The End of Apartheid (10 page)

Hawke and the Canadian prime minister, Brian Mulroney, protested at this appalling breach of etiquette. She got a terrible press in Britain, suggesting that she had disavowed John Major, though he had in fact approved her statement, and noting that she was once more ‘isolated'. Given that within four months De Klerk was to announce the release of Mandela, her stand and the statement she issued made a great deal more sense than theirs did.

I went to Soweto to meet Walter Sisulu and the other released Robben Islanders. They were grateful for the international support that had
been shown for them. I told them that I had spoken to the government about the need not to interfere with the planned rally to welcome them back to Soweto. We would be intensifying our efforts to get Mandela released in the new year. This would depend on the demonstrations remaining peaceful. Walter Sisulu said that he would be seeking to ensure this.

It was an emotional occasion to meet at last these legendary figures in the history of the ANC. None of these venerable gentlemen, wearing cardigans or waistcoats, looked very much like revolutionaries, though several were members of the SACP. I was pleased, especially, for Albertina Sisulu, who had conducted herself with as much dignity as they had, and who told me that she was finding it quite strange to have her husband, Walter, back home again!

In his public statements following his release, Sisulu continued to emphasise the armed struggle. He also called for more sanctions, though with no expectation that they would actually be imposed.

As De Klerk was continuing to talk about the need to protect group rights, I suggested to Gerrit Viljoen and others that this terminology should be changed to emphasise minority rights. De Klerk told me that he was not in the business of ‘reforming himself out of power'. What he was thinking of at this time was power-sharing, not a transfer of power. I told the Prime Minister that De Klerk was a calm and rational man, who was not going to fall back into the arms of the security establishment. He was trying to create conditions in which it should be possible to release Mandela.

In June, Lech Walesa and Solidarity had achieved victory in legislative elections in Poland, paving the way for the end of Communist rule and a transition to full democracy in that country. In October, the dismissal of Erich Honecker had signalled the imminent collapse of Communist rule in East Germany. Following the opening of the borders, the destruction of the Berlin Wall began on 10 November.

De Klerk by now had reached the conclusion that he would not be able to get meaningful constitutional negotiations under way without releasing Mandela, and that Mandela might well prove to be a moderating influence in those negotiations. Discussing with him the developments in Eastern Europe, I found that he had grasped the full significance of the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, discrediting the securocrat doctrine of the ‘total onslaught' and weakening Soviet support for the ANC.

I discussed the issue of Mandela's release again with Van Heerden. Gerrit Viljoen, the Minister for Constitutional Development, and Pik Botha wanted this to happen early in the new year, though some members of the government wanted an agreement on negotiations to be worked out first.

Mandela, meanwhile, had conveyed to De Klerk his appreciation for the release of his comrades. He had observed the authorisation of demonstrations that would have been banned under PW Botha, the scrapping by De Klerk of the militaristic NSMS, the opening up of beaches hitherto reserved for whites and the planned abolition of the
Separate Amenities Act, concluding that there was indeed a new hand on the tiller. He wrote a letter to De Klerk, as he had to PW Botha, urging talks between the government and the ANC, but reiterating that the ANC would not accept any preconditions, especially not suspension of the armed struggle.

Mandela met De Klerk at the Tuynhuys. De Klerk, who was accompanied by Kobie Coetsee and Niel Barnard, head of the NIS, ‘listened to what I had to say. This was a novel experience.' Mandela said that the National Party concept of ‘group rights' was seen by his people as a way to preserve a form of apartheid. According to Mandela, De Klerk's response was: ‘We will have to change it, then.'
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Mandela said that, if the government did not unban the ANC, when released he would be working for a banned organisation and would be liable to be rearrested. Mandela's report to his colleagues in Lusaka, in a deliberate echo of Margaret Thatcher's comment about Gorbachev, was that De Klerk was a man they could do business with.

I saw Pik Botha shortly after De Klerk's meeting with Mandela, which De Klerk told him had gone well. Pik Botha expected Mandela's release to be decided within weeks.

I returned to London to discuss with the new Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd – John Major having moved to become Chancellor of the Exchequer – and the Prime Minister what our response should be to the release of Mandela. The Prime Minister wanted a strongly
positive response by us, agreeing with my suggestion that we should lift the voluntary ban on new investment if De Klerk took steps also to open the way for negotiations. De Klerk was invited to visit her again at Chequers, provided there was progress in that direction. She agreed that we must redouble our efforts now to get South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A visit by her to South Africa would have to wait until later, but Douglas Hurd should visit South Africa at the time of the Namibian independence celebrations, scheduled for 21 March.

I heard that De Klerk had made a remarkable speech, in private, to the hierarchy of the South African Police. In it he said that, for too long, the police had been asked to solve South Africa's political problems. Henceforth this must be the task of the political leaders. For the resulting unrest had been like a bush fire. If stamped out in one place on the veld, it simply flared up in another. More fighting would not lead to victory, but to racial conflagration: ‘For if this Armageddon takes place – and blood flows ankle deep in our streets and four or five million people lie dead – the problem will remain exactly the same as it was before the shooting started.'

I had an hour's talk with De Klerk on his own. I gave him the Prime Minister's congratulations on the progress he was making and told him about Douglas Hurd's plan to visit South Africa, which he welcomed. He accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to meet him again
in May. Their last meeting had been valuable to him. He expected to have made a good deal of progress by then.

De Klerk said that he was in intense discussions with the senior members of his cabinet. They were addressing all the obstacles to getting negotiations under way – Mandela, the state of emergency, whether the ANC could be unbanned and the ANC's attitude to violence. He could not yet tell us what he would say in his speech to parliament on 2 February, but would give the Prime Minister an indication in advance. This would not, he assured me, be another ‘Rubicon' speech, which had so disappointed everybody. He was determined to make progress.

I argued that unbanning the ANC was the only way to propel them into negotiations. If the release of Mandela were not addressed in his speech in terms of intent, there would be great disappointment. De Klerk said that it would be addressed. But Mandela's release had to be managed in a way that would help to trigger negotiations.

De Klerk said that it was important that there should be a positive Western response. He had raised this with the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hank Cohen, without getting any very positive reaction. I said that, if he made progress on these issues, there would be a positive response from us.

We discussed the ANC statement expressing support for negotiations, but also the supposed need to intensify the armed struggle. I said that there had been no recent ANC attacks on civilian targets. We would go on arguing for a suspension of violence.

I raised also the issue of abolition of the death penalty. We welcomed the sharp increase in the number of cases in which death
sentences had been commuted. It would make a positive impact if a review could be announced. De Klerk clearly intended to do something about this.

At midnight, De Klerk telephoned me at the embassy in Cape Town to say: ‘You can tell your Prime Minister that she will not be disappointed.' He added that the US media were reporting that he would announce Mandela's immediate release. He had discussed this with Mandela, who was himself insisting that time should be taken to make proper arrangements. His speech to parliament would contain an announcement of the intention to release Mandela. There would be other dramatic announcements.

I thanked him for forewarning us and told 10 Downing Street that the ANC and all other banned organisations would be unbanned, Mandela's release would follow shortly, the death penalty would be reviewed and there would be a justiciable declaration of rights in the new constitution.

CHAPTER X

‘After today, South Africa will never be the same'

We gathered next morning, in our morning suits, the women all in hats, for the opening of parliament. There was a sense of excitement in the chamber as De Klerk stood up to speak. From the outset he signalled that this was going to be no ordinary speech, declaring with heavy emphasis that the ‘season of violence' was over: the time for reconciliation had arrived. Andries Treurnicht and his Conservative Party cohorts walked out as De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, the freeing of political prisoners, the suspension of capital punishment and the lifting of many of the restrictions imposed under the state of emergency. Then came the announcement the world had been waiting for: ‘I wish to put it plainly that the Government has taken a firm decision to release Mr Mandela unconditionally.'

On his way to parliament, De Klerk had said to his wife: ‘After today, South Africa will never be the same.' For De Klerk was
proclaiming nothing less than a constitutional revolution. One of my friends in the ANC, Cheryl Carolus, at that moment was making a fiery speech to a huge crowd in Greenmarket Square, urging them to march on parliament, an idea that had to be abandoned when she heard, to her amazement, what De Klerk had done.

The Prime Minister sent a message to De Klerk applauding his decision to release Mandela unconditionally, thereby unblocking the way for negotiations on a new constitution. She welcomed the unbanning of the ANC. The British government would henceforth be encouraging a policy of contacts with South Africa and would consider what further steps we could take once Mandela was free.

I passed this to De Klerk, who replied that there were no longer any reasonable grounds for South Africa to be isolated. ‘I assure you that Mr Nelson Mandela will shortly be a free man.' He looked forward to meeting her at Chequers in May.

I told Van Heerden that we would lift the ban on new investment as soon as Mandela was released on a basis that would trigger negotiations on a new constitution. De Klerk had promised to review all the remaining emergency restrictions if the ANC agreed to negotiations. We recognised that De Klerk and his colleagues were taking considerable political risks and deserved support. Douglas Hurd set about the uphill struggle of seeking to persuade other European Community governments of this, as did the Prime Minister with her European counterparts and President Bush.

Pik Botha made an impassioned plea to the European ambassadors for a more positive response from their governments. It was absurd to describe the fundamental changes De Klerk was making as
merely ‘a step in the right direction'. To do so helped only Treurnicht and the right-wing backlash. The British response had helped, as it included something tangible (the encouragement of scientific, cultural, academic and other contacts).

In a separate discussion with me, Pik Botha said that all the remaining apartheid laws would be repealed. Virtually all the troops had been withdrawn from the townships. The government was ready to discuss an amnesty with the ANC.

The Prime Minister and I were informed that De Klerk would announce Mandela's release that afternoon. The Prime Minister announced that Britain would lift the ban on new investment and urged other countries to do the same.

Mandela was released from Victor Verster prison, near Paarl, and met with a tumultuous and chaotic reception in Cape Town. The crowd was so dense that his car initially was unable to get through to the City Hall, where he was to address the throng assembled on the Grand Parade. On this great day, I was delighted to have staying with us in the embassy Anthony and Sally Sampson. Anthony Sampson, who had known Mandela well before he was imprisoned and was a great friend of Oliver Tambo, had helped me in my own contacts with the ANC.

Mandela's speech, written for him by the UDF on instructions from the ANC in Lusaka, fell a long way short of matching this
historic occasion. Amid a welter of hardline rhetoric, he reaffirmed his commitment to the armed struggle, though he added the hope that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement would be created soon so that there might no longer be a need for armed struggle. ‘I am a loyal and disciplined member of the African National Congress,' in full agreement with its policies and strategies, including that of nationalisation, he declared. He had not entered into negotiations with the government. ‘Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts.' He accepted that ‘Mr De Klerk himself is a man of integrity'. But he called on the international community to maintain sanctions and continue to isolate the regime. The
Financial Times
correspondent, Patti Waldmeir, described it as ‘a speech from hell'.
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On the following day, the real voice of Mandela was heard during a press conference in the gardens of Archbishop Tutu's house in Bishopscourt. He said that the ANC were concerned to address white fears over the principle of one person, one vote. They were ready to discuss guarantees to ensure that this did not result in black domination of whites. ‘The whites are our fellow South Africans. We want them to feel safe.' He recognised their contribution to the development of the country. He had sought not to negotiate, but to act as a facilitator between the ANC and the government. He repeated that De Klerk was a man of integrity, but there was no reason to lift sanctions. He did not want confrontation, but negotiations. The ANC were correct to pursue a policy of nationalisation.

Apart from one very agitated call to me by Pik Botha, the
government so far were reacting calmly to Mandela's call for continuance of the armed struggle.

Two-hour meeting with Mandela in Johannesburg with some of my ambassadorial colleagues. I was greeted with great friendliness by Mandela, who said that he would like a more private discussion and, to the surprise of the attendant television crews, asked for his best wishes to be passed to the Prime Minister.

Mandela expressed appreciation for the international support he had received, without which he could have been forgotten. For three years he had been discussing with the government how to bring them into a discussion with the ANC. He wanted a peaceful settlement. The state of emergency must be lifted and all politically motivated prisoners released, on the basis of an amnesty. He had been impressed by his discussion with De Klerk. South Africa was fortunate to have him as its head of state. De Klerk did want to write a new chapter in South Africa's history, as did Coetsee and Viljoen. But apartheid still existed. He had told De Klerk that no solution could be found on the basis of group rights; sanctions and the armed struggle must continue. He concluded by asking for help from us. In his view, Mrs Thatcher had played a crucial role in bringing the US and the Soviet Union together. She had led the way in persuading Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan that they could do business together. These were breathtaking developments.

I said that we were discussing with the government the removal of the remaining obstacles to a negotiation. We believed that they
would soon lift the state of emergency. I had discussed on a number of occasions with De Klerk and Viljoen the question of group rights, and had urged them to think rather along the lines of the protection of minority rights, the term Mandela himself was using. An amnesty for political prisoners was likely to be agreed in the process of negotiations. We hoped that, once negotiations were engaged, the armed struggle would be suspended.

In a brief discussion with Mandela afterwards, since he had referred to the Boer leader General Christiaan de Wet in arguing for the release of prisoners, I told him that I had many times used the same example in arguing for his own release. Mandela asked me for help with Pik Botha about organising his passport, which Pik Botha assured me would be delivered immediately.

Meeting in Soweto with Walter Sisulu, who had been appointed chairman of the internal wing of the ANC, and his deputy, Ahmed Kathrada. I explained that, when De Klerk had visited Britain the year before, we had urged him to take all the steps he had now taken and we had told him that, if he did so, there would be a response, at any rate from Britain. We had therefore reversed the discouragement of contacts with South Africa and of new investment, but the arms, oil and nuclear embargoes remained in place. I added that we did exert pressure for change, but in a way different from other governments. Mandela had telephoned me to ask if I could help to persuade De Klerk to release Peter Mokaba, head of the South African Youth Council (later superseded by the reconstituted ANC Youth League),
from detention. Their own release, and that of Mandela, had owed a great deal to the pressure by the Prime Minister.

Both said that they were well aware of this, and so was Mandela. Ahmed Kathrada said that he had stated publicly that the Prime Minister's efforts had contributed to these developments and that, while he differed with us over sanctions, he would not criticise the British government himself for that reason.

I said that, if De Klerk did not get some encouragement for the steps he had taken, it would be harder for him to go further. We were not going to treat him as if he were PW Botha. Walter Sisulu said that we had been more directly involved than others in obtaining these results, but he was worried that we might start leading a general crusade against sanctions. I said that we would not, but at some point I would be asking the ANC to consider suspending the sports boycott.

I made a first attempt to ask them to reconsider the ANC position on nationalisation. If the banks and mines were nationalised without compensation, there would be no further investment in the country. If compensation were paid, there would be no funding available for anything else.

These two highly impressive ANC leaders accepted the need to reflect on this issue. It would, they said, have to be discussed exhaustively within the ANC. I thanked Walter Sisulu for planning to visit Natal to see if he could help to reduce the violence between the ANC and Inkatha. I argued for an early meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi.

Our contacts with the ANC at this time were a good deal closer than was generally realised. On a couple of occasions while I was on
leave, Anthony Sampson had arranged private meetings for me with Oliver Tambo at his house in Highgate, where Tambo's wife, Adelaide, had plied me with currant cake. I was very impressed by the scholarly and thoughtful Tambo, who clearly was committed to a negotiated solution to his country's problems. An unlikely revolutionary, when Mandela was released he invited me to dinner in London with him with a card bearing the words ‘Carriages at eleven o'clock!' My colleagues in Lusaka had long since established close relationships with Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma.

Walter Sisulu rang to say that Mandela wanted to see me in Soweto. I met him in the tiny matchbox-style house he had returned to, not wanting at first to move into his wife's much larger house in Diepkloof, nicknamed by the Sowetans ‘Beverly Hills'. The contrast was dramatic between these humble surroundings and the quality of the man inside. Mandela in this period had not yet adopted the batik shirts he later made so famous, instead appearing in immaculate Prince of Wales tweed suits made for him by his friend and tailor, Yusuf Surtee.

His old-world courtesy and unfailing charm served to mask a steely determination not to compromise any of the principles for which he and others had sacrificed their liberty or lives. He was, he kept emphasising, the servant of his party, the African National Congress, and not its master. It was, he insisted to me, not a party, but a movement intended to embody the aspirations of all South Africans. He had difficulty accepting that the ANC could be wrong, and even in understanding that others might not want to join it. Yet he showed
a much greater commitment than others to genuine political tolerance and acceptance that South Africa must be a society with which all sections of the population could identify, including his former oppressors.

I explained to Mandela the efforts the Prime Minister personally had made with De Klerk, Pik Botha and their colleagues to help secure his release and a commitment to negotiations. Having urged them to take this major step, we had to respond, and were doing so by rescinding the voluntary embargoes on tourism and new investment. The other embargoes would continue, but it made no sense to discourage academic and scientific contacts with the liberal English-speaking universities, where we were supporting a number of black students.

Mandela said that he understood the role the Prime Minister had played and the efforts I had made to help secure his release and that of Walter Sisulu and others, as well as the unbanning of the ANC. But the process of political change had only just begun and international pressure must be maintained. I said that we agreed with this, but we were doing so in a way different from other countries, through much more direct engagement with the South African government. Mandela himself had stressed the importance of De Klerk's being able to take the National Party with him, and there were obvious difficulties with the security forces. We would be pressing the government to lift the state of emergency. Over political prisoners, I had talked to Gerrit Viljoen, the Minister for Constitutional Development, and there would be progress towards an amnesty.