Read The last tycoons: the secret history of Lazard Frères & Co Online
Authors: William D. Cohan
Tags: #Corporate & Business History, #France, #Lazard Freres & Co - History, #Banks & Banking, #Bankers - France, #Banks And Banking, #Finance, #Business, #Economics, #Bankers, #Corporate & Business History - General, #History Of Specific Companies, #Business & Economics, #History, #Banks and banking - France - History, #General, #New York, #Banks and banking - New York (State) - New York - History, #Bankers - New York (State) - New York, #Biography & Autobiography, #New York (State), #Biography
His thinking was admirable enough, but the disconnect was also painfully obvious: in a political age when plum cabinet positions are often the reward for the hard work of a campaign, to try to play by different rules was not a winning strategy. For one of the world's best strategists not to comprehend that simple reality was stunning. Rattner remembered Felix coming into his small office, where he had moved so that he and Fennebresque could be nearer each other. "Felix liked to walk the halls, which was one of his good qualities," Steve said. "He came in my office one day after the election of 1992 and he said, 'You know, I used to think that being a policy guru and saving New York was enough to become Treasury secretary, but I found out that you really have to be in the mix and you really have to raise money. It's not going to happen for me.' I felt sorry for him." If Steve learned anything from Felix's misfortune, it was the old saw about money and politics; he and his wife, Maureen, have since become among the most effective fund-raisers in the Democratic Party. He also took up his pen again. Soon after Clinton's election, Steve wrote his first
New York Times
op-ed piece, "Short-Term Stimulus? Long-Term Error." He admitted he was a Democrat (although he gave $500 to Dole for President in October 1987) and urged the new president to focus on crafting long-term economic solutions, such as encouraging investment and increasing productivity.
AS IF THE foibles of the Phar-Mor investment and Felix Rohatyn weren't difficult enough for the firm to digest, two investigative reporters for the
Wall Street Journal
chose the same moment to focus an unwanted spotlight on Lazard's tiny--but suddenly quite potent--municipal bond underwriting department. Ever since Felix had helped solve New York City's fiscal crisis, Lazard had been asked to help other cities with financial difficulties. For these advisory assignments, the firm received monthly fees.
Naturally, Felix himself didn't have the time or the inclination to personally work on all of these assignments on a day-to-day basis, so at Michel's urging, Lazard hired a cadre of people into the banking group for this purpose, the most prominent being Eugene Keilin, the former executive director of MAC, and Franklin Raines, who would later become Lazard's first black partner and the CEO of Fannie Mae (where his reputation would be badly tarnished by scandal). An offshoot of the business of providing advice to municipalities was the business of underwriting their bond issues, which raised money from the market to build hospitals, schools, and roads or was used for a municipality's "general obligations." From the outset of Michel's management of the firm, he sought to build up the municipal finance department--both by hiring traders who bought and sold municipal securities and by hiring bankers whose job it was to win underwriting mandates from state and local governments (although in those days if Lazard was hired as a financial adviser to a municipality, the firm was precluded from acting also as an underwriter). The effort remained small but profitable, in the typical Lazard mold.
That began to change in 1985, when Felix decided to hire Michael Del Guidice, the chief of staff to New York's governor, Mario Cuomo, to run the municipal finance business. Felix obviously knew Del Guidice well from his work with MAC and his numerous interactions over the years with Governor Cuomo. And certainly Del Guidice knew his way around the corridors of political power on the state level and knew how municipal underwriting assignments were awarded. Of course, he had never before worked on Wall Street or managed a group of bankers, but that was a minor detail; Lazard was well known (as were many other Wall Street firms) for providing a warm bath to former government officials with no prior Wall Street experience. "Del Guidice was really more of a political operative than he was a banker, and if anything, he took some pride in the fact that he wasn't a numbers guy, that he was more a relationship guy, a connections guy," observed one Lazard partner. Del Guidice, whom Mezzacappa, his boss, described as "a nice guy who was in way over his head," set out quickly to hire some new bankers with close ties to state government officials, figuring correctly that this was the way to win underwriting mandates. He was, after all, one of those guys himself. Among his hires were Richard Poirier Jr., a cigar-smoking six-footer from Prudential Securities, and Mark Ferber, then thirty-four, a supposed superstar municipal finance banker in Boston who had previously worked for First Boston and Kidder, Peabody.
Soon enough, the marketing skills of these two men became apparent to their colleagues in the department. "Ferber and Poirier were two of the most productive bankers in the country," recalled one partner, "doing some of the biggest deals ever done. They were very aggressive guys in seeking business. Poirier was more 'I'm gonna go through that brick wall and get that business, and if you're standing in front of that brick wall, I'm going through you, too.' Ferber was much smoother. Ferber was more 'How can I get the most leverage I can out of the system?'" Both of them knew the municipal finance business far better than Del Guidice did and by the early 1990s had started operating independently of their titular boss. "Del Guidice had two guys that were bigger guys than he was," one Lazard partner remembered.
Just how much bigger became clear in a surprising, twenty-eight-hundred-word front-page
Wall Street Journal
article in May 1993 that focused on how Poirier, who joined Lazard the same month as Rattner, was able to make Lazard the top underwriter of municipal securities in New Jersey in 1992, when as recently as two years before Lazard had not underwritten a single bond for the state. The article credited Poirier's stunning success in New Jersey to his political connections, particularly with Joseph Salema, the chief of staff to Governor Jim Florio, and with Florio himself.
Florio appointed Salema's brother-in-law, Sam Crane, to be state treasurer at just the same moment that Lazard was chosen to lead a $1.8 billion "general obligation" bond issue that the previous state treasurer had opposed both issuing and choosing Lazard to manage. Lazard made $10 million for its role in the underwriting. The article also described Poirier's ability to win a slew of state hospital underwritings, despite little experience in that discipline and despite the recommendations from hospital officials that other firms be hired instead. "We had selected Prudential," one hospital executive told the paper, "but then all of a sudden we got a call. It was obviously controlled by the governor's office." Poirier also won for Lazard the coveted role of advising the state's turnpike authority on the sale of $2.9 billion of bonds in 1991 and 1992. New Jersey paid Lazard a $2.3 million fee for that advice.
The article revealed, though, that the SEC and the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan were investigating Poirier's actions in relation to the sale of the turnpike bonds. Poirier's success in New Jersey notwithstanding, the
Journal
reporters also pointed out that his previous interactions with officials in Florida and Kentucky had gotten both him and Lazard into hot water. Lazard's lead underwriting of an $861 million bond offering for the Florida State Board of Education quickly turned sour amid charges that it had mispriced the deal. The outcry led to an inquiry about how Lazard had been chosen in the first place, and the answer--Poirier's political connections--led Governor Lawton Chiles to ban Wall Street firms that make political contributions to state officials from underwriting state bonds. In Kentucky, Poirier's handling of a $250 million turnpike bond caused state officials to write a "blistering" ten-page memo accusing him of "lying, making unauthorized trades on the state's behalf and overcharging the state by more than $1 million." Poirier's "attitude was antagonistic," and the deal "recalled many of the boilerroom tactics of an era we hoped was behind us." Poirier refused to be interviewed for the article. At least one of his former partners at Lazard believed that the highly damaging
Journal
article appeared because a number of competitors and colleagues, including Ferber, were just "getting even with Poirier" because he was so aggressive.
When the
Journal
next appeared the following Monday, there was a letter to the editor from "Lazard Freres & Co." complaining about the article's portrayal of both Poirier and the firm. "We are dismayed by the article that appeared on page one Friday about the work of a partner in our Municipal Finance Department, and we take issue with its tenor as well as its specifics," the firm wrote. "Our review of the matters discussed in your article has not brought to our attention any evidence of illegality. Our code of conduct, subscribed to by everyone from our more senior partners to our most junior employees, states clearly our policy that all business affairs be conducted on the highest ethical level. Nothing falling short of this will be tolerated." The letter pointed out that the firm had met with the
Journal
reporters as they were preparing the article but that Lazard's input did not make it into the paper. "The day-to-day efforts of individuals in our firm to formulate innovative responses to the extremely complex financial issues that confront our state and local authorities were disregarded in exchange for the drama of unproven insinuations of improper influence," the letter concluded. Before long, the firm would rue the day these words were written.
The same day the firm's letter appeared in the
Journal,
Rattner wrote Michel a memo suggesting that he was already tiring of the job as co-head of banking--a mere eight months after his appointment. He had run the weekly partners' meetings, given reviews to some of the junior bankers, and tried to give input to Michel on the partnership percentages, a process he called "tinkering with tenths," a reference to his minor role in trying to influence Michel's thinking. "If you go back in time (and it was before my time), no one was running banking," Steve explained. "Bill was the first one to try to run banking. He was quite good at it in a certain way, but--and Bill would be the first one to admit it--it still had a long way to go to really be effective. Kim and I were trying to take it to the next level. We met with enormous resistance from all the old guard, although Felix was relaxed about it," since what Steve and Kim were attempting rarely affected Felix. And of course, Felix was then still fond of Steve and his successes. Steve's frustrations, and even some of his thoughts, were curiously reminiscent of many of Loomis's feelings about being head of banking. "You asked that I try to articulate the key elements of my coordination responsibilities and what might be done to arrange them in a way that satisfies everyone's needs," Steve wrote. "Let me reiterate at the outset that my first choice is to be relieved of all of those responsibilities for the reasons that we have discussed. While I understand why this might not make sense for the Firm, I'm not concerned from my own standpoint about any reverberations." He recommended nothing less than dismantling much of the internal banking infrastructure that he and Loomis had so carefully constructed in the past decade. He was immensely frustrated and thought the time had come to "eliminate my efforts to influence decisions as to the direction of the Firm. The many conversations that I have had with you, Felix, Damon, Mel and others and the several significant analyses that have been prepared regarding size, profitability, productivity, etc. have taken an extraordinary amount of time. At this point, I've expressed everything that's on my mind so it would be relatively easy to relieve myself of this activity."
Despite this diatribe, which few knew about, once again not much changed outwardly. Summer was right around the corner anyway, and that meant Michel's departure for Sous-le-Vent and the general disappearance of most other partners to their fancy homes in the Hamptons, the Vineyard, the Hudson Valley, Litchfield County, or Wyoming, among other places. After Steve had written the memo, Fennebresque remembered one "summer evening" when he and Michel were "bullshitting" in Michel's office and the topic of managing the banking group came up. Michel had been doodling on a piece of paper, and then he said to Kim, "The problem is, you know, that you and Steve want to manage the banking group and the banking group is really the heart of the firm, and it's really my firm." To which the startled Fennebresque responded, "'I've got that message, pal. I get it. My foot's coming off the accelerator.' So, um, that was quite a telling moment." From that evening on, Fennebresque said, he was far more low-key about his already subdued efforts to run banking. "I didn't see any reason to increase the enemies list or make the enemies list," he said. He resolved to let Steve be even more out front managing the banking partners than before. Together, they continued to interview some big-name M&A bankers, such as Geoff Boisi, Roger Altman, Joe Perella, and Tom Hill, about coming to Lazard (all of whom declined), but mostly they focused on doing deals.
Like the few before him, Steve had quickly discovered the frustrations and the thanklessness of the task Michel had given him. He was frustrated with his inability to get things done with Michel's incessant micromanaging and undermining. He felt he was wasting his time and energy on trying to reform a system that would not be changed, at least not as long as Michel retained the power of the purse and Felix was free to meddle. He decided he was spending his time unwisely on internal matters when he could spend it far more profitably with clients.