The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (17 page)

TB and Peres overran, then I travelled with him to the [Ariel] Sharon meeting, before during and after which I was struck just how much heavier the security was for him and TB, not just the number of bodies around, but the barriers and the closed roads. Even we had to go through a weird series of obstacles before arriving at a kind of back door and in to see him. Sharon was less belligerent than usual and the lunch in many ways went fine, but they really just wanted to whack the Palestinians the whole time. At the press conference he was very uncompromising and I could sense our press getting very excited, building up for ‘rebuff for Blair’ Day 2. In fact, set against what he often said and how he said it, it wasn’t that bad, but it was enough to give them what they wanted. Even accepting how difficult the politics were and even remaining conscious, as I always tried to, of the reasons why Israel existed in the first place,
it was very hard to warm to Sharon. And this was him in fairly mellow mode. TB felt there was a lot more to him than he showed and agreed these exchanges were difficult. But TB had his own mantra, commitment to the right of Israel to exist alongside a Palestinian state.

We left for another long helicopter flight and drive to Palestine, handover at the checkpoint and then on to see Arafat, struck as ever, as it was impossible not to be, by the immediate switch from First World to Third. We had the usual over-the-top welcome and guard of honour and then in to see Arafat and Co. TB was urging Arafat to be more constructive in his comments on the Israelis, but of course it was like dealing with a mirror – the things we’d heard Sharon attacking them for, now we got the reverse view, equally forcefully. I was tired and hungry by now, knew that if I started eating the selection of nuts laid out on the tables I wouldn’t stop, and so it proved. We had another helicopter flight to get us to the airport later and we were running late, TB moaning about being away so often, yet he was the one who now wanted
to go to Genoa to see Berlusconi.

I spoke to Wes Clark [retired US general, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, during the Kosovo conflict] to suggest we stay in touch and that he did regular media. He felt he was excluded from some circles because he was close to Clinton but he felt he had a lot to offer. I saw the SpAds [special advisers] from all the departments, did the usual spiel, then a very long briefing with the foreign press. I felt totally on top of the issues and in command of the arguments but they were beginning to pick up on the gap in a strategy based on hammering the Taliban whilst not fully supporting the Northern Alliance. Guthrie called, said Musharraf was a bit alarmed about the use of the word ‘war’, felt there were better ways of describing the situation. I always enjoyed talking to Charles who had a grasp of the issues that went way beyond the military. I was also talking to the Americans about an agreed Grid format and process. TB called as I was on the way home, said he was sure he had the makings of a plan to take the Middle East peace process forward. I said we cannot get so focused on the international but then lose sight of the domestic.

The main story of the weekend developed into a diplomatic fiasco. While we were in the Middle East, Chirac had suggested another Big Three meeting and TB had agreed. That was really why he had wanted to go to Genoa on the way back, to try to keep Berlusconi sweet. With the papers starting to talk of the Big Three again, Berlusconi called TB to protest, and TB relented. That meant asking the Spaniards too. So while we were busy briefing that there was to be a meeting between the five major European military contributors to the effort, the Belgians bullied their way into it too, leaning on the Germans to say they would not do it without the Belgians. So that was them plus [Javier] Solana [Secretary General of the EU Council] now involved. Then [Wim] Kok [Netherlands Prime Minister] called TB to say if the Belgians were there and he wasn’t, it was a political disaster. It was a total shambles, and by tomorrow we would have problems with the rest and TB would be getting the blame for splitting Europe. He felt we could emphasise that it was a good thing they all wanted to come, which was pretty lame. Throw in Syria, [Ariel] Sharon and now this, and it wasn’t a great diplomatic picture.

TB remained torn about whether I should go up front as one of the CIC on-camera spokesmen. He felt I was probably the best person to do it but it would make spin a problem again. And this time possibly not just with the media but with the public. It was probably a bad idea all round because with all the travelling, and the long hours, I was already walking on eggshells at home. I asked the conference call to get a figure from the Pentagon of the percentage of Afghanistan land space that was being bombed. It came back pretty quickly – 0.0002536. I got John Reid [Northern Ireland Secretary, former Armed Forces minister] up deploying it as a way of trying to counter the media impression of the blanket bombing of the whole country. John was very good at communicating strategy – lay the ground, go for the front line, then further options which we were not going to flag up. I was starting to get not great feedback from Peter Reid and Paddy Feeny about Jim Wilkinson’s operation in Washington. They felt he kept stuff to himself, didn’t delegate and didn’t really appreciate what we were doing. Peter described him as a human dynamo, real bundle of energy, but not a manager and so people didn’t really know what they were meant to be doing.

There was still too much focus for my taste on the Taliban claims, and not enough scepticism about them. The dinner at Number 10 was growing more and more farcical and ridiculous as the day went on and the guest list grew. By the end of the day, some of the hacks were calling it a bring-a-bottle party. I spoke to TB and we agreed he shouldn’t do any media, partly because he’d find it so hard to keep
a straight face. He had given up on trying to pretend there was a way of saying it showed Britain strong in Europe. What it showed was a reality – namely that France, Germany and Britain were more powerful than the rest – that others didn’t like the reality and that we didn’t feel sufficiently comfortable with the French and Germans just to be able to tough it out. Most of the foreign leaders actively wanted to do media, which was fine, and even the big guys like Chirac I think liked doing stuff outside Number 10, but there was something very comic about the whole thing. I was working up a briefing on the CBI [Confederation of British Industry] speech. GB had done a pretty positive section on EMU [Economic and Monetary Union] but then the
FT
claimed the spin on it was anti euro. GB flatly denied to TB there had been an operation to do him in on the euro.

TB called, first asking whether we ‘got away with the dinner’ – just about, though Christ knows what the other leaders made of it – but also, and more seriously, worrying about where we were on the euro. I saw him as soon as I got in, and he was still going on about it. ‘It’s so obvious what is going on – he [GB] is trying to get the right-wing press behind him by seeming to be anti euro, and the left-wing press by being pro the poor. My problem is in not being able to trust what he’s saying on the euro.’ The problem when the two of them were mistrustful was that it spread down through the operation. I went over to the CIC and they were now pretty much clear about the different functions, and who was doing what. TB set off for the CBI in Birmingham and his speech seemed to go down OK.

The US conference call was better, more focused and confident. We collated all the different Arab leaders and voices criticising OBL and started placing them more widely. They were also starting to involve us more in working through GWB’s basic messages. I was arguing for him to be closely involved in this argument about extremism vs moderate Muslims. Peter Reid said Bush had visited the Washington CIC this morning which gave them a real boost. Also, after the conference call today, they had had for the first time a proper follow-through meeting. But some, notably the NSC [White House National Security Council], were still a bit antsy about us being involved and sometimes telling them what to do.

TB got OK coverage for the CBI speech, but it was seen in part as a rebuff to GB on the euro. I went up to see him in the flat and he told
me of his chat with GB yesterday when GB denied doing a spin job on the euro but then went into an elaborate thing about how it was TB’s fault because he had got the
Telegraph
to do a story about Roger Liddle [special adviser, European affairs] saying we were going in at a certain date as though the tests were irrelevant. TB said what worried him was that their bizarre understanding of how we operated meant it was almost certainly how they operated. He said he didn’t mind madness but he minded madness that had a policy read-across. He thought there was something almost comic about GB pumping out the line about TB being too presidential when he was the one arguing for decentralisation and GB was in practice the great centraliser. GB had been at him again, saying he promised to help him become leader to which TB said, I did, and I will, but only if you are going to help me do what I need to do while I am here. His worry now was so deep that he actually had moments wondering whether Gordon wanted him to succeed at all, e.g. on public services, or with the euro. ‘He wants to be the prime minister that finally delivers excellent public services and the prime minister at the time we make the decision on the euro. What irritates him about the war is that it might just see me build a reputation too big for him to handle.’ This was not good. The way each thought of the other was not healthy.

I asked Scarlett whether we could divulge some of the material they had on the Taliban running out of money and he came back later saying we could. The papers had calmed down again and I think we were beginning to see the benefits of a properly organised strategy. TB said ‘My ass is right out there and we just have to pull this off.’ Jack had done an interview on OBL in
The Times
and we tried to push on that. I was constantly toing and froing between Number 10 and the Foreign Office, had a quick meeting with TB before leaving for the airport with Alison [Blackshaw], Phil Bassett and Lee McLenny.

I was at the airport to do the conference call, the focus on Taliban lies, the need to do more re opinion in Pakistan, and generate more moderate Arab voices. On the plane, I worked on a draft script for TB for tomorrow. I was met by Peter Reid and drove in to the embassy. Chris Meyer had put together a good group for dinner – Dan Bartlett, Jim Wilkinson, Charlotte Beers, Richard Boucher from the State Department, Tucker Eskew [White House media affairs], who was going to be coming over to work in the CIC in London. It was a good discussion and I felt they were more or less buying into our approach. But there was still no sign of the Pakistan spokesman and the tension between the White House and State [Department] was pretty clear. I quite liked Charlotte because she was different and thought a bit
laterally, but I sensed she was driving the traditionalists a little crazy. She left reasonably early, and once Richard left both Dan and Jim really tore into the State Department. We agreed to there effectively being one 24-hour Grid that we all operated to. Meyer raised the question of when Powell was going to make the MEPP speech that had already had a lot of build-up, even without a date. There was still no sign of a date. Dan said that my last visit had been a catalyst to get them going properly, and now we had to start producing results, and above all get the military plugged in better. That was the other big lesson from Kosovo.

Slept pretty well, out for a really good run in near perfect temperature, then back for breakfast with Meyer, Phil Bassett and Lee McLenny. What we had all picked up last night and again today, was the tension between the White House and State. It was clear this wasn’t just about the Pentagon. I had a stack of meetings lined up, first with Victoria [’Torie’] Clarke at the Pentagon. We did the conference call from there. She was very easy to talk to, very open and receptive and agreed we had to find ways to help them off the hook Rumsfeld had landed them on of having to brief every day. We had to get the media to understand there was more to a media plan than media briefings, and that they couldn’t expect to see the same people all the time.

Then to the CIC, which had been really well set up, with beautifully designed signs above desks saying what everyone did, the office well laid out, atmosphere OK, Jim Wilkinson very dynamic, a bit introspective. Then over to see Mary Matalin to discuss the
Sun
and BBC interviews we were hoping Cheney would do, and how best to project message from them. She was an interesting character, had a rich voice, an accent I couldn’t place on the class scale. She was attractive in a very unclassical kind of way and could be very funny, e.g. about what life was like in the ‘secure undisclosed location’ they go to in times of crisis. I so couldn’t get my head around how she, committed Republican working for one of the real hate figures of the Democrats, could live with James Carville, a committed Democrat even more driven and obsessive about politics than her. But she was adamant it worked. Of all of them, I felt she was the one who most shared my understanding of the difference between strategy and tactics.

Then over to see Karen, via Karl Rove. She had a bad cold. My main worry was the slowness with which we were going for the Pakistan operation, and the lack of a spokesman yet. I didn’t feel
Karen was totally on top of things. She was obviously very focused on Bush, but probably not as plugged in across the system as I had hoped, and of course it was probably, almost certainly, a harder machine to drive. In between times, I was talking to Anji [Hunter] whose departure day was now set, and we talked over how to deal with any fallout. BP [Hunter’s new employer] would be doing the basic announcement. She said she was relieved that she was finally going, but also upset at the way things had panned out. Then off to the State Department and the guy sent down to escort me up was clearly pretty disaffected. I was making small talk in the lift and before long he was saying he didn’t like what we were doing, that it wasn’t really diplomacy. Fair enough. I later told [Colin] Powell that we needed to see more of him and less of Rumsfeld in Europe.