The Downing Street Years (35 page)

That day I also telephoned Tony Parsons at home in New York to discuss what, if anything, we should do at the United Nations. We
were in the happy position of having almost perfect backing for our position, in the form of UNSCR 502. But the problem was that as the Haig initiative was manifestly stalling and as military conflict loomed there was a risk that somebody else would take an initiative and that we would be placed in a difficult and defensive position in the Security Council. We could attempt to forestall that by tabling a resolution ourselves. But then it would be amended in ways which were simply not acceptable to us. Tony Parsons and I agreed that the best we could do for the moment was to hold our ground and seek to resist the pressure, which would undoubtedly mount.

It was on Monday that I first read the details of the proposals discussed by Al Haig and the Argentinians in Buenos Aires. In conveying them to us, the Secretary of State said that his own disappointment with this text prevented him from attempting to influence us in any way. Indeed, the proposals were quite unacceptable. The closer one looked the clearer it was that Argentina was still trying to keep what it had taken by force. The Argentinians wanted to give themselves the military advantage and have our forces redeployed far from the islands. They were intent on subverting the traditional local administration by insisting that two representatives of the Argentine Government should serve on each of the Island Councils. They wanted to flood the islands with their own people to change the nature of the population. Finally, they were not prepared to allow the islanders to choose if they wished to return to the British Administration they had enjoyed before the invasion. This latter point was shrouded in obscure language but the intention was very clear. The wording of their proposal was:

The innocuous sounding reference to removing the islands from the list under
Chapter XI
ruled out a return to the
status quo ante
the
invasion and so effectively denied the islanders the right to choose freely the form of government under which they were to live. A great many words to shroud the simple fact that the use of force would have succeeded, dictatorship would have prevailed and the wishes of the islanders would have been overridden. These proposals were so poor that we told Al Haig that we saw no need for him to come to London from Buenos Aires and promised to let him have detailed comments on the text when he returned to Washington.

On the same day I received a telegram from Buenos Aires which confirmed that there was no apparent let-up in the Junta’s determination to secure sovereignty over the islands. Every five minutes or so Argentine Radio would play the ‘Malvinas song’ which ran, ‘I am your fatherland and may need you to die for me.’ Soon that sentiment would be put to the test: it was on this day that the War Cabinet authorized the operation to repossess South Georgia — although the recovery was somewhat delayed because our ships arrived in a Force 11 gale which lasted for several days.

Al Haig asked that Francis Pym should go to Washington to discuss our views of the Argentine text and I agreed to this. Francis sent ahead our detailed comments and essential amendments to the Buenos Aires text. We agreed that he was to be guided by these counterproposals during his visit. He was also to seek an American guarantee for the security of the islands. Unfortunately during questions on a Commons statement the following day, Francis gave the impression that force would not be used as long as negotiations were continuing. This was an impossible position for us to take up, enabling the Argentinians to string us along indefinitely, and he had to return to the House later to make a short statement retracting the remark.

Also on Wednesday we notified Al Haig via Nico Henderson that a firm decision had been taken to recover South Georgia in the near future. Mr Haig expressed himself surprised and concerned. He asked whether our decision was final: I confirmed that it was. We were informing, not consulting him. Later he told our ambassador that he thought he would have to give the Argentine Junta advance notice of our intended operation. We were appalled. Nico Henderson persuaded him to think better of it.

Francis Pym spent Thursday in Washington discussing our proposals with Al Haig. He did not get very far in pressing the idea of an American guarantee. The Americans seemed unprepared to envisage anything going beyond the interim period. Nor, as I was shortly to learn, was he any more successful in putting across the rest of our
ideas. My own thoughts, however, were elsewhere. I was desperately worried about what was happening in South Georgia.

That Thursday evening John Nott and the Chief of the Defence Staff came to Downing Street to give me urgent news. Our Special Forces had landed on the Fortuna glacier in South Georgia to carry out a reconnaissance. The first attempt to get them in had had to be abandoned because of high wind and heavy snow. During a temporary and slight improvement in conditions our men were successfully landed. But the weather then rapidly worsened with a south-west wind gusting over 70 knots. Their exposed position on the glacier became intolerable and they sent a message to HMS
Antrim
asking for helicopters to take them off. The first helicopter came in and, blinded by the snow, crashed. A second suffered the same fate. The MoD did not know whether lives had been lost. It was a terrible and disturbing start to the campaign.

My heart was heavy as I changed for a charity dinner at the Mansion House at which I was to be the main speaker. How was I to conceal my feelings? I allowed myself to wonder whether the task we had set ourselves was truly impossible. But just as I reached the foot of the stairs at No. 10 on my way out, Clive Whitmore, my principal private secretary, rushed out of his office with more news. A third helicopter had landed on the glacier and picked up all the SAS men and the other two helicopter crews. How that pilot managed it I do not know. Months later I met him — completely modest, quietly professional: his comment was that he had never seen so many people in his helicopter. As I carried on out of No. 10 and left for the dinner I walked on air. All our people had survived.

On Friday 23 April we gave a general warning to Argentina that any approach on the part of their warships, submarines or aircraft which could amount to a threat to British forces in the South Atlantic would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. Later that day I went to Northwood from where military operations and all the logistics were being directed. It was fascinating to see how the decisions were put into effect. I had lunch at the home of Admiral Fieldhouse and his wife, Midge, before returning to No. 10.

Francis Pym was now on his way back from the United States with new draft proposals.

Saturday 24 April was to be one of the most crucial days in the Falklands story and a critical one for me personally. Early that morning Francis came to my study in No. 10 to tell me the results of his efforts. I can only describe the document which he brought back as conditional surrender. Al Haig was a powerful persuader and anyone
on the other side of the table had to stand up to him, not give ground. Mr Haig had clearly played upon the imminence of hostilities and the risk that Britain would lose international support if fighting broke out. I told Francis that the terms were totally unacceptable. They would rob the Falklanders of their freedom and Britain of her honour and respect. Francis disagreed. He thought that we should accept what was in the document. We were at loggerheads.

A meeting of the War Cabinet had been arranged for that evening and I spent the rest of that day comparing in detail all the different proposals which had been made up to that point in the diplomacy. The closer I looked the clearer it was that our position was being abandoned and the Falklanders betrayed. I asked for the Attorney-General to come to No. 10 and go through them with me. But the message went astray and instead he went to the Foreign Office. Less than an hour before the War Cabinet, he at last received the message and came to see me, only to confirm all my worst fears.

It is important to understand that what might appear at first glance to the untutored eye as minor variations in language between diplomatic texts can be of vital significance, as they were in this case. There were four main texts to compare. There were the proposals which Al Haig discussed with us and took to Argentina on 12 April. Our own attitude towards these had been left deliberately vague: though he had discussed them in detail with us, we had not committed ourselves to accept them. Then there were the totally impossible proposals brought back by Mr Haig after his visit to Buenos Aires on 19 April. On 22 April we amended those proposals in ways acceptable to us and it was on this basis that Francis Pym had been instructed to negotiate. Finally, there was the latest draft brought back by Francis from the United States, which now confronted me. The differences between the texts of 22 and 24 April went to the heart of why we were prepared to fight a war for the Falklands.

First, there was the question of how far and fast would our forces withdraw. Under the text Francis Pym had brought back our task force would have had to stand off even further than in the Buenos Aires proposals. Worse still, all of our forces, including the submarines, would have to leave the defined zones within seven days, depriving us of any effective military leverage over the withdrawal process. What if the Argentinians went back on the deal? Also the task force would have to disperse altogether after 15 days. Nor was there any way of ensuring that Argentine troops kept to the provision that they be ‘at less than 7 days’ readiness to invade again’ (whatever that meant).

Second, sanctions against Argentina were to be abandoned the
moment the agreement was signed, rather than as in our counterproposals on completion of withdrawal. Thus we lost the only other means we had to ensure that Argentine withdrawal actually took place.

Third, as regards the Special Interim Authority the text reverted to the Buenos Aires proposal for two representatives of the Argentine Government on the Islands’ Councils, as well as at least one representative of the local Argentine population. Moreover, there was a return to the wording relating to Argentine residence and property which would effectively have allowed them to swamp the existing population with Argentinians.

Equally important was the wording relating to the long-term negotiations after Argentine withdrawal. Like the Buenos Aires document, Francis Pym’s ruled out the possibility of a return to the situation enjoyed by the islanders before the invasion. We would have gone against our commitment to the principle that the islanders’ wishes were paramount and would have abandoned all possibility of their staying with us. Did Francis realize how much he had signed away?

Despite my clear views expressed that morning, Francis put in a paper to the War Cabinet recommending acceptance of these terms. Shortly before 6 o’clock that evening ministers and civil servants began assembling outside the Cabinet Room. Francis was there, busy lobbying for their support. I asked Willie Whitelaw to come upstairs to my study. I told him that I could not accept these terms and gave him my reasons. As always on crucial occasions he backed my judgement.

The meeting began and Francis Pym introduced his paper, recommending that we concur in the plan. But five hours of preparation on my part had not been wasted. I went through the text clause by clause. What did each point actually mean? How come that we had now accepted what had previously been rejected? Why had we not insisted as a minimum on self-determination? Why had we accepted almost unlimited Argentine immigration and acquisition of property on an equal basis with the existing Falkland Islanders? The rest of the committee were with me.

It was John Nott who found the procedural way forward. He proposed that we should make no comment on the draft but ask Mr Haig to put it to the Argentinians first. If they accepted it we should undoubtedly be in difficulties: but we could then put the matter to Parliament in the light of their acceptance. If the Argentinians rejected it — and we thought that they would, because it is almost impossible for any military Junta to withdraw — we could then urge the Americans to come down firmly on our side, as Al Haig had indicated they would
as long as we did not break off the negotiations. This is what was decided. I sent a message to Mr Haig:

And so a great crisis passed. I could not have stayed as Prime Minister had the War Cabinet accepted Francis Pym’s proposals. I would have resigned.

That difficult and decisive argument was followed the next day by the recapture of South Georgia. At Grytviken an Argentine submarine was spotted on the surface and was successfully attacked by our helicopters and immobilized. A certain Captain Astiz had been in charge of the Argentine garrison there. His capture was to present us with problems. He was wanted for murder by both France and Sweden. He was flown to Ascension and then brought to Britain, but refused to answer questions and, due to the provisions of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War eventually, reluctantly, we had to return him to Argentina.