The essential writings of Machiavelli (4 page)

In short, Louis lost Lombardy because he did not observe some of the principles followed by others who have taken territories and managed to keep them. Nor is any of this a miracle, but quite ordinary and reasonable. I spoke to the Cardinal of Rouen about this matter at Nantes, when Valentino (that was how Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was known to his friends) was occupying the Romagna. When the cardinal declared that the Italians did not understand warfare, I replied that the French did not understand the state; because had they understood the state, they would not have let the Church rise to such power. And experience has shown that the strength of the Church and of Spain in Italy was brought about by France, and that France’s ruin was brought about by them. From this one can draw a general rule that is almost always true: He who helps another man to power is setting himself up for ruin, because that power has been brought about by either diligence or force, both of which are suspect to the man who has newly become powerful.

5.
Louis XII occupied Milan in September 1499, but was ousted in February 1500 by Ludovico Sforza. Louis, however, managed to recapture Milan within two months.

6.
Once Louis XII recaptured Milan, it remained under his rule until 1512.

7.
The Holy League of 1511, organized by Pope Julius II, was an anti-French coalition that included Spain, Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Swiss. The League managed to drive the French out of Milan in May 1512.

8.
The Turks occupied Constantinople in 1453, and in 1457 transferred the capital of the Ottoman Empire from Edirne to Constantinople.

9.
The Aetolian League, a federation of cities north of the Gulf of Corinth, had become one of the leading military powers in Greece by the fourth century
BCE
. In 211 and 200–197
BCE
the Aetolians joined Rome in its war against Philip V of Macedon.

10.
The Achaean League, a federation of cities in the Peloponnesus, entered an alliance with Rome in 198
BCE
against Philip V of Macedon, at the time the most powerful ruler in Greece. The alliance temporarily gave the Achaeans and the Aetolians (see previous footnote) dominance in Greece. But within a few decades they were degraded to weak protectorates of Rome. Antiochus the Great (242–187) created a vast empire in Asia Minor and the East, but was finally defeated by Rome in the Battle of Magnesia in 190
BCE
.

11.
Charles VIII of France had marched through Italy in 1494 to occupy Naples, which he had inherited from the Angevins. He was crowned King of Naples in 1495, but was ousted in the Battle of Fornovo that same year by Ludovico Sforza, Emperor Maximilian I, the pope, and King Ferdinand II of Aragon, who formed the League of Venice.

12.
In 1500, Louis XII signed the Treaty of Granada with Ferdinand II for a partition of the Kingdom of Naples. But tensions soon grew between Louis and Ferdinand over the partition, and by 1504 Louis had been ousted from Naples.

13.
Pope Alexander.

14.
King Ferdinand.

15.
Louis XII had been granted an annulment of his marriage to Jeanne de Valois, and a cardinalate for his minister, Georges d’Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen.

CHAPTER FOUR
W
HY
D
ARIUS’S
¹⁶
KINGDOM, WHICH
A
LEXANDER HAD OCCUPIED, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST
A
LEXANDER’S SUCCESSORS AFTER HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties of retaining a newly acquired state, one marvels at how in a few years Alexander the Great managed to become the ruler of Asia and, having occupied it, died.
¹⁷
It would seem reasonable that after his death the territories he had acquired would have rebelled. And yet Alexander’s successors did retain these territories, and had no difficulties other than those that arose among themselves, difficulties sparked by their own ambition. My point is that all the principalities in history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince and his servants, in which case the ministers who help him govern do so by his favor and concession, or by a prince and a group of barons, who hold their rank not by his favor but by the rights of their bloodline. These barons have their own states and subjects, who recognize them as their lords and have a natural affection for them.

In those states where a prince and his servants govern, the prince has more authority, as in all his territory there is no man who is considered superior to him. And if subjects obey a minister, they obey him as an official of the prince, and not out of particular affection.

Examples of these two kinds of government in our times are the Turk and the King of France. The Turk’s monarchy is governed by a single ruler, and everyone else is his servant. Dividing his kingdom into
sanjaks
, or provinces, he sends out governors, changing them at his pleasure. But the King of France is at the center of an ancient multitude of lords, recognized by their subjects and loved by them. These lords have their own dominions, which the king can take from them only at his peril.

If one considers these two states, one finds it difficult to acquire that of the Turk, but easy to keep once it is won. It is difficult to conquer because there are no barons who can be called on to help the conqueror, nor is there hope for a rebellion of the Turk’s entourage. This springs from the reasons I have mentioned previously. As all the Turk’s men are dependents and bondsmen it is harder to corrupt them; and if they are corrupted, they prove of little use, as they do not have the populace behind them for the reasons I have mentioned. Consequently, whoever attacks the Turk should expect to find a united front, and must rely more on his own power than on the disorder of others. But once the Turk has been utterly defeated on the battlefield so that he cannot regroup, there is nothing left to fear but his own bloodline. Once that is extinguished, nobody remains to be feared, as there is no one who has credit with the people. Just as the victor could not expect anything from the Turk’s men before the victory, he has nothing to fear from them afterward.

The opposite happens in kingdoms like France, which you can conquer with ease by winning over some baron of the realm, because there are always those who are dissatisfied and desire change. They can open the way for you and help you to victory. But afterward, when you try to maintain yourself in your new acquisition, you will face infinite difficulties both from those who helped you and from those you oppressed. Nor is it enough for you to extinguish the bloodline of the former prince, because there remain those lords who aspire to be leaders of a new regime. And as you will be unable either to please them or destroy them, you will lose the state whenever the opportunity to seize it from you arises.

If we look at Darius’s kingdom, we find that its government was similar to that of the Turk. Therefore, Alexander needed first to strike at it in full force and achieve a decisive victory, after which, with Darius dead, the state, for the reasons I have already mentioned, stayed firmly in Alexander’s grip. And Alexander’s successors, had they been united, could have enjoyed this state in complete idleness. No turmoil broke out in their territories except for the turmoil they themselves provoked. But states organized like France cannot be possessed with such ease. This was also the reason for the frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, because of the many old principalities in those territories. While the memory of those principalities lasted, the Romans were always tenuous in their possession. But ultimately, with the power and continuum of the empire, the memory died out and they became secure possessions. Later, when the Roman governors began fighting among themselves, each could take back part of the provinces according to how much power he had acquired in these territories. And since the bloodline of their old princes had been extinguished, the Roman governors were the only rulers these states recognized.

Considering all these issues, one should not be surprised at the ease with which Alexander kept his acquisitions in Asia, and the difficulty others had in conserving theirs (like Pyrrhus,
¹⁸
to name one of many). This is not a matter of the victor’s skill, but of the different characteristics of the state he conquers.

16.
Darius III (d. 330
BCE
) was the last king of Persia’s Achaemenid dynasty. His empire was conquered by Alexander the Great in a series of battles from 334 to 331
BCE
.

17.
Alexander the Great (356–23
BCE
), King of Macedonia, had within a decade conquered the Persian Empire and parts of northern India by the time he died at the age of thirty-four.

18.
King Pyrrhus of Epirus (319–272
BCE
) fought energetically to expand his empire, seizing territories from Macedonia and Rome. His costly military accomplishments, however, resulted in his inability to hold on to his new acquisitions, giving rise to the modern phrase “Pyrrhic victory”: a victory at too great a cost.

CHAPTER FIVE
H
OW ONE SHOULD GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE BEING CONQUERED

When an acquired state has been accustomed to living in freedom under its own laws, there are three ways of securing it. The first is to destroy it; the second, to move there oneself; the third, to let it live with its own laws, exacting a tribute and creating within it a regime of a selected few who will keep it friendly toward you. As the regime of the state has been created by the new prince, it knows it cannot exist without his goodwill and power, and must do everything to maintain him. The best way to keep a city accustomed to living freely is through its citizens.

Consider, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans occupied Athens and Thebes, creating a state governed by a few (though they lost this state again). The Romans, on the other hand, destroyed Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, and therefore did not lose them. They also wanted to occupy Greece in almost the same way the Spartans had occupied Athens and Thebes, making it free and with its own laws. This did not work, and the Romans ended up having to destroy many of Greece’s cities in order to keep the province. In fact, the only secure way of keeping such a city is to destroy it. And whoever becomes the ruler of a city that is used to living free without destroying it can expect to be destroyed by the city. Because when such a city rebels, it always waves the banners of liberty and its former government, which are not forgotten with the passage of time or through any benefits bestowed by the new ruler. Notwithstanding what a new prince does or anticipates, if the inhabitants are not dispersed or driven into quarreling factions, they will never forget the former government or order of things, and will quickly revert to it at every opportunity (as did Pisa after a hundred years of servitude to the Florentines). It is a different matter when cities or states are accustomed to living under a prince and his bloodline is extinguished, as on one hand they are used to obeying, and on the other they do not have their former prince. They will not be capable of uniting to elect a prince from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom without a prince. Consequently, they are slower at taking up arms, and a new prince can win and secure them with greater ease. But in republics there is more vitality, more hatred, and more desire for revenge. The memory of former freedom simply will not leave the people in peace. In this case the safest course is for the prince either to destroy them or to go and live there himself.

CHAPTER SIX
O
F NEW PRINCIPALITIES ACQUIRED THROUGH ARMS AND SKILL

No one will be surprised if I cite a few eminent examples in speaking of principalities that are completely new in both prince and government. Men will always follow paths beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation. But as they are rarely able to keep to these paths, or to match the skill of those they imitate, a prudent man should always set out on paths beaten by those who are truly great and worthy of imitation. This way, even if his own skill does not attain the same heights, he can at least expect to achieve some of the effect. A wise archer, for instance, will perceive that the distance of the target he intends to hit is too far off, and, knowing the extent of his bow’s capacity, will aim quite a bit higher, not so that he will reach that height with his arrow, but so that he will gain his objective by aiming above it. The point I wish to make is that maintaining a principality that is entirely new, where there is a new prince, depends entirely on the skill of that prince. And because turning from a private citizen to a prince presupposes skill or good fortune, it would seem that either of these two factors will alleviate many of the difficulties. And yet he who has relied less on good fortune to acquire his principality has a better prospect of keeping it. Things also become much easier when the new prince does not have another state, and is obliged to live in his new acquisition.

But to come to those who have become princes through their own skill and not through chance, I would say that foremost among them are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus.
¹⁹
One ought perhaps not to count Moses, as he was a mere executor of the will of God; he must nevertheless be admired, if only for the grace that made him worthy of speaking to God. But let us consider Cyrus, and the others who acquired or founded kingdoms. They are all most admirable. If one weighs their actions and the measures they took, it is clear that they are not very different from those of Moses, who had such a great preceptor watching over him. If we examine their actions and lives, we see that the only gift that Fortune accorded them was the opportunity that gave them the substance they could mold into any form they pleased. Without that opportunity, their skill would not have flourished, and without that skill, the opportunity would have presented itself in vain. In other words, it was essential for Moses to find the people of Israel pining under the Egyptian yoke, so that they could emerge from slavery and be willing to follow him. It was vital for Romulus not to remain in Alba but to be exposed at birth,
²⁰
so that he would become King of Rome and founder of the nation. It was crucial for Cyrus to find the Persians unhappy under the Empire of the Medes, and for the Medes to have grown soft and effeminate from a long period of peace. Theseus could not have demonstrated his skill had he not found the Athenians dispersed. Consequently, those opportunities favored these men, and with their skill they seized the opportunity, with the result that their nations were ennobled and prospered.

Those who become princes through such skill acquire their principality with difficulty, but retain it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring the principality arise in part from the new order they are forced to introduce to set up their state and ensure their own security. Nothing is harder to do, more dubious to succeed at, or more dangerous to manage, than making oneself a ruler and introducing a new order. This is because he who introduces the new order makes enemies of all those who have done well under the old, and finds only halfhearted defenders in the men who would do well under the new. This halfheartedness arises in part from these men’s fear of adversaries who have the law on their side, and in part from the incredulity of man. Men intrinsically do not trust new things that they have not experienced themselves. Consequently, when enemies of the new order find any chance to attack the prince, they will attack him in full force, while men who benefit from the new order will defend him halfheartedly. Hence the prince is in a precarious position.

It is therefore necessary when examining this matter to ascertain whether the prince introducing the new order can act alone or must depend on others. In other words, he must seek help or use force to achieve his innovations. If he seeks help, he will always end up badly and accomplish nothing. But if he relies on his own skill and can use force, the innovator will rarely be in harm’s way. This is why all armed prophets were successful, while unarmed prophets came to ruin. Another factor that must be considered is that a populace is always erratic. It is easy enough to win the people over, but difficult to keep their allegiance. Therefore, matters must be arranged in such a way that when the populace no longer believes, a prince can compel them to believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able to make their people observe their laws for long without the force of arms, as we have seen in our own times with Girolamo Savonarola,
²¹
who came to ruin with his new order when the multitude lost belief in him. Savonarola did not have a system for holding on to those who had believed in him, nor did he have a system for making those believe who did not. Therefore, rulers like Savonarola have great difficulty in proceeding; their path is strewn with difficulties that they must overcome through prowess. Once they overcome these difficulties, the populace begins to venerate them. And once these rulers have eliminated those who resent their achievement, they remain powerful, secure, honored, and content.

To these illustrious examples I would like to add a less eminent one, but one that is to some extent comparable, which might suffice for all other similar cases. It is the example of Hiero of Syracuse, who from private citizen became Prince of Syracuse.
²²
In his case, Fortune did not accord him more than an opportunity. The people of Syracuse were oppressed, and so elected him their general, after which he proved himself worthy of being made their prince. He had so much skill, even as a private citizen, that someone who wrote about him says:
Quod nihil illi deerat ad regnandum praeter regnum
(He lacked nothing to make him a ruler except a kingdom).
²³
Hiero eliminated the old army and set up a new one, abandoned old friendships for new ones, and on the foundation of these new soldiers and friends realized that he could build any edifice. It took much effort for him to acquire his state, but little to keep it.

19.
Machiavelli often uses these historical figures as examples of princely skill and ability. (See
The Prince
, chapters 16 and 26, and
Discourses
, Book II, chapter 13.)

20.
Romulus, one of the legendary founders of Rome, had been ordered to be exposed to death as an infant by his uncle, King Amulius of Alba. According to legend, Romulus and his brother, Remus, were then raised by a wolf.

21.
Girolamo Savonarola (1452–98) was a charismatic Christian preacher who, after the fall of the Medici in Florence in 1494, ruled Florence as the leader of a strict and sober republican government until he was executed in 1498. See Machiavelli’s letter to Riccardo Bechi.

22.
Hiero II of Syracuse (d. 216
BCE
).

23.
Machiavelli quotes an altered line from Justin’s
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
(Book XXIII, chapter 4):
Prorsus ut nihil ei regium deesse praeter regnum uideretur
.