The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (55 page)

6
     But since a motion appears to have contrary to it not only another motion but also a state of rest, we must determine how this is so. A motion has for its contrary in the strict sense of the term another motion, but it also has for an opposite a state of rest (for rest is the privation of motion and the privation of anything may be called its contrary),
(25)
and motion of one kind has for its opposite rest of that kind, e. g. local motion has local rest. This statement, however, needs further qualification: there remains the question, is the opposite of remaining at a particular place motion from or motion to that place? It is surely clear that since there are two subjects between which motion takes place, motion from one of these (
A
) to its contrary (
B
) has for its opposite remaining in
A,
(30)
while the reverse motion has for its opposite remaining in
B.
At the same time these two are also contrary to each other: for it would be absurd to suppose that there are contrary motions and not opposite states of rest.
[230a]
States of rest in contraries
are
opposed. To take an example, a state of rest in health is (1) contrary to a state of rest in disease, and (2) the motion to which it is contrary is that from health to disease. For (2) it would be absurd that its contrary motion should be that from disease to health, since motion to that in which a thing is at rest is rather a coming to rest, the coming to rest being found to come into being simultaneously with the motion; and one of these two motions it must be.
(5)
And (1) rest in
whiteness
is of course not contrary to rest in health.

Of all things that have no contraries there are opposite
changes
(viz. change from the thing and change to the thing, e. g. change from being and change to being), but no
motion.
So, too, of such things there is no remaining though there is absence of change.
(10)
Should there be a particular subject, absence of change in its being will be contrary to absence of change in its not-being. And here a difficulty may be raised: if not-being is not a particular something, what is it, it may be asked, that is contrary to absence of change in a thing’s being?
and is this absence of change a state of rest? If it is, then either it is not true that every state of rest is contrary to a motion or else coming to be and ceasing to be are motion.
(15)
It is clear then that, since we exclude these from among motions, we must not say that this absence of change is a state of rest: we must say that it is similar to a state of rest and call it absence of change. And it will have for its contrary either nothing or absence of change in the thing’s not-being, or the ceasing to be of the thing: for such ceasing to be is change from it and the thing’s coming to be is change to it.

Again, a further difficulty may be raised. How is it, it may be asked, that whereas in local change both remaining and moving may be natural or unnatural,
(20)
in the other changes this is not so? e. g. alteration is not now natural and now unnatural, for convalescence is no more natural or unnatural than falling ill, whitening no more natural or unnatural than blackening; so, too, with increase and decrease: these are not contrary to each other in the sense that either of them is natural while the other is unnatural,
(25)
nor is one increase contrary to another in this sense; and the same account may be given of becoming and perishing: it is not true that becoming is natural and perishing unnatural (for growing old is natural), nor do we observe one becoming to be natural and another unnatural. We answer that if what happens under violence is unnatural,
(30)
then violent perishing is unnatural and as such contrary to natural perishing. Are there then also some becomings that are violent and not the result of natural necessity, and are therefore contrary to natural becomings, and violent increases and decreases, e. g. the rapid growth to maturity of profligates and the rapid ripening of seeds even when not packed close in the earth? And how is it with alterations?
[230b]
Surely just the same: we may say that some alterations are violent while others are natural, e. g.
(5)
patients alter naturally or unnaturally according as they throw off fevers on the critical days or not. But, it may be objected, then we shall have perishings contrary to one another, not to becoming. Certainly: and why should not this in a sense be so? Thus it is so if one perishing is pleasant and another painful: and so one perishing will be contrary to another not in an unqualified sense, but in so far as one has this quality and the other that.

Now motions and states of rest universally exhibit contrariety in the manner described above,
⁶
(10)
e. g. upward motion and rest above are respectively contrary to downward motion and rest below, these being instances of local contrariety; and upward locomotion belongs naturally to fire and downward to earth, i. e. the locomotions of the
two are contrary to each other. And again, fire moves up naturally and down unnaturally: and its natural motion is certainly contrary to its unnatural motion. Similarly with remaining: remaining above is contrary to motion from above downwards,
(15)
and to earth this remaining comes unnaturally, this motion naturally. So the unnatural remaining of a thing is contrary to its natural motion, just as we find a similar contrariety in the motion of the same thing: one of its motions,
(20)
the upward or the downward, will be natural, the other unnatural.

Here, however, the question arises, has every state of rest that is not permanent a becoming, and is this becoming a coming to a standstill? If so, there must be a becoming of that which is at rest unnaturally, e. g. of earth at rest above: and therefore this earth during the time that it was being carried violently upward was coming to a standstill. But whereas the velocity of that which comes to a standstill seems always to increase, the velocity of that which is carried violently seems always to decrease: so it will
be
in a state of rest without having
become
so.
(25)
Moreover ‘coming to a standstill’ is generally recognized to be identical or at least concomitant with the locomotion of a thing to its proper place.

There is also another difficulty involved in the view that remaining in a particular place is contrary to motion from that place. For when a thing is moving from or discarding something, it still appears to have that which is being discarded, so that if a state of rest is itself contrary to the motion from the state of rest to its contrary,
(30)
the contraries rest and motion will be simultaneously predicable of the same thing. May we not say, however, that in so far as the thing is still stationary it is in a state of rest in a qualified sense? For, in fact, whenever a thing is in motion, part of it is at the starting-point while part is at the goal to which it is changing: and consequently a motion finds its true contrary rather in another motion than in a state of rest.
[231a]

With regard to motion and rest, then, we have now explained in what sense each of them is one and under what conditions they exhibit contrariety.

With regard to coming to a standstill the question may be raised whether there is an opposite state of rest to unnatural as well as to natural motions.
(5)
It would be absurd if this were not the case: for a thing may remain still merely under violence: thus we shall have a thing being in a non-permanent state of rest without having become so. But it is clear that it must be the case: for just as there is unnatural motion, so, too, a thing may be in an unnatural state of rest. Further, some things have a natural and an unnatural motion,
(10)
e. g. fire has a natural upward motion and an unnatural downward motion:
is it, then, this unnatural downward motion or is it the natural downward motion of earth that is contrary to the natural upward motion? Surely it is clear that both are contrary to it though not in the same sense: the natural motion of earth is contrary inasmuch as the motion of fire is also natural,
(15)
whereas the upward motion of fire as being natural is contrary to the downward motion of fire as being unnatural. The same is true of the corresponding cases of remaining. But there would seem to be a sense in which a state of rest and a motion are opposites.

^1a
201
^a
10.

¹
sc.
a contradictory.

²
sc.
a contrary.

³
224
^b
26.

^3a
This sentence has been transposed from its place in the next paragraph in the interest of sense.—Ed.

⁴
l. 28 sqq.

⁵
224
^b
32 sqq.

⁶
In chapter 5.

1
     Now if the terms ‘continuous’,
(21)
‘in contact’, and ‘in succession’ are understood as defined above
¹
—things being ‘continuous’ if their extrèmities are one, ‘in contact’ if their extremities are together, and ‘in succession’ if there is nothing of their own kind intermediate between them—nothing that is continuous can be composed of indivisibles:
(25)
e. g. a line cannot be composed of points, the line being continuous and the point indivisible. For the extremities of two points can neither be
one
(since of an indivisible there can be no extremity as distinct from some other part) nor
together
(since that which has no parts can have no extremity, the extremity and the thing of which it is the extremity being distinct).

Moreover, if that which is continuous is composed of points,
(30)
these points must be either
continuous
or
in contact
with one another: and the same reasoning applies in the case of all indivisibles.
[231b]
Now for the reason given above they cannot be continuous: and one thing can be in contact with another only if whole is in contact with whole or part with part or part with whole. But since indivisibles have no parts, they must be in contact with one another as whole with whole. And if they are in contact with one another as whole with whole, they will not be continuous: for that which is continuous has distinct parts: and these parts into which it is divisible are different in this way,
(5)
i. e. spatially separate.

Nor, again, can a point be
in succession
to a point or a moment to a moment in such a way that length can be composed of points or time of moments: for things are in succession if there is nothing of their own kind intermediate between them, whereas that which is intermediate between points is always a line and that which is intermediate between moments is always a period of time.

Again,
(10)
if length and time could thus be composed of indivisibles,
they could be divided into indivisibles, since each is divisible into the parts of which it is composed. But, as we saw, no continuous thing is divisible into things without parts. Nor can there be anything of any other kind intermediate between the parts or between the moments: for if there could be any such thing it is clear that it must be either indivisible or divisible, and if it is divisible, it must be divisible either into indivisibles or into divisibles that are infinitely divisible, in which case it is continuous.

Moreover, it is plain that everything continuous is divisible into divisibles that are infinitely divisible: for if it were divisible into indivisibles,
(15)
we should have an indivisible in contact with an indivisible, since the extremities of things that are continuous with one another are one and are in contact.

The same reasoning applies equally to magnitude, to time, and to motion: either all of these are composed of indivisibles and are divisible into indivisibles, or none. This may be made clear as follows.
(20)
If a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, the motion over that magnitude must be composed of corresponding indivisible motions: e. g. if the magnitude ABC is composed of the indivisibles A, B, C, each corresponding part of the motion DEF of Z over ABC is indivisible. Therefore, since where there is motion there must be something that is in motion,
(25)
and where there is something in motion there must be motion, therefore the being-moved will also be composed of indivisibles. So Z traversed A when its motion was D, B when its motion was E, and C similarly when its motion was F. Now a thing that is in motion from one place to another cannot at the moment when it was in motion both be in motion and at the same time have completed its motion at the place to which it was in motion: e. g. if a man is walking to Thebes, he cannot be walking to Thebes and at the same time have completed his walk to Thebes: and, as we saw,
(30)
Z traverses the partless section A in virtue of the presence of the motion D.
[232a]
Consequently, if Z actually passed through A
after
being in process of passing through, the motion must be divisible: for at the time when Z was passing through, it neither was at rest nor had completed its passage but was in an intermediate state: while if it is passing through and has completed its passage
at the same moment,
then that which is walking will at the moment when it is walking have completed its walk and will be in the place to which it is walking; that is to say,
(5)
it will have completed its motion at the place to which it is in motion.
²
And if a thing is in motion over the whole ABC and its motion is the three D, E, and F, and if it is not in motion at all over the partless
section A but has completed its motion over it, then the motion will consist not of motions but of starts, and will take place by a thing’s having completed a motion without being in motion: for on this assumption it has completed its passage through A without passing through it.
(10)
So it will be possible for a thing to have completed a walk without ever walking: for on this assumption it has completed a walk over a particular distance without walking over that distance. Since, then, everything must be either at rest or in motion, and Z is therefore at rest in each of the sections A, B, and C, it follows that a thing can be continuously at rest and at the same time in motion: for, as we saw, Z is in motion over the whole ABC and at rest in any part (and consequently in the whole) of it.
(15)
Moreover, if the indivisibles composing DEF are motions, it would be possible for a thing in spite of the presence in it of motion to be not in motion but at rest, while if they are not motions, it would be possible for motion to be composed of something other than motions.

And if length and motion are thus indivisible, it is neither more nor less necessary that time also be similarly indivisible, that is to say be composed of indivisible moments: for if the whole distance is divisible and an equal velocity will cause a thing to pass through less of it in less time,
(20)
the time must also be divisible, and conversely, if the time in which a thing is carried over the section A is divisible, this section A must also be divisible.