The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance (3 page)

While Grouchy was dealing with Angoulême, a new royalist uprising had begun in the Vendée, in the lower valley of the Loire river. The area had never been particularly keen on the Revolution and had rebelled twice before, in 1792 and 1799. Now the Vendée erupted in a pro-royalist rebellion yet again. The leader was Jean-Baptiste Constant, count of Suzannet, who had led the 1799 uprising. He was assisted by another local nobleman, Charles de Beaumont, count of Autichamp. He, too, had fought in the 1799 uprising and, like Suzannet, had subsequently surrendered to Napoleon and been living quietly in retirement. The two men had taken up local government positions on the restoration of Louis XVIII and now saw it as their duty to retain those positions for the king in the face of what they saw as an illegal military coup.

Suzannet and Autichamp captured the town of Cholet and nearby areas without a struggle, but found that very few men rallied to their colours. Only about 8,000 men could be found, and few of them had any real military experience. Unable to advance towards the major towns of the region, the royalists began preparing defensive positions to hold out against the expected Napoleonic offensive.

But the offensive was slow in coming. The royalists were not holding any strategically important areas, so Napoleon felt that he had more important matters to attend to. General Jean Lamarque was sent to the Vendée with 3,000 men. He had orders to recruit men locally to tackle the royalists and to keep them pinned back in their defensive positions, where they could do little harm to Napoleon.

It was not these internal enemies that formed the main threat to Napoleon – it was his foreign foes.

Emmanuel de Grouchy, 1766 - 1847

Chapter 2
 
‘White knight to black bishop’
 

Sir Charles Oman, commenting on Napoleon’s ability to mask his intentions.
 

Almost as soon as news arrived in Vienna that Napoleon had landed in France, the war began. The alliance that was hurriedly put together appeared to be impressive indeed. Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal and a host of smaller German and Italian states all allied themselves against Napoleon. Together they could put nearly 1 million men into the field. The date for the joint invasion of France was set for 1 July 1815.

In fact the vast coalition was not as impressive as it appeared to be. The unity of purpose was largely illusory. Only days before, Austria and Russia had nearly gone to war with each other – while Prussia had lingering doubts about British policies and was openly hostile to Austrian claims to leadership of the German-speaking peoples.

Moreover the ability of the allies to put armies into the field was rather in doubt. Some powers were quite unable to do what they had promised. King Ferdinand VII of Spain, for instance, had promised at Vienna to send two armies to invade France. One would go over the eastern Pyrenees to seize Perpignan and Narbonne, the other over the western Pyrenees to take Bayonne and Bordeaux. However, the Spanish government was bankrupt and Spain itself had been badly damaged by eight years of French occupation and wars of liberation. Nobody seriously expected the Spanish army to invade France – at least not in 1815.

‘German Corps’

Rather more useful were expected to be the armies of an assortment of smaller states in northern Germany. The Electorate of Hessen, Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, Duchy of Saxe-Gotha, Duchy of Anhalt-Bernburg, Duchy of Anhalt-Dessau, Duchy of Anhalt-Köthen, Principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Principality of Waldeck, Principality of Lippe and the Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe all promised to muster their armies at Koblenz by early June. It was expected that they would together total around 25,000 men.

Because none of these small states had a military commander of note, and in any case were jealous of each other’s status, they asked Prussia to provide a commander. General Friedrich von Nollendorf was given the task, but he had barely arrived when he fell dangerously ill and effective command fell to his second in command, the Hessian general, von Engelhardt.

Engelhardt soon experienced difficulties welding his confusing array of separate forces into a single army. The various armies did, at least, all speak the same language but their system of commands varied dramatically, as did the tactics in which they were trained. Even more diverse were the uniforms. The army of Anhalt-Bernburg wore green jackets and grey trousers. The men of Mecklenburg-Schwerin wore blue coats and white trousers, except the cavalry who were in green. The troops of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach wore white coats with grey trousers, while those of Anhalt-Bernburg were kitted out in a fetching shade of sky blue. Making the confusion worse, the rank badges varied enormously, making it difficult for a captain from Oldenburg to know if he were supposed to give orders to an officer from Waldeck or take orders from him.

The task of this ‘German Corps’ – as it was dubbed – was to guard the Rhine around Koblenz. When war began in early July it was expected to advance on the French fortress towns of Sedan, Bouillon, Montmédy, Laon and Rheims, to which it would lay siege. After capturing those strongpoints, the German Corps was to advance on Paris in co-operation with the Prussian army of Field Marshal Blücher that was forming to its north.

Russian contingents

Other armies were likely to take part, but were certainly going to be late. Tsar Alexander of Russia had promised 250,000 men, with 200,000 men marching immediately and the rest following on in the summer. In fact, it was difficult to know how large these two Russian armies really were. Corruption was widespread and endemic, being considered a normal part of military life. Officers routinely claimed their units were larger than they really were. This enabled them to draw pay and rations for men who did not exist and take it for themselves. It is thought that the First Russian Army may have had an actual strength of about 160,000 men, compared to an official strength of 200,000; but nobody is, or was, certain.

The Russians’ military effectiveness was further hampered by their appalling supply system. The supply wagons trundling along behind the troops were empty as often as they were full. More than once in the campaigns of 1812–14 Russian soldiers had been unable to attack due to a total lack of ammunition. Food was also frequently missing, forcing the men to steal and loot to stave off hunger. Whenever civilians learned a force of Russians was approaching they packed everything up and left. What could not be taken away was buried or hidden deep in the forests.

It is indicative of the quality of the Russian army that when Tsar Alexander told Wellington that he could march one advanced army corps to Belgium to arrive by early June, Wellington turned the offer down.

Nevertheless, the First Russian Army was clearly a large force. It was commanded by Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly, who had a distinguished record and was reckoned to be one of the better Russian field commanders. In order to speed up his advance, Tolly divided his army into three and sent them by different routes across Germany to recombine on the banks of the Rhine near Mainz. This force was expected to reach the Rhine in late June or early July.

Austrians and allies

Also heading for the Rhine was a mixed army of German states under Austrian control. Field Marshal Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg was aged 44 in 1815 and had a solid reputation as a careful military administrator. His reputation as a field commander was so high that he was made the overall commander-in-chief of the Allied armies massing against France. He was generally considered to be a cautious commander who would not advance unless absolutely certain of victory, and would not defend a position unless he understood it fully. Nevertheless, it had been Schwarzenberg who in 1814 had captured Paris, forcing Napoleon’s abdication. Together with Austria’s key role in the alliance this brought him the supreme command.

As well as around 100,000 Austrian troops, Schwarzenberg had around 150,000 Germans drawn from the Kingdom of Bavaria, Kingdom of Saxony, Kingdom of Württemberg, Grand Duchy of Baden, Grand Duchy of Hesse, Duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, Duchy of Saxe-Meiningen, Duchy of Saxe-Hildburghausen, Free City of Frankfurt and Principality of Reuss.

Schwarzenberg was intending to cross the Rhine near Gemersheim, then advance past Strasbourg and Nancy towards the Seine and Paris. Having captured Paris once before, Schwarzenberg fully intended to capture it again. He had also decided that he would not cross the Rhine in strength until Tolly and the Russians had arrived. In part this may have been his natural caution emerging as a reluctance to face Napoleon alone, but given how close Austria and Russia had come to war just a few weeks earlier it might be that Schwarzenberg wanted to make sure the Russians were invading France, not Austria.

Already in position when the war broke out was the Swiss army of 37,000 men. The commander, General Niklaus von Bachmann had very firm orders from his government. He was not to move outside Switzerland, no matter what happened. It is indicative of the fraught state of international relations that the Swiss government was uncertain of which foreign power they should be more afraid – the French or the Austrians. Whichever might turn out to be the real enemy, the Swiss were taking no chances. They told their allies that they would keep the French tied down and under observation, though effectively this meant they were not going to join in the invasion of France.

In northern Italy another Austrian army was gathering under General Johann Frimont, a talented cavalry commander who had fought against Napoleon – though with little success – at Marengo in 1800. Serving under Frimont were the troops of several north Italian states. Other than those from Piedmont, however, it was not entirely certain how reliable these Italian troops were going to be. The Italians had fought alongside the forces of France for years and were known to favour the new freedoms the Revolution had brought them. The return of their autocratic rulers was not generally welcomed, and the soldiers might not be too willing to fight.

Nevertheless, Frimont had around 70,000 men under arms. His orders were to cross the French border on 1 July and secure the pro-royalist areas of Provence, together with the major ports of Toulon and Marseilles, before marching north up the Rhône Valley to Lyons. It was this army that the duke of Angoulême had been hoping would march to his aid, but it had not – and so the royalist rising in Provence never took off.

Neapolitan War

Frimont had other problems to contend with. When news spread of Napoleon’s landing in southern France, southern Italy exploded in a fever of revolutionary fervour. If northern Italy was unreliable for the allies, southern Italy was positively hostile to them. Joachim Murat, king of Naples, wasted no time at all in declaring war on Austria and calling on all Italians to rally to the cause of the freedoms that the revolutionary era had brought them. Austria wanted to reimpose the old rulers, but Murat would kick them out.