The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (87 page)

We set off for a studio in Wembley, where he was doing an MTV special. He was fairly relaxed and it helped put out a tough message, the idea that it was going to a vote and people had to decide.
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The audience was pretty good, not the usual rent-a-crowd. He spoke to the Cameroon president [Paul Biya] in the car on the way back and offered him a visit to the UK. Then the call to Lagos, and the idea of the visit was clearly not on as things stood. There was a rumour doing the rounds that Bush was about to address the Americans to say they had captured Bin Laden. I called Dan. It wasn’t true. He intended to say they were confident of a second resolution and he intended to be positive re MEPP. We agreed there may be a case for going for Blix tomorrow.

With the Chile trip off, TB was keen to go and see Bush soon. I said we had to be clear about a purpose, because there would be such focus on the visit. He said it was to get them to do the right thing. I said but they were already very clear about their purpose, which was to go for it. I said ‘Are you not sure that your frustration at the way others are dealing with it is just producing a kind of wanderlust?’ He said no matter how many times you spoke on the phone, there was no substitute for face-to-face meetings. He said don’t worry, we’ll get through this fine. I asked him, if at the end of this he was history before his time, was this issue really worth sacrificing everything? He said it is always worth doing what you think is the right thing to do. Iraq is a real problem, Saddam is a real problem, for us as much as anyone, and it’s been ignored too long.

Up to the flat to see TB with David, Jonathan and Sally. Condi had told David overnight that Putin had been clear with Bush that they would veto the second resolution. Also we still didn’t have a clue whether Chile and Mexico would come over. The mood was gloomier than ever. TB was keen to get up the clusters document and also move towards the sense of an ultimatum. He and David were both now expressing their irritation at the US. David was even of the view that we should be pushing the US to a version of the Franco-German idea of inspections with force, a blue beret [UN] force involved in disarmament. TB spent hours on the phone, including an hour with Putin, a long call with Jack and later with Bush. He wanted to give
him a clear message about the political realities, namely that we could not do this without a Commons vote and it was not going to be easy without a second resolution, or with a resolution that was vetoed. The Russian veto was a new element. Everyone expected the French to be ultra difficult but thought the Russians might be more prone to be neutral, but Putin’s position had clearly hardened. During their call, Putin was very clear that he felt taken for granted by the Americans, and he felt he got a lot of talk from them but very little delivery. Jack was doing his UNSC speech and did it well and with passion. Bush was agreeing to a slightly later deadline, March 17.

TB, Jonathan, Sally, Pat [McFadden] and I had a meeting to go through some of the what-ifs, including him going if we lost a vote. TB said he felt that there had to be a vote on a second resolution and if it was about the use of troops and he lost a vote on that, he would have to go. The Tories were making clear they would support us on a war motion but not on a confidence motion. Andrew Turnbull was quietly looking into how a JP caretaker premiership would operate. Even though we were talking about his own demise, TB still felt we were doing the right thing. He said even though we were all rightly irritated by the Americans, it was the French we should be really angry with. Bush told TB he would certainly go for a vote. He was still making clear he didn’t feel he needed a UNSCR but he wanted to go for it.

Jonathan described the whole thing now as an enormous game of diplomatic chicken. TB said we could not flinch now, that if any weakness was signalled, we’ve had it. He was making clear to Bush, not in personal or moaning terms but as a reality, that his job was on the line, that if we didn’t get the Commons vote, there could be no using UK troops, which the Americans needed. Black humour was setting in. TB said his future was now in the hands of the dying president of Guinea [Lansana Conté] and the diplomatic judgement of Jeff Ennis [Labour MP]. We were sending JP to a president’s deathbed to keep the British government alive.

Bush was at least conscious of the difficulties they gave us. He said to TB don’t worry, I’ll be more subtle than you fear. ‘I’m not going to say to Lagos – hey you mutha, I’m gonna crush you like a Chilean grape.’ TB said afterwards that the reason he liked him was that he was actually so straight, and understood his own weaknesses as well as strengths. He happened to be right on the issue even if they didn’t always handle it well. I said all that being said, TB did need to think about his own position, not get pinned into just doing what Bush wanted. TB was clear with him that we needed a bit more time. I
reckoned the chances of him being out within a week or two were about 20–1 now. Parliamentary arithmetic was complicated, and not yet entirely clear.

Jack called from New York and pissed me off when he referred post CIC dossier to the ‘discredited Downing Street machine’ and said he didn’t want to put out our short clusters document. We did it anyway, with Tom going over to the gallery after Blix. We were all outraged at the Blix report. TB said it was political and dishonest. Dan Bartlett said we don’t care what he thinks, his job is to tell us what he knows. Scarlett said he was wrong in saying the Iraqis were trying to co-operate more. TB was very philosophical about it all. As I sat listening to him on the phone, I lost count of how many times he said: 1. we are right on the issue; 2. we have to see it through; 3. I’m philosophical about what it means for me and whether I survive or not. TB was keen to push the idea that the only reason the concessions were coming was because of the pressure we were applying. But there were real divisions and dangers and the UN was on very dangerous terrain. There was a very clear picture, clearer than ever, of the US in one place, us in another, the French in another, the Russians in another, and the UN as an organisation really worried about where it was heading.

Blix didn’t come out as badly as it might have done. In a sense he was almost irrelevant now. I spoke to TB to agree the lines to push for the Sundays – namely there are two routes by which he can avoid conflict: 1. he disarms, or 2. he goes. TB was working the phones pretty much flat out, especially Lagos but also the Chinese and keeping in touch with Bush. We were pushing hard for the second resolution. We were discussing whether JP should go to Africa to work the African countries on TB’s behalf. I tried to get Jack out for the
Frost
programme but he said he was desperate for a day off. I spoke to JP who agreed to come down from Hull to do it. JP was totally onside at the moment. TB felt the PLP was at best shaky. He remained sure we were doing the right thing and it helped internally that JP was as solid as he was.

Later I did a conference call with JP, [Patricia] Hewitt and [Peter] Hain who were also on the [Sunday] programmes and went over some of the problem questions e.g. on second resolution and also the issue of a Commons vote. By the time the papers came in, the main story was a mini wave of threatened resignations by PPSs [parliamentary private secretaries]. JP was totally scornful, said they were cowardly and pathetic. When it was pointed out that Anne Campbell
was one of them, JP said ‘Who is she PPS to?’ ‘Me,’ said Patricia. ‘Who is me?’ said JP. ‘It’s Patricia here, John.’ I managed to get in a long run earlier, twenty-one miles or so, and was feeling in good shape pre marathon. But Rory was racing at Brighton and had a massive allergy attack which had Fiona really worried for a while. Again, I felt bad that work had kept me from going down there with him, but he seemed a lot better when they got home. The key now was winning the necessary votes at the UN but in some ways the situation was in limbo. TB was clear we just had to keep our nerve and keep striving to get their votes.

Up to watch JP on
Frost
. He was fine on the basic lines we had agreed though the resignations were the main news out of it. Andy Reed [PPS to Margaret Beckett] duly resigned as I was driving with Calum, Philip [Gould] and Georgia [his daughter] to Watford. I was troubled all the way by the possible clash between the marathon and the [FA] Cup semi-final if we got through and were playing on the Sunday. But the problem never arose as we played poorly and went down 2–0. I had agreed to do a piece for the
Mirror
which I dictated rather half-heartedly on the drive back.

TB spoke to Jiang Zemin [Chinese Premier], and the Chinese put out the line that they were calling for more time for inspections. Then at around 5.30, just as I was settling down to do some work upstairs, Clare Short called me. She hardly ever called me, so I was surprised when Switch came on with her. She was friendly enough as we did a bit of small talk, but then got to the point. She had done an interview with Andrew Rawnsley for the
Westminster Hour
and had said she would resign if we went to war without a second resolution; that we were allowing our own policy to be dictated by the US; and that we were not doing enough in the Middle East. She said it all very matter-of-factly, as though she was telling me a few football results. I was conscious of myself shaking my head as she spoke, and then making a mental note to myself not to let my loathing of her pour out, but I said I was at a total loss to understand how she thought this kind of public conversation helped the government make and implement sensible policy. I also reminded her that nobody, as she herself had said, had done more than TB to get this down the UN route.

She said nothing at first. Then I said I also thought it absolutely extraordinary that she should be saying this to me, rather than to TB. ‘I thought I would call you because I knew you would be angry and
I thought I’d rather get the anger direct than through the media.’ The whine in the voice was whinier than ever. As if TB was going to be doing fucking cartwheels. I said I found the whole thing extraordinary. I thought the deal was that if you were a Cabinet minister, you spoke up in Cabinet if you had concerns, that was the place to do it, and then a policy or a line was agreed and everyone stuck to it. I said I had never heard her say in Cabinet she would resign. She said – rich this, considering how often she spoke – that she tended not to speak in Cabinet in case she was briefed against. I said there was no point her talking to me; she would have to speak to TB. I would call him to see if he wanted to speak to her. She said she was going out shopping with her mum but she would take her mobile with her. How considerate.

TB was at church so I sent through a note to be given to him when the service ended. I called JP, who was due to meet TB at 7. He said the whole thing was typical of her – she was a coward, couldn’t cope with pressure, and so ended up doing it like this, hanging her conscience out to dry. Jack called after learning Mike O’Brien was going to be played the tape of her interview on the programme. He said this was the result of years of her being allowed to do what she wanted. It was a disgrace. I spoke to Mike and we agreed he would simply stress the line we were working for a second resolution and not get drawn into a detailed conversation re Clare. TB finally called after he got back to Chequers from church. He was as appalled as I expected him to be. ‘It is disgusting, totally disgusting.’ It was the same word virtually every minister who called to complain used. TB said he was appalled for a whole stack of different reasons: 1. at what she had said and done; 2. that she had done it on the radio rather than talking to him; 3. that she had called me rather than him, and 4. most importantly, that it totally undercut his strategy to build UN support. He felt it showed there was a willingness among some – her included – to push him out over this. I was less sure it was a thought-through thing at all.

I said I cannot see how you can keep her without looking weak. He said in process terms, there was no doubt about that. The BBC had told Mike O’Brien that she called them up and volunteered to go on. He spoke to her later, and said simply he would reflect. We agreed to a public line that simply made clear she had never spoken in these terms within Cabinet or to the PM. There was no point rushing on this. JP spoke to her a couple of times. He said what she was saying was that she didn’t have confidence in the PM’s strategy, or his ability to pursue it. She claimed it had not come out as she intended,
which was bollocks. I now had the transcript and went through it with JP. He said he didn’t see how he could keep her in those circumstances. She was clearly limbering up to go. He thought it was not impossible GB knew what she was planning and that she might be thinking in terms of a stalking-horse challenge at conference. I went with Fiona and the kids to Pizza Express, but the phone just never stopped, usually another minister to go on about how beyond the pale she was and had to go.

TB called again, said Saddam would be laughing his head off when he heard about it. Later a secure conference call with Jonathan, David M with Condi, Dan and Andy Card [White House chief of staff] to go through the various scenarios: majority with no vetoes – fine; majority plus veto(es) – manageable but difficult; no vote; no majority. We said if we got a second resolution we would put it to a parliamentary vote quickly. We could live with a French veto, because people expected it, but we couldn’t live without a majority. If that happened, we would probably have to put it to a vote, and if we lost it, there was a danger we would lose the prime minister. The Yanks said that if we got a majority with vetoes, Bush wanted to go straight in, within days, even short of the March 17 deadline, would say the UNSC had failed to act, and get going, on the basis of 1441. We made the point that we needed the second resolution. Without it, we had real problems in Parliament. They said continually they wanted to help us but of course what they really wanted was the use of our forces.