The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945 (44 page)

`The opinion of the German population on the execution of Poles still varies greatly': so began a special section of an SD report of 17 August 1942 in Bayreuth.1
' In view of the increasing incidence of forbidden contact between Germans and foreign workers, especially those from Poland, some suggestions about how to deal with the situation were offered. The SD provided observations on the reaction of the German people on the basis of experiences from 'the execution of Poles over the course of time in virtually all parts of the district'. Considerable importance was attributed to the selection of the place of execution. An example of a poor choice was a case in the Straubing area where the local Party boss selected a spot only a few hundred metres from a youth-camp which housed i oo young girls. In the Lichtenfels district another unfortunate choice was made when the Polish man was hanged in a place favoured as a nice spot to go for a walk. Some villagers now thought that this picturesque hill was spoilt and they wondered aloud why a 'less beautiful site' could not have been found. In Rottenburg (Lower Bavaria) an execution was carried out on a piece of private land without the permission of its shocked owner, who vowed he would lodge a complaint. The choice in the Zwiesel district was not much better: local women were worried about going past it in the evening for fear it might now be haunted.

The SD believed that German citizens should be kept from witnessing the executions. For the most part this recommendation had been followed, in order to prevent the execution from turning into a sensation, or a farce. In Hildburghausen (Gau Thuringia), when 'twenty Poles were executed, numerous German national comrades, soldiers and civilians, were present at the site. The figure of between 80o and i,ooo spectators has been mentioned. Besides that, the police kept back an additional 60o to 700 women and children in the forest.' The SD maintained that this kind of mass execution' should not be allowed to turn into a show for hundreds of Germans. That such large-scale executions of Poles took place this early in the war, well before the tide really turned and the war was brought back to the German homeland, means in all likelihood that many more deaths occurred than is usually suggested in the literature. Perhaps further research in Polish sources will settle the matter.

The SD report analyses the widely varying reactions of the German people to the executions into different categories. Whenever a Polish man was executed for having sexual relations with a German woman, the response of the people was 'much clearer and unambiguous' if he happened to be evidently 'racially inferior'. A similar stance was taken if the murder of a gendarme had taken place. In the Lichtenfels district popular opinion was in agreement with the fate of Poles held responsible for murdering a gendarme, as it was when it came to the 'ratio of ten Poles for one German'. It was regarded as 'self-evident' that 'special handling' was called for in cases of sexual assaults on German women: the usual distinction in attitudes between the Nazi and non-Nazi population then 'disappeared'. Many people who had daily contact with the Poles agreed with 'sharp measures' when they were needed, but there were the 'exceptions', notably the religious Germans. 'Women of this category' were known to have muttered 'To do such a thing to a poor Pole; he's also a person, and just to hang him!' Another remark 'not seldom' heard was 'Why just up and hang so many? After all, they are people too!' In such religious circles there was also a questioning of the practice of hanging a Pole without a court hearing.

But how, if at all, should the German woman who willingly engaged in illicit sexual relationships with a Polish man be punished? That, according to the document, was the 'most important' issue exercising all national comrades of all social classes. Party members insisted that the woman was every bit as guilty as the man, and should be hanged as well. The remarks cited by the SD were, 'And what was done with the Miss?', or 'She ought to have been hanged next to him', and so on. Such opinions were in fact common in all circles. 'Reflections that the woman is German-blooded, and as such ought to be handled more mildly, are foreign to the population.' In Regensburg it had been reported that 'the larger part of the city population actually apportioned the greater guilt to the German girl'. The reason for this view was that 'the Polish man was simply satisfying his sexual need, while the German girl, from whom more could be expected than from the Pole, had damaged the honour of the nation'. Local Nazi Kreisleiters took the view that, at the very least, the German woman should be forced to attend the execution.

If the German woman became pregnant and the Polish man was judged racially inferior' he was promptly hanged; but there remained the problem of what ought to be done with the mother and child. As the policy stood, according to the SD, the population saw a contradiction. While one woman might have to bear the shame alone, with her child-who would learn soon enough that its father was hanged as a criminal-another woman, if her Polish friend passed the appropriate racial examination, would be spared the shame and under some circumstances be able to marry him. Just how far ordinary German people had come to identify with Nazi racial policies is suggested in their implicit and explicit acknowledgement that both women 'forgot their honour'. What was bothering them was the different-unjusteffects that the same 'crime' could produce. While one woman paid too heavily, the other got off and could even beat the system.

Some German women committed suicide when they found out that they had been reported for having sexual relations with foreign workers. How frequently this happened cannot be established, but the SD made special mention of it in a report of August
Two young women in the Miinchberg district, whose husbands were in the army, took their own lives, events which caused some consternation among other women of the area; however, they tended to place blame on the state and the authorities for letting foreigners in the country move about with far too much freedom.

The population was found to express great pity when the Polish person who was executed was very young. There was also some dissatisfaction, especially in Party circles, when the man to be executed was obviously suitable for 'Germanization', even though he may have failed the racial 'tests'. Further criticism pertained to the long interval which sometimes occurred between the deed and the punishment. Hearings could drag on for nearly a year (as happened in Lichtenfels), whereas in a straightforward case the punishment should, if possible, follow immediately'. According to regulations from Berlin, the Polish workers in the area were to witness any execution, and one of them had to carry out the hanging. 'The impression created by the spectators', the SD said, 'is on the whole best characterized as "indifference". The Poles accept the event with stoic quiet. The same is true for the lecture which follows from the translator. Remarks from the Poles indicate a basic rejection of the execution, although there are variations in the sharpness of this rejection.' The SD maintained that doubtlessly the executions were a deterrent-an expression of conviction rather than a calculation based on hard evidence. They were on firmer ground when they acknowleged that 'hatred of the Germans' increased as a result.1z'
In Bavaria executions were organized by Gestapo commandos from Munich, Nuremberg, or Regens- burg.'25

Notwithstanding the dire consequences in store for offenders, and in spite of the belief that executions, as the ultimate form of punishment, would check prohibited sexual relations, many foreign workers were able to find sympathetic German women who were themselves willing to risk public humiliation and personal tragedy. The Attorney-General's office in Munich continued to complain in June 1944 that German women had not ceased having intimate relations with foreigners of all kinds, and that in fact the illicit acts had increased in volume. The Party in particular stepped up its efforts to get through to the women in public meetings. 'Hitherto the particularly heavy punishments have, unfortunately, not achieved an overwhelmingly successful result.""

5. GERMANS AND FOREIGNERS ON THE HOME FRONT IN THE LAST YEARS

Even before word about the disastrous outcome of the battle at Stalingrad reached Germany (at the end of January 1943) there was widespread concern on the home front about the millions of foreigners on German soil.'''
As early
as 1942 this anxiety was given limited expression in some areas with the establishment of a volunteer police force (a 'Landwacht') that would help out in the event of an
After Stalingrad, however, the attitude of foreigners inside Germany began to change. Already in February 1943 Poles began to stop wearing the obnoxious 'P' required by law, and to make alarming 'advances' to German women.
`9 One statement of a foreign worker quoted by the SD was, 'In the last while we've had to run around in rags, but soon you'll have to run around in rags and we'll put on the nice clothes."'('
Other nationalities, especially the French, made no secret of their joy (Schadenfreude) about Stalingrad. Discipline among 'east' workers began to break down, as they reckoned with a victory of the Russians and the beginnning of reprisals; most Germans could count on 'having their throats
The impact of Stalingrad inside Germany made the policing of all foreign workers more difficult for the Nazi

People in Lower Franconia and rural Bavaria, like those in most parts of Germany, regarded the events in the eastern campaign with grave concern. In their midst, the foreign workers constantly served to remind them of what was in store. The lowly Ukrainian servant who had worked for a number of years for a family in Augsburg now assured them-in broken German-that, since they had been kind to her, she would be putting in a good word for them when the Russians
The SD reported from Wurzburg in early March 1943 'hopelessness and demoralization in all circles of
At the same time Friedberg's SD post observed that

in conversation with the people in rural areas [there was] palpable anxiety concerning general security. The large number of foreign workers, the waves of conscription, and the small number of official surveillance persons are the main causes of this manifestation. If the foreigners only could, they would ring all our necks. They are all over the place, meet with one another, and hatch their tricks. If things were to go badly over there, then our goose would be cooked!' It is also pointed out that in some villages not a single gun is available, and that this is known by the farm-workers.1'

Similar reports came from all over the

Discovery of the murders of thousand of Poles shot by Soviet troops and buried at Katyn (March 1940) was played up by Nazi propaganda for all it
was
Out in the German countryside, however, there was talk that other mass graves, this time of Jews, would soon be found. Given those deeds, and the persecutions of the Poles inside Germany, country people thought it prudent not to make too much of the atrocities of the

Worries about the foreigners within the country, coupled with war-weariness and increasing doubts and scepticism about eventual victory, grew throughout 194 3. There was also fear of being bombed, and even in the rural parts of Bavaria this concern was fuelled daily. Lower Franconians' first direct experience of the bombing came on 17 August 1943, when 376 US `Flying Fortresses' attacked Schweinfurt in a daylight raid, followed by 291 on 14 October. While losses were heavy among the bombers (60 on the first attack, 77 on the second one, with an additional 121 aeroplanes damaged on the second raid alone), this was little comfort to the people on the ground, all the more so as the Allied forces felt confident enough to carry out these raids, and many others, by
Following the second raid, Wurzburgers grew disturbed by the rumour that some of Schweinfurt's industry would be brought to the city, thereby turning it into a military target."They
were also upset that hardly any precautions had been taken in case of an attack on the city; though Wiirzburg was not a military target, how long would it be overlooked?
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As the chances of a German victory dwindled and the war was brought increasingly to the home front, the foreign workers began to flex their muscles. The SD in Friedberg noted in early February 1944 how the situation was deteriorating:

The behaviour of the Poles and other foreign workers in regard to the development of the war has become almost unmanageable. An informer reports that particularly the Poles begin to rule whole villages, and that farmers, out of anxiety that they might lose their workers, do not dare to say anything. Pfaffenhofen a.d. Glon reports: The regulation that Poles must be home by 8.0o p.m. is hardly followed. The farmers themselves say that they cannot really see to this, because otherwise the Poles will not work any more or would engage in passive resistance. In this regard, men of the Landwacht maintain that this year more sabotage and partisan acts are likely to be reckoned with. Farsighted farmers bring forth the suggestion that strict controls should be introduced and not just the Poles but also the careless farmers forced to adhere strictly to the regulations.'
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The volume of Gestapo records in Wurzburg pertaining to Germans who broke rank with the regime by socializing with the Poles shows a noticeable
decline beginning in 1944; so far not a single case has turned up for 1945. A combination of factors were at work. For its part, the Gestapo attempted to enforce policy to the bitter end, so the lack of cases does not testify to waning of interest or official concern. Moreover, the law-breakers were often summarily dealt with and no files written up. Authorities in Nuremberg believed that the decline in the numbers of Poles being brought to court for various misdemeanours could be traced to the Gestapo and the police, who wanted to deal with the matters themselves and on the spot.14'
At the very end, all kinds of people were simply shot out of hand, left in ditches or hanging from trees and lamp-posts at the side of the road. Law-enforcement and justice authorities in both the civilian and military spheres, far from becoming lax, grew more vicious.144