comm system; if the control is set at A instead of I/C, everyone on the same frequency can hear what is being said. This is often interesting, but prevents other traffic.

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Shut up!

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Jot Ram’s account does not mention that one of the drivers had been killed in the attempt to recover Morgan’s tank; this could well have influenced Morgan’s decision to remain with his vehicles. In fact, Ris. Bharat Singh brought up more Gurkhas twice during the night, but on each occasion they were all killed.

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Slope.

On 29th March 1944 Lt-General Yamauchi’s 15th Division cut the road north of Imphal at the village of Kanglatongbi, and a few days later Lt-General Sato’s 31st Division invested Kohima. The troops on the Imphal plain were completely isolated from the rest of India.

The plain itself covers an area of some 700 square miles, and is 2,500 feet above sea level. It is entirely surrounded by mountains up to 8,000 feet in height. Through it, from north to south, runs the Manipur River, draining a marshy area known as the Log Tag Lake at the southern end of the plain. The only reasonable road is that from Dimapur, which enters from the north after passing through Kohima, crosses the plain, and winds southwards through the mountains towards Tiddim.

If Imphal town was the centre of a clock, the Dimapur road would leave it at twelve. At one o’clock is a massive detached hill feature known as Nunshigum. At two, some thirty miles distant, is the Ukhrul saddle, giving access by the most primitive of tracks to the upper reaches of the Chindwin, many miles beyond. At four o’clock is the Shenam saddle, and the road to the Kabaw valley. At six, the Manipur River and Log Tag Lake. At seven, the Tiddim road, with the villages of Bishenpur, Potsangbam
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and Ningthoukong along it; and at nine o’clock, another primitive track which snaked through the mountains to Silchar in Assam, some sixty miles distant.

The Battle of Imphal was an untidy battle. Both geographically and in time it is not possible to say exactly where or when it began and ended. Broadly speaking, it lasted from the end of March until the middle of June, and was fought out around the edges of the plain and the approaches to Imphal town. To the north, another battle, strategically interconnected, raged around Kohima.

6 The Imphal Plain

It might, perhaps, assist the reader to see the course of the action if he imagines it as being an enormous reconstruction of the Admin Box battle. This time the garrison consisted of the entire 4 Corps, which had been joined by 5th Indian Division, flown in from the Arakan. As in the case of the Admin Box, supplies, and reinforcements, came in by air.

The Japanese attacks, too, resembled those on the Admin Box. All their skill in jungle movement was wasted by unco-ordinated arrivals and piecemeal attacks, frittering away their slender resources. Their communications between units was virtually tribal, their supply system taxed beyond its creaky capacity and harried by Chindits, and their medical services little short of grisly. At the end, they ate grass and slugs, but only left when
they had nothing with which to fight, those of them who had not been killed starved to death or died of tropical fevers.

Again, just as 5th Indian Division had fought its way through the Ngakyedauk Pass to relieve the Admin Box, so too did 33 Corps, under Lt-General Sir Montagu Stopford battle its way past Kohima and effect a junction north of Imphal with 4 Corps.

To tell in detail all that 254 Tank Brigade did to assist die infantry to final victory would require far more space than I have available, and for this reason I have selected those actions which had a direct bearing on the outcome of the battle, and of these the most desperate and dramatic was the fight for Nunshigum.

This feature was an isolated ridge which towered 1,000 feet over the plain, dominating several road junctions, and, infinitely more important, 4 Corps’ principal airstrips. If Nunshigum fell to the Japanese, the end of the Battle of Imphal might well have had more like that of Dien Bien Phu than the Admin Box.

In fact, it did fall on 10th April, after some days of vicious fighting which saw the feature change hands several times. A final counter attack by 3/9th Jats, with fire support from half the Carabiniers’ B Squadron, failed on 11th April, and a heavier attack was planned for the 13th involving 1st Dogras under Colonel ‘Lakri’ Woods, and the whole of B Squadron under Major E. A. Sanford.

By now, of course, the enemy had had time to consolidate his position, and it was appreciated that even if the infantry did reach the top, they would not be able to deal with the bunkers without direct support from the tanks; but could the Lees climb the exceedingly steep slopes to the summit? Both Brigadier Scoones and Colonel Younger expressed their opinion that they could, although the limited time available did not permit a detailed reconnaissance of the going.

Nunshigum ridge is 7,000 yards long, and the summit is composed of a number of small hills joined by hog’s-back cols, some only a few yards wide. Whilst the summit itself is covered with fairly open jungle, the slopes were clothed in long grass and shrubs. It was a good scramble by any standards, and took the average infantryman an hour to climb, without combat hazards.

The attack was planned with a heavy artillery support programme, accompanied by continuous ground straffing by Hurri-bombers and Vengeance Dive Bombers. The assault itself would converge on the summit by way of the south-eastern and southwestern spurs, and then clear the crest.

7 The battle for Nunshigum

The Dogra’s A Company, accompanied by Lt H. N. Neale’s No 5 Troop, plus Sanford’s HQ tanks and that of the FOO, would climb the western spur whilst B Company with Lt C. T. V. FitzHerbert’s No 4 Troop climbed the eastern spur, B Squadron’s two remaining troops, No 6 under Lt A. Weir, and No 7 under Lt C. A. Stewart, would provide overhead fire support during the climb from their position on the plain below. The whole operation was under the command of Colonel Woods, who had been told that failure could not be contemplated.

The attacking force began its long climb at about 1030 hours, the thunder of the bombardment above muffled by the low-gear roaring of the tank engines. It was a slow and painful business, and inside the vehicles the drivers, sweating hands gripping the steering levers and throttles fully open, were anxiously watching their engine temperature gauges and feeling ‘with the seat of their pants’ for the first hint of a disastrous side slip that could send their tank crabwise down the steep slopes, crashing its way through the undergrowth until it finally overturned or dropped over the edge of a nullah.

By 1115 the tanks and infantry had completed their climb, and were converging on the Pyramid, the first of the summit features, which was being battered by the Hurri-bombers and hammered by the artillery. This was climbed and captured without difficulty, as was the central feature, known as the Twin Bumps, from which observers in the valley below could see the enemy running north along the ridge. The way ahead now became clear.

This lay along a razor-backed col which linked the Twin Bumps to the next feature, the Northern Bump, and it was clear that the tanks would have to proceed in single file along this, with the infantry companies deployed on either side.

Neale’s troop led off along the col, followed by Sanford with SHQ, then FitzHerbert’s troop, with the FOO bringing up the rear. As the commander’s optical aids in the Lee left a lot to be desired, all tank commanders had their heads out so that they could exercise a proper control over their vehicles’ movements along this precarious route. Because of the nature of the going, the tanks were travelling about 1 mph.

As they closed on the Northern Bump, all seemed to be going well. Nothing could have been more deceptive, for no sooner had the artillery and air support finished than the Japanese counter attacked in strength from both flanks, yelling and screaming as they closed in on the tanks.

The tank commanders attempted to hold them off with grenades, tommy guns and pistols, but in spite of this, and the casualties caused by supporting fire from other tanks and the Dogras, they came to grips and were obviously at their most vicious, making a special effort to get at the officers.