The essential writings of Machiavelli (11 page)

But let us come to Commodus, who, having inherited his throne from his father, Emperor Marcus, should have been able to hold on to it with ease. He had only to follow in his father’s footsteps to satisfy both the army and the people, but he had a cruel and feral nature. In order to exercise his rapacity on the populace, he chose to favor the army, and allowed it every dissipation. Furthermore, he did not maintain his dignity, often descending into the arenas to fight with gladiators and doing other things that were contemptible and unworthy of imperial majesty becoming a figure of scorn in the eyes of the soldiers. Being hated on one hand and scorned on the other, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains for us to consider the qualities of Maximinus. He was extremely pugnacious, but as the army had become weary of Alexander’s weakness, which I discussed above, when he died, they elected Maximinus to the imperial throne. But Maximinus did not rule for long. Two things made him hated and disdained: First, he came from a very humble background, having herded sheep in Thrace (a fact that was widely known and looked down upon by all), and second, at the beginning of his reign he resisted going to Rome to take possession of the imperial throne. He also gave the impression of being unusually cruel, since through his prefects he had exercised great brutality in Rome and throughout the empire. As a result, everyone was filled with contempt for his lowly birth and with hatred that arose from fear of his ferocity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate and the populace of Rome, and finally all of Italy conspired against him. His own soldiers rebelled during a difficult siege of Aquileia, and, tired of his cruelty and fearing him less because he had so many enemies, they killed him.

I will not discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julianus, who were so widely disdained that they were quickly eliminated, but shall come to the conclusion of this discourse. The princes of our era do not face the Roman emperors’ problem of having to indulge their soldiers by unlawful means, though they do have to make some concessions to them. Issues are now resolved quickly, as none of our princes have the kind of established armies that evolved with the government and with the administration of the provinces, as was the case in imperial Rome. If in Roman times it was necessary to favor the army more than the people, that was because the soldiers carried more weight than the people. Now it is necessary for all princes, except the Ottoman sultan and the Sultan of Egypt, to favor the people above the army, because it is the people who carry more weight. But I make an exception of the Ottoman sultan: He always surrounds himself with an infantry of twelve thousand and a cavalry of fifteen thousand, on which the security and power of his rule depend. For him it is vital that he set aside all other considerations and keep his soldiers well disposed. Similarly, the Egyptian sultan’s rule is also entirely in the hands of his soldiers, and so it behooves him to keep them on his side without consideration for the populace. It should be noted that the principality of the Egyptian sultan differs from other principalities in that it is similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called a hereditary principality or a new principality because it is not the sons of the old prince who are the heirs and rulers. Princes are elected to that rank by those who have the authority to do so. As the Egyptian sultanate is an old institution, one cannot call it a new principality because it does not bring with it any of the difficulties of new principalities. Even if the prince is new, the institutions of that state are old and set up to receive him as if he were a hereditary ruler.

But let us return to our subject. If one weighs the above discourse, it is clear that it was hatred or contempt that brought about the ruin of the emperors I have mentioned. Though some followed one path and some the other, in each case some of the emperors ended well and some badly. It was futile and disastrous for Pertinax and Alexander, as new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary ruler, and it was just as disastrous for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to imitate Severus, as they did not have the skill to follow in his footsteps. A new prince in a new principality cannot imitate the exploits of Marcus, but neither should he imitate those of Severus. He must take from Severus the necessary attributes to found a new state, and from Marcus the glorious attributes suitable for conserving a state that is already established and stable.

73.
See chapter 15, in which Machiavelli discusses “the qualities that attract praise or blame.”

74.
Throughout this chapter Machiavelli touches on ideas put forward in Aristotle’s
Politics
, Book V. Aristotle writes (Book V, chapter 10, 1312b, 20): “There are two principal reasons that lead men to attack tyrannies: hatred and scorn.”

75.
See chapter 9.

76.
See
Discourses
, Book III, chapter 6: “If on the other hand you measure faithfulness by the discontent an ally has for the prince, you can be quite deceived, because the instant you take this malcontent into your confidence you provide him with the opportunity to become quite content at your expense.”

77.
The French
parlements
formed the supreme court under the Ancien Régime in France, divided into the Parisian
parlement
, which was the most powerful, and the regional
parlements. The parlements saw
to it that the king’s edicts and measures conformed with the principles of law and justice. They provided a counterbalance to royal power. By Machiavelli’s time, the
parlements
had adopted a course of systematic opposition to the king.

78.
General Pescennius Niger was proclaimed emperor by his legions when Emperor Commodus’s successor, Pertinax, was murdered in the spring of 193 CE, becoming ruler of the Greek-speaking East. General Albinus represented the aristocracy of the Latin-speaking West, and was an imperial candidate in the years 193–197
CE
.

79.
Machiavelli follows Herodian’s description in
History of the Empire
, Book IV, particularly chapters 4–9.

80.
Aristotle (
Politics
, Book V, chapter 11, 1315a, 24) writes: “Among those who plot to assassinate the tyrant, those who are most worrisome, and should be most carefully watched, are those who do not strive to preserve their own lives while destroying his.”

81.
Aristotle (
Politics
, Book V, chapter 11, 1315a, 27) writes: “Therefore the ruler must be extremely wary of those who believe that he has harmed them or those under their care.” King Agis IV (d. 241
BCE
) attempted to introduce sweeping reforms that drew on Sparta’s legendary lawgiver Lycurgus (c. seventh century
BCE
). Agis was, however, assassinated in the fourth year of his reign.

CHAPTER TWENTY
O
F WHETHER FORTRESSES AND MANY OTHER THINGS PRINCES CREATE EVERY DAY ARE USEFUL

In order to hold their states securely, some princes disarm their subjects, others keep their conquered territories divided, while still others encourage hostility against themselves. Still others turn to winning over those whom they suspected at the beginning of their rule. Some princes build fortresses, others destroy them. Even though one cannot lay down a definite rule concerning these choices unless one examines the particulars of the states in question, I will nevertheless discuss this in as broad terms as the topic will allow.

No new prince has ever disarmed his subjects. In fact, whenever a prince found his new subjects disarmed, he has always armed them, because when he does so those arms become his. The men he did not trust become faithful, those who were faithful remain so, and his subjects become his partisans. And yet the prince cannot arm all his subjects, so when the ones he does arm receive benefits, he need not worry unduly about the rest: The armed subjects see that they are being preferred and are bound to the prince, while the others excuse the prince for showing preference, judging it necessary that those bearing arms should receive greater rewards since they have to shoulder more duties and face greater danger. But when you start to disarm them, they take offense. You show that you mistrust them, either out of cowardice or because you have little faith in them, both of which opinions will generate hatred toward you. Because you cannot remain unarmed, you will then have to turn to a mercenary army, which is of the quality that I have already described.
⁸²
Even if the mercenary army is good, it can never be good enough to defend you from powerful enemies and subjects you cannot trust. But as I have already said, new princes in new principalities have always armed their subjects. History is filled with such examples. Only when a prince acquires a new state added like a limb to his old state
⁸³
is it necessary for him to disarm the new state, unless his new subjects are his partisans, but even they, over time, must be made soft and effeminate, and things must be organized so that all the arms in the prince’s state are in the hands of his actual soldiers who have been at his side in his old state.

Our forefathers, and those we thought wise, used to say that Pistoia was to be held by factions and Pisa by fortresses.
⁸⁴
They therefore encouraged conflicts in some of their subject cities so they could hold them more easily. In those days, when there was a certain equilibrium in Italy, this might have been a good strategy, but I do not see how one can live by this principle today, because I do not believe that such divisions ever do anyone any good. In fact, it is inevitable that a divided city will fall the instant an enemy attacks: The weaker faction will ally itself with the external force, while the stronger faction will not be able to hold out.

I believe that the Venetians incited the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in the cities under their control for the reasons I have just mentioned.
⁸⁵
The Venetians never actually let them shed each other’s blood, but they did encourage their differences, so that the Guelphs and Ghibellines, occupied as they were with each other, did not unite against the Venetians. Yet as we have subsequently seen, this did not turn out to Venice’s advantage, because when she was defeated at Vailà, one of the factions was quick to take courage and seize the whole state from her.
⁸⁶
This strategy indicates weakness in a prince, because in a strong principality such divisions are never permitted. They bring advantages only in times of peace, enabling the prince to manage his subjects with greater ease. But when war comes, this strategy reveals its flaws.

Without doubt, princes become great when they overcome difficulties and hurdles put in their path. When Fortune wants to advance a new prince, for whom it is more vital to acquire prestige than it is for a hereditary prince, she creates enemies for him, making them launch campaigns against him so that he is compelled to overcome them and climb higher on the ladder that they have brought him. Therefore, many judge that a wise prince must skillfully fan some enmity whenever the opportunity arises, so that in crushing it he will increase his standing.

Princes, particularly new ones, have found more loyalty and value in the men they distrusted at the beginning of their reign than in those who were considered sound. Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena, ruled his state relying more on men he had initially distrusted than on his first supporters. But one cannot lay this matter out in broad terms, since it varies with every case. I will only say that men who are enemies of the prince at the beginning of his reign, but who are of quality and who need his support to maintain their position, can be won over with great ease. These men will be forced to serve him the more loyally, as they are aware that it is vital to rescind the negative opinion the prince initially had of them. Hence they are of greater use to him than are men who serve him with too much confidence in his goodwill and thus neglect his affairs.

Since our topic requires it, I do not wish to omit reminding princes who have recently acquired a state with the help of a faction within it that they should weigh the reasons that might have moved this faction to support them. If it is not natural affection toward the prince that made it favor him, but rather discontent with the former government, it will be only with much toil and difficulty that the prince will maintain these malcontents as his allies, because it will be impossible to satisfy them. If he looks closely at what can be deduced from ancient and modern examples, he will see that it is far easier to win over men who were content with the state before he conquered it, and therefore were his enemies, than to win over those who had not been satisfied, and so became his allies and supported his occupation of the state.

In order that princes might hold their states more securely, it has been their custom to build fortresses to act as a check on those who might have designs against them and to have a secure refuge against sudden rebellion. I praise this, as it has been a long-standing practice. And yet in our own times Niccolò Vitelli tore down two fortresses in Città di Castello in order to hold on to that state, while Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, when he returned to his dominions from which Cesare Borgia had driven him, razed all the fortresses of that province to the ground, judging that he would be less likely to lose his state a second time without them. The Bentivogli, returning to Bologna, employed similar measures. Therefore, fortresses can be useful or not, depending on the times. If they are useful in one way, they can harm you in another. The question can be considered in this light: The prince who fears his people more than he does a foreign enemy must build fortresses, but the prince who fears a foreign enemy more than he does his people should not. The Castle of Milan built by Francesco Sforza has done and will do more harm to the House of Sforza than any turmoil in that state. The best fortress for the prince is to be loved by his people, because if he is hated by them, all the fortresses in the world will not save him. Once the populace has taken up arms, there will always be a foreign power eager to come to its aid.

In our time, we have not seen fortresses to be of any use to princes, except in the case of the Countess of Forlì when her husband, Count Girolamo, was killed. She managed to escape her people’s uprising by retiring to her fortress and waiting there to recover her state with the help of Milan:
⁸⁷
At that point in history, circumstances were such that a foreign power could not come to the aid of the people. But later the countess’s fortresses were of little help to her when a foreign power—Cesare Borgia—attacked, and the populace, hostile to her, joined forces with him. Both then and before, it would have been safer for the countess to be loved by her people than to have fortresses. All things considered, I will praise both the prince who builds fortresses and the prince who does not, but I shall blame the prince who relies on his fortresses and thinks nothing of being hated by the people.

82.
See chapter 12.

83.
See chapter 3.

84.
See chapter 17.

85.
The Guelphs supported the papacy and the Ghibellines the Holy Roman Emperors.

86.
The Venetians were defeated in 1509 in the Battle of Agnadello by the forces of the League of Cambrai, after which the Ghibelline faction gained the upper hand in Venice.

87.
Caterina Sforza Riario (1463–1509) was the ruler of Imola and Forlì. When her husband, Girolamo Riario, was assassinated in 1488, she held out against the rebels in one of her fortresses until help arrived from her uncle, Ludovico Sforza of Milan. (Negotiations with Caterina Sforza Riario were the subject of Machiavelli’s very first diplomatic assignment in July 1499.)