The Grand Alliance (115 page)

I hope for the first, but cannot yet be certain.” On the 23d a somewhat darker impression was conveyed: “It looks as if the battle is moving to its climax. Some at any rate of the German tanks north of El Gubi succeeded in breaking out.

Our troops at Sidi Rezegh were being strongly pressed yesterday from east and west by enemy reported to have a hundred tanks in action….”

These fragmentary quotations show the impressions prevailing almost from hour to hour at the Supreme Headquarters, and are of course a very small part of the reports which they sent.

The heavy blows we had received and the impression of disorder behind our front, caused by Rommel’s raid, led General Cunningham to represent to the Commander-in-Chief that a continuation of our offensive might result in the annihilation of our tank force, and so endanger the safety of The Grand Alliance

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Egypt. This would mean acknowledged defeat and failure of the whole operation. At this decisive moment General Auchinleck intervened personally. At Cunningham’s request he flew with Air Marshal Tedder to the Desert Headquarters on November 23, and, with full knowledge of all the dangers, ordered General Cunningham “to continue to press the offensive against the enemy.” By his personal action Auchinleck thus saved the battle and proved his outstanding qualities as a commander in the field.

To me he telegraphed on the 24th from the Advanced Headquarters:

General

Auchinleck

24 Nov. 41

to Prime Minister

On arrival I found Cunningham perturbed at the
situation, owing to the very small number of our tanks
reported still in running order. Apparently five days’

continuous fighting and manoeuvring resulted in
considerable disorganisation and losses from enemy
action and mechanical breakdowns in our armoured
division. There are sure to be reasons for this, but they
do not matter now…. In his attack yesterday evening
the enemy used Italian tanks, which I take as evidence
that he is running short of his own. I am convinced that
he is fully stretched and desperate, and that we must
go on pressing him relentlessly. We may immobilise
temporarily at least practically all our tanks in the
process, but that does not matter if we destroy all his.

The fact that he has abandoned Sidi Omar and Sollum
garrisons to their fate and that we have already taken
over three thousand prisoners, including a thousand
Germans, … is significant. I have accordingly ordered
General Cunningham to attack with all available resources, regain Sidi Rezegh, and join hands with
Tobruk garrison, which is to co-operate by attacking the
enemy on its front. Commanders and troops in great
heart, and New Zealand Division is concentrated in

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front of Sidi Rezegh with infantry tanks. The enemy is
fighting desperately, but we always expected that.

I replied at once:

Prime

Minister

to

25 Nov. 41

General Auchinleck

Yours of 24th. I cordially endorse your view and
intentions, and His Majesty’s Government wish to share
your responsibility for fighting it out to the last inch,
whatever may be the result. It is all or nothing, but I am
sure you are the stronger and will win.

2. You have no doubt had my message about the
rest of the 1st Armoured Division landing at Suez today.

Ram it in if useful at earliest without regard for future.

Close grip upon the enemy by all units will choke the
life out of him.

3. Am immensely heartened by your magnificent
spirit and willpower. Say “Bravo” to Tedder and R.A.F.

on air mastery.

On Auchinleck’s return to Cairo on the 25th he telegraphed to me:

General

Auchinleck

25 Nov. 41

to Prime Minister

I have decided to replace General Cunningham
temporarily by General Ritchie, my present Deputy
Chief of Staff. This is not on account of any misgiving
as to the present situation in my mind, but because I
have reluctantly concluded that Cunningham, admirable
as he has been up to date, has now begun to think
defensively, mainly because of our large tank losses.

But before taking this drastic step I gave the matter
prolonged and anxious consideration and consulted the
Minister of State on my return this afternoon. I am
convinced that I am right, though I realise the undesir-

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ability of such a step at present on general grounds. I
will try and minimise publicity as much as possible.

In his dispatch of 1948, already quoted, General Auchinleck writes:

I most reluctantly decided that I must relieve General
Cunningham of his command, as I had come to the
conclusion that he was unduly influenced by the threat
of an enemy counter-stroke against his communications.

The Minister of State, Oliver Lyttelton, explained and strongly supported the Commander-in-Chief’s decision. To him I telegraphed at once.

Prime

Minister

to

25 Nov. 41

Minister of State

General Auchinleck’s authority over all commanders
is supreme, and all his decisions during the battle will
be confirmed by us. Your action and attitude highly
approved. Communicate [this] to General Auchinleck.

Here I shall leave this incident, so painful to the gallant officer concerned, to his brother the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and to General Auchinleck, who was a personal friend of both. I particularly admired General Auchinleck’s conduct in rising superior to all personal considerations and to all temptations to compromise or delay action.

At this point in the battle I must turn aside to record some other closely related events. On November 20, while the news was still good, I sent an account to the President urging him to do all in his power to keep Vichy motionless in these cardinal days.

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Former

Naval

20 Nov. 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

The approach and deployment of our forces in Libya
has been most successful, and the enemy was taken
by surprise. Only now does he realise the large scale of
our operations against him. Heavy fighting between the
armoured forces seems probable today. Orders have
been given to press what is now begun to a decision at
all costs. The chances do not seem to be unfavourable.

2. It would be disastrous if Weygand were to be
replaced by some pro-Hun officer just at the moment
when we are likely to be in a position to influence
events in North Africa both from the East and from
home. I hope you will try your utmost to persuade Vichy
to preserve Weygand in his command. If this cannot be
achieved some friendly figure from retirement, like
General Georges, might be agreed upon. I have not
seen Georges since the collapse, but I have reason to
believe his heart is sound. I knew him very well. Anyhow, Mr. President, Tunis and all French North Africa
might open out to us if we gain a good victory in Libya,
and we must be ready to exploit success. I am afraid,
on the other hand, lest Hitler may demand to occupy
Bizerta in view of possible danger to Tripoli. It is now or
never with the Vichy French, and their last chance of
redemption.

It was vital also at this moment to cut off Rommel’s fuel supply, and I therefore telegraphed both to General Auchinleck and the Naval Commander-in-Chief urging that a blow should be struck at the enemy communications.

Prime

Minister

to

23 Nov. 41

General Auchinleck

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698

When one sees the invaluable cargoes of fuel now
being directed upon Benghazi, and the enemy air
concentration at Benina, it would seem that quite
exceptional risk should be run to sterilise these places,
even for three or four days. The enemy’s fear of this
operation is obviously well founded. The only time for
such a venture is while he is in the throes of the battle.

Chance of success will diminish as soon as he has
been able to reinforce with troops withdrawing or
escaping from the battle zone. There is a lot to be
picked up cheap now, both at Benghazi and west of
Agheila, which will rise in price enormously once the
main battle is over. I am sure you will be considering
this. Please remember how much they got by brass and
bluff at the time of the French collapse. What is the
mission of the Oasis force?

Prime

Minister

to

23 Nov. 41

Admiral

Cunningham,

Commander Chief in

Mediterranean

I asked the First Sea Lord to wireless you today
about the vital importance of intercepting surface ships
bringing reinforcements, supplies, and above all fuel, to
Benghazi. Our information here shows a number of
vessels now approaching or starting. Request has been
made by enemy for air protection, but this cannot be
given owing to absorption in battle of his African air
force. All this information has been repeated to you. I
shall be glad to hear through Admiralty what action you
propose to take. The stopping of these ships may save
thousands of lives, apart from aiding a victory of
cardinal importance.

The Admiral replied to me personally forthwith:
Admiral Cunningham to Prime Minister
Yours of the 23d. I am naturally very much alive to
vital importance of Benghazi supply route, and First