The Grand Alliance (61 page)

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But now late on the twenty-sixth grave news reached Wavell from Freyberg.

I regret to have to report [said Freyberg] that in my opinion the limit of endurance has been reached by the troops under my command here at Suda Bay. No matter what decision is taken by the Commanders-in-Chief from a military point of view, our position here is hopeless. A small ill-equipped and immobile force such as ours cannot stand up against the concentrated bombing that we have been faced with during the last seven days. I feel I should tell you that from an administrative point of view the difficulties of extricating this force in full are insuperable. Provided a decision is reached at once, a certain proportion of the force might be embarked. Once this section has been reduced the reduction of Retimo and Heraklion by the same methods will only be a matter of time. The troops we have, with the exception of the Welsh Regiment and the commandos, are past any offensive action. If you decide, in view of the whole Middle-East position, that hours will help we will carry on. I would have to consider how this would be best achieved. Suda Bay may be under fire within twenty-four hours. Further casualties have been heavy, and we have lost the majority of our immobile guns.

To Freyberg I telegraphed:

27 May 41

Your glorious defence commands admiration in
every land. We know enemy is hard pressed. All aid in
our power is being sent.

Prime

Minister

to

27 May 41

Commanders-in-

chief Middle East

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Victory in Crete essential at this turning-point in the
war. Keep hurling in all aid you can.

But that night we learned that all hope of success was gone.

General

Wavell

to

27 May 41

Prime Minister

Fear that situation in Crete most serious. Canea
front has collapsed and Suda Bay only likely to be
covered for another twenty-four hours, if as long. There
is no possibility of hurling in reinforcements….

2. On the island itself our troops, majority of whom
had most severe trial in Greece from overwhelming air
attack, have been subjected to same conditions on
steadily increasing scale in Crete. Such continuous and
unopposed air attack must drive stoutest troops from
positions sooner or later and makes administration
practically impossible.

3. Telegram just received from Freyberg states only
chance of survival of force in Suda area is to withdraw
to beaches in south of island, hiding by day and moving
by night. Force at Retimo reported cut off and short of
supplies. Force at Heraklion also apparently almost
surrounded.

4. Fear we must recognise that Crete is no longer
tenable and that troops must be withdrawn as far as
possible. It has been impossible to withstand weight of
enemy air attack, which has been on unprecedented
scale and has been through force of circumstances
practically unopposed.

On the fourth day of the land battle General Freyberg had formed a new line in the Maleme-Canea sector. Thanks to the free use of the airfield, the Germans’ strength grew

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continually. May 26 was the decisive day. Our troops forced back in the neighbourhood of Canea had been under evergrowing pressure for six days. Finally they could stand it no more. The front was broken on the landward side and the enemy reached Suda Bay. Communication with Freyberg’s headquarters failed, and retirement southward across the island to Sphakia began on his delegated authority. Late that night the decision to evacuate Crete was taken. There was much confusion on the trek across the mountains.

Fortunately two commandos, about seven hundred and fifty men, under Colonel Laycock, had been landed at Suda by the minelayer
Abdiel
on the night of the twenty-sixth. These comparatively fresh forces, with the remains of the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the 7th and 8th Australian battalions, fought a strong rear-guard action, which enabled almost the whole of our forces in the Suda-Canea-Maleme area that still survived to make their way to the southern shore.

At Retimo the position was firmly held, although the troops were completely surrounded on the landward side and food and ammunition ran low. They received some rations by motor craft, but no orders to break for the south coast could reach them. Steadily the enemy closed in, until on the thirtieth, with their food exhausted, the survivors surrendered, having killed at least three hundred Germans.

About one hundred and forty individuals contrived their escape.

At Heraklion the German strength east of the airfield grew daily. The garrison had been reinforced by part of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had landed at Timbaki and fought their way through to join them. The Navy now came to the rescue, just in time.

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We had to face once again the bitter and dismal task of an evacuation and the certainty of heavy losses. The harassed, overstrained Fleet had to undertake the embarking of about twenty-two thousand men, mostly from the open beach at Sphakia, across three hundred and fifty miles of sea dominated by hostile air forces. The Royal Air Force had done their best from Egypt with the few aircraft which had the necessary range. The principal target was the enemy-held Maleme airfield, which received a number of bombing attacks both by day and night. While these operations threw a heavy strain on the crews, their necessarily small scale could not have any appreciable effect. Air Marshal Tedder promised to provide some fighter cover for the ships, but this, he warned us, would be meagre and spasmodic. Sphakia, a small fishing village on the south coast, lies at the foot of a steep cliff five hundred feet high traversed only by a precipitous goat track. It was necessary for the troops to hide near the edge until called forward for embarkation. Four destroyers, under Captain Arliss, arrived on the night of the twenty-eighth and embarked seven hundred men, besides bringing food for the very large numbers now gathering. Fighter protection was available for the return voyage, which was made with only minor damage to one destroyer. At least fifteen thousand men lay concealed in the broken ground near Sphakia, and Freyberg’s rear guard was in constant action.

A tragedy awaited the simultaneous expedition by Rear-Admiral Rawlings, which, with the cruisers
Orion, Ajax,
and
Dido
and six destroyers, went to rescue the Heraklion garrison. His force was under severe air attack from Scarpanto from 5 P.M. till dark. The
Ajax
and the destroyer
Imperial
were near-missed, and the former had to return.

Arriving at Heraklion before midnight, the destroyers ferried the troops to the cruisers waiting outside. By 3.20 A.M. the The Grand Alliance

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work was complete. Four thousand men had been embarked and the return voyage began. Half an hour later the steering gear of the damaged
Imperial
suddenly failed, and collision with the cruisers was narrowly averted. It was imperative that the whole force should be as far as possible to the south by daylight. Rear-Admiral Rawlings nevertheless decided to order the destroyer
Hotspur
to return, take off all the
Imperial’s
troops and crew, and sink her. He himself reduced speed to fifteen knots, and the
Hotspur,
carrying nine hundred soldiers, rejoined him just before daylight. He was now an hour and a half late on his time-table, and it was not until sunrise that he turned south to pass through the Kaso Strait. Fighter protection had been arranged, but partly through the change in times the aircraft did not find the ships. The dreaded bombing began at 6 A.

M., and continued until 3 P.M., when the squadron was within a hundred miles of Alexandria.

The
Hereward
was the first casualty. At 6.25 A.M. she was hit by a bomb and could no longer keep up with the convoy.

The Admiral rightly decided that he must leave the stricken ship to her fate. She was last seen approaching the coast of Crete. The majority of those on board survived, though as prisoners of war. Worse was to follow. During the next four hours the cruisers
Dido
and
Orion
and the destroyer
Decoy
were all hit. The speed of the squadron fell to twenty-one knots, but all kept their southerly course in company. In the
Orion
conditions were appalling. Besides her own crew, she had 1100 troops on board. On her crowded mess-decks about 260 men were killed and 280 wounded by a bomb which penetrated the bridge. Her commander, Captain G. R. B. Back, was also killed, the ship heavily damaged and set on fire. At noon two Fulmars of the Fleet air arm appeared, and thereafter afforded a measure of relief. The fighters of the Royal Air Force, despite all efforts,

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could not find the tortured squadron, though they fought several engagements and destroyed at least two aircraft.

When the squadron reached Alexandria at 8 P.M. on the twenty-ninth it was found that one-fifth of the garrison rescued from Heraklion had been killed, wounded, or captured.

We have seen how hard the Commanders-in-Chief in Cairo were pressed from home both by the political and military authorities, and much of this pressure was passed on to our forces in contact with the enemy, who responded nobly. But after the experiences of the twenty-ninth, General Wavell and his colleagues had to decide how far the effort to bring our troops off from Crete should be pursued. The Army was in mortal peril, the Air could do little, and again the task fell upon the wearied and bomb-torn Navy. To Admiral Cunningham it was against all tradition to abandon the Army in such a crisis. He declared, “It takes the Navy three years to build a new ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The evacuation [that is, rescue] will continue.” But it was only after much heart-searching and after consultation both with the Admiralty and General Wavell that the decision was taken to persevere. By the morning of the twenty-ninth nearly five thousand men had been brought off, but very large numbers were holding out and sheltering on all the approaches to Sphakia, and were bombed whenever they showed themselves by day. The decision to risk unlimited further naval losses was justified, not only in its impulse but by the results.