The Enigma of Japanese Power (64 page)

Emile Durkheim,
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
, Free Press, 1965.
↩

There is much literature on these ‘old’ new religions. I have both relied on my memory and referred to Carmen Blacker, ‘Millenarian aspects of the new religions in Japan’, in Donald H. Shively (ed.),
Tradition and Modernisation in Japanese Culture
, Princeton University Press, 1971.
↩

‘Jinsei annai’ [Life guide] column,
Yomiuri Shinbun
, date unknown.
↩

H. D. Harootunian, ‘Between politics and culture’, in B. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (eds.),
Japan in Crisis
, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 144.
↩

Masaharu Anesaki,
History of Japanese Religion
, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1930, pp. 201–3.
↩

Herman Ooms,
Tokugawa Ideology – Early Constructs, 1570–1680
, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 30. Much of the following information on the quest for legitimacy by the Tokugawa rulers comes from this masterly study, which is rare in its emphasis on political expediency underlying the development of early modern Japanese thought. See also Inoue Toshio,
Ikko ikki no kenkyu
[A Study of Ikko Ikki], Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1968.
↩

Ooms,
Ideology
, op. cit. (n. 6), pp. 30–1.
↩

Ibid., p. 48.
↩

Ibid., p. 129.
↩

Ibid., pp. 171–3.
↩

Ibid., p. 155.
↩

The number of martyrdoms recognised by Rome for the period 1597–1660 is 3,125. This includes only those executed or who died under torture, and not the many who died as a result of ill treatment and destitution. The Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries counted nearly one million converts by 1614 – G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, Knopf, 1962, p. 173.
↩

Ibid., p. 176.
↩

Maruyama Masao,
Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan
, Tokyo University Press, 1974, pp. 249–58; and Ooms,
Ideology
, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 61.
↩

Ooms,
Ideology
, op. cit. (n. 6), chapter 5.
↩

Ibid., pp. 35–62, 168–9.
↩

As quoted in Delmer Brown,
Nationalism in Japan
, University of California Press, 1955, p. 120; see also ibid., pp. 137–8.
↩

Kenneth B. Pyle,
The New Generation in Meiji Japan
, Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 130.
↩

Carol Gluck,
Japan’s Modern Myths
, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 135.
↩

Abe Isoo, a Christian, was prominently involved with all three organisations. His associate in some of these efforts was Katayama Sen, also a Christian, and leader of several fairly radical worker movements. In 1921 Katayama, by then a confirmed Leninist, accepted a Comintern invitation to come to Moscow, where he died in 1933, while advising the Comintern on propaganda in Asia. He is buried in the Kremlin Wall. A third Christian, Suzuki Bunji, founded the Yuaikai in 1912 and played an important role in the later moderate socialist movement.
↩

Richard H. Mitchell,
Thought Control in Prewar Japan
, Cornell University Press, 1976, p. 31 and fn. 43.
↩

Paul Langer,
Communism in Japan
, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 6, 10–15.
↩

Tachibana Takashi,
Nihon Kyosanto no kenkyu
[A Study of the Japanese Communist Party], vol. 1, Kodansha, 1978, pp. 185–6.
↩

K. O. van Wolferen,
Student Revolutionaries of the Sixties
, Interdoc, The Hague, 1970.
↩

R. P. Dore,
Education in Tokugawa Japan
, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 37.
↩

R. Tsunoda, W. T. de Bary and D. Keene (eds.),
Sources of Japanese Tradition
, Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 382.
↩

Ibid., p. 385. Nakae Toju and Kumazawa Banzan were cult figures throughout the Tokugawa period. Their idea that humans have a spiritual identity separate from social expectations, and their pleas for ethical action based on one’s intuition of good and bad, were made respectable by their identification with the needy. Both sought the company of poor villagers, turning their backs on the aristocracy and the scholars, who did not appear to consider them a great threat.
↩

Tetsuo Najita, ‘Oshio Heihachiro’, in A. Craig and D. Shively (eds.),
Personality in Japanese History
, University of California Press, 1970, pp. 160–1.
↩

Ibid., p. 163.
↩

Tetsuo Najita,
Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics
, University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 55.
↩

Ibid., pp. 56–9.
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Fujii Jintaro,
Meiji ishinshi kowa
[Lectures on the History of the Meiji Restoration], Yuzankaku, 1926, p. 42.
↩

Najita,
Intellectual Foundation
s, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 59; and Thomas M. Huber, ‘“Men of high purpose” and the politics of direct action, 1862–1864’, in Tetsuo Najita and J. V. Koschmann (eds.),
Conflict in Modern Japanese History
, Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 124–6.
↩

Which is of course the powerful undertone of the teachings by Nakae Toju, Kumazawa Banzan and Oshio Heihachiro.
↩

Richard Storry,
The Double Patriots
, Chatto &. Windus, 1957, p. 24.
↩

Fujiwara Akira, ‘The role of the Japanese army’, in D. Borg and S. Okamoto (eds.),
Pearl Harbor as History
, Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 192.
↩

As quoted in James B. Crowley, ‘Japanese army factionalism in the early 1930s’,
Journal of Asian Studies
, May 1962, p. 314.
↩

For an exhaustive account of this battle and the ideological factors that determined its outcome, see Alvin D. Coox,
Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939
, Stanford University Press, 1985.
↩

Asada Sadao, ‘The Japanese navy and the United States’, in Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor as History
, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 254. The Imperial Conference was the one on 6 September 1941. For Kato Kanji’s beliefs, see ibid., pp. 234, 240.
↩

Ben-Ami Shillony,
Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan
, Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 135.
↩

See Takeshi Ishida,
Japanese Political Culture
, Transaction Books, 1983, p. 35.
↩

Mainichi Daily News
, 2 March 1972.
↩

Ian Buruma,
A Japanese Mirror
, Cape, 1984, p. 160.
↩

At a Foreign Correspondents’ Club luncheon on 7 October 1985. See
Asahi Shimbun
, 8 October 1985.
↩

See Chapter 8.
↩

Thomas R. H. Havens,
Farm and Nation in Modern Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 25–6, 42–5.
↩

Sheldon Garon,
The State and Labor in Modern Japan
, University of California Press, 1987, p. 201; and Robert M. Spaulding,
Imperial Japan’s Higher Civil Service Examinations
, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 54.
↩

Watanabe Takeshi, ‘Seiron’ column,
Sankei Shimbun
, translated as ‘What’s wrong with thrift?’,
Japan Times
, 27 April 1987.
↩

Sawa Takamitsu, ‘One Japan boom wanes’,
Japan Times
, 14 February 1988.
↩

‘Intellectuals on the Warpath’,
Japan Times
, editorial, 4 December 1987.
↩

John H. Schaar, ‘Legitimacy in the modern state’, in William Connolly (ed.),
Legitimacy and the State
, Blackwell, 1984, p. 111.
↩

For a short but incisive treatment of this confusion, see ibid., pp. 108–11; and Carl J. Friedrich,
Man and his Government
, McGraw-Hill, 1963, p. 233.
↩

The widely taught classifications made by Max Weber, of ‘traditional’, ‘charismatic’ and ‘rational’ types of power, are not satisfactory in this context. All three categories, which are not used consistently by Weber himself, could be made to apply to the exercise of power on different levels in Japan, or for that matter in Western democracies and twentieth-century totalitarian systems, without saying much about legitimacy since they don’t exclude each other. For a critique on Weber’s scheme, see Stanislav Andreski, Max Weber’s Insights and Errors, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, pp. 96–8.
↩

Anthony de Jasay,
The State
, Blackwell, 1985, p. 71. De Jasay is a recent author who makes valid points with regard to the distinctions between acquiescence and legitimacy; see pp. 67–78.
↩

Tanaka Kakuei is also often mentioned as a prime minister interested in expanding his power. But for him strengthening the prime ministerial institution was not a primary goal. His empire rested on informal relations.
↩

Delmer Brown and Ichiro Ishida,
The Future and the Past
, University of California Press, 1979, p. 368.
↩

Stanislav Andreski,
Military Organisation and Society
, 2nd edn. University of California Press, 1968.
↩

Herman Ooms,
Tokugawa Ideology
, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 44.
↩

Ibid., p. 42.
↩

Jeffrey P. Mass, ‘Introduction’, in J. P. Mass and W. B. Hauser (eds.),
The Bakufu in Japanese History
, Stanford University Press, 1985, p. 4.
↩

Dan Fenno Henderson, ‘The evolution of Tokugawa law’, in John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen (eds.),
Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 214.
↩

Irwin Scheiner, ‘Benevolent lords and honorable peasants: rebellion and peasant consciousness in Tokugawa Japan’, in Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner,
Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period
, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 41.
↩

Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi,
Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early Modern Japan
, Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 112–13.
↩

For a lucid theoretical treatment of the suppression, consent, legitimacy continuum, see de Jasay,
The State
, op. cit. (n. 4), pp. 67 ff.
↩

Thomas M. Huber, ‘The Choshu activists and 1868’, in H. Wray and H. Conroy (eds.),
Japan Examined
, University of Hawaii Press, 1983.
↩

See John W. Hall, ‘Rule by status in Tokugawa Japan’,
Journal of Japanese Studies
, Autumn 1974, pp. 39–40.
↩

Sir Rutherford Alcock,
The Capital of the Tycoon
, London, 1863, vol. 2, as cited in Hall, ‘Rule by status’, op. cit. (n. 16).
↩

Harold Bolitho, ‘The Meiji restoration’, in Wray and Conroy,
Japan Examined
, op. cit. (n. 15), p. 63.
↩

David Titus,
Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan
, Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 20.
↩

Gordon Berger, personal communication.
↩

Maruyama Masao, ‘Japanese thought’,
Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan
, April 1964, p. 44. Translation of Iwanami Koza,
Gendai Nikon no shiso
, vol. 11, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 3–46.
↩

The
Shinron
, or
New Theses
, the major work of the Mito school, which became the bible of the ‘restore the emperor and expel the barbarian’ movement. See also Chapter 10.
↩

Wakabayashi,
Anti-Foreignism
, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 113.
↩

Richard H. Minear,
Japanese Tradition and Western Law
, Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 72.
↩

Jung Bock Lee,
The Political Character of the Japanese Press
, Seoul National University Press, 1985, p. 97.
↩

‘Tami wa shirashimu bekarazu, yorashimu beshi’ – see Lee, ibid., p. 98; and Maruyama Masao,
Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan
, University of Tokyo Press, 1974, p. 330, n. 4.
↩

Ooms,
Ideology
, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 107.
↩

See George M. Beckmann,
The Making of the Meiji Constitution
, University of Kansas Press, 1957, chapter III.
↩

Richard H. Mitchell,
Censorship in Imperial Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 16.
↩

Carol Gluck,
Japan’s Modern Myths
, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 60.
↩

Ibid., pp. 53–6.
↩

Walter McLaren,
A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Period
, Allen &Unwin, 1916, pp. 356–7.
↩

Gordon Berger,
Parties out of Power in Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 28.
↩

Roger F. Hackett, ‘The Meiji leaders and modernisation: the case of Yama-gata Aritomo’, in Marius B. Jansen (ed.),
Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernisation
, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 268.
↩

An oligarch such as Ito Hirobumi established his own party with followers from the bureaucracy in 1900.
↩

Robert M. Spaulding,
Imperial Japan’s Higher Civil Service Examinations
, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 112. This unsurpassed study provides the best historical outline in English of modern Japan’s bureaucratic institutions.
↩

Hata Ikuhiko,
Kanryo no kenkyu
[On Bureaucrats], Kodansha, 1983, p. 109; and Spaulding,
Examinations
, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 117.
↩

Established in 1888 in order to advise the emperor on matters pertaining to the draft constitution and other laws. Later it gained jurisdiction over Imperial Rescripts and Ordinances. Its members were former bureaucrats, peers and other, always conservative figures. It was chaired by Yamagata from 1905 until his death in 1922. It effectively restricted the power of party cabinets.
↩

Spaulding, Examinations, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 119.
↩

Ibid., p. 119.
↩

Ibid., p. 119–20.
↩

See James L. Huffman,
Politics of the Meiji Press
, University of Hawaii Press, 1980, p. 192.
↩

Spaulding,
Examinations
, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 89.
↩

Byron K. Marshall, ‘Professors and politics: the Meiji academic élite’, in
Journal of Japanese Studies
, Winter 1977, pp. 79–80.
↩

Tetsuo Najita,
Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics
, University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 10.
↩

Gaetano Mosca,
The Ruling Class
, McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 52.
↩

The autocracies of Indonesia and the Philippines, before the flight of Marcos (countries that do not share in the Confucianist heritage), represent a different type of power dynamics.
↩

Ellen Hammer,
Death in November
, Dutton, 1987.
↩

An interesting account demonstrating this fact can be found in the context of the struggle against the authorities concerning the construction of Narita Airport: David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa,
Against the State
, Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 266.
↩

Jiyuminshu Henshubu, ‘1985 nen taisei e no tembo’ [Perspectives for the 1985 system],
Jiyuminshu
, January 1982, p. 228. For more on this seminal article, see Chapter 14.
↩

Murakami Yasusuke, ‘The age of new middle mass politics: the case of Japan’,
Journal of Japanese Studies
, Winter 1982, pp. 29–72.
↩