Task Force Black (28 page)
Authors: Mark Urban
What was Britain’s role in this? To many in London, particularly on the political side, Bush’s tough public rhetoric seemed like irrational hubris – why pick a fight with a major regional power or indeed Iraq’s Shia majority when Sunni militants were still so dangerous? The counter-Iran strategy also seemed like a deliberate slight towards the great and good of the US Iraq Study Group who had recommended the previous December that the administration reach out to Iran in the search for solutions.
In MI6 headquarters at Vauxhall Cross, or at Hereford, opinion however had hardened against Iran. The evidence of Iranian involvement, at first regarded sceptically, had become compelling. British soldiers were being killed by Shia special groups at a depressing and, it appeared, rising rate. Some of those who studied the UK intelligence picture at this national level reached the conclusion that Iran saw Britain as the soft underbelly of the Coalition. ‘[It’s] pretty hard to understand it in any other terms,’ one such official told me. ‘It’s pretty clear the Iranians would like to say they’ve forced our withdrawal.’
Those who shared this analysis could see no problem with attacking Iraqi members of the special groups, although there were clear UK orders that Iranian nationals should not be taken by Task Force Knight. The British government also decided to exclude its forces from certain intelligence-gathering measures being taken to prepare possible strikes against Iran. All of those who I have asked insist, for example, that the SAS did not carry out operations inside Iran. But while the Coalition analysts in Iraq understood better as a result of the Baghdad and Irbil raids how these Iranian-backed groups worked, there were doubts that the British task force in Baghdad could do much about them, even within their own defined area of operations. This became a major priority for Richard Williams, the CO of 22 SAS, who once more deployed Task Group HQ to Iraq early in 2007. The new deployment, codenamed Operation TRACTION 2, was part of a specific drive to target Shia militants, particularly in the south.
Britain had, by early 2007, devoted a huge amount of intelligence effort to building up a better understanding of the rat lines used between Iran and Iraq. This took the form of building up agent networks who understood the movement of people or goods to and from Iran and of surveillance operations along the border. It also involved some exotic new intelligence techniques. Prior to America’s move to a ‘kill or capture’ policy on Iranian agents, dozens had been arrested and then released. Many of these men were ‘biometrically logged’ and this was done in such a way that their identity could be quickly confirmed when they were arrested.
By early 2007 British intelligence people felt increasingly confident that they understood infiltration routes from Iran, but the question of how to combat the Quds Force remained a vexed one. The Iranian officers were careful enough not to carry weapons or bombs themselves and used fake IDs. If the Iranian consultants were off limits for political reasons, what about the Iraqi management of the Secret Cells? New targets could certainly be developed for Task Force Knight, but many still harboured doubts about the possible consequences. And while this question was debated by those in charge the wind of change swept through the headquarters of the Multi-National Force. For General Casey had finally run out of road with his political masters. He had departed, and his successor arrived in Baghdad.
On 23 January General David Petraeus stepped into the room for his confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He moved forward with his distinctive gait, to a chorus of photographers’ shutters. With the announcement of his appointment to succeed George Casey and implement the new Bush Administration strategy, Petraeus had become an intensely newsworthy and controversial figure. Little wonder he quipped that morning that he had received many e-mails with the subject line ‘Congratulations – I think’.
The challenges facing US forces in Iraq were bewildering. In Washington there was a widespread assumption that Iraq was already a lost cause. Petraeus himself conceded that events had produced the prospect of a ‘failed Iraqi state’. But there was something else in the atmosphere that morning – something toxic closer to home, a taste of the bitter partisanship generated by the President’s war. Critics of the invasion had taken a full-page advert in the
New York Times
with a picture of the nominee for command in Baghdad and a headline ‘General Betray Us’.
To many of that growing number of Americans who opposed the Iraq war, General Petraeus seemed to be the man being sent out in a desperate attempt to get the President off the hook. In addition, the way in which the White House had formulated its new policy – politely greeting but ignoring the broad-based Iraq Study Group report and opting instead for the ‘Choosing Victory’ blueprint of a right-wing thinktank – had angered some on Capitol Hill.
Petraeus knew that some in that Senate committee were willing the whole endeavour to fail. He pleaded for time. He insisted that the new strategy was different because ‘for a military commander, the term “secure” is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of an area’. Petraeus said that although the new approach was a comprehensive one, involving many political or economic aspects, it was essential for security to be improved first, particularly in Baghdad. In his prepared remarks, he refrained from accusing Iran by name of involvement in the insurgency, instead referring only to ‘regional meddling’.
Nobody had seriously thought that the general would not be confirmed in his post. Although there were some inevitable barbs from senators critical of the administration, there were equally many who paid testimony to the man’s long service.
Petraeus was a paratrooper by training who had survived serious accidents on the firing range and drop zone. He had led the 101st Airborne Division into Iraq in 2003, taking control of the northern part of the country, including the city of Mosul. During his time there he had launched many programmes to win over the local populace and the city, despite its dangerous multi-ethnic mix, had not produced the flashpoint many had predicted. Things changed once Petraeus left. As a three-star and head of the Transition Command he had been given the job of licking Iraqi security forces into shape. There were those within the army who argued that responsibility for the failures of the Iraqi army, such as during the 2006 Baghdad Security Plan, rested at least in part with Petraeus. He had left Iraq in September 2005 to run Fort Leavenworth, the army’s command and staff college. There he headed the panel of officers that issue the counterinsurgency manual, which contained ideas, for example about securing the population, that had already been proven in Ramadi.
The general had promised the senators that he would give them regular reports on the progress of the new strategy and in doing so demonstrated a political astuteness many colleagues had already seen. His choice of words was so careful – for example he avoided picking a fight with Iran in his hearing – that he was able to shape his message to any particular audience with great deftness. Once on his way to Iraq, Petraeus stopped in London.
He had to brief Tony Blair on what he intended to do. He also needed to gauge the depth of Britain’s commitment to remaining in Iraq. Petraeus knew only too well that the war had become a political millstone around Blair’s neck, but needed to get a feel for the bilateral issues including whether the British division in the south would continue to withdraw come what may, and whether Task Force Knight would remain committed to the Baghdad fight. The new commander seemed sanguine about the British drawdown in the south and, alluding to the more secret aspects of what the country was doing, told one person who met him in London that ‘the UK brings considerable assets to this in the intelligence world and other areas’. Petraeus had some personal business too. He wanted to make sure that the British government would extend the tenure of his British deputy, Lieutenant-General Graeme Lamb.
Lamb and Petraeus had become firm friends during their time as divisional commanders. One officer describes them giggling together during a command presentation late in 2003. Both, apparently, could detect the idiocy in some of the Coalition’s early plans. Knowing early in 2007 that the tenure of the Senior British Military Representative in Iraq was normally six months and that Lamb was already more than halfway through, Petraeus needed to get it extended. He had been in frequent e-mail correspondence with Lamb during the autumn and knew something about the work the British general was doing with the Awakening movement. The new commander wanted continuity in this vital task and the British government agreed to be flexible.
During his short stop in London, the aspects in which Petraeus really valued Britain’s contribution thus became clear: he wanted the SAS, he wanted MI6 and he wanted Graeme Lamb. He rated the Iraqi Prime Minister as weak and inexperienced. If Maliki wasn’t up to it, the Coalition needed to drive the reconciliation process.
The first surge brigade into Baghdad, one belonging to the 82nd Airborne Division, arrived in February. In all, the Pentagon planned to add five extra brigade combat teams, two more US Marine battalions and a variety of other units totalling nearly thirty thousand. Doing this required them to strain every sinew – extending some units from twelve- to fifteen-month tours, shortening time between tours and stopping many soldiers leaving.
Despite the effort involved, the peak troop strength would only be achieved for a short period between April and September 2007. The surge was not sustainable – not with regular units at least. The ‘Choosing Victory’ paper had envisaged a large mobilisation of National Guard brigades for a second phase, if one was required, but few regarded this prospect with relish. Petraeus had to deliver improvements in Baghdad, mollify critics in Congress and somehow – the most nebulous part of his mission – create a breathing space in which Iraqi politicians might operate more effectively.
With these huge additional forces involved and such important political stakes, it might be wondered what role Petraeus envisaged for JSOC and Task Force Knight in all this. He told many people during those early weeks, ‘You cannot kill your way out of an insurgency.’ That was precisely the approach some of the door-kickers felt they had been applying. But, above them, McChrystal and others knew both that they were not trying to kill their way out of the insurgency (their tactics involved many captures too) and that under their new commander the special ops takedowns would continue to have a vital role in reducing the suicide bombing threat in Baghdad while thwarting Iranian influence. In fact, with the coming of General Petraeus the message to the secret warriors was to redouble their efforts.
Once Petraeus was hard at work in Baghdad a great many advisers were able to shape his ideas. In the case of Graeme Lamb, the plain-speaking Brit was able to move his efforts to woo tribal sheikhs into a higher gear. He was also influential in formulating new strategies to combat the car bombs in Baghdad. Petraeus was determined to put high concrete T-walls around certain markets or neighbourhoods in order to control access. He called it creating ‘gated communities’.
Petraeus’s ideas on Iran and the Counter Iranian Influence mission were only half formed when he arrived in Baghdad. He believed the Irbil raid had worried the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran but thought that any further steps needed to be considered with great care. He was particularly worried about being drawn into stand-up fights in places like Sadr City before the Sunni insurgency had been tackled.
Lamb provided a concept of operations at this time, called the Squeeze Box. One special operations officer who was briefed by the general recalls:
[Lamb] produced this spectrum chart. On the right was lethal Iranian influence and on the left was al-Qaeda in Iraq. In the middle you have the ‘squeeze box’, ordinary people you needed to win over. By using Task Force 17 to neutralise the Iranians and Task Force 16 on al-Qaeda you could allow the middle ground to escape the influence of the extremes.
Petraeus endorsed these ideas and added his own political top-spin. He leant on Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi leader, to publicly condemn Iranian interference and to support the removal of senior government or security forces figures found to have cooperated with the Shia militias. It was vital for the new effort to be seen as even-handed, or at least more so than the security drives of 2006. This was not just a matter of political stage management; it also reflected the reality that Shia militants were killing growing numbers of Coalition soldiers at the same time as the Sunni strike rate was showing some signs of slackening. The drive against the Special Groups was about to move into a different gear. The trigger would prove to be an operation by Task Force Knight.
On a mid-March night some members of G Squadron found themselves aboard a Hercules, deploying once again to Basra. In the near darkness of the cargo hold, men listened to their iPods or dozed. The blades rotating through their duty at Task Force Knight had become used to shuttling back and forth, but this tour of G Squadron, which was coming towards its end, had seen more of it than most. The higher tempo of strike operations started the previous autumn by Major-General Shirreff had not stopped with his departure. Although the SAS presence at Basra Palace had been upgraded through the formation of Task Force Spartan early in 2007, extra people were sometimes needed for big jobs, and this was one of those occasions.
One senior Coalition commander told me, ‘Even in late 2006 there was a recognition of how involved the Iranians were in a number of issues. They had in mind a compliant and weak Iraq. They’d been getting an absolutely free ride for some time.’ This latest serial in Basra was a further attempt to do something about it. It was a result of intelligence-gathering on a player called Qais Khazali. The ‘find’ part of the F3EA (find-fix-finish-exploit-analyse) doctrine had not been hard. Reports from human and other sources gave him a central role in organising militant breakaways from the Mehdi Army.
