The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (36 page)

In this complex world, most children are required to move across discontinu-

ous social spaces. For the children of immigrants, however, these discontinuities can be dramatic. Immigrant children today may have their breakfast conversation in Farsi, listen to African American rap with their peers on the way to

school, and learn in mainstream English about the New Deal from their social

studies teacher. Therefore, the experience of the children of immigrants offers us a particularly powerful lens through which to view the workings of identity.

138

Carola SuaÂrez-Orozco

Given the multiple worlds in which immigrant children live, they face particu-

lar challenges in their identity formation (Aronowitz, 1984; Vigil, 1988;

Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989; Phinney, 1998). When there is too much cultural

dissonance, negative social mirroring, and role confusion, and when the cultural guides are inadequate, an adolescent will find it difficult to develop a flexible and adaptive sense of self. Many are torn between the attachment to the parental

culture of origin, the lure of the often more intriguing adolescent peer culture, and aspirations to join the American mainstream culture (which may or may not

welcome them).

Optimistic hopes for the future are often tempered by pessimism borne of

deprivation and disparagement. While immigrant and second-generation youth

may believe that thèÀmerican Dream'' should be attainable with sufficient

effort, the many limits to this dream become increasingly evident with experi-

ence. High school graduation no longer guarantees earnings sufficient to lead a

good life; college tuition is prohibitively expensive; and networks and connec-

tions ± which their parents may not have ± do indeed make a difference in

youth's opportunities.

To further encumber the process of identity formation, the children of immi-

grants are a dissonant combination of precocious worldliness and sheltered

naiveteÂ. They are often vested with responsibilities beyond their years. They

may be called upon to act as interpreters, to care for siblings, and to attend to chores at home while their parents work. They may be able to manipulate two

languages and have insight into two different worlds. At the same time, particu-

larly for girls, forays into the New World are often overrestricted by their

anxious parents, which contributes to a relative naiveteÂ. With a limited network of informed individuals to provide adequate information and advice, many

immigrant children have difficulty navigating the turbulent waters of adoles-

cence.

Given this multiplicity of factors, it is clear that immigrant adolescents face

special struggles in the formation of identity. Each individual forges an identity, finding ways to adapt to the vicissitudes of being a stranger in a new land. In

1937, Stonequist astutely described the experiences of social dislocation. He

aptly described cultural transitions, which leave the migrant `òn the margin of

each but a member of neither'' (Stonequist, 1937, p. 4). He emphasized that the

common traits of what he termed thè`marginal man'' (he wrote in pre-feminist

consciousness-raising 1937 after all) evolved from the conflict of two cultures

rather than from thè`specific content'' (Stonequist, 1937, p. 9) of any particular culture. Stonequist contended that cultural differences create the most difficulty in circumstances where there are sharp ethnic contrasts and hostile social attitudes. His observations on the psychological costs of marginal status are as

useful today as when he first wrote them.

The majority of immigrant children, coming from a variety of countries and

social classes, arrive with extremely positive attitudes towards schooling and

education (SuaÂrez-Orozco and SuaÂrez-Orozco, 2000). Yet a number of new

studies have shown that the longer the children are in the new environment,

the less positive they are about school and the more at risk they are to disengage Immigrant Families and Their Children

139

from academic pursuits. Kohut (1971) theorized that loss, mourning, and the

narcissistic injuries of humiliation are linked to destructive tendencies such as aggression and violence. I would argue that the losses and mourning resulting

from immigration coupled with the narcissistic injuries of the host culture's

reception are a dangerous combination which may in large part account for

this disconcerting pattern of decline.

Given that one in five children in the USA is a child of immigrants, how these

children adapt to their new country should be a crucial societal concern. The

pathways they take and the identities they form are multiply determined. The

resources, experiences, stresses, and trauma, as well as coping strategies, they bring with them play a key role. The structural environment ± including

neighborhood, employment opportunities, and schools ± within which they

find themselves must not be overlooked. The social mirroring that children

encounter is also critical. Immigrant children suffer a variety of forms of stress and loss, which are only compounded by corrosive social disparagement. We

should not underestimate the toll that these erosive experiences and shattered

dreams take upon the souls of developing children. The positive attitudes of

recent immigrant children are a remarkable resource; as a society the USA would

be best served by harnessing rather than crushing those energies.

Part III

Economic Inequalities

11

On Inequality

Siddiqur Rahman Osmani

Introduction

Few would deny that any morally defensible social arrangement must be

based on some notions of impartiality and fair play. In popular perception at

least, equality seems to be a very similar type of notion. It is true that the old adagèàll men are born equal'' fails utterly to reflect the human condition in

the real world, where the accident of birth routinely drives a wedge between

fellow human beings by bestowing unearned privilege on some and undeserved

misery on others, but at least it echoes a deeply felt human aspiration for how

things ought to be. Yet neither in intellectual discourse nor in practical

politics does equality appear to command the same universal appeal as do the

notions of impartiality and fair play. There are in fact many champions of

inequality, and they are not in the most part evil people reveling at the mis-

fortune of others. This chapter is in part an attempt to explain this apparent

paradox and in part an attempt to reiterate the demand for egalitarianism. I

take a critical look at some of the major theoretical and empirical issues that

have figured prominently in the debate on equality, especially on economic

equality.

The arguments for inequality fall generally into two groups. The first group of

arguments is concerned with the object of equality. The demand for equality

must refer to the equality of something ± the object of equality ± and the debate is about whether that object is really of fundamental value to the society.

Take, for instance, the idea of equality of income. Traditionally, income has

been seen as a means of achieving utility or satisfaction; so when equality of

income is sought, the true object of equality, at least in the traditional view, is human satisfaction. Now, it can be argued, as it has been argued by many, that

utility or satisfaction cannot be the ultimate object of value for a good or just 144

Siddiqur Rahman Osmani

human society, so equality of utility per se cannot be a fundamental goal worth

pursuing. For many of these critics, liberty or freedom is a more genuine object of value; so, if one wants equality in something, then, they would argue, one

should want equal liberty rather than equal income. If the pursuit of equal

liberty were to result in equal income, that would be fine, but the critics point out that in general that would not be the case, i.e. the goal of equal liberty may conflict with the goal of equal income or utility. In that case, equality of income will have to be jettisoned, for the sake of equal liberty.

In this example, inequality of income has been justified by invoking the

supposedly superior claim of equality of liberty. This is a specific illustration of a general point that demanding or at least tolerating inequality in one dimension may be perfectly consistent with demanding equality in another dimension. In

fact, Amartya Sen (1992) has made the stronger claim that most of those who

advance a reasoned case for inequality do actually favour, either explicitly or by implication, equality in something else. So the debate, in the first set of arguments, is not really for or against equality but on the question of `èquality of what.'' This debate is reviewed in the next section.

The second set of arguments can be more properly characterized as a debate

for or against equality. Here the focus remains fixed on the same dimension or

the object of value, and the question is asked whether equality in that dimension is really what is demanded by the conception of a good society as judged by that object of value. Consider again the example of equality of income, where

the object of value, in the traditional view, is utility or satisfaction that one derives from income. While accepting utility as the ultimate object of value, and income as its proxy, one can argue, however, that equality of income is not

necessarily the best way of promoting that value. A utilitarian would argue, for instance, that a society's goal should be maximizing the sum total of utilities

enjoyed by its people, and if a more equal distribution of income leads to a lower aggregate income (and hence lower aggregate utility), then equality is not consistent with that goal. The debate here is not about the plausibility of utility as the ultimate object of value, but about an alleged conflict between a more

equitable distribution and the aggregate sum of that object of value.

This is the context of the classic debate on ``growth versus equity.'' There is a point of view, of considerable pedigree, which argues that unequal distribution

of income is a necessary condition for faster growth of the aggregate income of a nation. Any attempt to make the distribution more equal will, in this view, only serve to reduce the total amount of economic resources that will be available for distribution. In the extreme case, the quest for equality can even be self-defeating, in the sense that people might end up with less income than they otherwise

would. In particular, even the poor, who are intended to be the beneficiaries of a more egalitarian distribution, may end up with less income in absolute terms

than they would have, had economic growth not been slowed down for the sake

of equality. Thus, equality, in this extreme case, can be an enemy of the poor, and inequality a friend.

This view, of course, has been hotly contested. The argument that a more

equal distribution of income will hold back the rate of economic growth has

On Inequality

145

been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. According to an

emerging, and what might be called a revisionist, view, greater equity in income distribution may even be conducive to a faster rate of growth. If so, a move

toward greater equality will be doubly beneficial to the poor: first, by helping to increase the aggregate amount of resources available for distribution; second, by tilting the distribution in favor of the poor. Below, I review these debates on the relationship between equality and growth.

Equality of What?

Any argument for equality must specify an object, the distribution of which is

desired to be equal. But that object itself must be of some fundamental value to the society, as otherwise a claim for equality in its distribution would not

constitute a fundamental moral claim. What, then, is the object that is of

fundamental value to the society? There is no single answer to this question,

because the answer depends on one's conception of what constitutes a good or

just society, and there are many such conceptions corresponding to many altern-

ative ethical theories.

The resulting plurality in what is taken to be an object of fundamental value

leads inevitably to a corresponding plurality in the dimension or ``space'' in

which different people demand equality. And, as we shall see below, equality

in one space may coexist with inequality in another space. What is more,

equality in one space may demand inequality in another. One can, therefore,

consistently be a champion of inequality in any particular space, while claiming to be an egalitarian in a general sense. Much of the debate on inequality stems

from this plurality of spaces, which in turn stems from a plurality of ethical

theories about what constitutes a good society.

One of the best known ethical theories, one that has had a powerful influence

on economic as well as social and political discourse in the past two centuries, is the utilitarian philosophy. According to this philosophy, a society should strive to achieve the greatest possible satisfaction, or utility, for the largest number of people, which in practice means maximizing the sum total of all individual

utilities. As stated, this principle does not show any egalitarian concern, indeed it does not say anything about distribution at all, concerned as it is solely with the aggregate or sum total of utilities. Implicit in the doctrine, however, there lies a special kind of egalitarianism, which some modern utilitarians have tried to