The Kennedy Half-Century (101 page)

12
. Tax rates have jumped up and down over the years. As the Great Depression deepened in June 1932, President Hoover and Congress raised the top income tax rate from 25% to 63% and quadrupled the lowest tax rate from 1.1% to 4%. President Roosevelt raised taxes
at times to pay for his New Deal programs and World War II. Under President Truman, income tax rates were cut across the board, with the top marginal rate, 94% on all income over $200,000, cut to 86.45%. The lowest rate was cut to 19% from 23%, and with a change in the amount of income exempt from taxation an estimated 12 million Americans were eliminated from the tax rolls entirely. There were also changes in the separate corporate tax rate structure. See Alan Reynolds, “The Hoover Analogy Flunks,” Cato Institute website, reprinted from
Forbes
, September 29, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/hoover-analogy-flunks
 [accessed April 9, 2013], and Burton Folsom, Jr., and Anita Folsom, “Did FDR End the Depression?”
Wall Street Journal
, April 12, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304024604575173632046893848.html
 [accessed April 9, 2013].

13
. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, “Yale University Commencement (June 11, 1962),” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia,
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3370
 [accessed January 13, 2011]; Schlesinger,
Thousand Days
, 648; Matt Viser, “JFK’s Words Echo Once More in Washington,”
Boston Globe
, January 21, 2011; David Greenberg, “Tax Cuts in Camelot?” January 16, 2004,
Slate
,
http://www.slate.com/id/2093947/
 [accessed January 13, 2011]. Liberals counter by arguing that JFK was trying to put money in the hands of consumers with a kind of demand-side economics, not further enriching the wealthy. They may be right about the intent, but the effect of the Kennedy tax cut disproportionately benefited the well-off.

14
. Bundy knew about the missile sites on October 15, but decided to withhold the information from the president until the following day. Bundy later explained the reasons for his decision: (1) it would take 24 hours to put together a presentation, (2) a hastily-assembled meeting of top officials would alert the press to the crisis, (3) Bundy thought that Kennedy, back from a “strenuous campaign weekend,” would benefit from a good night’s sleep. So-rensen,
Classic Biography
, 673.

15
. Sorensen,
Classic Biography
, 673–74; “Kennedy’s Cuba Statement,”
New York Times
, September 5, 1962; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–64
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 222–23. Sorensen said Ex-Comm actually consisted of as many as “fourteen or fifteen men.”

16
. Fursenko and Naftali,
Hell of a Gamble
, 224–25; Sorensen,
Classic Biography
, 675–77; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 545–47; Audio Clips from the Kennedy White House, Tuesday, October 16, 11:50 A.M., Cabinet Room, White House, National Security Archive, George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/audio.htm
 [accessed January 19, 2011].

17
. Fursenko and Naftali,
Hell of a Gamble
, 226; Reeves,
President Kennedy
, 376–77.

18
. In the autumn of 1963, LeMay occasionally served as acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in that capacity recommended sabotage operations against Cuba. Some conspiracy theorists tie LeMay’s aggressive posture toward Cuba, and President Kennedy’s refusal to sign off on the general’s plans, to LeMay’s alleged but unsubstantiated involvement in JFK’s assassination. See LeMay’s memo to the Secretary of the Army, September 23, 1963, Mary Ferrell website,
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=10220&relPageId=1
 [accessed January 5, 2012]. LeMay’s hawkish views were the inspiration behind Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey’s book
Seven Days in May
, which tells the story of a right-wing general who plots a coup against a
president who is trying to make peace with the Soviets. See Adam Bernstein, “Charles W. Bailey II, ‘Seven Days in May’ Co-author, Dies at 82,”
Washington Post
, January 4, 2012.

19
. Fursenko and Naftali,
Hell of a Gamble
, 230; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 551–52; Audio Clips from the Kennedy White House, Thursday, October 18, 12:00 P.M., Cabinet Room, White House, National Security Archive, George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/audio.htm
 [accessed January 19, 2011].

20
. Schlesinger,
Thousand Days
, 805; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 553.

21
. LeMay became the running mate of presidential candidate George C. Wallace in 1968. Wallace was the nominee of the American Independent Party, whose anti-civil rights platform helped Wallace and LeMay win 46 electoral votes in the South.

22
. John Morton Blum,
Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961–74
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 82–83; Reeves,
Question of Character
, 374; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 55.

23
. Sorensen,
Classic Biography
, 692–94; Reeves,
Question of Character
, 375–77.

24
. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, “Address on the Buildup of Arms in Cuba (October 22, 1962),” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia,
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3372
 [accessed January 20, 2011].

25
. Herbert S. Parmet,
JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy
(New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 292; Sidey,
Reporter’s Inside Story
, 344.

26
. On October 23, the OAS voted unanimously to support the U.S. response to the missile crisis.

27
. Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 561; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 514; Reeves,
Question of Character
, 381.

28
. Author Michael Dobbs describes the “eyeball to eyeball” moment as an “erroneous myth.” The lead Soviet ship, says Dobbs, was actually 750 miles away from the quarantine line when it turned around and Khrushchev had ordered his ships back to the Soviet Union “some 30 hours earlier.” See Michael Dobbs, “The Price of a 50-Year Myth,”
New York Times
, October 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/opinion/the-eyeball-to-eyeball-myth-and-the-cuban-missile-crisiss-legacy.html?_r=1&
 [accessed October 25, 2012].

29
. Parmet,
JFK
, 294; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 565.

30
. James Rosen, “RFK Files Show Missile Crisis Disrupted Anti-Castro Plots,” FoxNews.com, July 25, 2013,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/07/25/rfk-files-show-missile-crisis-disrupted-anti-castro-plots/
 [accessed July 26, 2103]. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds.,
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
(New York: New Press, 1992), 374–79; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 565–68; Blum,
Years of Discord
, 88.

31
. Khrushchev’s account of the meeting, as told to him by Dobrynin, portrays the Kennedy brothers as worried about the possibility of a military putsch in the U.S. According to Dobrynin, “Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. ‘The president is in a grave situation,’ Robert Kennedy said, ‘and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the president is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy’s message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the president himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will … If
the situation continues much longer, the president is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power.’ ” Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962,”
The Cold War International History Project Bulletin
5 (Spring 1995), National Security Archive, George Washington University,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm
 [accessed January 21, 2011]. While we do not know for sure what RFK said to Dobrynin and there is no evidence at all that a military coup was contemplated by anyone, this was perhaps a useful argument to make to a Soviet well aware of how regime change happened in his own country.

32
. In 1989 Sorensen admitted that he purposefully omitted the Jupiter missile arrangement from Robert Kennedy’s book
Thirteen Days
.

33
. Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 570–71.

34
. McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the Executive Committee, November 16, 1962,” Harlan Cleveland Papers, Box 78, “Cuba—Cuban Crisis 1962,” John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts; Tad Szulc, “Navy Gets Order,”
New York Times
, November 21, 1962. See also David G. Coleman,
The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2012).

35
. Meredith had also been inspired by the New Frontier. According to Arthur Schlesinger, he applied for admission to Ole Miss on the day that JFK delivered his inaugural address.

36
. Blum,
Years of Discord
, 73–75; Schlesinger,
A Thousand Days
, 940–49; John Fitzgerald Kennedy, “Address on the Situation at the University of Mississippi (September 30, 1962),” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia,
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/5743
 [accessed January 25, 2011].

37
. J. H. Meredith to “The Attorney General,” September 5, 1963, Burke Marshall Papers, Box 8, “Meredith, James H.,” John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. In an undated letter to President Kennedy [probably sent in early 1963], Robert Kennedy chose to look on the bright side of the integration struggle: “For the headline writer, rioting and violence at the University of Mississippi overshadowed the civil rights field and painted 1962 as one of resistance by the South to law and the orders of our courts. The historian, however, will find, on the contrary, that 1962 was a year of great progress in civil rights, in large measure because of the responsibility and respect for law displayed by the great majority of the citizens of the South. In 1962 the United States took major steps toward equal opportunity and equal rights for all our citizens and in every area of civil rights—whether voting, transportation, education, employment, or housing. During this administration, officials in 29 counties in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana have voluntarily made voting records available to the department in our investigations of voting complaints—without the need for court action.” RFK to JFK, undated letter, Burke Marshall Papers, Box 8, “Presidential April 8, 1963–August 17, 1964 & undated,” John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

38
. The racism of the 1960s pervaded much of the Southern media. On August 28, 1963, WMOG radio, part of the “Johnnie Reb” chain of stations, ran an advertisement sponsored by the Glynn Society for Democratic Action that allegedly included the following announcement: “The niggers are now marching in Washington; keep the schools for white people.” A subsequent FCC investigation concluded that the word “Negro” had been pronounced “nigra.” “The Secretary of the anti-integration society that placed the subject advertisements with the station, in a letter to the FCC, [made] the pithy
comment: ‘In one section of the country the word ‘vigor’ is believed to be pronounced as though it was spelled ‘viggah.’ ” Jerome K. Heilbron to Burke Marshall, September 23, 1963, Victor S. Navasky Papers, Box 3, “Background Civil Rights,” John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. One of JFK’s signature words, spoken with a Boston accent, was “vigor.”

39
. Blum,
Years of Discord
, 75; Rhodes Cook, “The Midterm Election of ’62: A Real ‘October Surprise,’”
Sabato’s Crystal Ball
VIII (September 30, 2010),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2010093001/
 [accessed January 25, 2011].

40
. Harris Wofford,
Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 170; Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Why We Can’t Wait
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 77–100.

41
. Parmet,
JFK
, 264–67; Reeves,
President Kennedy
, 488–89; Letter from Marshall Haynes, Jr., to Burke Marshall, September 18, 1963, Burke Marshall Papers, Box 8, “Attorney General, September–October 1963,” John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts; Western Union telegram from Jackie Robinson to JFK, May 7, 1963, Jackie Robinson Papers, Box 5, Folder 14, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, Washington, DC.