The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (36 page)

¹
Cf. 94
^a
11–14.

²
Cf. 72
^b
18–25 and 84
^a
30-
^b
2.

³
sc.
‘and an indefinite regress occurs’. This argument is a corollary of the proof in 15–26 that if the proposition predicating
A
—its definition—of
C
can be a conclusion, there must be a middle term,
B,
and since
A, B,
and
C
are reciprocally predicable,
B
too, as well as
A,
will be a definition of
C.

⁴
A reminder of a necessary condition of syllogism. If the definition of syllogism is premised the conclusion would have to affirm some subject to be of the nature of syllogism.

⁵
‘distinct from it’; i. e. in the case of
properties,
with the definition of which Aristotle is alone concerned in this chapter. The being of a property consists in its inherence in a substance through a middle which defines it. Cf. the following chapter.

⁶
Aristotle speaks of two moments of the definable form as two essential natures. His argument amounts to this: that if the conclusion contains the whole definition, the question has been begged in the premisses (cf. ii, ch. 4). Hence syllogism—and even so merely dialectical syllogism—is only possible if premisses and conclusion each contain a part of the definition.

⁷
ii, ch. 2.

⁸
The distinction is that between genuine knowledge of a connexion through its cause and accidental knowledge of it through a middle not the cause.

⁹
i. e. that there is no moonlight casting shadows on the earth on a clear night at full moon.

¹⁰
ii, ch. 3.

¹¹
Cf., however, ii, ch. 2.

¹²
i. e. as treated by geometry; that is, as abstracted
a materia
and treated as a subject. Cf. 81
^b
25.

¹³
Cf. 93
^a
16–27.

¹⁴
Presumably a reason for there being a kind of definition other than nominal. The reference is obviously to 92
^b
32.

¹⁵
Demonstration, like a line, is continuous because its premisses are parts which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point.

¹⁶
By this Aristotle appears to mean the material cause; cf.
Physics
ii, 195
^a
18, 19, where the premisses of a syllogism are said to be the material cause of the conclusion.

¹⁷
sc.
‘lest you should suppose that (2) could not be a middle’.

¹⁸
sc.
‘that (2) can appear as a middle’.

¹⁹
Cf. Euclid,
Elem.
i, Def. x, but Aristotle may be referring to some earlier definition. The proof here given that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle is not that of Euclid iii. 31; cf. Heath,
Greek Mathematics,
i. pp. 339, 340.

²⁰
The reference is to 93
^a
3 ff., and other passages such as 94
^a
5 ff., where the middle is shown to define the major.

²¹
Cf.
Physics
vi.

²²
i. e. Aristotle has had in this chapter to explain (1) how syllogisms concerning a process of events can be brought into line with other demonstrations equally derivable from immediate primary premisses, and (2) in what sense the middle term contains the cause. He has in fact had (1) to show that in these syllogisms inference must find its primary premiss in the effect, and (2) to imply that the ‘cause’ which appears as middle when cause and effect are not simultaneous is a
causa cognoscendi
and not
essendi.

²³
i, ch. 3 and
An. Pr.
ii, cc. 3–5, 8–10.

²⁴
This chapter treats only the definition of substances.

²⁵
i, ch. 4.

²⁶
With the remainder of the chapter compare
An. Pr.
i, ch. 25, where the treatment covers all syllogism.

²⁷
sc.
genera and species.

²⁸
ii, ch. 5 and
An. Pr.
i, ch. 31.

²⁹
Cf.
Topics
iv.

³⁰
Cf.
Topics
ii.

³¹
Here begins Aristotle’s answer.

³²
Here begins Aristotle’s answer.

³³
sc.
broad-leaved.

³⁴
Vine, fig, &c.

³⁵
Broad-leaved with deciduous.

³⁶
Aristotle contemplates four terms: (1) deciduous, (2) coagulation, (3) broad-leaved, (4) vine, fig, &c.

If we get the middle proximate to (1) it is a definition of (1). But in investigating vines, figs, &c. according to the method of chapter 13, we shall first find a common character of them in broad-leaved, and, taking this as a middle, we shall prove that vine, fig, &c.,
qua
broad-leaved, are deciduous. But this proof is not demonstration, because broad-leaved is not a definition of deciduous. So our next step will be to find a middle—coagulation—mediating the major premiss of this proof, and demonstrate that broad-leaved plants,
qua
liable to coagulation, are deciduous. This is strict demonstration, because coagulation defines deciduous.

³⁷
But cf. i, ch. 4, 73
^b
21–74
^a
3.

³⁸
The schema of Aristotle’s argument in this paragraph is:

³⁹
i. e. the property.

⁴⁰
the subject

⁴¹
i, ch. 2.

⁴²
i, ch. 1.

⁴³
Cf.
Met.
A
980
^a
28.
Met.
A
I
should be compared with this chapter.

   
CHAPTER

  
1.
   Programme of treatise.

  
2.
   Uses of treatise.

  
3.
   Ideal aimed at.

  
4.
   Subjects (Problems) and materials (Propositions) classified into four groups according to nature of Predicable concerned.

  
5.
   The four Predicables.

  
6.
   How far to be treated separately.

  
7.
   Different kinds of sameness.

  
8.
   Twofold proof of division of Predicables.

  
9.
   The ten Categories and their relation to the Predicables.

10.
   Dialectical Propositions.

11.
   Dialectical Problems:—Theses.

12.
   Dialectical Reasoning distinguished from Induction.

13.
   Four sources of arguments:—

14.
   (1) How to secure propositions.

15.
   (2) How to distinguish ambiguous meanings.

16.
   (3) How to note differences.

17.
   (4) How to note resemblances.

18.
   The special uses of the last three processes.

1
     
[100a]
Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us,
(18)
and also shall ourselves,
(20)
when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First, then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us.

Now reasoning is an argument in which,
(25)
certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (
a
) It is a ‘demonstration’, when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (
b
) reasoning,
(30)
on the other hand, is ‘dialectical’, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.
[100b]
Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them;
(18)
each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself.
(20)
On the other hand, those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers—i. e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again (
c
), reasoning is ‘contentious’ if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such,
(25)
or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately,
(30)
and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension.
[101a]
So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called ‘reasoning’ as well, but the other should
be called ‘contentious reasoning’, but not ‘reasoning’, since it appears to reason, but does not really do so.

Further (
d
), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences,
(5)
as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted.
(10)
For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers—that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them—but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
(15)

The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall discuss later,
(20)
we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way.

2
     Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful.
(25)
They are three—intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed.
(30)
For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise.
(35)
It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the
prius
of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.
[101b]