The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (17 page)

ising start. But as noted at the outset of this chapter, the vast bulk of the work of the IPCC continues to proceed with relatively little input from environmental

sociologists. Rosa and Dietz (1998) have made the bold and constructive sugges-

tion that the way forward for global change research is for the diverse commun-

ity of environmental sociology scholars to recognize the complementarities

between neo-realist research (typified by STIRPAT) and interpretive research

(such as constructionist research on how climate science data are represented

to the public and framed within environmental movement organizations).

Ecological Modernization

The most significant trend in Anglo-American environmental sociology in the

late 1990s has been the rise of ecological modernization. As noted above, the

Emerging Trends in Environmental Sociology

55

core of environmental sociology had long involved a predominance of perspect-

ives that were aimed primarily at theorizing the inevitability of environmental

destruction. To the degree that general environmental-sociological theorists saw a way out of thèìron cage'' of environmental destruction, their solution was

almost always that of radical environmental movement opposition. In general,

then, there was little room for anticipating or explaining environmental

improvement deriving endogenously from major societal institutions.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, various groups of environmental

and social scientists began to dissent from these notions of `ìron cage'' and of radical environmentalism as being the only logical response. German and Dutch

scholars became convinced that there were emerging tendencies toward environ-

mental improvement being manifested in eco-efficiency improvements (for

example, strategic environmental management and industrial ecology) in manu-

facturing industry. In addition, these scholars came to be increasingly skeptical that radical environmental groups (for example, the radical wing of the German

GruÈnen) would be effective in spearheading environmental reforms.

Drawing on the pioneering German literature (JaÈnicke, 1986) and anchored in

very general terms in Beck's and Giddens's (Beck et al., 1994; see also Giddens, 1998) perspective on ``reflexive modernization,'' Mol and Spaargaren (Mol,

1995, 1997; Spaargaren, 1996; Mol and Spaargaren, 2000) have played key

roles in articulating an ecological modernization perspective as an alternative to core theories in environmental sociology. Essentially, ecological modernization

theory holds that capitalist liberal democracy has the institutional capacity to reform its impact on the natural environment, and that further development

(``modernization'' and ``superindustrialization'') of industrial economies and

liberal democracy will tend to result in improvement in ecological outcomes.

The growth of ecological modernization thought in the late 1990s was meteoric.

Ecological modernization hypotheses and concepts have very rapidly become the

most dynamic area of environmental sociological research. Interestingly, the

influence of ecological modernization is not confined to environmental sociology (for example, Giddens, 1998).

While ecological modernization is widely thought of as a new and challenging

theory, and thèècological modernization hypothesis'' ± that one ought to

expect ecological improvement over time in response to progressive moderniza-

tion ± is very commonly cited, ecological modernization is more variegated that

many of its proponents and critics recognize. The ecological modernization

notion, for example, is used in a variety of ways, ranging from the efforts of

Mol and Spaargaren (2000) to construct a coherent ecological modernization

perspective to Murphy's (1997) use of ecological modernization as a synonym

for any state policies that make possible thèìnternalization of externalities.'' In addition, ecological modernization is not yet a well elaborated theory. With the growing number of practitioners of ecological moderization and the diversity of

ways they employ this concept, there exists a large variety of explanations (for example, decentralization of environmental policy-making, enlightened self-interest on the part of industrial organizations, global diffusion of international environmental standards, strategic ``framing'' on the part of environmental

56

Frederick H. Buttel and August Gijswijt

bureaucracies and movement organizations) for why one would expect an

ecological modernization trend (see Buttel, 2000b). For our own part, we feel

that the logic of ecological modernization suggests that central to the explana-

tion must be a political-sociological rationale. Elsewhere (Buttel, 2000b) we

have suggested that theories of embedded autonomy and state±society synergy

(Evans, 1995) are particularly promising in explaining why environmental-state

bureaucracies would find it in their interest to shift toward a decentralized

oversight role in environmental regulation and away from ``command-and-

control'' regulation, which decreases corporate autonomy to experiment with

alternative industrial ecology practices. The transformation of the role of

the environmental state seems critical in explaining why private firms would

find it advantageous to make environmental improvements in their produc-

tion practices and why environmental groups would shift from a largely adver-

sarial to a partnership role in private environmental decision-making (Buttel,

2000b).

The ascendant role of ecological modernization can be gauged not only by the

explosion in the volume of its literature (see, for example, the special issues on the topic in GeoForum and Environmental Politicism in 2000), but also by the

fact that it is increasingly obligatory for environmental sociologists of all stripes to refer to this perspective, even if only to criticize it (Benton, 1997; Schnaiberg et al., 1999; Redclift and Woodgate, 1997). These criticisms include the perspective's (Northern) Eurocentricity (the fact that its theoretical roots and

empirical examples are largely taken from a set of Northern European countries

that are distinctive by world standards), the excessive stress on transformative industry, the preoccupation with efficiency and pollution control over broader

concerns about aggregate resource consumption and its environmental impacts,

the potentially uncritical stance toward the transformative potentials of modern capitalism, and the fact that very fundamental questions raised about modernizationism within the development studies literature have not been addressed

within ecological modernization theory. It should also be noted that while we

can agree with the ecological modernizationists that radical environmentalism

may not be directly responsible for many of the environmental gains achieved in

Northern Europe and elsewhere, these non-mainstream ecology groups arguably

play a significant role in pushing mainstream environmental groups and their

allies in the state and private industry to advance a more forceful ecological

viewpoint. Thus, radical environmental groups, by providing alternative voca-

bularies and ``frames'' of environmentalism, by stressing issues often ignored

within mainstream environmentalism, and by providing new loci of personal

identity for citizens, could well serve to strengthen the movement as a whole, and thus indirectly contribute to ecological modernization processes. It is worth

noting, in fact, that in the USA the environmental groups that are most con-

cerned about toxins and chemicals ± the primary preoccupation of ecological

modernizationists ± are not the mainstream environmental groups, but rather

local (particularly `ènvironmental justice'' oriented) groups which are most

radical and often thought as being out of the movement mainstream (Capek,

1993; Gottlieb, 1994). In sum, as the social science community moves rapidly to

Emerging Trends in Environmental Sociology

57

explore the new ecological modernizationist viewpoint, it should do so with

awareness of both its strengths and weaknesses.

Concluding Remarks

Environmental sociology can look back on its first quarter century with some

satisfaction that the subdiscipline has been able to make slow, but perceptible, inroads into two types of influential circles: the discipline of sociology and the policy-making communities with responsibility for addressing issues within the

purview of environmental sociology. To be sure, most sociologists today are no

more interested in applying ecological concepts or more likely to see environ-

mental sociology as one of the highest status specialties than they were in the

1970s. And sociological global-change research is still relatively marginal to the agendas of international organizations such as the IPCC. Nonetheless, there is

now a stronger environmental-sociological foothold in both arenas than there

was a decade ago.

A good share of this progress has been made during the past decade. Interest-

ingly, though, the decade of the 1990s was not an entirely comfortable one for

environmental sociologists. The 1990s witnessed invasion of environmental-

sociological turf by new cadres of sociologists who did so with little regard for the subdiscipline's historical commitments and goals (see Macnaghten and Urry,

1998). The 1990s also witnessed a quickening pace of major controversies ± over

postmaterialism, the nature of environmentalism, social constructivism, and

ecological modernization. The subdiscipline has grown in its ability to deal

with external appropriations of its subject matter and in its capacity to be able to build on debate and controversy.

Almost from the beginnings of environmental sociology, the major axes of

theoretical debate have revolved around its ``double specification'' ± that environmental sociology draws from material-ecological postures about humans as a

biological species in an ecosystem on one hand, and from the classical-theoret-

ical emphasis on the distinctly social and symbolic capacities of humans and the social character of their institutions on the other. We have attempted to suggest, however, that instead of these rival views and perspectives being irreconcilably contradictory, there are some opportunities for cross-fertilization. The issues

identified in this chapter ± the environmental implications of political and

economic institutions, whether further ``modernization'' is primarily an antece-

dent of or solution to environmental problems, and the origins and significance

of environmentalism ± are not only important in their own right, but are among

the major areas in which environmental sociology is working toward syntheses

of the biophysical and social dimensions of environmental change.

5

Bringing in Codependence

Judith R. Blau

One way of assessing various schools in Western sociological theory is how

in one way or another they have focused on how individuals incur risks

and how they grapple with them. This is the case for functionalism, systems

theory, symbolic interactionism, mass society theory, dramaturgical sociology,

structural sociology, institutional theory, and rational choice theory. That is, for example, institutionalized rules and norms, social rewards for compliance

and conformity, group memberships, and positions in various social structures

reduce the risks individuals incur. Socialization, status incumbency, class

membership, norms, and social control protect individuals from one another,

and from society. Likewise, it is assumed that individuals deal with risks them-

selves through, for example, competition, domination, cooperation, and con-

formity.

In this way, too, Western capitalism provided a foundational linkage between

self-interest and risk-taking. Its origins, according to Max Weber and Joseph A.

Schumpeter, can be traced to the legitimization of economic risk-taking as the

superior expression of rationality. Capitalism's ascent in the West and its global penetration were achieved because risk-taking entrepreneurs were protected by

laws, administrative mechanisms, and technologies, which helped to keep their

transactions costs ± that is, their social costs ± low (Coase, 1988). Western

nation-states may have solved other problems, but their most critical role has

been protecting economic risk-taking and risk-takers.

Alternatively, we might entertain a conception of risks as lying in spaces of

codependence, as between or among individuals, groups, and communities, and

within, more generally, civil society. To coin a phrase, utility lies in the ties. (To put this in the terms of economics, utility lies in the very transactions that are now considered to be thè`costs.'') That is, we can think of risks and responsibilities as being embedded in relational spaces rather than being precisely

Bringing in Codependence

59

situated with individuals (or economic entities). I think this is heuristically useful because it reaffirms the axiomatic priority of social relations over economic

abstractions, and might suggest that codependencies are more endangered the

more markets and economic risk-takers are protected.

Market capitalism is based on the doctrine that there is a standard of utility

common to all individuals. As initially advanced by Jeremy Bentham, and

further elaborated by John Stuart Mills, Vilfredo Pareto, and Carl Menger, this