Target (14 page)
Authors: Robert K. Wilcox
But the trick backfired. “I had no idea it would be an [important] American [he would eventually be asked to kill] and least of all a great general.” Upon being identified as the type they were looking for, he wrote there was much “sparring” in the preliminary
talks with Donovan, who probed him about his background, especially about the killings he had already done. “He [Donovan] was non-committal, very shifty, always ‘OSS has no place for this type of brutality.’” But then he would ask for details. Bazata writes he told him about his exploits in Cuba, the bums on the train, others he “dispatched. I’d say, ‘Of course, Sir. I ask only to aid our war effort in any small way’” and emphasized “my operating alone . . . never once caught, never once talked, even for survival. And I don’t care about glory.” Once accepted, however, he wrote, it was like a weight had been lifted from Donovan’s shoulders. “He was afraid . . . relieved to throw it all on me . . . and maybe ashamed.... As soon as I said no problem... they [Donovan?] were instantly happy... had a magical belief in me . . . his [Donovan’s] attitude and confidence in me [opened] up . . . he got bolder, using stronger language . . . .”
talks with Donovan, who probed him about his background, especially about the killings he had already done. “He [Donovan] was non-committal, very shifty, always ‘OSS has no place for this type of brutality.’” But then he would ask for details. Bazata writes he told him about his exploits in Cuba, the bums on the train, others he “dispatched. I’d say, ‘Of course, Sir. I ask only to aid our war effort in any small way’” and emphasized “my operating alone . . . never once caught, never once talked, even for survival. And I don’t care about glory.” Once accepted, however, he wrote, it was like a weight had been lifted from Donovan’s shoulders. “He was afraid . . . relieved to throw it all on me . . . and maybe ashamed.... As soon as I said no problem... they [Donovan?] were instantly happy... had a magical belief in me . . . his [Donovan’s] attitude and confidence in me [opened] up . . . he got bolder, using stronger language . . . .”
For instance, in describing one of the undated meetings, he wrote, “[Donovan’s] sycophant aids [sic] left the room. We were absolutely alone....He said, “Douglas, we have a most disagreeable, perplexing problem—a disobedient general. There is no time for dismissal, especially as he performs miracles. I have been ordered through proper channels to delay, detour and stop this general. He is George Patton. I want you to undertake this assignment.” What specifically did he have in mind, asked Bazata? “Play it as it develops, dependant largely on Patton, the terrain, and the Germans. It must look like an accident of war.”
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Throughout the discussions of “stopping Patton,” Bazata writes he was shocked and confused, although he believed he hid it from Donovan. He did not know whether to accept or refuse. Sometimes he indicates he was just playing a game with Donovan and had no intention of doing anything rash. The idea of killing Patton—broached, he writes, in these meetings—
“repulsed” him. Other times he elaborates on how he was turned by Donovan into acceptance of what eventually became the killing order. He seems, in these post-Patton writings, to be endlessly battling with himself about whether he had done right or wrong, whether he was justified or not, a patriot or a monster, battling with the truth of just how much involvement he had actually had in any Patton plot—but always indicating that a plot to kill the general had existed. About that there is no confusion, no ambiguity.
“repulsed” him. Other times he elaborates on how he was turned by Donovan into acceptance of what eventually became the killing order. He seems, in these post-Patton writings, to be endlessly battling with himself about whether he had done right or wrong, whether he was justified or not, a patriot or a monster, battling with the truth of just how much involvement he had actually had in any Patton plot—but always indicating that a plot to kill the general had existed. About that there is no confusion, no ambiguity.
In one such run, he writes, “What should I do?... Why did he [Donovan] do this to me?. . . He could have resigned—as I could have . . . . Should I try to counter? Warn Patton?”—something he claims elsewhere actually to have done. But here, relating what may have been a short moment in a long period of indecision, he writes, “Decided against any [counter] whatsoever. D [Donovan] had warned me [he] would deny me—as liar—madman—possibly admitting he had met me at “my insistence”. . . [but] never admit we discussed. . . . ” He would have turned Bazata over to the army and “cashiering.” And what else? Elimination? He had to be careful, he wrote. It was “a dirty, very dirty business.”
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When Millar’s book
Maquis
was rushed into publication in early 1945—an attempt by the British, according to Bazata, to get credit for the important Special Operations work in France—Donovan, “was green with fear,” wrote Bazata. He thought “I’d collaborated with Millar to pop the Patton story.” Bazata assured Donovan that he had not. “I told him I’d read the book & we had nothing to fear save betrayal by his [Donovan’s] friends and sponsors . . . the Brits.” Thus challenged, “Donovan gulped.” He asked if (Bazata) had any “specifics” regarding the charge he was working for the Brits. Only when Bazata assured Donovan that he did not, he writes, did Donovan “relax.”
Maquis
was rushed into publication in early 1945—an attempt by the British, according to Bazata, to get credit for the important Special Operations work in France—Donovan, “was green with fear,” wrote Bazata. He thought “I’d collaborated with Millar to pop the Patton story.” Bazata assured Donovan that he had not. “I told him I’d read the book & we had nothing to fear save betrayal by his [Donovan’s] friends and sponsors . . . the Brits.” Thus challenged, “Donovan gulped.” He asked if (Bazata) had any “specifics” regarding the charge he was working for the Brits. Only when Bazata assured Donovan that he did not, he writes, did Donovan “relax.”
Bazata is not the only knowledgeable person to believe that the unpredictable and secretive Donovan may have been a British agent. It is fairly well known that British agent-envoy, Sir William Stephenson,
A Man Called Intrepid
,
12
was intricately involved in getting Donovan selected as the head of the OSS. Donovan and Stephenson’s friendship went back to World War I, according to Cave Brown in
Last Hero
, Donovan’s biography. They both had served in the war, and Brown believes they had met at a French hospital, although that is in dispute amongst Donovan-Stephenson scholars.
13
Stephenson had been an infantryman and decorated fighter pilot in WWI, and Donovan, an officer in New York’s famous “Fighting 69
th
,” a unit about which a movie starring James Cagney was later made. It had been Donovan’s later fact-finding mission to England for President Roosevelt in 1940 during the Battle of Britain that had helped FDR justify sending controversial war supplies to the besieged island nation. This was before Pearl Harbor brought America into the war and many Americans were not willing to commit to the European conflict. Isolationists, wanting to avoid any American involvement, felt Britain was on the verge of defeat and U.S. aid would be wasted. Roosevelt, wanting to help England, was facing reelection and needed a good reason and a lawful way to get involved. Donovan had returned with the report that Britain was indeed holding its own against the Germans and could prevail if supplied with American ships, planes, and other war items. He also helped fashion a lawful and politically acceptable way to do it: “Lend-Lease,” a reciprocal arrangement where the supplies were exchanged for U.S. use of British bases.
A Man Called Intrepid
,
12
was intricately involved in getting Donovan selected as the head of the OSS. Donovan and Stephenson’s friendship went back to World War I, according to Cave Brown in
Last Hero
, Donovan’s biography. They both had served in the war, and Brown believes they had met at a French hospital, although that is in dispute amongst Donovan-Stephenson scholars.
13
Stephenson had been an infantryman and decorated fighter pilot in WWI, and Donovan, an officer in New York’s famous “Fighting 69
th
,” a unit about which a movie starring James Cagney was later made. It had been Donovan’s later fact-finding mission to England for President Roosevelt in 1940 during the Battle of Britain that had helped FDR justify sending controversial war supplies to the besieged island nation. This was before Pearl Harbor brought America into the war and many Americans were not willing to commit to the European conflict. Isolationists, wanting to avoid any American involvement, felt Britain was on the verge of defeat and U.S. aid would be wasted. Roosevelt, wanting to help England, was facing reelection and needed a good reason and a lawful way to get involved. Donovan had returned with the report that Britain was indeed holding its own against the Germans and could prevail if supplied with American ships, planes, and other war items. He also helped fashion a lawful and politically acceptable way to do it: “Lend-Lease,” a reciprocal arrangement where the supplies were exchanged for U.S. use of British bases.
While in Britain, Donovan forged close ties—almost too close. Reputable historians now believe Donovan was a British agent.
14
Stephenson had introduced Donovan to Prime Minister Churchill and members of the British military. And it was Stephenson—sent
by Churchill to liaison with the U.S. government to help speed America’s entry into the war—who suggested to Roosevelt that America form an overall intelligence-gathering agency and recommended that Donovan head it. Roosevelt agreed, and in the summer of 1941, he established the new position of Coordinator of Intelligence, which would soon morph into OSS, and made Donovan its head. Following that appointment, Stephenson cabled back to British intelligence chief, Stewart Menzies, “You can imagine how relieved I am after three months of battle and jockeying for position in Washington that our man [Donovan] is in a position of such importance to our efforts.”
15
Stephenson was Donovan’s “case” officer, writes former CIA staff officer, Thomas F. Troy, a historian who has looked into the matter.
16
He was given the codename “Q,” adds Cave Brown.
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Though there is no concrete evidence that Donovan was working for the British, he was certainly a sympathizer. And given the wartime animosity between Patton and Montgomery (still downplayed by the British) and the fact that the two nations, although close allies, had varying end goals in the war—America, to win and vanquish, and Britain, in addition to victory, to retain what it could of its far-flung empire—the possibility of British involvement with Patton’s death is certainly plausible and is mentioned more than once in Bazata’s writings. “I wondered,” he speculates in one of the diaries, “was Mildew trying to prove himself to the Brits?”
14
Stephenson had introduced Donovan to Prime Minister Churchill and members of the British military. And it was Stephenson—sent
by Churchill to liaison with the U.S. government to help speed America’s entry into the war—who suggested to Roosevelt that America form an overall intelligence-gathering agency and recommended that Donovan head it. Roosevelt agreed, and in the summer of 1941, he established the new position of Coordinator of Intelligence, which would soon morph into OSS, and made Donovan its head. Following that appointment, Stephenson cabled back to British intelligence chief, Stewart Menzies, “You can imagine how relieved I am after three months of battle and jockeying for position in Washington that our man [Donovan] is in a position of such importance to our efforts.”
15
Stephenson was Donovan’s “case” officer, writes former CIA staff officer, Thomas F. Troy, a historian who has looked into the matter.
16
He was given the codename “Q,” adds Cave Brown.
17
Though there is no concrete evidence that Donovan was working for the British, he was certainly a sympathizer. And given the wartime animosity between Patton and Montgomery (still downplayed by the British) and the fact that the two nations, although close allies, had varying end goals in the war—America, to win and vanquish, and Britain, in addition to victory, to retain what it could of its far-flung empire—the possibility of British involvement with Patton’s death is certainly plausible and is mentioned more than once in Bazata’s writings. “I wondered,” he speculates in one of the diaries, “was Mildew trying to prove himself to the Brits?”
Were they involved in any plot?
It’s a legitimate question, but one, given Britain’s stringent secrecy laws involving WWII, that’s probably not answerable any time soon—if ever.
Throughout his writings, Bazata, although he has his own speculations on the matter,
18
claims no firsthand, personal knowledge about who was behind the wish to kill Patton, only that the
request to do so came directly from Donovan. But one of the most intriguing aspects of his writings to validate his charges are the descriptions he gives of the meeting he had with Donovan in which he says the director made the assassination request. In a personal letter he wrote entitled “CO-OP!”, dated “2 Aug. ’75” addressed to a Dear Bill, whose identity is unknown, he wrote,
19
“Donovan called me to his office in Grosvesnor [sic] Street, London for a very PRIVATE [sic] chat . . . .
20
We went over to the Claridge Hotel
21
to a Corner [sic] for lunch ....
22
D seemed very reticent and embarrassed.... I put him easy at once with: ‘General, Sir, you have an additional mission for me! You can trust me totally! I am the servant of the United States, of OSS and General D. . . . ’ ” To which he writes Donovan replied,
18
claims no firsthand, personal knowledge about who was behind the wish to kill Patton, only that the
request to do so came directly from Donovan. But one of the most intriguing aspects of his writings to validate his charges are the descriptions he gives of the meeting he had with Donovan in which he says the director made the assassination request. In a personal letter he wrote entitled “CO-OP!”, dated “2 Aug. ’75” addressed to a Dear Bill, whose identity is unknown, he wrote,
19
“Donovan called me to his office in Grosvesnor [sic] Street, London for a very PRIVATE [sic] chat . . . .
20
We went over to the Claridge Hotel
21
to a Corner [sic] for lunch ....
22
D seemed very reticent and embarrassed.... I put him easy at once with: ‘General, Sir, you have an additional mission for me! You can trust me totally! I am the servant of the United States, of OSS and General D. . . . ’ ” To which he writes Donovan replied,
“ Thank you, Douglas, I do indeed have a problem: that we all must settle. It is the extreme disobedience of Gen. Geo. P. and his very very serious disregard of orders for the common cause.... He grows more violent daily and surely must be ill . . . . This is in no way a reflection of my opinion: but that of the High Command and Higher (?)’ [Bazatas’ parenthesis and question mark].... We must stop this rebellious Gen . . . . I have my orders. I’ve selected you to execute them. But first I wish to remind you of your Oath . . . .
23
I would like you to now swear yet again to silence: forever! Even if you do NOT volunteer for the mission undertaking . . . .” I swore . . . .
24
D then slowly spoke of stopping P “somehow”. . . . He offered several possible solutions all of which amounted to an “accident”... i.e., food poisoning, or water, or command vehicle, or some such . . . .I said a shot perhaps: accidentally in the nite [sic]. . . . D squirmed . . . . that we didn’t need to go that far. . . . Then he digressed . . .
25
for 5 minutes on how great and grand
P. was . . . what a magnificent contribution . . . .
26
Ending with: this great Am. Servant is surely sick and not at all responsible: we must protect him from himself and suicidal irreparable damage to not only the U.S. and this War: but himself and his great reputation, , , , [Bazata’s commas] etc. I waited and repeated “shot” saying: “but if I must, and ’tis the only way; shall I kill him Sir?” He waited. At last D. looked at me . . . . He bleated in a whisper: “Yes, Douglas, you do exactly what you must, it is now totally your ‘creation’: kill this man if you must.... ” I felt like patting his arm and telling him it would be all-right . . . . I said instead, “Sir you have my word . . . .”
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23
I would like you to now swear yet again to silence: forever! Even if you do NOT volunteer for the mission undertaking . . . .” I swore . . . .
24
D then slowly spoke of stopping P “somehow”. . . . He offered several possible solutions all of which amounted to an “accident”... i.e., food poisoning, or water, or command vehicle, or some such . . . .I said a shot perhaps: accidentally in the nite [sic]. . . . D squirmed . . . . that we didn’t need to go that far. . . . Then he digressed . . .
25
for 5 minutes on how great and grand
P. was . . . what a magnificent contribution . . . .
26
Ending with: this great Am. Servant is surely sick and not at all responsible: we must protect him from himself and suicidal irreparable damage to not only the U.S. and this War: but himself and his great reputation, , , , [Bazata’s commas] etc. I waited and repeated “shot” saying: “but if I must, and ’tis the only way; shall I kill him Sir?” He waited. At last D. looked at me . . . . He bleated in a whisper: “Yes, Douglas, you do exactly what you must, it is now totally your ‘creation’: kill this man if you must.... ” I felt like patting his arm and telling him it would be all-right . . . . I said instead, “Sir you have my word . . . .”
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Donovan’s saying Patton was sick reflects the view of General Marshall’s War Department during the immediate post-war period. They thought he was insane and unreliable, which was not widely known at the time, so Bazata’s knowledge of it certainly adds credibility to his account.
Bazata reiterates in his writings—just as he told the
Spotlight
—that the amount he was given was $10,000 plus $800 for expenses in “old 50 dollar bills.”
Spotlight
—that the amount he was given was $10,000 plus $800 for expenses in “old 50 dollar bills.”
Several times in the diaries Bazata stresses, “I did not kill Patton,” the same as what he stressed in our interviews. He had only
injured
Patton. They had botched the assassination attempt at Mannheim and although he and the mysterious “Pole” had gone to the Heidelberg hospital to try and finish the job, they had not succeeded. However, just as many times in the writings he says, “We killed him.” So he was conflicted on that point. And talking about Patton’s accident and death to Nick Longworth, the deputy VA administrator, Bazata told his friend, “I did that.... I want you to know I did that.”
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Longworth believed him.
injured
Patton. They had botched the assassination attempt at Mannheim and although he and the mysterious “Pole” had gone to the Heidelberg hospital to try and finish the job, they had not succeeded. However, just as many times in the writings he says, “We killed him.” So he was conflicted on that point. And talking about Patton’s accident and death to Nick Longworth, the deputy VA administrator, Bazata told his friend, “I did that.... I want you to know I did that.”
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Longworth believed him.
CHAPTER SEVEN
HIT LIST
Counter Intelligence Corps
(CIC) Special Agent Stephen J. Skubik was impatient.
(CIC) Special Agent Stephen J. Skubik was impatient.
He was frustrated, exhausted, verging on anger.
The Ohio State University graduate had been attached as an investigator to Patton’s 89
th
Infantry Division until war’s end when he was moved to the new post-war 970
th
CIC. Not only was he in the midst of trying to persuade higher-ups that he had uncovered a Russian-OSS plot to assassinate Patton, but on this late summer day in 1945,
1
the former Nazi SS corporal he had arrested was refusing to talk.
th
Infantry Division until war’s end when he was moved to the new post-war 970
th
CIC. Not only was he in the midst of trying to persuade higher-ups that he had uncovered a Russian-OSS plot to assassinate Patton, but on this late summer day in 1945,
1
the former Nazi SS corporal he had arrested was refusing to talk.
Almost every day in Germany since his arrival in February of 1945 had been chaotic for Skubik, both before the surrender and after. If it was not a scheming Nazi causing trouble, it was a Neanderthal Russian. He was tired of it, fed up. He had seen enough brutality to make any investigator sick. He was one of the first American intelligence agents—if not
the
first Allied soldier
outright—to enter the Ohrdruf Concentration Camp near Czechoslovakia.
the
first Allied soldier
outright—to enter the Ohrdruf Concentration Camp near Czechoslovakia.
Decades later, he recalled the discovery.
“I came upon the gates of the concentration camp. It was deserted by the guards. I walked a short distance before being overwhelmed by an awful smell. Shortly I came upon bodies. Some were naked, others in striped uniforms.” Beyond, he gasped at what unfolded: “thousands of emaciated bodies” everywhere—sprawled haphazard over the grounds, stacked like cordwood in eerie, vacant buildings. As he later recalled, “I became ill and retreated in horror. I must admit I ran away from that place as fast as I could. It was as if I was afraid the dead would rise to seize me.”
2
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