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most of them are based on either L’Orient or Bordeaux
they can do this without operating farther from their
bases than they are at the present time.

6. It is quite likely therefore that the area to the
westward of 35° West and to the southward of Greenland will be the next danger area, and it is one which it
is difficult for us to deal with. Aerial reconnaissance
which could be carried out from Greenland to cover this
area would therefore be of the greatest value, as if a U-boat were located we should be able to reroute our
convoys by signal so as to pass clear of the danger.

7. Another area in which we are having considerable
trouble is that from Freetown up through the Cape
Verdes to the Azores. We cannot route our convoys
very far to the west owing to the [limited] endurance of
the vessels on this run. In fact, it is only by reducing
their cargo and taking in extra fuel that they can make
the passage. We are providing such escort for these
convoys as we are able, but it is quite inadequate, and
it would be of the greatest help if air reconnaissance by
one of the United States carriers would cover the water
some distance in advance of the convoys.

8. There will be no difficulty in giving the American
naval authorities notification of the movements of
convoys.

9. As regards raiders, one great danger point is off
Newfound land, as we have a very large amount of
shipping proceeding independently through this area.

This was the area in which the Scharnhorstand Gneisenau made such a bag. Any additional long-range air
reconnaissance which could be carried out from New
foundland or Nova Scotia would be of the greatest
assistance.

10. We hope to station a powerful capital ship in
either Nova Scotia or Newfoundland, which would be
able to take advantage of any information which we
receive regarding the activities of raiders.

11. There are various areas on our trade routes in
which the enemy is liable to operate and which are
west of the longitude 26 West. There are also certain
areas in the North and South Atlantic off the trade
routes in which the enemy maintain their supply ships
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and where they go to refuel. Up to the present time we
have been unable to search out these seas, as we
have not had the ships to do it with. If we knew that
reconnaissance was going to take place over any given
area we would endeavour to have in the vicinity a force
which would be capable of dealing with any raider
which was located. Apart from any information which
your ships were able to broadcast, the mere fact of air
reconnaissance taking place over these areas would
give the enemy a great feeling of uneasiness.

12. It is understood that arrangements have already
been made for secret intercommunication between
British and United States warships.

13. For yourself alone. There is another matter
closely connected with the above which is causing me
and the Naval Staff in creasing anxiety. The capacity of
Spain and Portugal to resist the increasing German
pressure may at any time collapse, and the anchorage
at Gibraltar be rendered unusable. To effect this the
Germans would not need to move a large army through
Spain, but merely to get hold of the batteries which may
molest the anchorage, for which a few thousand
artillerists and technicians might, be sufficient. They
have already done some of their usual preliminary
penetration into Tangier, and thus both sides of the
Straits might quickly pass into the hands of expert
hostile gunners.

14. Of course, the moment Spain gives way or is
attacked we shall dispatch two expeditions which we
have long been holding in readiness, one from Britain
to one of the islands in the Azores, and subsequently to
a second island, and the second expedition to do the
same in the Cape Verdes. But these operations will
take eight days from the signal being given, and one
can never tell that the Germans may not have forestalling plans on foot. With our other naval burdens we
have not the forces to maintain a continuous watch. It
would be a very great advantage if you could send an
American squadron for a friendly cruise in these regions
at the earliest moment. This would probably warn Nazi
raiders off, and would keep the place warm for us as
well as giving us invaluable information.

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15. I have had long talks with Mr. Forrestal, and am
taking him and Harriman with me tomorrow night to
study the position in the Mersey area, so important to
the northwestern approaches.

Meanwhile, as a result of the Admiralty talks with Admiral Ghormley, a detailed plan for helping us in the Atlantic had been arranged with the United States.

Former

Naval

24 April 41

Person to President

Roosevelt

Greatly cheered by the news about “Navy Western
Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2.” It almost entirely
covers the points made in my cable to you, which
crossed the official communication. We are deeply
impressed by the rapidity with which it is being brought
into play. We have just received a report which
indicates that a surface raider is operating in a position
about three hundred miles southeast of Bermuda.

Everything will be done to tell the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Fleet about our convoys and other
matters. Admiral Ghormley is in closest touch with the
Admiralty, and the necessary Staff arrangements will
be perfected.

2. The route taken by British shipping to and from
the Cape is dependent on the areas in which U-boats
are suspected, but a route west of 26° West is being
used at the present time, and will be used whenever
possible.

3. We welcome the energetic steps the United
States Navy are taking to prepare the bases in the
northwestern approaches…. The action you have taken
may well decide the Battle of the Atlantic in a
favourable sense.

We are, of course, observing the strictest secrecy.

You will, I am sure, however, realise that if it were
possible for you to make any kind of disclosure or
declaration on these lines, it might powerfully influence

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the attitude both of Turkey and Spain at a cardinal
moment.

The effects of the President’s policy were far-reaching, and we continued our struggle with important parts of our load taken off our backs by the Royal Canadian and the United States Navies. The United States was moving ever nearer to war, and this world-tide was still further speeded by the irruption of the
Bismarck
into the Atlantic towards the end of May. This episode will be described in due course. In a broadcast on May 27, the very day that the
Bismarck
was sunk, the President declared, “The war is approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere itself…. The Battle of the Atlantic now extends from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen continent of the Antarctic.” He went on, “It would be suicide to wait until they [the enemy] are in our front yard…. We have accordingly extended our patrols in North and South Atlantic waters.” At the conclusion of this speech the President declared an “Unlimited National Emergency.”

There is ample evidence to show that the Germans were greatly disturbed at this extension of American activity, and Admirals Raeder and Doenitz besought the Fuehrer to grant greater latitude to the U-boats and permit them to operate towards the American coast as well as against American ships if convoyed or if proceeding without lights.

Hitler, however, remained adamant. He always dreaded the consequences of: war with the United States, and insisted that German forces should avoid provocative action against her.

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The expansion of the enemy’s efforts also brought its own correctives. By June he had, apart from those training, about thirty-five U-boats at sea, but the manning of the numbers of new craft now coming forward outstripped his resources in highly trained crews, and above all in experienced captains. The “diluted” crews of the new U-boats, largely composed of young and unpractised men, showed a decline in pertinacity and skill. Furthermore, the extension of the battle into the remoter expanses of the ocean disrupted the dangerous combination of the U-boats and the air. German aircraft in large numbers had not been equipped or trained for operations over the sea. None the less, in the same three months of March, April, and May 179 ships, of 545,000 tons, were sunk by air attack, mainly in the coastal regions. Of this total 40,000 tons were destroyed, as has been described in an earlier chapter, in two fierce attacks on the Liverpool docks early in May. I was thankful the Germans did not persevere on this tormented target. All the while the stealthy, insidious menace of the magnetic mine had continued around our coasts, with varying success; but our counter-measures remained dominant, and by 1941 sinkings by mines were greatly diminishing.

By June the steady growth of our defence measures both in home waters and in the Atlantic, aided by Canada and America, began once more to gain the upper hand. The utmost exertions were being made both to improve the organisation of our convoy escorts and to develop new weapons and devices to aid them in their task. The chief needs were for more and faster escorts with greater fuel endurance, for more long-range aircraft, and above all for good radar. Shore-based aircraft alone were not enough,