The Circle (60 page)

At the corner table, Dan tapped a tablet from the green-edged pharmacy envelope and gulped it. He'd skipped one to be clearheaded for his testimony and his shoulder seared as if the burning oil still clung to it. He thought about taking two. Then he forced himself to put the envelope away.

He stared at the salad. He wasn't hungry. The long session with Johnstone and Hauck and Barrett had wrung him out like wet laundry. His hands had trembled at the board; everyone had heard the clatter of chalk. And then Bryce … that bastard! Now he and Evlin were both on record as incompetent, worse, of being tied in with drugs and permissiveness. While the ones who were really responsible—

He looked up to find Lassard leaning on his table.

“Got a message for you, Lenberg. From the Man. Anything else, have a ball, but lay off me, lay off him, lay off the boat. Hear?”

“What's he got on you, Slick? I still don't get what put you two together.”

“Negatory, man, no way. Nobody ‘got anything' on Slick Lassard. He just got on the winning team. His ass is covered. Yours ain't. You're out in the wide blue open, my man. You're in the nutcracker, and we're gonna crack your nuts.”

“Tell Bryce to fuck himself, Slick. That goes for you, too.”

“Okay, man. The kinnicks just wanted to cut some slack for a shipmate. Give you one last chance to get in the boat. But you just stepped in it, man. The Man and me, we're gonna waste you.”

Lenson sat there for some time, picking at the food. In the middle of the Pentagon, he was alone.

*   *   *

THE Court reconvened at 1400. Present: All members, counsel for the Court, the parties, and counsels.

Lieutenant Edson D. Talliaferro, USN, was called as a witness by the counsel for the Court. He was duly sworn and examined as follows.

Q
. Mr. Talliaferro, you were attached to
RYAN
as engineering officer. Is that correct?

A
. Yes.

Q
. How long had you been so assigned?

A
. About a year and a half.

Q
. I will pose to you the same question I posed to Mr. Lenson this morning. What was the material condition of
RYAN
when she joined TG 21.1?

A
. As he said, we'd sustained damage during storms and action in the Arctic, but by the 24th most of these were repaired. All evaporators, generators, and pumps were operational. Flooded spaces had been dewatered and accesses to the sea patched.

Q
. In your opinion, did any mechanical failure or material deficiency contribute in any way to the collision and subsequent loss of life?

A
. No sir.

Q
. What is your opinion of the state of training and morale aboard
RYAN?

A
. In my department, engineering, they were good. As to the rest of the ship, I can't say.

Q
. On the evening of 24 December and morning of 25 December of last year, where were you stationed?

A
. I was holding down Main Control.

Q
. In the engine room?

A
. Yes, in Main Control there.

Q
. State the sequence of commands you received after 0200, please.

A
. From memory, we had twenty knots rung up; then a flank bell for twenty-seven. A few minutes later, we got an increase to twenty-eight and then an emergency ahead flank.

Q
. You were on the throttle at that time?

A
. No. I was supervising the throttleman and other members of the watch.

Q
. But you were in a position to observe the throttle and so on?

A
. That's right.

Q
. Did you answer the engine orders you received?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. All of them? Promptly?

A
. Yes, immediately.

Cross-examined by counsel for Commander Packer.

Q
. What were the conditions of your engines at that time?

A
. We had three boilers on the line, the superheater fires were lighted and the plant was split.

Q
. You stated that all orders were answered immediately. Will you clarify for me what that means?

A
. We indicated on the engine-order telegraph that we had received the order.

Q
. But did this mean that it had been carried out? Correct me if I am wrong, but changing speed on a destroyer is not as simple as, say, pressing a gas pedal on a car, is it?

A
. No. On receipt of an engine order, the watch has to evaluate power available, decide routing, then set the valves. On major changes like a backing bell, it gets complicated. The engines have to be stopped, steam has to be shifted to the reverse turbines, and so on. The speed changes we are discussing here, all we have to do is use more burners on the boilers. But it does take time to accelerate.

Q
. So answering and responding are two different things. And there is a delay in response, even in normal operation, is there not?

A
. Yes.

Q
. How long is this delay?

A
. It can take as long as three minutes or just a few seconds to set up the plant. But then the ship has to gather momentum. From twenty to twenty-seven knots ahead, say, it can easily take ten minutes before she is actually at that speed.

Q
. That is when everything is working perfectly.

A
. Yes.

Q
. But we have heard testimony to the effect that everything on
RYAN
was not working perfectly.

A
. She was an old ship. The overhaul was cut short. There were lines I had to hold together with radiator clamps and wire. And we had problems left over from the Arctic.

Q
. Please elaborate.

A
. I think what you are getting at is the remark Lieutenant (jg) Silver, or maybe it was the boatswain's mate, made about a problem with engine response. The reason for that was that we had water in the fuel.

Q
. How did water come to be in the fuel?

A
. When we were in a severe storm, some days previous, Commander Packer ordered me to ballast.

Q
. Which means?

A
. Pumping seawater into the empty spaces of the fuel tanks to give us more stability.

Q
. Did you think this was a reasonable order?

A
. Yes, given the ice we had accumulated. I thought at the time he had even delayed doing it too long.

Q
. But he had not?

A
. That's hard to say, sir. According to the stability diagrams, ballasting was the right thing to do. But it's risky, because later on when you refuel, you may have contaminated tanks, which is exactly what we got.

Q
. What was the effect of this water?

A
. It's almost impossible to get all the seawater out of the tanks after you ballast. It settles to the bottom, but when the ship rolls, it mixes a little. Not much, but once in a while we were getting a slug of water in the fuel lines. This makes the boiler fires sputter, and, as a worst case, can put them out.

Q
. And you had this problem that night.

A
. Once in a while, yes.

Q
. Yet you said that you answered all bells immediately.

A
. What I meant was that the ship might not respond.

Q
. When you got the captain's emergency flank order, did the ship respond promptly?

A
. That's hard to say.

Q
. Why?

A
. I was not in Main Control at the moment we got that order.

Q
. Where were you?

A
. I had gone forward to use the head.

Q
. But weren't you on watch?

A
. I didn't say I was on watch. I was exempted from bridge watches to spend most of my time below, but there was no requirement that I be in a specific space at a specific time. I went where problems required my attention. Those members of the Court who have served in engineering billets will understand this arrangement. My chief was a qualified engineering officer of the watch. He was on watch, and he was there.

Q
. So you were in the head when the collision occurred?

A
. Yes, sir. It knocked me off the throne onto the deck.

Q
. Were you in Main Control before that, when the order for twenty-seven knots came down?

A
. Yes.

Q
. Was that responded to?

A
. The response seemed sluggish. I went forward, intending to go back to the boilers and check them out as soon as I was done. But there were good men on the controls and the throttle. I'm sure they did all they could to increase speed. Down in the hole, you don't have much idea what's going on topside, but when you get an emergency bell you jam every ounce of steam you got into the lines.

Cross-examined by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.

Q
. Mr. Talliaferro, do you think
RYAN
was ever traveling at twenty-seven knots through the water before the collision?

A
. I think we may have done that, yes.

Q
. But never at flank emergency, which was what—

A
. About twenty-nine knots would be all we would get out of three boilers, even all out. Calm water, downhill, maybe twenty-nine point five.

Q
. So the difference was about two knots. How far would a ship go in two minutes in that two-knot difference?

A
. What do you mean?

Q
. Perhaps I am expressing it clumsily. How far ahead of its position at collision would it have been if it had been traveling at twenty-nine knots instead of twenty-seven?

A
. I don't know. Too many variables in that.

Q
. In fact, in two minutes, would it not have been almost 150 yards farther on, and cleared the carrier by almost 100 feet?

A
. You seem to know more about it than you let on, Mr. Barrett.

Q
. I served in destroyers during the war. The point is, had not whoever was in charge on the bridge given an order that would have carried the ship clear if the engines had responded as they should?

A
. I wasn't up there and can't tell you that.

Recross-examined by counsel for Commander Packer.

Q
. Let us return to the order to ballast. You assert that this was justified by weather and stability conditions?

A
. It was the right decision.

Q
. What would have happened had you not ballasted?

A
. We would have capsized.

There were no further questions for this witness, and he resumed his seat.

*   *   *

RICHARD N. Norden, Lieutenant, USN, was recalled as a witness. He was reminded that his oath was still binding and was examined as follows.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Mr. Norden, go over again for us where you were at the time of the collision.

A
. I was in my stateroom, in bed. I explained earlier that Mr. Evlin and I had exchanged watches, so I expected to be called around 0330 to take the morning watch.

Q
. But in fact, you were awakened by the collision.

A
. That's right.

Q
. Then what happened?

A
. I don't remember much about it. Everything was confused. I remember talking at one point to Mr. Lenson. He told me
KENNEDY
had run us down, and said “abandon ship” had been passed.

Q
. Continue.

A
. I then abandoned ship.

Q
. That's all?

A
. Apparently I went aft, got into the whaleboat, and abandoned ship.

Q
. Did you not have any duties, in the event of a collision?

A
. Not after the order to abandon ship had been given. My recollection of this is not the best, because I sustained a head injury at some point during the events of that night.

Q
. But you remember talking to Lenson?

A
. Yes.

Q
. Let us return to the allegations Lieutenant Commander Bryce has made about conditions in Mr. Lenson's division, in fact throughout
RYAN
to some extent, if I understand him correctly. Were you aware of these conditions?

A
. I had taken part in the search the evening before. I knew what had been found, yes.

Q
. Did you know there were problems before that time?

A
. No.

Q
. Are you acquainted with Seaman Recruit William T. Lassard?

A
. He was in my department. I did not know him well.

Q
. What is your evaluation of his performance?

A
. As far as I know, he is a typically effective seaman.

Q
. You have heard the questions raised as to the movements of the ship's motor whaleboat after
RYAN
went down. What can you tell us about such movements?

A
. I don't remember anything that happened between talking to Mr. Lenson and coming back to consciousness aboard USS
TALBOT.
Shortly thereafter, we were transferred by helicopter to
KENNEDY.

Cross-examined by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.