The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists (11 page)

and unprincipled moral force, constantly restructuring and re- defining itself to respond to a never-ending, constantly shifting power dynamic.

In the end, no one could be entirely sure about the ethical and moral principles that Salafism represented, other than a stark form of functionalism that constantly shifted in response to the political demands of the day. By the mid-twentieth cen- tury, it had become clear that Salafism had drifted into stifling apologetics. These apologetics consisted of an effort to defend Islam and its tradition against the onslaught of Westernization and modernity by simultaneously emphasizing both the com- patibility and the supremacy of Islam. Apologists responded to the intellectual challenges of the modern age by adopting pietistic fictions about the presumed perfection of Islam, es- chewing any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines. A com- mon device of apologists was to argue that any meritorious or worthwhile modern institutions were first invented and real- ized by Muslims. Therefore, according to the apologists, Islam liberated women, created a democracy, endorsed pluralism, and protected human rights, long before these institutions ever existed in the West.
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Nonetheless, this was not asserted out of a critical engagement with the Islamic tradition, or even out of a genuine ideological commitment or a rigorous under- standing of the implications of the ideas and institutions as- serted. Rather, these issues were asserted primarily as a means of affirming self-worth and attaining a measure of emotional empowerment. The apologists simply raised the issue of Is- lamic authenticity in relation to issues such as democracy, human rights, and women’s rights, but did not seriously en- gage them. According to such apologetics, all society needed to do in order to fully attain the benefits of democracy, human rights, economic development, or women’s rights was to give full expression to the real and genuine Islam. But what natu-

rally flowed from this was an artificial sense of confidence and an intellectual lethargy that took neither the Islamic tradition nor these modern challenges very seriously.
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The incipient op- portunism in Salafi approaches, which was strongly exempli- fied in its apologetic literature, had degenerated into an intellectual carelessness and whimsicalness that had all but de- stroyed any efforts at systematic and rigorous analysis. By the 1960s the initial optimistic liberalism had dissipated, and what remained of this liberal bent had become largely apologetic.

Meanwhile, through a complex sociopolitical process, Wah- habism was able to rid itself of some of its extreme forms of intolerance, and it proceeded to co-opt the language and sym- bolisms of Salafism in the 1970s until the two had become practically indistinguishable. Both Wahhabism and Salafism imagined a golden age within Islam; this entailed a belief in a near-historical utopia that they thought was entirely retriev- able and reproducible in contemporary Islam. Both remained uninterested in critical historical inquiry and responded to the challenges of modernity by escaping to the secure haven of the text. And both advocated a form of egalitarianism and anti- elitism to the point that they came to consider intellectualism and rational moral insight to be inaccessible, and thus corrup- tions to the purity of the Islamic message. Curiously, this amounted to an attitude that treated whatever was intellectu- ally complex and challenging as somehow contrary to Islam. This stand was quite odd coming from the offspring of a civi- lization that had produced a remarkably rich tradition of Is- lamic philosophy.

These similarities between the two facilitated the Wahhabi co-optation of Salafism. Wahhabism from its very inception, and Salafism especially after it entered its apologetic phase, were infested with a kind of supremacist thinking that prevails until today. The level of intellectual sophistication found in the

writings of early Salafists like Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida, for example, became increasingly rare, and increasingly the texts written by Salafis became indistinguishable from those written by Wahhabis. It is this blend of Salafism and Wahhabism, which took place in the 1970s, that forms the theology of the puritanical movements of today.
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The puritan- ical approach became best represented in the writings of people such as Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi (d. 1979) and Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966, who to different extents were both Salafi and Wahhabi. Mawdudi was an influential Islamic thinker who wrote over twenty books, and who exercised a considerable impact upon Indo-Pakistanis as well as Arab Muslims. Following in the footsteps of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mawdudi believed that all Muslim societies have reverted to a pre-Islamic condition where darkness and ignorance prevails (a state of
jahiliyya
). Like ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mawdudi believed that Muslims have lost their true faith and that much of their beliefs and actions betrayed a lack of understanding of
tawwhid
(monotheism). Like ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mawdudi be- lieved in the seclusion of women, and emphasized orthoproxy or correct ritualistic practice as true proof of the faith. Maw- dudi, however, was not willing to go as far as declaring all Muslims as apostates, and on that basis spill their blood. Mawdudi did not resort to violence during his lifetime, but he led a fairly large grass roots movement in Pakistan, which aimed to amass enough popular support to eventually over- throw the government and take power. Mawdudi did not ob- ject to the use of violence as a matter of principle, but he believed that a premature use of violence would lead to state suppression and the ultimate defeat of Islamic forces. It is fair to say that the difference between Mawdudi and ‘Abd al- Wahhab was a difference of circumstance. Tribal feuding, the existence of a weak state in Arabia, and British support aimed

at weakening the Ottoman Empire were factors that helped ‘Abd al-Wahhab in using violence as the primary means of propagating his message. Mawdudi advocated the idea of de- layed jihad—the idea that true Muslims should not use vio- lence as long as the balance of powers did not favor their victory, but if the balance of powers changes, resorting to vio- lence becomes justified. In a very significant respect, Mawdudi was quite similar to ‘Abd al-Wahhab—both shared the dream of establishing a new and improved alternative society that is genuinely Islamic, and that is nothing like the societies that al- ready existed and in which these two activists lived. According to these two activists, this highly coveted alternative society was an imagined utopian state, which ought to be modeled after the Prophet’s city-state in Medina. Ultimately, Mawdudi and his many followers, as well as the Wahhabis, shared in the belief in a dictatorial theocratic state that forces people to comply with their puritanical version of Islamic law. Maw- dudi, however, reflected a clear Western influence insisting that an Islamic state is a theo-democracy—a combination be- tween theocracy and democracy. But this was nothing more than apologetic rhetoric aimed at defending his followers against the charge that they were activists working to trans- form Pakistan into a religious dictatorship.

Sayyid Qutb has often been called the father of all militants, but this accusation is not entirely accurate. Qutb was sen- tenced to death by Nasser’s regime in Egypt for his ideas, not for any violent acts that he committed. But because he was ex- ecuted for his ideas, even people who do not agree with his thought remember him as a martyr. Not surprisingly, that martyrdom has virtually ensured his survival in the Muslim memory for generations to come.

Moreover, Qutb was a complicated figure because he lived most of his life as a moderate Muslim and, as a result, he left a

legacy of influential studies on the Qur’an and literary criti- cism. Qutb was highly educated and widely read, familiar with Mawdudi’s and ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings as well as the writings of several Western philosophers. However, he was not drawn to the thought of Mawdudi or ‘Abd al-Wahhab until he was arrested and severely tortured by Nasser’s regime; it is this experience that proved to be truly transfor- mative for Qutb. Qutb became an extremist, and he wrote the treatise titled
Milestones on the Road,
which became his most influential and famous work. As an extremist, Qutb truly exemplified the simultaneous influences and contradic- tions of puritanical Islam, which were Salafism, Wahhabism, and Western thought. In
Milestones
he attempted to offer a description of the genuine Islamic society and the true Islamic faith, but in reality, Qutb’s book did nothing more than at- tempt to add an Islamic veneer to a thoroughly fascist ideo- logical construct.

Qutb was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organiza- tion in Egypt and insisted that like Hasan al-Bana (assassi- nated in 1949), the founder of that movement, he was a Salafi. However, like ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Qutb divided society into the true faithful versus those who live in the age of
jahiliyya
(pre- Islamic ignorance and darkness). In his view, it was obligatory upon all Muslims to migrate (do
hijra
) to the land of true of Islam; those who failed to do so were to be considered apos- tates and infidels. Qutb insisted that the Qur’an was the con- stitution of all true Muslims, and he also claimed that sovereignty exclusively belongs to God. This meant that in a true Islamic society, God is the only legislature, and perfect justice could be achieved if the ruler faithfully applies God’s commandments. The land of true Islam must be governed in all its particulars by Islamic law. It is not surprising that nei- ther Qutb nor Mawdudi were trained jurists, and their knowl-

edge of the Islamic jurisprudential tradition was minimal. Nevertheless, like ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mawdudi and Qutb imag- ined Islamic law to be a set of clear cut, inflexible, and rigid positive commands that covered and regulated every aspect of life. Qutb imagined Islamic law to be a cure-all—its imple- mentation meant that God’s justice was being implemented and God’s justice was perfect.

Qutb argued that when this land of true Islam is founded, all Muslims must promptly migrate (do
hijra
) and settle in it. If, however, it does not exist, Qutb contended that the true believ- ers must isolate themselves from the rest of society (
i’tizal
), which is Muslim by name only but which is in reality heretical and foul. The true believers must withdraw and isolate them- selves from society so that they will not be contaminated by the state of pre-Islamic ignorance that prevails in society (
jahiliyya
). But then after withdrawing and forming their own community, it is incumbent upon Muslims to expend every effort at founding the true Islamic state. Clearly, Qutb’s willingness to declare Muslims to be apostates was reminiscent of ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s rhetoric on true belief and apostasy. Like ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Qutb accused the vast majority of Muslims of being hypocrites and heretics. In essence, both ‘Abd al- Wahhab and Qutb believed in the idea of the community of the truly saved (
al-firqa al-Najiya
) fighting against other Muslims to establish the true Islamic state and enforce God’s law. However, Qutb provided a more detailed vision of the idealistic and utopian Islamic state. In this regard, Qutb, unlike ‘Abd al- Wahhab, was influenced by Western thinkers, particularly the German fascist philosopher Carl Schmidt. Although Qutb does not once mention Schmidt in his works, a careful reading of
Milestones on the Road
reveals that many of Qutb’s ideas, con- structs, and phrases are clearly adapted from the works of Schmidt.
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As a true sign of the shifting fate of Salafi Islam, when Qutb wrote his
Milestones,
the director of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Hudaybi, who described himself as a Salafi, wrote a book refuting Qutb’s claims. Al-Hudaybi criticized the thinking of ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Mawdudi and strenuously protested the practice of
takfir
(the act of accusing Muslims of being apostates and heretics). Al-Hudaybi argued that this practice is inconsistent with the tradition of tolerance in Islam. Al- Hudaybi also challenged the idea that Muslim societies as a whole have drifted back into the age of darkness and ignorance (
jahiliyya
). Muslim societies, according to al-Hudaybi, might have become too Westernized or they might have drifted away from some Islamic values, but this does not mean that these so- cieties ceased to be Muslim. The answer to all problems that might confront Muslims is to advocate, persuade, and seek in- cremental reform, and not to resort to violence or to try to force change. In all cases, it is a grave error to assume that all Muslims deserve to be killed or to consider oneself in a state of war with society at large, as the Wahhabis have done. Signifi- cantly, al-Hudaybi argued that political sovereignty should properly belong to the people, and therefore a theocratic sys- tem of government is inconsistent with Islamic theology, his- tory, and morality. Al-Hudaybi was very critical of the idea of God’s sovereignty, claiming that it is alien to Islam and that it is being used for the wrong purposes. He contended that the con- cept of a utopian state in which God alone is sovereign is fac- tually impossible and politically naive. Al-Hudaybi was a judge and a jurist and, indeed, in his book he demonstrates a greater degree of competence and knowledge of Islamic law. Conse- quently, he does not consider the application of Islamic law to be a cure-all to whatever problems that might confront Mus- lims. Islamic law cannot be applied without first developing the appropriate institutional apparatus and social context.

It is very telling that while most Muslims have at least heard of
Milestones on the Road,
and while Qutb’s book is widely available, the same is not true for al-Hudaybi’s book. Few have heard of it, and it is long out of print and difficult to locate.
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Sadly, al-Hudaybi’s liberal book was written long after the liberal phase of Salafism had passed. It no longer represented Salafi thought; it represented only the lonely thought of al-Hudaybi.
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Today, Salafis resoundingly reject al- Hudaybi’s thought, as they reject the thought of the liberal Salafis of the early twentieth century.