The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (64 page)

On September 12 I issued the following minute:

Cruiser Policy

In the past we have sought to protect our trade against sudden attack by [means of] cruisers; having regard to the vast ocean spaces to be controlled, the principle was “the more the better.” In the search for enemy raiders or cruisers, even small cruisers could play their part, and in the case of the
Emden
we were forced to gather over twenty ships before she was rounded up. However, a long view of cruiser policy would seem to suggest that a new unit of search is required. Whereas a cruiser squadron of four ships could search on a front of, say eighty miles, a single cruiser accompanied by an aircraft carrier could cover at least three hundred miles, or if the movement of the ship is taken into account, four hundred miles. On the other hand, we must apprehend that the raiders of the future will be powerful vessels, eager to fight a single-ship action if a chance is presented. The mere multiplication of small, weak cruisers is no means of ridding the seas of powerful raiders. Indeed they are only an easy prey. The raider, cornered at length, will overwhelm one weak vessel and escape from the cordon.

Every unit of search must be able to find, to catch, and to kill. For this purpose we require a number of cruisers superior to the 10,000-ton type, or else pairs of our own 10,000-ton type. These must be accompanied by small aircraft carriers carrying perhaps a dozen or two dozen machines, and of the smallest possible displacement. The ideal unit of search would be one killer or two three-quarter killers, plus one aircraft carrier, plus four ocean-going destroyers, plus two or three specially constructed tankers of good speed. Such a formation cruising would be protected against submarines, and could search an enormous area and destroy any single raider when detected.

The policy of forming hunting groups as discussed in this minute, comprising balanced forces capable of scouring wide areas and overwhelming any raider within the field of search, was developed so far as our limited resources allowed, and I shall refer to this subject again in a later chapter. The same idea was afterwards more fully expanded by the United States in their task force system, which made an important contribution to the art of sea warfare.

* * * * *

Towards the end of the month I thought it would be well for me to give the House some coherent story of what was happening and why.

Would it not be well for me to make a statement to the House on the anti-submarine warfare and general naval position, more at length than what you could give in your own speech? I think I could speak for twenty-five or thirty minutes on the subject, and that this would do good. At any rate, when I saw in confidence sixty press representatives the other day, they appeared vastly relieved by the account I was able to give. If this idea commended itself to you, you would perhaps say in your speech that I would give a fuller account later on in the discussion, which I suppose will take place on Thursday, as the budget is on Wednesday.

Mr. Chamberlain readily assented, and accordingly in his speech on the twenty-sixth he told the House that I would make a statement on the sea war as soon as he sat down. This was the first time, apart from answering questions, that I had spoken in Parliament since I had entered the Government. I had a good tale to tell. In the first seven days our losses in tonnage had been half the weekly losses of the month of April, 1917, which was the peak year of the U-boat attack in the first war. We had already made progress by setting in motion the convoy system; secondly, by pressing on with the arming of all our merchant ships; and thirdly, by our counter-attack upon the U-boats. “In the first week our losses by U-boat sinkings amounted to 65,000 tons; in the second week they were 46,000 tons; and in the third week they were 21,000 tons. In the last six days we have lost only 9,000 tons.”
⁶
I observed throughout that habit of understatement and of avoiding all optimistic forecasts which had been inculcated upon me by the hard experiences of the past. “One must not dwell,” I said, “upon these reassuring figures too much, for war is full of unpleasant surprises. But certainly I am entitled to say that so far as they go these figures need not cause any undue despondency or alarm.”

Meanwhile [I continued], the whole vast business of our worldwide trade continues without interruption or appreciable diminution. Great convoys of troops are escorted to their various destinations. The enemy’s ships and commerce have been swept from the seas. Over 2,000,000 tons of German shipping is now sheltering in German, or interned in neutral harbours…. In the first fortnight of the war we have actually arrested, seized, and converted to our own use, 67,000 tons more German merchandise than has been sunk in ships of our own…. Again I reiterate my caution against oversanguine conclusions. We have in fact, however, got more supplies in this country this afternoon than we should have had if no war had been declared and no U-boat had come into action. It is not going beyond the limits of prudent statement if I say that at that rate it will take a long time to starve us out.

From time to time the German U-boat commanders have tried their best to behave with humanity. We have seen them give good warning and also endeavour to help the crews to find their ways to port. One German captain signalled to me personally the position of a British ship which he had just sunk, and urged that rescue should be sent. He signed his message, “German Submarine.” I was in some doubt at the time to what address I should direct a reply. However, he is now in our hands, and is treated with all consideration.

Even taking six or seven U-boats sunk as a safe figure,
⁷
that is one-tenth of the total enemy submarine fleet as it existed at the declaration of war destroyed during the first fortnight of the war, and it is probably one-quarter or perhaps even one-third of all the U-boats which are being employed actively. But the British attack upon the U-boats is only just beginning. Our hunting force is getting stronger every day. By the end of October, we expect to have three times the hunting force which was operating at the beginning of the war.

This speech, which lasted only twenty-five minutes, was extremely well received by the House, and in fact it recorded the failure of the first German U-boat attack upon our trade. My fears were for the future, but our preparations for 1941 were now proceeding with all possible speed and on the largest scale which our resources would allow.

* * * * *

By the end of September, we had little cause for dissatisfaction with the results of the first impact of the war at sea. I could feel that I had effectively taken over the great department which I knew so well and loved with a discriminating eye. I now knew what there was in hand and on the way. I knew where everything was. I had visited all the principal naval ports and met all the Commanders-in-Chief. By the letters patent constituting the Board, the First Lord is “responsible to Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty,” and I certainly felt prepared to discharge that duty in fact as well as in form.

On the whole the month of September had been prosperous and fruitful for the Navy. We had made the immense, delicate, and hazardous transition from peace to war. Forfeits had to be paid in the first few weeks by a world-wide commerce suddenly attacked contrary to formal international agreement by indiscriminate U-boat warfare; but the convoy system was now in full flow, and merchant ships were leaving our ports every day by scores with a gun, sometimes high-angle, mounted aft, and a nucleus of trained gunners. The Asdic-equipped trawlers and other small craft armed with depth-charges, all well prepared by the Admiralty before the outbreak, were now coming daily into commission in a growing stream with trained crews. We all felt sure that the first attack of the U-boat on British trade had been broken and that the menace was in thorough and hardening control. It was obvious that the Germans would build submarines by hundreds, and no doubt numerous shoals were upon the slips in various stages of completion. In twelve months, certainly in eighteen, we must expect the main U-boat war to begin. But by that time we hoped that our mass of new flotillas and anti-U-boat craft, which was our first priority, would be ready to meet it with a proportionate and effective predominance. The painful dearth of anti-aircraft guns, especially 3.7-inch and Bofors, could, alas, only be relieved after many months; but measures had been taken within the limits of our resources to provide for the defence of our naval harbours; and meanwhile the Fleet, while ruling the oceans, would have to go on playing hide-and-seek.

* * * * *

In the wider sphere of naval operations no definite challenge had yet been made to our position. After the temporary suspension of traffic in the Mediterranean, our shipping soon moved again through this invaluable corridor. Meanwhile, the transport of the Expeditionary Force to France was proceeding smoothly. The Home Fleet itself “somewhere in the North” was ready to intercept any sortie by the few heavy ships of the enemy. The blockade of Germany was being enforced by similar methods to those employed in the previous war. The Northern Patrol had been established between Scotland and Iceland, and by the end of the first month a total of nearly three hundred thousand tons of goods destined for Germany had been seized in prize against a loss to ourselves of a hundred and forty thousand tons by enemy action at sea. Overseas, our cruisers were hunting down German ships while at the same time providing cover against attack on our shipping by raiders. German shipping had thus come to a standstill. By the end of September, some three hundred and twenty-five German ships totalling nearly seven hundred and fifty thousand tons were immobilised in foreign ports. Few, therefore, fell into our hands.

Our Allies also played their part. The French took an important share in the control of the Mediterranean. In home waters and the Bay of Biscay they also helped in the battle against the U-boats, and in the central Atlantic a powerful force based on Dakar formed part of the Allied plans against surface raiders.

The young Polish Navy distinguished itself. Early in the war three modern destroyers and two submarines,
Wilk
and
Orzel,
escaped from Poland and, defying the German forces in the Baltic, succeeded in reaching England. The escape of the submarine
Orzel
is an epic. Sailing from Gdynia when the Germans invaded Poland, she first cruised in the Baltic, putting into the neutral port of Tallinn on September 15 to land her sick captain. The Esthonian authorities decided to intern the vessel, placed a guard on board, and removed her charts and the breech-blocks of her guns. Undismayed, her commanding officer put to sea after overpowering the guard. In the ensuing weeks the submarine was continually hunted by sea and air patrols, but eventually, without even charts, made her escape from the Baltic into the North Sea. Here she was able to transmit a faint wireless signal to a British station giving her supposed position, and on October 14 was met and escorted into safety by a British destroyer.

* * * * *

In September I was delighted to receive a personal letter from President Roosevelt. I had met him only once in the previous war. It was at a dinner at Gray’s Inn, and I had been struck by his magnificent presence in all his youth and strength. There had been no opportunity for anything but salutations.

It is because you and I occupied similar positions in the World War that I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty. Your problems are, I realise, complicated by new factors, but the essential is not very different. What I want you and the Prime Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it, if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about. You can always send sealed letters through your pouch or my pouch.

I am glad you did the Marlborough volumes before this thing started – and I much enjoyed reading them.

I responded with alacrity, using the signature of “Naval Person,” and thus began that long and memorable correspondence – covering perhaps a thousand communications on each side, and lasting till his death more than five years later.