Terror in the Balkans (103 page)

ensuring that this order, without exception and in a brutally harsh spirit,

is executed by the troops. I will investigate every transgression and bring

those responsible to account.”61

And even before this, the ferocious tone being set by higher command

was increasingly suffusing the directives of General Bader’s Serbia Com-

mand also. So read its war diary on October 2:

In order to achieve an effective deterrent effect (sic), those punish-

able deeds . . . which are directed against the Wehrmacht are to be

punished more severely, the punishment to be executed ruthlessly.

Aiding and abetting the enemy and unauthorized possession of arms

(are) to be paid for with death . . . The ideas of the (military) judges

are much too clement for the fourth year of the war. In cases of sus-

pected espionage most severe measures must be employed . . . Our

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terror in the balk ans

divisions frequently seem to have a too pro-Serbian attitude. The SS

will offer example.62

Then on October 10, Serbia Command issued an order, signed by Gen-

eral Bader himself, directing that “the established reprisal measures for

dead and wounded may also be extended in the future in accordance

with the situation to
missing
German soldiers.”63

And General Löhr’s efforts also undoubtedly made it harder still

for units in the fi eld to contemplate the kinds of measures that might

de-escalate the campaign’s brutality. The effect of the welter of harsh

directives upon the 718th Infantry Division was unmistakable. It was

probably also out of its own mounting alarm at the burgeoning Partisan

threat, and its failure thus far to extinguish that threat through popular

engagement and small-unit tactics, that the division now came increas-

ingly to rely on brute force and terror. Its operations around the town of

Jajce between October and December demonstrate this clearly.

Partisan units, in the course of Tito’s northward expansion of his territory,

captured Jajce on September 25; advance parties of the 718th moving on

Jajce from the southeast the following day were met by withering machine-

gun and rifl e fi re.64 Jajce, it seems, had been ripe for a Partisan takeover for

some time, and for a depressingly familiar reason. The division remarked

that, “according to the reliable part of the population, the foremost cause

of the situation in Jajce was the behaviour of the Ustasha.”65 The 718th

aimed fi rstly to attack the Partisan group that had just crossed the River

Vrbas, driving it back to Jajce. It would then combine with elements of the

714th Infantry Division advancing from the northwest to destroy the Parti-

sans. This operational phase was to be completed by October 2.66

The Jajce Partisans presented a mixed picture to the 718th. The divi-

sion considered their state of supply less than impressive. It also believed

that the Partisans’ commanders often plied their troops with alcohol

before they attacked, and concealed the scale of their losses from them.67

But they were organized to effective military standard. They were dis-

tributed across three battalions, each consisting of three companies of

between sixty and one hundred men, and commanded by Communist

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203

Party commissars. They usually attacked at night, especially when it was

raining and the moon was hidden.68 “(Partisan) raiding parties are sent

in with hand grenades and Molotov cocktails,” according to the 718th’s

intelligence section. “Firing lines follow behind them.”69 The Partisans

also possessed penal battalions, antitank battalions, mining sections,

and an excellent communications network utilizing “mostly beggars,

adolescents, and Dalmatian peddlers” as its couriers.70

With all its other proliferating responsibilities, the 718th could only

commit limited forces to the operations. The lineup of divisional forces

for the fi rst operation, assembled on September 28, included only two

battalions each from the 738th and 750th Infantry Regiments, a battery

and an additional platoon from the 668th Artillery Section, two platoons

of Panzers, and an armored train. The rest comprised elements of three

different Croatian infantry regiments, an Ustasha company, and Croa-

tian artillery batteries of various types.71 This was hardly the most for-

midable array the 718th had yet assembled.

In the event, the 718th only retook Jajce on October 4. Even then, it failed

to encircle the Partisans properly.72 By mid-October, Partisan forces were

massing west and southwest of Jajce to attack the town again.73 The 718th

resolved to attack them fi rst, conducting a preemptive operation between

October 24 and November 5. Its main force was divided between Battle

Group Suschnig, formed around the three battalions of the 738th Infan-

try Regiment, and Battle Group Wüst, formed around the three battalions

(minus one company) of the 750th Infantry Regiment. Battle Group Wüst

was only granted two German infantry battalions (plus an additional com-

pany) against Battle Group Suschnig’s three, and three Croatian artillery

batteries against Battle Group Suschnig’s four. It was, however, assigned

three full Croatian infantry battalions against Battle Group Suschnig’s one.

Wüst’s group possessed only one German artillery battery, Suschnig’s

none, and no tanks were provided to either. Two smaller battle groups,

however, were between them allocated three Panzer platoons, two German

artillery batteries, a German infantry company, an Ustasha company, an

armored train, and parts of two Field Gendarmerie companies.74

But matters were not helped by the reassignment elsewhere, on October

14, of most of the second company of the division’s motorized 501st Field

Gendarmerie Detachment,75 and, nine days later, of four Panzer companies

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terror in the balk ans

that had been temporarily assigned to the division.76 All this when the divi-

sion had to contend with mushrooming chaos elsewhere in its jurisdiction,

particularly Chetnik attacks against Croatian patrols and transport.77

On November 26, the Partisans succeeded in retaking Jajce. “The

heights along the Donje Vakuf—Jajce road were held by strong enemy

forces,” reported Battle Group Wüst, “4,000 men equipped with machine-

guns . . . grenade launchers, artillery, and suffi cient ammunition.”78

Throughout the fi rst week of December, in an effort to wrest the town

back again and destroy the Partisan forces in the vicinity, the 718th pros-

ecuted Operation Jajce III. For this operation the division committed

fewer forces than before. Though it was able to fi eld all six battalions of

the 738th and 750th Infantry Regiments, they were deprived of all but

one Panzer platoon, and one platoon of the 668th Artillery Regiment.

Aside from an anti-aircraft platoon and an armored train, the remaining

forces committed to the operation were, again, Croatian—six infantry

battalions, two Ustasha battalions, two platoons of pioneers, and seven

artillery platoons of various types.79

And throughout the operations, the 718th continued to regard its Cro-

atian army “allies” as a burden. It had not always been thus. In March

1942, for instance, Croatian army units had acquitted themselves well

against Partisans in the 718th’s jurisdiction.80 But in mid-November divi-

sional command damned the Croatian units in its area as poorly armed,

“decadent, and disorganized.”81 There was no trust in their offi cers, “no

connection between offi cers and men . . . Units down to battalion level

are fragmented and leaderless, while the staff offi cers just wander around

with nothing to do.”82 The Ustasha’s units were better armed than the

Croatian army’s, but their discipline was worse. “Theft, murder, and

plunder are the daily routine in the Serb areas . . . (The Ustasha) is hated

by the population, including the Croatian.”83

In view of the division’s pillorying of the Croatian army and Ustasha,

General Fortner’s typewriter probably balked at having to produce the

address he felt obliged to issue, presumably for the sake of cordial rela-

tions, to the Croatian troops on October 10:

Comrades of the Ustasha and the Croatian Army! Side by side with

the men of my division, you have attacked, scattered or exterminated

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205

the Communist enemy. In so doing, you have proven that, when you

are possessed of the true martial spirit and assail the enemy wher-

ever you meet him, no enemy can stand against you, whatever his

numbers. I extend my recognition and gratitude to all of you, from

the oldest commander down to the youngest soldier!84

The reality was that, while the 718th Infantry Division itself stood “ready,

in the event of a general uprising, to defend its positions, the Croatian Army

can only be partially trusted. In the event of an English landing in Dalmatia

it must be reckoned that a general Chetnik uprising will break out and a

large part of the Croatian Army will defect to the insurgents.”85 By the end

of the year, matters within the Croatian army had improved not one iota.86

Not all elements of the 718th held the Croats in such contempt. The

750th Infantry Regiment, for instance, testifi ed to their usefulness as

patrol personnel.87 It is of course possible that here, as elsewhere, the

division was scapegoating the Croats for its own failings. But clearly, given

the Croatian army’s undoubted serial defects, there was much truth in the

718th’s contemptuous assessment.

And the 718th was increasingly plagued by failings of its own. It again

stressed its need for more air reconnaissance, more artillery, more spe-

cialist mountain gear, better communications, and small patrols that

could observe the enemy from concealed positions.88 But the division’s

own fi ghting power was now being whittled down from above, as well as

being dispersed ever more thinly. In mid-November the 718th requested

to be allowed to retain its tanks, pleading that their mere presence helped

deter attacks on supply transports and routes. Four days later, Croatia

Command refused this entreaty.89

The effect of all this on the division’s combat performance in the

operations was entirely predictable. The 738th Infantry Regiment’s

report for the third phase of the Jajce operations claimed that its own

troops’ self-belief was suffering in the face of an enemy who had grown

increasingly self-confi dent, and whose troops had been driven from the

villages only after heavy fi ghting.90 On October 10, meanwhile, the 750th

Infantry Regiment drew up a list of all the bitter experiences the Jajce

operation was teaching it. The defects in its equipment were legion; it

also requested smaller, more realistic daily targets for its advance.91

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terror in the balk ans

The operations themselves were drawn out and hard-fought.92 During

the fi rst operation the troops endured diffi cult terrain, poor weather, and

Partisan disruption to rear communications. The 714th Infantry Divi-

sion, meanwhile, blamed the terrain and the lack of mountain equipment

for its own failure to advance from Jezero-Pliva to Sarici in line with the

operational plan.93 The 714th’s other commitments soon prevented it

from assisting the 718th further in the operations.94

The 718th’s Battle Group Annacker issued a report in late November

that conveyed in detail just how fearsome a prospect the Partisans now

were. On November 25 the battle group had been given the task of extricat-

ing the fi fth company of the 738th Infantry Regiment from encirclement.

Then, “on 26 November at 5.15am the battle group reached the southern

exit of Jajce at Skela. After such a rapid forward movement, it was possible

to surprise the Partisans in Skela. It was established that Partisans wearing

nothing but their underclothes had fl ed into the neighboring woods and

surrounding hills. Some even had to jump out of the window.”95

But then the battle group attacked the Partisans in the factory district,

and it became immediately apparent what it was up against:

A heavy rifl e and above all machine-gun fi re set in at the moment the

searching of the houses began. The commander of the fi rst company,

Lieutenant Steiner, fell immediately to machine-gun fi re.96 Several

NCOs and men were wounded in the same way. The Partisans, who

may well have been members of the intelligentsia, put up a particu-

larly fi erce resistance in these houses. Unobserved by them, the

company was able after heavy fi ghting to break into one of the build-

ings and kill around 30 Partisans. Meanwhile the third company of

the 738th Infantry Regiment . . . came under heavy enemy attack

from the east, and it was established that around 3,000 Partisans

were approaching Jajce from the north-west. Artillery and grenade

launchers were observed being brought into position, and after a

short while they were infl icting heavy fi re on our battle group’s posi-

tions. Aside from this, heavy machine-gun fi re became noticeable.