The Modern Middle East (87 page)

56.
David McDowall,
The Palestinians: The Road to Nationhood
(London: Minority Rights Group, 1995), pp. 82–84.

57.
Amnesty International,
Amnesty International Report,
2012:
The State of the World’s Human Rights
(London: Amnesty International, 2012), p. 187.

58.
Anthony Coon,
Israel and the Occupied Territories, Demolition and Dispossession: The Destruction of Palestinian Homes
(London: Amnesty International, 1999), p. 1.

59.
Amnesty International, “Palestinian Homes Demolished without Warning,” March 11, 2008,
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/palestinian-homes-demolished-without-warning-20080311
.

60.
Data collected from BʾTselem, under “Statistics,” “Destruction of Property,”
www.btselem.org/statistics
. Because of house demolitions from 1987 to the first three months of 1999, an estimated 14,500 people, including at least 6,000 children, were rendered homeless. Coon,
Israel and the Occupied Territories
, p. 9.

61.
Coon,
Israel and the Occupied Territories
, p. 12.

62.
BʾTselem, “Statistics on Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem,” December 3, 2012,
www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics
.

63.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel,
Statistical Abstract of Israel,
2000, no. 51 (Tel Aviv: Government Publishing House, 2000), pp. 16–17.

64.
Palestinian homes are often destroyed under the pretext of not having the proper building permits. The same requirement does not apply to the homes of Israeli settlers, however. According to a statement by the Israel Committee against Home Demolitions,

With three unusual exceptions, in the past 30 years NO Jewish house on the West Bank has ever been threatened with demolition. The entire notion is absolutely unthinkable to an Israeli. Moreover, any comparison of the legal status of the Palestinian and Jewish residents of the West Bank reveals completely different sets of rights, protections, and penalties.

Israeli settlers are citizens of Israel and are subject only to Israeli law. None of the planning guidelines, procedures for obtaining building permits from the civilian administration or house demolition penalties applies to them. The first 21 Jewish settlements on the West Bank were done so without plans or permits and, indeed, against the stated policies and wishes of the Israeli government. Erecting structures in order to
“create facts” on the ground is still a favorite tactic of the settlers, and thousands of Jewish housing units have been built without permits.

Jeff Halper,
On the Policy of House Demolition by the Israeli Army in the West Bank
(Hebron: Israel Committee against House Demolitions, 1998).

65.
Charles D. Smith,
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), pp. 303–4.

66.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel,
Survey of New Dwellings for Sale in the Private Sector, January–March
2009, table 1.1, p. 15.

67.
Craig Horowitz, “A Tale of Two Cities,”
New York
, April 7, 1997, p. 34.

68.
Ian S. Lustick,
For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988), pp. 45–46.

69.
McDowall,
Palestinians
, p. 87.

70.
BʾTselem,
Human Rights
, p. 39.

71.
Colin MacKinnon, “Costs of the Closure: Gaza Hard Hit,”
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
, July 1996, p. 85.

72.
The 2012 poverty data for the West Bank Gaza are from World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza at a Glance,” March 29, 2012,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/wbg_aag.pdf
; World Bank,
Coping with Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), p. 15.

73.
World Bank,
Towards Economic Sustainability of a Future Palestinian State: Promoting Private Sector–Led Growth
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), pp. 122–23. See also World Bank,
Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

74.
In February–March 1996, for example, Hamas claimed responsibility for three suicide car bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem that killed fifty-seven civilian Israelis. For an account of some of the more recent terrorist activities committed by Palestinian guerrillas and suicide bombers against Israeli targets, see U.S. Department of State, “Israel and the Occupied Territories,” in
Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
2000 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2001).

75.
U.S. Department of State, “Israel and the Occupied Territories,” in
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—
2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003).

76.
Mishal and Sela,
Palestinian Hamas
, p. 62.

77.
See, for example, Shimon Peres,
The New Middle East
(New York: Henry Holt, 1993); and Shimon Peres and Robert Littell,
For the Future of Israel
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

78.
Uri Savir,
The Process:
1,100
Days That Changed the Middle East
(New York: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 77.

79.
Nicholas Guyatt,
The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 35.

80.
For a detailed account of Sadat’s trip to Israel and other events leading up to the Camp David Accords, see Kenneth Stein,
Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 187–228.

81.
Quoted in Laqueur and Rubin,
Israeli-Arab Reader
, p. 396.

82.
Quoted in Fred Khouri,
The Arab-Israeli Dilemma
, 3rd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 403.

83.
Publicly, the PLO and Syria condemned Sadat’s initiative but tried to keep their options open, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan took a wait-and-see attitude. Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen, however, were most vocal in condemning Sadat and succeeded in getting Egypt ejected, temporarily as it turned out, from the Arab League. Khouri,
Arab-Israeli Dilemma
, p. 404.

84.
Ibid., p. 407.

85.
Quoted in ibid., pp. 407–8.

86.
Stein,
Heroic Diplomacy
, p. 254.

87.
In announcing Jordan’s “administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank,” the king argued that continued Jordanian administration of the territory “would be an obstacle to the Palestinian struggle, which seeks to win international support for the Palestinian question, considering that it is a just national issue of a people struggling against foreign occupation.” Quoted in Adnan Abu-Odeh,
Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 226.

88.
Savir,
Process
, p. 5.

89.
Uri Savir was the chief Israeli diplomat who negotiated with the PLO in Oslo. For a most fascinating account of his efforts and his perspective, see ibid.

90.
On several occasions, for example, Israeli negotiators presented the PLO teams with a “take it or leave it” option, and the Palestinians almost always caved in. See, for example, ibid., p. 43.

91.
Ibid., p. 59.

92.
For a full text of the DOP, see Laqueur and Rubin,
Israeli-Arab Reader
, pp. 599–611. For this and other related documents, see also Institute for Palestine Studies,
The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994).

93.
Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
23 (Spring 1994): 34.

94.
Guyatt,
Absence of Peace
, p. 35.

95.
Edward Said,
Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 7.

96.
Ibid., pp. 3–4.

97.
Hillel Frisch,
Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 132–35.

98.
Quoted in Jimmy Carter,
Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 147.

99.
Naseer H. Aruri, “The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu’s Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
28 (Winter 1999): 17–28; Norman Finkelstein, “Securing Occupation: The Real Meaning of the Wye River Memorandum,”
New Left Review
, no. 232 (1998): 128–39.

100.
Finkelstein, “Securing Occupation,” p. 137.

101.
Avi Shlaim,
The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World
(New York: Norton, 2001), p. 600.

102.
Don Peretz, “Barak’s Israel,”
Current History
100 (January 2001): 22.

103.
Sara Roy, “Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy,”
Current History
101 (January 2002): 9.

104.
Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
30 (Winter 2001): 76.

105.
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, “Camp David: Tragedy of Errors,”
New York Review of Books
, August 9, 2001.

106.
Shibley Telhami, “Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences,”
Current History
100 (January 2001): 11.

107.
Tim Youngs, “The Middle East Crisis: Camp David, the ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada’ and the Prospects for the Peace Process,” United Kingdom House of Commons Library, Research Paper 01/09, January 24, 2001, p. 15.

108.
Roy, “Why Peace Failed,” p. 15.

109.
Ibid., p. 19.

110.
Malley and Agha, “Camp David,” p. 71.

111.
For a discussion of the Sabra and Shatila massacres and Sharon’s role, see Tessler,
History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
pp. 590–99.

112.
For excerpts of the Mitchell Report, see George J. Mitchell et al., “The Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee, ‘The Mitchell Report,’ 20 May 2001,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
30 (Spring 2001): 146–50.

113.
U.S. Department of State, “Israel and the Occupied Territories,” in
Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2002).

114.
Ibid.

115.
Quoted in Edward R. F. Sheehan, “The Map and the Fence,”
New York Review of Books
50 (July 3, 2003): 8.

116.
See, for example, Milton Viorst, “The Road Map to Nowhere,”
Washington Quarterly
26 (Summer 2003): 177–90.

117.
Sheehan, “Map and the Fence,” pp. 8–9.

118.
“Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference,” December 18, 2003,
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2003/Address%20by%20PM%20Ariel%20Sharon%20at%20the%20Fourth%20Herzliya
.

119.
David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,”
Vanity Fair
, April 2008, pp. 192–98, 247–51.

120.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 24–26 January 2009,” East Jerusalem, 2009,
www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_01_14_english.pdf
.

121.
Clancy Chassay and Julian Borger, “New Evidence of Israel’s Gaza War Crimes Revealed: Investigation Finds Medical Staff Hit and Civilians ‘Used as Shields,’”
Guardian
, March 24, 2009, p. 1.

122.
Robert Fisk, “What Has Been Gained, Apart from Netanyahu’s Reelection?”
Independent
(London), November 23, 2012, p. 30.

123.
Ethan Bronner and Christine Hauser, “U.N. in Blow to U.S., Heightens the Status of Palestine,”
New York Times
, November 30, 2012, p. 1.

124.
Jodi Rudoren, “Israel Defies Allies in Move to Bolster Settlements,”
New York Times
, December 20, 2012, p. 6.

125.
Quoted in ibid.

126.
Shlaim,
Iron Wall
, p. xx.

127.
See, for example, Said,
Peace and Its Discontents
, p. 121.

128.
Aharon Klieman,
Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 239–42.

10. THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1.
Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk,
A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 7.

2.
Charles Issawi,
The Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery
(Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1995), p. 101.

3.
Owen and Pamuk,
History of Middle East Economies,
p. 7.

4.
Michael P. Todaro,
Economic Development,
6th ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 721.

5.
Alan Richards and John Waterbury,
A Political Economy of the Middle East,
2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 175.

6.
Ibid., p. 201.