The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (136 page)

Traditionally, there is no separation between religion and politics in Islam:
Islam din wa dawla
(Islam is religion and state). However, secularization in the sense of the separation of state and religion has been a fact of social life in the Middle East for some considerable time. This is most evident in the generally accepted and widespread encroachment of the state on the jurisdiction of Islamic (
Shari'a
) law. Some have dated this separation of state and religion with the onset of Umayyad rule in AD 661, at the end of the era of the
Rashidun
or the first four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (successors of the Prophet). In any case, by the time of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar dynasty in Iran, imperial rule was most evidently secular. However, this occurred in a way that did not consciously secularize the population. As a consequence, while governments pursued policies reflecting ‘reasons of state’, Islam has remained an important part of the culture and identity of the masses in Middle Eastern societies. Western penetration of the Islamic world sharpened the conflict between secular and religious conceptions of politics.
With the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978–9, the profile of Islamism intensified and with it the question of whether secularism can be reconciled with Islam: Does Islam prescribe for all matters including daily affairs? Should it be enforced? Are Muslims allowed any area which they can determine for themselves? On the other hand, among those who reject secularism, the debate among Islamists has moved more sharply onto the terrain of pluralistic politics and human rights which have been increasingly pressed by the West.
In this debate, distinctions are made between those matters that are absolute requirements of the Muslim for the maintenance of his or her relationship with God, for example, the five pillars of Islam (the
Shahada
—the profession of the faith,
Salah
—prayer,
Ramadan
—fasting,
Zakat
—almsgiving, and the
Haj
—pilgrimage), and those matters about which adjustments are allowed by the religion given the requirements and conditions of the time. These matters concern economic, political, and family affairs. Given these ambiguities, different positions are held among Islamists. There is general agreement that what is done must remain within the meaning of the Sharia, and the role of the state is to maintain the conditions for the implementation of the Sharia. This places the focus on two questions: What kind of state and what kind of
Shari'a
? The state must be founded on certain principles based on the
Qur'an
and
sunna
of the Prophet, in particular, the principles of justice, equality, and consultation (
shura
). There has been a debate between secularists and Islamists and one amongst Islamists themselves as to what should constitute the
Shari'a
. The secularists have conceded that the
Shari'a
is based on God's Word in the
Qur'an
and also the
sunna
. But they argue further that its historical development and implementation has been the creation of men and, therefore, subject to question. The discussion among Islamists has concerned the nature of the
Shari'a
. Does it set out a morality that should be insisted upon by the state or should it be seen as a more benign belief system by which the individual pursues his or her moral existence both in this life and in the next? All agree that the
Shari'a
is both all-embracing and facilitating as long as any independent interpretation of the sacred sources (
ijtihad
) follows the established methodological rules in Islamic jurisprudence.
It is often observed in traditional literature that sovereignty belongs to God, and the ruler—even an unjust ruler—must be obeyed in order to maintain peace and stability. This led to arbitrary government. However, recent debate among Islamists indicates a shift away from a blanket acceptance of a ruler towards an emphasis, instead, on the authority of the community and the responsibility of each believer. With the emphasis upon the implementation of the
Shari'a
, Muslims' current concerns are to limit the arbitrariness of governments, and to substitute instead the rule of law. The sort of system expected is no longer the classical one of the leader being chosen, ostensibly by the community via
shura
, in reality by the ruling élite, and then giving the leader the oath of allegiance leading to arbitrary rule but rather a constitutional system with continuous consultation in which the ruler and government could be constantly monitored and held responsible not only to God but also to the electorate. For some, this is a system of a separation of powers between the ruler and the institution of
shura
with an independent judiciary, even a constitutional court—in effect, a system of checks and balances.
There is still considerable debate about the actual relationship between the ruler and the
shura
element. Many see
shura
or consultation as a requirement and binding on the ruler, that it is a formal process and an institution with elected members, and that it would operate on the basis of the principle of majority decision. So far, though, this may not necessarily be a parliament but more likely a council of experts giving Islamically correct advice based on the common good.
These ideas and debates are the results, after the First World War, of the development and elaboration in the
Sunni
world of a theology challenging the basic character of the secularist state. The key originators and contributors to the development of this theological approach were Hassan al-Banna (1906–49, an Egyptian, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928), Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903–79, a British Indian-Pakistani, founder of the
Jamaat-e Islami
in 1941) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–66, an Egyptian, Muslim Brother). This approach to Islam spread to an Islamic world that was essentially traditional, with its orthodox and traditional establishment, its particular configuration of Sufi (mystical Sunni) orders, history, and conditions.
These ideas and the Muslim Brotherhood (from 1947) are found in Sudan, given the close historical relationship between Egypt and Sudan. But historically, Islam took hold in the tribal society of Sudan via Sufism which became widely prevalent. The role of the
Ulama
(traditional religious scholars of classical Islamic Law) has always been weak. Because of this Sufidominated scene, the size of the following of the Muslim Brotherhood has remained small. The political history of Sudan has been turbulent since the military
coup d'état
of 1969. Eventually from the late 1970s, as this and succeeding governments have found themselves relying increasingly on Islam for their legitimacy. The result was that the Muslim Brothers, as the religious group most effectively organized for political purposes, became involved in the politics of the country, with occasional involvement in government itself.
Afghanistan, like other parts of the Islamic world, has had a rich and complex religious history with its traditional and orthodox establishments and sufi orders. The population is largely Sunni with a Shiite minority. Islamism is a fairly recent development in the religious life of Afghanistan emerging in the late 1950s as a challenge to the secular state from those Afghans, some of whom later became leaders of the various
mujahiedeen
groups, who had been educated at the al-Azhar University in Cairo and had absorbed the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the fall of the communist government ( see
Afghan War
), power coalesced around two main groups—
Jamiat-i Islami
(not to be confused with the similarly named group in Pakistan) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and the other,
Hezb-i Islami
, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Pakistan has always been under the influence of the
Jamaat-e Islami
, founded and led, from 1941, by Abu al-Ala Mawdudi , whose Islamic ideas were popularized for more general consumption and which have been a significant influence on the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1950s and 1960s. The
Jamaat-e Islami
have contributed to the long-running internal debate and struggle in Pakistan on whether or not it was to be an Islamic state or simply a state for Muslims. Where attempts were made to give the laws an Islamic character, the irresolution of government was evident in that the measures that were proposed were seldom given institutional means of enforcement. Not only in Pakistan but elsewhere in the Middle East and South Asia, it has been the intellectual heritage of Mawdudi that has formed, to an important extent, the ideological backdrop for the debates concerning the Islamization of the state.
Central Asia, where the new Muslim republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and also the Transcaucasian republic of Azerbaijan are to be found, has not had the same opportunity of association for the past seventy years with the mainstream of either the Sunni or Shiite Islamist thought circulating in the Middle East. This area, having been gradually dominated from the eighteenth century and over the course of the nineteenth century by Tsarist imperialism and colonialism, was subjected to the restrictive policies of the Soviet government which promoted atheism, and limited Muslim education and
Qur'anic
knowledge to the local level. The number of mosques was reduced, and imams were officially appointed; book knowledge as well as basic knowledge of classical Islam declined. On the other hand, what came to be called ‘unofficial’ Islam, or popular Islam, dramatically increased via the spread of Sufi orders and the lowest stratum of clergy. The lowest stratum of clergy comprised the unofficial imams of the ‘non-mosques’ or underground mosques, teachers of secret schools, and reciters of the
Qur'an
. It is from this stratum that an Islamic revival began. This revival has, in one sense, been directed against the official imams and muftis. On the other hand, Central Asian Muslims comprise a diverse linguistic, ethnic, and religious group, with differing historical experiences, making co-operation difficult. In the post Soviet transition, Islam has become an important symbol associated with national identity. It can be and has been utilized by all the forces unleashed by the new situation whether conservative, nationalist, democratic, or other. It is unclear whether any of these forces will combine politically.
BAR 

 
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Support for non-involvement in foreign affairs, especially by the United States. Applied particularly to American politicians who wished the United States not to be involved in the Second World War, or in postwar treaty-making.

 
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