The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh (37 page)

On Wednesday, 22 February, Rama and I went to Andhra Bhavan for dinner. We were in ‘mid-thaali’ when my mobile phone rang. It was a 3 RCR number. It was the PM himself, summoning me. I forced Rama to forgo dessert and we drove straight to the PM’s house.

While noting the urgency in the PM’s voice, I thought I was being summoned for a discussion on his reply the next morning to the debate in the Lok Sabha on the motion of thanks for the President’s address to the Parliament. I had drafted his reply and felt he might want to go over some points I had made. At RCR, Rama chose to wait in the car park assuming I would be back soon.

When I reached 3 RCR, Dr Singh was seated in his living room looking distraught. ‘We do not have an agreement as yet and President Bush is coming in a week’s time. I don’t think this nuclear agreement will go through,’ he said.

I was not prepared for this. I had not been in the loop on the ongoing negotiations and was unaware that they were on the verge of breaking down. The Indian side still wanted a 14:8 division between civilian and military reactors, while the American side had not budged from its position of 18:4. Moreover, the Indian side was particularly keen on keeping the two research reactors out of IAEA safeguards .The PM was clear in his mind that his government had made its best offer and would not back down. It was up to the American side to agree, or close the negotiations and walk away. The latter would be disastrous, given the political capital the PM had already expended on this matter. Clearly, he was worried.

He also believed that the deadlock was only at the level of the negotiators and if President Bush were made aware of this, he would get the American negotiators to back off and accept Indian terms. ‘When I explained to President Bush what we would be able to accept, he was okay with that,’ he said. ‘He kept repeating to me that it was not his intention to hurt India’s strategic capability. So I do not think this US insistence on eighteen has his approval. He needs to be made aware of the deadlock so that he can intervene with his people.’

I realized Dr Singh was wondering if there was any way I could help. I imagined he must have reached out to other interlocutors as well. I knew my friend Ashley Tellis, who had access to people in the White House, was already in Delhi. Maybe he could convey a message to the White House. Offering to try, I went back to the car park and called Ashley. We agreed to meet for breakfast at his hotel the next morning.

I first met Ashley as a member of an India-US ‘track two’ group sponsored by the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Aspen Strategy Group, a high-powered US think tank. An Indian American from Goa, Ashley had made his mark as a bright spark on the foreign policy and strategic affairs think tank circuit in the US. After the Pokhran-II nuclear tests, he wrote an authoritative book on India’s nuclear strategy. He came to be noticed in India’s policymaking circles when US ambassador Robert Blackwill inducted Ashley as his adviser in the US embassy in Delhi. Ashley was the perfect interlocutor between India and the US. He understood both systems well and was committed to good relations between the two democracies. He had acquired impeccable professional credentials as an ‘American’ analyst, while developing friendships in India based on trust. I certainly knew I could trust him.

Over breakfast, we discussed all the options and the offers the two sides had made to each other on the separation plan. I conveyed Dr Singh’s view that a 14:8 separation plan was India’s bottom line and that Dr Singh felt President Bush would approve the Indian offer, if only he were made aware of it. Ashley said this would be difficult to sell with the anti-deal ‘non-proliferation lobby’ in the US Congress. He felt the second-best deal possible would be one where India committed to 14 in the first round and agreed to go up to 18 by a specified date, like 2014 or 2016 at the latest. He was also not sure if the US side would agree to the Indian demand to keep fast breeder research reactors outside the civilian category.

Having offered his own views, Ashley agreed to convey Dr Singh’s message to his contacts in the White House. When I drove to 3 RCR and told the PM what had transpired with Ashley, he was disappointed. ‘This will not work,’ he mumbled. It seemed as if he had not slept through the night.

Later that morning, he drove to Parliament to reply to the debate on the motion of thanks to the President’s address. He spoke at length about almost every issue that was raised in the debate but, surprisingly, made no reference at all to the state of the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear agreement, or what he expected from the Bush visit a few days later. He ended his lengthy, mostly extempore statement by defending his vision of Indian foreign policy and concluded:

Sir, this House has my solemn assurance that in pursuing our foreign policy, in ensuring our national security, and in promoting our economic development, our government will always have the nation’s interest uppermost in our mind. I do believe we have the trust and confidence of the people of India.

 

Four days later, on 27 February, Dr Singh made a lengthy suo moto statement in Parliament, virtually setting out India’s terms for an agreement. This statement was aimed partly at reassuring domestic critics of the deal and partly at drawing public red lines on what was on offer to the US. His lengthy statement pressed all the right buttons for various constituencies at home and abroad. On the key issue of the separation plan it said:

. . . our proposed Separation Plan entails identifying in phases, a number of our thermal nuclear reactors as civilian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, amounting to roughly 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity, by the end of the Separation Plan. A list of some other DAE facilities may be added to the list of facilities within the civilian domain. The Separation Plan will create a clearly defined civilian domain, where IAEA safeguards apply. On our part, we are committed not to divert any nuclear material intended for the civilian domain from designated civilian use or for export to third countries without safeguards.

 

The percentage specified indicated that only fourteen plants would be on offer for separation. The DAE had obviously rejected Ashley’s ‘second option’ and forced the PM to state India’s bottom line in Parliament, thus closing any window for negotiation. It was a take-it-or-leave-it stand. US negotiators were reportedly livid. Till the very last minute, they did not relent.

 

 

On the evening of 1 March, President Bush was received at Palam airport by Dr Singh. As he got into his car, Bush turned to M.K. Narayanan and, placing his hands on Narayanan’s shoulder and making direct eye contact with him, he said, loud enough for others around to hear, ‘I want that deal!’

The negotiating teams on both sides got the message. President Bush was making it clear to everyone, on his side and ours, that whatever differences were still holding up an agreement should be resolved overnight so that by the next morning, when he sat down with Dr Singh for the formal summit meeting, the agreement would be ready for the two leaders’ signatures.

Indian and US negotiators burnt the midnight oil narrowing their differences so that they could report back to their leaders the next morning that they now had a deal. At 8.30 a.m. on the morning of 2 March, I arrived at the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhavan for the ceremonial welcome of the President. Soldiers from the army, navy and air force were smartly lined up for the guard of honour. As senior ministers and officials arrived one by one and took their allotted seats, Ronen Sen walked up to me and indicated that most differences had been ironed out and things should fall into place in time for the two leaders to make an announcement.

Referring to a conversation he had with Pranab Mukherjee, at the time defence minister (referred to in official parlance as raksha mantri, and therefore RM), whose support for the nuclear deal was not fully assured till then, Ronen added, ‘I spoke to RM. He is now supportive. He understands the importance of getting the deal and the dangers of it falling through. We have him on our side.’

Pranab’s support for the deal was in some doubt mainly because, according to some political observers, it was felt he may want to remain in the good books of the CPI(M) given his dependence on the Left to get re-elected to the Lok Sabha from West Bengal. Ronen’s outreach to Pranab and the reassuring reply was, therefore, helpful.

I saw the PM’s motorcade arrive at the forecourt and walked up to Dr Singh. He looked preoccupied. After he finished greeting his ministerial colleagues, he turned to me, saying, ‘So?’ in a matter-of-fact way. That was always my cue to offer him the latest news or gossip. I briefed him on what Ronen had just mentioned to me.

‘Can I trust him?’ he asked, referring to the defence minister. I said there was no reason why Pranab would lie to Ronen. If he had assured Ronen of his cooperation, then we should trust him. But, I added that there was no harm in Dr Singh having another word with Pranab before the formal meetings at Hyderabad House.

President Abdul Kalam’s motorcade arrived and soon we heard the guns boom, announcing the entry of President Bush’s carcade into the Rashtrapati Bhavan forecourt. After the twenty-one-gun salute, the guard of honour and other formalities, the two heads of state went their separate ways. Dr Singh walked up to Pranab and the two drove down together to South Block.

At Hyderabad House, Dr Singh and President Bush were closeted together for thirty minutes, with officials on both sides still discussing the fine print of the joint statement in another room. When the two delegations finally met, it was Condoleezza Rice who spoke first and informed President Bush, ‘We have an agreement.’ All the tension in the air evaporated. President Bush was his warm and jovial self and Dr Singh wouldn’t stop smiling.

The 2 March 2006 agreement accepted the Indian red lines, as specified by the PM and conveyed to Ashley a week earlier. India was required to place under IAEA safeguards only fourteen power reactors, with an installed thermal power capacity that would amount to 65 per cent of the total capacity by 2014. The US side also agreed that India would not accept safeguards on the two fast breeder research reactors at Kalpakkam. Finally, it was agreed that the Indian government would determine which of the twenty-two plants would be classified as civilian and which would be set aside for the strategic programme. Bush and the PM had satisfied the DAE.

The Bush visit was a great success and a shot in the arm for Dr Singh. Whatever his political image, at a personal level Bush was warm and friendly. Being shy and a poor conversationalist, Dr Singh always relaxed in the company of men who were gregarious, and took an instant liking to Bush. When the two first met in NewYork in September 2004, Bush was deferential and, rather surprisingly for an American President, kept addressing Dr Singh as ‘Sir’. By the time they met in Delhi in March 2006, the two had become buddies. Bush’s gesture of placing his arm around Dr Singh’s shoulder as the two walked towards the media was frowned upon by some Indian diplomats and journalists, who read it as a patronizing one. But to me, watching from close quarters, he seemed to be treating Dr Singh like a ‘buddy’ in a natural sort of way. They clearly had good personal chemistry and that played a key role in bringing the nuclear deal to fruition.

In the months that followed, Indian officials had to present their separation plan to the US to enable the US government to secure Congressional approval. Amendments to US law, namely the US Atomic Energy Act, were made through the Henry J. Hyde Act of December 2006. This enabled the US government to then conclude the 123 Agreement with India that would enable the two countries to resume trade in nuclear fuel and technology. All these processes were long drawn-out and full of controversy. Naysayers on both sides tried their best, at every stage, to sabotage the deal.

The legislative process in the US was as contentious as it was in India. Many US lawmakers were not convinced by President Bush’s arguments in favour of an India-specific exemption and argued that this would encourage nuclear proliferation by other powers. In India, both the BJP and the Left parties ganged up against Dr Singh. Many tried to fish in these troubled waters.

Every now and then someone or the other would come and tell me that a plot was afoot to unseat Dr Singh since his insistence on the deal had become an embarrassment for the Congress. Sometimes, even senior Cabinet ministers would walk into my room whispering conspiracy theories and advising me to carry them to the PM.

What complicated the politics of the nuclear deal was the US’s insistence that India too demonstrate its willingness to address US security concerns. This was the ‘Blackwill Question’—what was India prepared to do for the US in exchange for what India expected the US to do for it? Rahul Gandhi had captured the idea well when he paraphrased John Kennedy’s famous line—’ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country’—and said in the Lok Sabha during the debate on the vote of confidence sought by Dr Singh in July 2008: ‘What is important is that we stop worrying about how the world will impact us . . . and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.’ That was the question the US was posing at the time. How did India intend to impact the world around it? Would this accord well with the interests of the United States?