The Grand Alliance (54 page)

Full advantage was taken of their nervousness, and it was possible from the second day to turn a proportion of our air effort to dealing with the Iraqi Air Force and their bases. On the nights of May 3 and 4, offensive land patrols from Habbaniya moved out to raid the enemy lines, and by the fifth, after four days of attack from the Royal Air Force, the enemy had had enough. That night they withdrew from the plateau. They were followed up, and a very successful action yielded four hundred prisoners, a dozen guns, sixty machine guns, and ten armoured cars. A reinforcing column from Falluja was caught on the road and destroyed by forty of our aircraft dispatched from Habbaniya for the purpose. By May 7, therefore, the siege of Habbaniya was over. The defenders had been reinforced by fighter aircraft from Egypt; British women and children had all been evacuated by air to Basra; the Iraqi Air Force of about sixty planes had been virtually destroyed. This good news only reached us late and bit by bit.

Prime Minister to Air

7 May 41

Vice-Marshal Smart

Your vigorous and splendid action has largely
restored the situation. We are all watching the grand
fight you are making. All possible aid will be sent. Keep
it up.

Prime

Minister

to

7 May 41

General Wavell

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It would seem that the Habbaniya show has greatly
improved, and audacious action now against the Iraqis
may crush the revolt before the Germans arrive. They
can, of course, fly there direct in heavy bombers, but
these would only have what they stand up in and could
not operate long. We must forestall the moral effect of
their arrival by a stunning blow. I presume that, if Rutba
and Habbaniya are clear, [our] column will take possession of Baghdad or otherwise exploit success to the full.

Other telegrams are being sent to you about rousing
the tribes and about Government policy.

General Wavell replied to the Chiefs of Staff direct:
8 May 41

I think you should appreciate the limits of military
action in Iraq during next few months without a
favourable political situation. Forces from India can
secure Basra, but cannot, in my opinion, advance
northward unless the co-operation of the local population and tribes is fully secured. Force from Palestine
can relieve Habbaniya and hold approaches from
Baghdad to prevent farther advance on Habbaniya; but
it is not capable of entering Baghdad against opposition
or maintaining itself there. … In order, therefore, to
avoid a heavy military commitment in a non-vital area, I
still recommend that a political solution be sought by all
available means.

Although I realised his cares and his devotion, I continued to press General Wavell hard.

Prime

Minister

to

9 May 41

General Wavell

The Defence Committee have considered your
telegram of May 8 about Iraq. Our information is that
Rashid Ali and his partisans are in desperate straits.

However this may be, you are to fight hard against
them. The mobile column being prepared in Palestine
should advance as you propose, or earlier if possible,
and actively engage the enemy, whether at Rutba or
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Habbaniya. Having joined the Habbaniya forces, you
should exploit the situation to the utmost, not hesitating
to try to break into Baghdad even with quite small
forces, and running the same kind of risks as the
Germans are accustomed to run and profit by.

2. There can be no question of negotiation with
Rashid Ali unless he immediately accepts the terms in
C.O.S. telegram. Such negotiation would only lead to
delay, during which the German Air Force will arrive.

We do not think that any ground forces you may be
able to divert to Iraq will affect your immediate problem
in the Western Desert. The air force must do its best to
cover both situations. Only in the event of your being
actually engaged or about to engage in an offensive in
the Western Desert should Tedder deny the necessary
air support to the Iraq operations.

I tried to reassure General Wavell that we had no extensive operation in view and were only seeking to cope with the immediate need.

You do not need to bother too much about the long future in Iraq. Your immediate task is to get a friendly Government set up in Baghdad, and to beat down Rashid Ali’s forces with the utmost vigour. We do not wish to be involved at present in any large-scale advance up the river from Basra, nor have we prescribed the occupation of Kirkuk or Mosul. We do not seek any change in the independent status of Iraq, and full instructions have been given in accordance with your own ideas upon this point. But what matters is action; namely, the swift advance of the mobile column to establish effective contact between Baghdad and Palestine. Every day counts, for the Germans may not be long. We hoped that the column would be ready to move on the tenth, and would reach Habbaniya on the twelfth, assuming Habbaniya could hold out, which they have done, and a good deal more. We trust these dates have been kept, and that you will do your utmost to accelerate movement.

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Wavell responded gallantly to the many cumulative calls made upon him.

Without waiting for “Tiger” [he reported on the thirteenth] I ordered all available tanks to join Gott’s force and attack the enemy in the Sollum area. … If things go well in the Western Desert I will try to move additional troops to Palestine for action towards Iraq….

We will try to liquidate this tiresome Iraq business quickly. … I am doing my best to strengthen Crete against impending attack. I discussed the question of Syria with Catroux this afternoon.

By this time “Tiger” had begun to arrive safely at Alexandria, and I cherished many hopes of good results in Crete, in the Western Desert, and in Syria. Varied fortunes attended these interrelated ventures.

Prime

Minister

to

14 May 41

General Auchinleck

1. I am very glad you are going to meet Wavell at
Basra. He will tell you about “Tiger” and “Scorcher” [defence of Crete]. A victory in Libya would alter all values
in Iraq, both in German and Iraqi minds.

2. We are most grateful to you for the energetic
efforts you have made about Basra. The stronger the
forces India can assemble there the better. But we
have not yet felt able to commit ourselves to any
advance (except with small parties when the going is
good) northward towards Baghdad, and still less to
occupation in force of Kirkuk and/or Mosul. This cannot
be contemplated until we see what happens about

“Tiger” and “Scorcher.” We are, therefore, confined at
the moment to trying to get a friendly Government
installed in Baghdad and building up the largest
possible bridgehead at Basra. Even less can we
attempt to dominate Syria at the present time, though

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the Free French may be allowed to do their best there.

The defeat of the Germans in Libya is the commanding
event, and larger and longer views cannot be taken till
that is achieved. Everything will be much easier then.

It will be well to complete the Iraq story before the impact of more sanguinary events, though not graver dangers, fell upon us in Crete.

The advance guard of the relieving “Habforce,” a motorised brigade group from Palestine, arrived at Habbaniya on May 18 to resume the attack on the enemy, now holding the bridge across the Euphrates at Falluja. By this time the Iraqis were not the only enemy. The first German aircraft were established on Mosul airfield on May 13, and thenceforward our air force had as a principal task to attack them and prevent their being supplied by railway from Syria. The attack on Falluja by the advance guard of

“Habforce” and the land elements of the Habbaniya garrison took place on May 19. Inundations hampered direct approach from the west, and small columns were, therefore, dispatched over a flying bridge upstream from the town to cut off the retreat of the defenders; another party made an air landing to block the road to Baghdad. It had been expected that this action, together with air bombardment, would make the enemy, about a brigade strong, surrender or disperse. But in the end ground attack was needed. A small force on the west bank whose task had been to prevent by rifle fire the demolition of the vital bridge was ordered to rush it; they did so successfully and without casualties. The enemy gave way; three hundred prisoners were taken. A counter-attack three days later was beaten off.

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Some days were spent in making preparations for the final advance on Baghdad, during which our air action against the German Air Force on the northern airfields of Iraq finally crushed their effort. Later an Italian fighter squadron appeared, but accomplished nothing. The German officer charged with co-ordinating the action of the Axis air squadrons with the Iraqi forces, a son of Field Marshal Blomberg, landed at Baghdad with a bullet in his head, thanks to misjudged firing by his allies. His successor, General Felmy, though more fortunate in his landing, could do nothing. His vigorous instructions from Hitler were dated May 23, by which time all chance of useful Axis intervention had passed.

HITLER’S DIRECTIVE No. 30. MIDDLE EAST

Field Headquarters: May 23, 1941

The Arab Freedom Movement is, in the Middle East,
our natural ally against England. In this connection the
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raising of rebellion in Iraq is of special importance. Such
rebellion will extend across the Iraq frontiers to
strengthen the forces which are hostile to England in
the Middle East, interrupt the British lines of communication, and tie down both English troops and English
shipping space at the expense of other theatres of war.

For these reasons I have decided to push the development of operations in the Middle East through the
medium of going to the support of Iraq. Whether and in
what way it may later be possible to wreck finally the
English position between the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf, in conjunction with an offensive against
the Suez Canal, is still in the lap of the gods….