The Battle of Britain (34 page)

There is really no end to the chain of consequences which flows from an event as decisive as the Battle of Britain. But I believe I have listed those which are most significant:

Firstly, the German invasion plan, Operation Sealion, had to be called off. If it had gone forward, in conditions where the Germans exercised control of the air, it would most probably have succeeded.

Secondly, the Battle of Britain was the first major military set-back for Germany and for Hitler himself; the effect on the morale of the protagonists and on the attitudes of the world at large was, though intangible and therefore not precisely calculable, a major factor in the further prosecution of the war.

Thirdly, the British Army gradually changed its stance and role from that of an anti-invasion force to one of attack and invasion.

Fourthly, Britain's aircraft factories were able to build up production of planes for Bomber and Coastal Commands so that the assault against Germany itself could be carried forward by the RAF, long before the 1944 landings, and the battle for the maintenance of our supply lines could be successfully fought out over the hostile Atlantic Ocean.

Fifthly, the German invasion of Russia had to be carried out with an enemy at her back – and an enemy of ever increasing strength.

As the British people – and some, no doubt, in the nations of the old Empire whose pilots played so bold a part in the Battle – look back, some six decades later, they see the image as it has been projected over the years – the image of vapour trails in the blue summer sky above Kent and Sussex; of the rattle of machine gun and light cannon fire as small formations of Spitfires and Hurricanes dived into great wedges of Swastika-marked German bombers; of young men with silk scarves and yellow ‘Mae West' life-jackets scrambling from bomb-pocked airfields; of pretty but business-like WAAFs moving the plots around like roulette chips on operations room boards; and of the death and destruction in a thousand city streets across the face of south-east England, but most particularly
in London and its outer suburbs. Those are the stereotype images and they are accurate enough. But behind them and above them you should look for the image of Lord Dowding, who conceived and built the system of air defence which was capable of saving Britain from German invasion and who then, most brilliantly supported by Keith Park, directed its use when the test came. And you should consider the dire consequences if that unique and effective system had not been in place – dire consequences not only for Britain but also, as we have seen, for the whole of the civilised world.

T
he Battle of Britain is deemed by British historians to have begun on July 10 and ended on October 31, 1940. A clasp on the ribbon of the 1939–45 Star – indicated by a rosette when medal ribbons only are worn – was awarded to aircrew who served under the operational control of Fighter Command between those dates. But the four phases into which the battle is officially divided did not begin until August 8. This first phase continued until August 18. The second phase was August 19 to September 5, the third September 6 to October 5, and the fourth October 6 to October 31.

German historians see it differently. In the eyes of the Luftwaffe, the Battle opened on August 8, 1940 and did not close until May 11, 1941, with the 500-bomber raid on London on the night of the 10th/11th. Moreover, they consider that it was waged in five phases. But the period from February 9 to May 11, 1941 is regarded as an appendix to the main battle; a sixth phase. Thus the five phases proper, as seen by German historians, are defined as: August 8 to August 18 – Beginning of the All-Out Onslaught; August 19 to September 6 – Severest Fighter Combats; September 7 to October 5 – The Air Battle at Its Height; October 6 to October 31 – Fighters As Bombers; November 1, 1940 to February 8, 1941 – The End of the Air Battle.

That the battle had to be fought at all was a consequence of Hitler's swift conquest of the Low Countries and France, on May 10, 1940, Germany had
invaded Belgium and Holland and entered France on the 13th. On May 26 the British Expeditionary Force began to retreat from France. The bulk of the evacuation was completed by June 4, but the last British troops did not leave until the 17th. On that day the French Government asked Germany for surrender terms and on June 22 the armistice was signed. The last RAF squadrons based in France withdrew on June 18.

Before the battle came a brief breathing space for those already hard-pressed RAF fighter squadrons that had been fighting in French air space against heavy odds. Had Hitler launched an immediate invasion, treading on the heels of the departing British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the 112,000 officers and men of the French Army who accompanied them, he might have established a foothold on the south coast of England, even if it were only temporary. But he would have had to put an immense naval force at risk to protect his invasion fleet and to pound the Kent or Sussex shore. He would have had to cross at or near the Straits of Dover, to make the passage as short as possible. He would have had to concentrate the whole weight of his assault on only one or two points for it to be effective.

Hitler did not, for many reasons which are given elsewhere. Two of them were that he believed Britain, under a pusillanimous and appeasing Prime Minister, was too weak in both military strength and morale to fight, so would sue for peace. Another was that he could not resist showing off his victory ostentatiously to the world: hence the several days' delay while he staged a vulgar, tawdry armistice ritual at Compiègne, when he should have been on a clifftop near Calais, watching his army, navy and air force trying to hammer Britain into surrender. In any event, the Royal Navy would have sunk a great part of an invasion fleet in those narrow waters, while the RAF's Bomber and Coastal Command aircraft, however exiguous the protection that the grossly outnumbered Fighter Command could afford them, would have accounted for as many again.

The air battle did not suddenly burst upon Britain on July 10, 1940, without any preliminaries. The Luftwaffe was not entirely inactive during this lull. It had made its first large-scale raids on the night of June 18, when 100 bombers attacked targets between Yorkshire and Kent. A South African Flight Lieutenant, A. G. Malan of No. 74 Squadron, considered by his fellows to be the outstanding personality in the Battle, an exceptional pilot and gifted leader, was flying a Spitfire that night and shot down two bombers that were caught by searchlights. The next night, 100 bombers raided targets in southern, eastern and northern England, and south Wales. On seven more nights that month mainland Britain felt the impact of German bombs on the eastern counties, the Midlands, the
south-west and west of England, south Wales and Scotland. On two successive nights, June 25 and 26, the defending pilots, groping their way about in the dark, flying aeroplanes designed for day fighting, and relying on their eyesight and searchlights to pick up a target, shot down three raiders. On June 28 the Channel Islands were bombed.

The Luftwaffe made its first daylight raid on July 1, on Hull, in Yorkshire and Wick, in Scotland and repeated this performance on the next two days. On July 3 the RAF brought down six bombers. On July 4 Portland was the target, again in daylight. Some small ships were sunk or damaged, buildings battered and civilians killed. On July 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 many parts of Britain suffered day and night raids during which slight damage was done to ports and factories and more people were blown apart. Aircraft on both sides were destroyed; not always a mere few – on July 8 the RAF shot down eight for the loss of three.

Now the most intensive aggression against Britain was about to be unleashed. Its objectives were:

1. The blockade of the British Isles in co-operation with the German Navy: attacks on ports and shipping, and the mining of harbour entrances and sea lanes.

2. The achievement of air supremacy as a preliminary to the invasion.

3. Annihilation of Britain by total air warfare.

It is salutary at this point to consider what would have been the consequences if this final objective had been attained. Among all the admiration and respect that has been expressed by former enemy airmen for each other, the much vaunted chivalry shared by the opposing air forces, and the general forgiveness and friendliness that have burgeoned in the half-century that has passed since the Battle, it should never be forgotten that victory for Germany in the Battle of Britain would have meant victory in the war.

RAF Fighter Command, Anti-Aircraft Command, the Observer Corps (later Royal), the Fire Service, the Civil Defence, were all fighting for the lives of their compatriots, men, women and children, and the freedom of future generations: generations of Britons who would never have been born if the Luftwaffe had had its way.

The following is a day-to-day diary of the immense struggle Britain underwent against tremendous odds during those summer months of 1940.

Wednesday, July 10:
Rain over most of Britain. Showers south-east England and Channel.

Day:
RAF No. 11 Group began detaching whole squadrons instead of flights to forward airfields at first light. Enemy dawn weather reconnaissance, and tactical reconnaissance during morning. A few inconclusive interceptions. Enemy activity heavier than usual. By 1330hrs some 20 Do 17s, 20 Bf 109s and 30 Bf 110s forming up in Calais area seen on radar. These attacked convoy escorted by six Hurricanes off Dover. Four more squadrons sent reinforcing Hurricanes. One ship sunk, three Hurricanes and four Bf 109s shot down. Near Newhaven, train attacked, driver killed. Seventy-bomber raid on Falmouth and Swansea killed 30, damaged ships, railways, power station and ordnance factory. RAF station Martlesham Heath in Suffolk slightly damaged.

Night:
Scotland, south-east and east coast raided.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 6, Luftwaffe 13.

Thursday, July 11:
Overcast in south, bright intervals and thunder elsewhere.

Day:
Early morning, radar reported three formations approaching convoy off Dorset. Six Hurricanes ordered to intercept while six Spitfires covered ships. None sunk. Late morning, Douglas Bader scored his second victory, his first in the Battle of Britain. Taking off in rain and poor visibility to investigate an unidentified aircraft, he found it, recognised it as a Dornier 17, opened fire and last saw it disappear into cloud. Five minutes after he landed, the Observer Corps reported having seen the Do 17 crash into the sea, Early afternoon, six Hurricanes arrived at Portland while 15 Ju 87s, escorted by 30-plus Bf 110s, were bombing. Two Bf 110s destroyed. Afternoon, six Spitfires intercepted 12 Bf 109s off Deal, escorting Heinkel 59 seaplane, with Red Cross marking, on air-sea rescue, and shot down the He 59, which beached near Deal. Two Bf 109s and two Spitfires shot down. Afternoon, six Hurricanes attacked 12 He 111s and 12 Bf 110s over Isle of Wight.

Night:
Bombs on Portsmouth, eastern and north-western England.

Aircraft Losses:
RAF 4, Luftwaffe 11.

Friday, July 12:
Cloudy, some thunderstorms.

Day:
Bombers over convoys off Orfordness, Suffolk and North Foreland, Kent. Three Defiants and nine Hurricanes protected convoy off Suffolk while 12 Hurricanes went for attackers. Spitfires shot down a He 111 near Aberdeen. Small raids intercepted over wide area. 11 Group reinforced by moving 152 (Spitfire) Squadron from Acklington, Northumberland to Middle Wallop, Hampshire.

Night:
South Wales and Bristol attacked.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 6, Luftwaffe 8.

Saturday, July 13:
Poor after early fog cleared.

Day:
Weather kept down scale of enemy effort. Two raids on Dover thwarted but two convoys off Harwich and ships at Portland bombed.

Night:
Thames Estuary mined.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 7.

Sunday, July 14:
Fair

Day:
Germans evidently using Red Cross seaplanes on convoy reconnaissance. British Government therefore announced that these were no longer immune from attack. Start of six days of reduced enemy activity. Morning, bomber's attempt to hit a destroyer off Swanage failed. Convoy near Dover damaged.

Night:
Bombers over west, south, south-east and east England.

Aircraft Losses:
RAF 4, Luftwaffe 2.

Monday, July 15:
Low cloud and heavy rain.

Day:
Small raid damaged Westland Aircraft factory and runway at Yeovil in Somerset. Light force of Do 17s prevented by Hurricanes from hitting Channel convoy. At St Athan, south Wales, airfield cratered. Railway lines near Avon-mouth, Somerset, hit.

Night:
No bombing, some mines laid.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 3.

Tuesday, July 16:
Foggy in Channel, south-eastern England and northern France.

Day:
Convoys off southern and eastern English and north-eastern Scottish coasts, and Westland Aircraft harassed when weather lifted a trifle.

Night:
Minelaying in north-east England.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 2, Luftwaffe 5.

Major Josef Schmid, chief of Abteilung (Department) V, the Intelligence Service, submitted to Hitler a document entitled, ‘A Comparative Appreciation of the Striking Power of the RAF and the Luftwaffe'. In this he stated that the British had 900 first-line fighters, of which 675 could be considered fully serviceable. Not a bad estimate: the actual number available on an ideal day was 587. Schmid was less accurate when he wrote, ‘Taking into account both their combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannon, the Hurricane and the Spitfire are both inferior to the Messerschmitt 109.' But right in adding, ‘The Messerschmitt 110, however, is inferior to the Spitfire . . .', although his proviso, ‘if the latter is well piloted' was nonsense. He concluded that the odds
favoured the Luftwaffe ‘so long as the large-scale operations are begun early enough to permit the exploitation of the relatively favourable meteorological conditions of July to early October.'