The Age of Wrath: A History of the Delhi Sultanate (18 page)

Ala-ud-din therefore sought to curb the powers of the traditional village officers by depriving them of their privileges and withdrawing the perquisites and concessions that they had traditionally enjoyed, thus in effect reducing them to the level of common peasants. ‘I have discovered that the khuts and muqaddams (village headmen) ride upon fine horses, wear fine clothes, shoot with Persian bows, make war upon each other, and go out hunting; but of the tribute, poll tax, house tax and pasture tax, they do not pay even one jital (coin),’ Ala-ud-din observed. ‘They levy separately the khut’s share from the villages, give parties and drink wine, and many of them pay no tax at all … Nor do they show any respect for my officers … I have therefore taken measures … so that at my command they are ready to creep into holes like mice.’ The suppression of the arbitrary powers of village chieftains and revenue collectors not only facilitated the efficient functioning of the government at the local level, but also benefited peasants, as it freed them from the oppressions and extortions of by chieftains.

Another important administrative measure of Ala-ud-din was to deal with the corruption of royal officials, which was endemic in the Delhi Sultanate. Government servants, the sultan noted, ‘were in the habit of taking bribes and committing embezzlements … They falsify accounts and defraud the state of revenue.’ Ala-ud-din dealt with this problem with a two-pronged measure. On the one hand, he kept strict surveillance over the work of government servants, and inflicted severe punishments on the corrupt, so that ‘it was no longer
possible for anyone to take one tanka (coin) or any single thing from either a Hindu or Mussulman by way of bribe.’ At the same time the sultan increased the salaries of officials so that they would not have any survival compulsion to resort to corruption—‘I have directed that the salary of superintendents and other officials shall be fixed at such a rate as to allow them to live respectably,’ he announced.

ONE OF THE topmost concerns of Ala-ud-din throughout his reign was to maintain the strength and discipline of his army. That was essential for preserving the integrity of the empire against the persistent problems of provincial rebellions and Mongol raids. Besides, the booty that military campaigns brought was a major source of revenue for the Sultanate. In view of all this Ala-ud-din quite early in his reign decided, according to Barani, that the one indispensable requirement for the maintenance of the stability and security of the empire was to have a large standing army—‘and not only a large, but a choice army, well-armed, well-mounted, with archers, and all ready for immediate service.’

But the maintenance of such an army would involve enormous expenditure, which would empty the royal treasury in just a few years, Ala-ud-din realised. The only way that this could be managed was to substantially lower the salaries of officers and soldiers. And for this to be feasible, it was necessary to bring down the prices of provisions and other essential supplies, so that soldiers could maintain a good standard of living on a low salary. But how could the prices of provisions be brought down? ‘The sultan then consulted with his most experienced ministers as to the means of reducing the prices of provisions without resorting to severe and tyrannical punishments,’ reports Barani. ‘His councillors replied that the necessaries of life would never become cheap until the price of grain was fixed by regulations and tariffs.’

Heeding that advice, Ala-ud-din then issued a series of seven market regulations. First of all, he issued an order regulating the prices of grains, and this was so rigorously enforced that ‘this scale of prices was maintained as long as Ala-ud-din lived … whether the rains were abundant or scanty,’ states Barani in his detailed report about the price control measures of Ala-ud-din. Secondly, to ensure that traders complied with the regulated prices, the sultan appointed a senior officer, ‘a wise and practical man,’ as the controller of markets.

But prices could not be controlled through administrative measures alone, Ala-ud-din knew. He was well aware that the key means to control prices was to control supplies, and that the royal order fixing prices could be maintained only if it was backed by balancing supply and demand. Therefore, to regulate the supply of grain, he ordered, as his third measure of market control, that
‘all the
khalisa
villages (whose revenues were reserved for the royal treasury) in the Doab should pay their tribute in kind,’ and that those in some of the other nearby areas should pay half their tribute in grain. As a result of this order, grains from the districts arrived in Delhi in caravans, so ‘there never was a time when there were not two or three royal granaries full of grain in the city. When there was a deficiency of rain, or when for any reason the caravans [bringing grain] did not arrive, and grain became scarce in the markets, then the royal stores were opened and the corn was sold at the tariff price.’

To further regulate the supply of essential goods, Ala-ud-din ‘ordered that the names of all the merchants of the empire, whether Mussulmans or Hindus, should be registered in the book of the Diwan … Merchants were required to sign engagements whereby they were compelled to bring a certain quantity of wares to town and to sell them at the rates fixed by the sultan.’

Fourthly, Ala-ud-din placed grain dealers and transporters under the authority of the controller of markets. And to control them effectively, they, along with their families, were forced to settle in villages along the Yamuna near Delhi, and a supervisor was placed over them to ensure their proper conduct.

The fifth market control measure of Ala-ud-din was to prohibit regrating. ‘This was so rigidly enforced that no merchant, farmer or retailer, or anyone else could hold back secretly … [even a small amount of grain, or sell even a small amount of it] above the regulated price.’ Sixthly, ‘engagements were taken from provincial revenue officers and their assistants that they would ensure that the corn-carriers were supplied with corn by peasants on the field at a fixed [farm] price.’ The order also thoughtfully granted that, ‘to give the villagers a chance of profit, they were [to be] permitted to carry their corn into the market and sell it at the regulation [market] price.’

Lastly, the sultan maintained a hands-on control over the market by requiring three different sources—market superintendent, reporters and spies—to send to him daily reports on market rates and transactions. He also took care to ensure that the three sources served as checks on each other, in order to prevent any of them from falsifying their reports in any way.

‘ALL THE WISE men of the age were astonished at the evenness of the price [of grains] in the markets,’ comments Barani. Whether the season was favourable or unfavourable for cultivation, there was no scarcity of provisions in Delhi, and their prices remained unvarying. ‘This was indeed the wonder of the age, which no other monarch was able to achieve.’ Even luck favoured Ala-ud-din, for the monsoon was regular during most of his reign, and harvests were abundant.

Controlling the prices of food-grains was only the first step in Ala-ud-din’s market control measures, which in their final formulation were very comprehensive, and covered virtually the entire gamut of market operations.
The prices of ‘piece goods, garments, sugar, vegetables, fruits, animal oil, and lamp oil’ were all regulated by Ala-ud-din, notes Barani. The prices of maid servants and concubines, as well as of male slaves, were also fixed. ‘The price of a serving girl was fixed from five to twelve tankas, of a concubine at 20, 30, or 40 tankas. The price of a male slave was 100 or 200 tankas or less … Handsome lads fetched from 20 to 30 tankas; the price of slave labourers was 10 to 15 tankas, and of young domestic slaves 17 or 18 tankas … Great pains were taken to secure low prices for all things sold in the stalls in the markets, from caps to shoes, from combs to needles … Even in the case of articles of the most trifling value, the sultan took the greatest trouble to fix their prices and settle the profit of the vendors.’ In the case of luxury items, their purchase was permitted only with the written permission of the Diwan.

These price control measures were enforced with great rigour, with Ala-ud-din personally inquiring regularly into all aspects of market operations in every bazaar in Delhi. Violators of the price regulations were severely punished. Merchants then sought to circumvent the price regulations by using short weights—‘They sold their goods according to the stipulated rate, but they cheated the purchasers in the weight, especially ignorant people and children,’ reports Barani. Ala-ud-din investigated this matter by sending children to buy various things and take them to him, and he then had the items weighed. If any deficiency was found, ‘the inspector took from … [the particular] shop whatever was deficient, and afterwards cut from the shopkeeper’s haunches an equal weight of flesh, which was thrown down before his eyes. The certainty of this punishment kept the traders honest, and restrained them from giving short weight and resorting to other knavish tricks.’

‘From fear of the police, people both high and low, whether belonging to the market or not, became careful about their behaviour, obedient, and submissive, and subdued with fear and awe,’ continues Barani. ‘Nor did anyone dare to swerve a needle’s point from the letter of the law, to increase or diminish any of the royal standard prices, or to indulge in vain desires and excesses of any sort.’

These were all restrictive measures, which kept the market operations within the parameters prescribed by Ala-ud-din. But the sultan also initiated certain positive measures to stimulate the economy, such as advancing money from the royal treasury to traders for financing their business, and freeing cultivators from exploitation by village chieftains.

ALA-UD-DIN SUPPLEMENTED THESE market regulations with a number of revenue reforms, to augment the financial resources of the empire. He collected a variety of urban and rural taxes, and took particular care to systematise agricultural taxes, which were by far the main sources of revenue
of the state. He classified farmlands into different categories, and assessed tax on them on the basis of the average yield per given measure of land in a given area. ‘Half [the produce] was required to be paid [as tax] without any diminution,’ states Barani. In addition to the tax on agricultural produce, peasants had to pay tax on milch cattle, as well as a general grazing tax.

All these revenue measures were rigorously enforced by the sultan. ‘People were brought to such a state of obedience that one revenue officer could string together by the neck twenty khuts, muqaddams and chaudharys (village headmen) and enforce payment by blows,’ notes Barani. ‘Blows, confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains, were all employed to enforce payment.’

Ala-ud-din preferred to collect taxes directly from cultivators rather than through village headmen. This was done to prevent tax collectors from cheating the government, or exploiting peasants, and to ensure, as Barani notes, that ‘the burden of the strong might not fall upon the weak, and there might be but one law for the payment of the revenue for both the strong and the weak.’ The tax pressure of Ala-ud-din was on the rich, not on the poor. Characteristically, he abolished the various concessions and privileges that village headmen had traditionally enjoyed, and collected from them the full tax due on their lands. He also prohibited them from levying on cultivators any cess of their own. This severity of Ala-ud-din with village headmen and traditional tax collectors was beneficial to common peasants, towards whom the sultan was generally protective.

Ala-ud-din was also strict in dealing with parasitic government tax officials, as he was in dealing with village headmen and traditional rural tax collectors. Royal officers who held land grants in lieu of pay were strictly forbidden to levy any additional cesses on their own. And ‘collectors, clerks, and other officers employed in revenue matters, who took bribes and acted dishonestly, were all dismissed,’ notes Barani. ‘There was no chance of a single tanka being taken dishonestly or as bribe from any Hindu or Mussulman. The revenue collectors and officers were so coerced and checked that for [cheating the government even] five hundred or a thousand tankas they were imprisoned and kept in chains for years … [Consequently] clerkship came to be considered … [a wretched profession], and no man would give his daughter to a clerk. Death was deemed preferable to revenue employment.’

THE MARKET AND revenue reforms of Ala-ud-din resulted in a substantial reduction in the prices of essential commodities. And this enabled the sultan, as he had planned, to regulate the salaries of soldiers, and to increase the size of his army. ‘At the present time the imperial army consists of 475,000 … warriors, whose names are recorded by the imperial muster-master, and whose pay and rations are entered in the regulations of the deputy-victualler,’
records Wassaf. There was also an increase in the number of war elephants in the Sultanate army at this time—according to Wassaf, there were as many as 400 elephants in the royal stables alone.

The army of Ala-ud-din was quite probably the largest, the best organised, and the best equipped army in the entire history of the Delhi Sultanate. The sultan took particular care to ensure that soldiers and their equipment met his quality specifications. ‘All the men were inspected by the muster-master. Those who were skilled in archery and the use of arms passed, and were paid the price of their horses. The horses were then branded,’ notes Barani. These soldiers were paid in cash, instead of with land assignments, as was usually done by the Delhi sultans. Ala-ud-din met the cash requirement for this by appropriating all the land near Delhi in the Doab as khalisa, royal estate, the revenue from which went directly into the royal treasury, rather than into provincial coffers.

And just as Ala-ud-din carefully monitored the recruitment of his soldiers, so also he kept a close watch on the operations of the army when it was in the field. ‘It was the practice of the sultan, when he sent an army on an expedition, to establish posts on the road,’ states Barani. ‘Relays of horses were stationed at every post, and at every half or quarter kos runners were posted, and officers and report writers were posted in every town or place where horses were stationed. Every day, or every two or three days, news used to come to the sultan reporting the progress of the army, and news about the health of the sovereign was carried back to the army. False news was thus prevented from being circulated in the city or in the army. This exchange of accurate information between the court and the army was of great public benefit.’