The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (111 page)

Japanese Strength – N.I.D.
02242/39

1. It is of the greatest importance to form a true opinion about present and prospective Japanese building. Before I can put this case to the Cabinet, I must be satisfied that there is solid evidence of the ability of Japan to construct a navy superior to the present navies of Britain and the United States, built and building. The financial condition of Japan has lamentably deteriorated. She has for two and a half years been engaged in a most ruinous war in China, between one and one and a half millions of Japanese soldiers have had to be maintained in the field. No decisive progress has been made. On the contrary, it is believed the Chinese are gaining strength. Certainly there is a marked reaction in Japan, and the internal tension is very great.

2. We must look at the kind of statements which are made about their new shipbuilding intentions in the light of these facts. They have to buy a large proportion of their materials for warship construction from over the seas, and this, with the drain of the China war, must greatly affect their foreign exchange. What would be the cost of the programme set out in the First Sea Lord’s table in yen, in sterling, and in dollars? It seems to me that they are going into figures of naval expense never attempted before at a time when their finances are rapidly deteriorating.

3. What is their capacity of steel production? What is their consuming power of steel? If my recollection serves me, the Japanese consuming power of steel is in the neighbourhood of three million tons a year, compared to British fifteen and American fifty-four. Yet such a programme as Japan is said to be embarking on would be, and is, a heavy drain on British or American strength. No doubt the heavy building in America and Britain will impose an additional effort on Japan. Whether they can go the pace is quite another question. I do not feel that mere rumours of ships they are said to have laid down form a sufficient basis. Has Major Morton’s Branch or Committee which studies the military capacities of enemy or potentially enemy countries been consulted?

In short, I am extremely sceptical of the Japanese power to build a fleet equal to the present built and building fleets of either Britain or the United States.

In view of yesterday’s Cabinet decision all preparations should be made to carry out the operation referred to as soon as possible.

Pray let me have your proposals.

I consider the matter is most urgent, as it must be linked with the
Altmark.
The operation being minor and innocent may be called “Wilfred.”
¹⁵

Let me have an early report on condition of
Exeter
and time likely for her repairs. Every effort should be made to keep the crew together. If
Exeter
repairs take more than three or four months, what are the other cruisers coming along in the interval by which
Exeter’s
crew could be taken on with their present captain? In the Army it would be thought madness to break up a unit like this, and I do not see why the same moral consideration should not affect the Navy too.
¹⁶

Reclassification of Smaller War Vessels

Director of Plan’s remark that the terms “destroyer has by association come to imply a particular type of vessel whose principal weapon is the torpedo” ignores the whole story of the destroyer, whose chief function was to destroy the torpedo-boat with superior gun-fire. The idea of destruction is not confined to destruction by torpedo; it may equally be expressed by depth-charges or gun-fire.

I agree with First Sea Lord about the needlessness of repeating the word “vessel,” and his wish to simplify all titles to one word.

I should like the word “destroyer” to cover ships formerly described as “fast escort vessels,” which are, in fact, medium destroyers. I do not like the word “whaler,” which is an entire misnomer, as they are not going to catch whales, and I should like to have some suggestions about this. What is, in fact, the distinction between an “escorter,” a “patroller,” and a “whaler” as now specified? It seems most important to arrive at simple conclusions quickly on this subject, and enforce them from March 1 on all commands and departments. Let me see a list of the vessels built and building which will fall in the various categories.
¹⁷

M
ARCH
, 1940

A plan should be prepared for a battleship concentration in the Mediterranean (with other craft), supposing trouble should arise in March. I do not expect trouble; but it would be well to have all the combinations surveyed in advance.
¹⁸

After the air attack on the Fleet on September 26, we all thought it most necessary to train the A.A. gunners against faster targets than those hitherto provided. Ideas were suggested by Professor Lindemann, experiments were made, and other ideas for flares, etc., put forward by the “Vernon.” What has happened about all this? Of course the weather has been terribly against it, but I fear there have virtually been no practices in Home Waters at high-speed targets. Five months have passed, and it is very serious if we have not been able to develop an effective system of fast targets, and obtain the necessary machines so that the Fleet can work up.

We must have this now that the weather is improving and the Fleet back at Scapa. An improvement in the gunnery of H.M. ships is of the utmost importance to their safety.

Repairing ships is better than new building. A strong effort should be made to turn this 8,000-ton ship
Domala
into an effective cargo-carrying bottom immediately she can be seized upon, and repaired in the plainest way for the roughest work.

2. Are we doing enough about salvage? Let me have a return of the vessels now beached on our coasts, and a report on the measures taken to fit them again for sea. The very minimum should be done to them, compatible to life and navigation.
There ought to be a tremendous move-on in the salvage and repair departments.
The tonnage working on any given day ranks above the rate of new merchant shipbuilding.

I think it would be only prudent for you to concert with the French the necessary regroupings of the Allied Fleets, which would be appropriate to a hostile or menacing Italian attitude. Perhaps you will let me know about this on my return.

I am very glad you have had a considerable measure of success in your parleys with the trades unions. Be careful about the “Ministry of Labour Training Centres.” As hitherto organised, these have been nothing but quasi-philanthropic institutions to tone-up the unfortunate people in the derelict areas. They have never been organised to make skilled tradesmen out of semi-skilled. In their present condition they are a snare so far as we are concerned. We have got to get competent people to learn new trades. The Minister of Labour has always said that his training centres cannot touch any but the unemployed, meaning thereby the peace-time unemployed. What we have to cater for is a far livelier class who are changing their occupations in consequence of the war.

I think you must rely on training in the dockyards and in special training schools stablished by the Admiralty.

Speak to me about this, as it seems to me to be a serious flaw.

Now that we are not allowed to interfere with the Norwegian Corridor, would it not be possible to have one or two merchant ships of sufficient speed, specially strengthened in the bows and if possible equipped with a ram? These vessels would carry merchandise and travel up the Leads looking for German ore-ships or any other German merchant vessels, and then ram them by accident. This is only another development of the “Q” ship idea.

Mr. Shinwell declares that in Vigo there are still a number of German merchant ships, many of whose crews are non-German, and among the Germans many non-Nazis. He suggests that with a little money and some organisation it would be possible to get these crews to take the ships to sea, when they could be picked up by our ships, and those who had brought them out suitably rewarded. Is there anything in this?

Cutting from D.T.
29.3.40.
Twenty Nazi ships get ready to sail – attempts to run the blockade (Amsterdam, Friday). Elster reported at Rotterdam.

The reason why I cut this from the
Daily Telegraph
and asked my question of the D.N.I. is because an exodus of German ships from Dutch ports might well be a danger-sign in respect of Holland herself. I have no doubt the same thought has occurred to you.

War Cabinet
–
Sub-Committee on Reserved Occupations.

Note by Treasury.

While there are nearly 1,500,000 unemployed and no serious drain of casualties from the Army, I propose to resist the disturbance of Admiralty work by movement of men we need from the dockyards. The matter must be settled by Cabinet decision. You should let Sir Horace Wilson know how much I regret I cannot meet his views.

A
PRIL
, 1940

Where are the facts about the return of the 40 destroyers, which are in hospital, to their duty? And can anything be done to speed up new destroyers, especially those of the 40th Flotilla, by leaving out some of the final improvements and latest additions, which take so much time? The great aim must be to have the maximum numbers during these coming summer months. They can go back to have further treatment when we have a larger margin.

While I do not see any adverse change in the Italian situation, I presume that the appropriate Departments of the Admiralty Staff are at work upon, or have already completed, a plan of naval operations in the Mediterranean against Italy, should she force us into war with her. We might be asked for this by the Cabinet, and I should be glad to see it as soon as possible, at any rate during the course of the next four or five days.

The most intense efforts should be concentrated upon
Hood,
as we may need all our strength to meet an Italian threat or attack.

Pray let me have a time-table showing when she will be ready for sea.

Are there any other Danish islands besides the Faroes which require attention?

Will you also kindly ask the Staff to examine the position at Curaçao, in case Holland should be overrun. The Fourth Sea Lord spoke to me on the oil supplies dependent upon Curaçao Refineries. I should like a short paper upon the subject.

Weekly Statement of Shipyard Workers,
dated 9.IV.40.

This report is much more favourable, and for the first time shows a lift on new merchant construction. Altogether we have added fifteen thousand men since February 1, when we took over. Are you satisfied that all arrangements made by the late Parliamentary Secretary are completed, and working satisfactorily? We shall want another thirty thousand men, and the most strenuous efforts must be made to procure them. Can anything else be done now?