The Naked Communist (28 page)

Do you think diplomatic blunders may have encouraged the attack on South Korea? What significance do you attach to Owen Lattimore's amazing statement in 1949: "The thing to do is let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as if we pushed her"?

What was the turning point in the Korean war which gave the U.N. forces their first military advantage?

After the Korean cease-fire in 1953, what did the U.S. Secretary of State say to indicate that the U.S. was abandoning a twenty-year policy of appeasement?

What was the role of the FBI in the "Battle of the Underground?"

Why did the U.S. not do more to prevent the loss of French Indo-China?

In the dispute over Formosa, why did the Red Chinese call the U.S. a paper tiger?

What did Dimitry Z. Manuilsky say about the strategy of "peaceful coexistence"?

The evidence of Communist subversion and aggression became so apparent toward the close of World War II that even some of those who had staked their professional careers on the friendship of the Soviet leaders began to sense a feeling of alarm. This included Harry Hopkins. Within a month after the death of President Roosevelt, Hopkins became so concerned with developments that he hurriedly made arrangements to see Stalin in person. At the time Hopkins was critically ill, with only a short time to live, but he forced himself to make this final pilgrimage to Moscow to try and salvage some of the remnants from the wreckage of what was to have been a master plan for post-war peace.

When he arrived in Moscow, however, Hopkins was confronted by a blunt and angry Stalin. We are indebted to former Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, for an account at what happened.
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Stalin made an amazingly antagonistic verbal assault on the handling of the program Hopkins had sponsored for Russia -- the program of Lend-Lease.

The shock of this attack may be better appreciated when it is remembered that Hopkins considered himself to be the best friend the Soviets had in America. He and his associates had just spent billions of dollars and risked an atomic war to try and create a Russo-American partnership for peace. Probably Hopkins would not have been more startled by the treatment he received if Stalin had physically slapped him in the face.

In reply, Hopkins vigorously pointed out "how liberally the United States (through him) had construed the law in sending foodstuffs and
other non-military items to their aid
." Stalin admitted all of this but roughly crossed it off by saying the Soviets still could not forgive the United States for terminating Lend-Lease after V-Day in Europe.

At the moment it seemed that nothing would pacify Stalin but a brand new round of wide-open American Lend-Lease generosity; otherwise he apparently could think of no particular reason for even pretending to want the friendship of the United States any longer. He even threatened to boycott the United Nations Conference which was soon to be held in San Francisco.

For reasons which now seem quite incongruous, Hopkins continued to plead with Stalin to stay on the team and reiterated the many concessions which he was sure the Communists could gain by taking part in the United Nations organization. Like a pouting and spunky child, Stalin assumed an air of studied reluctance, but gradually gave in. By agreeing to join the United Nations Conference at San Francisco he wanted Hopkins to know he was doing the United States a tremendous favor.

Finally, Hopkins returned home. By the time of his death in January, 1946, there was already ample evidence that peace-loving nations were in for a violent and stormy era as a result of the strategy of writing in the Soviets as full-fledged partners of the free world.

Obviously, a primary object of World War II was to liberate all of the countries occupied by the Axis powers. Russia was well aware that if she were to expand her influence into these liberated nations -- particularly the ones which bordered the USSR -- she would have to do it in such a way as to create the illusion that these nations had gone Communistic through their own political self-determination. It became established Soviet policy to take secret but highly active interest in the affairs of these countries -- to make them "voluntary" satellites through infiltration and subversion.

In some nations this plan brought immediate results. For example, it made satellites of Yugoslavia and Albania almost overnight because the Communists had captured the leadership of the anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist resistance movements during the war and as soon as these countries were liberated the Communists demanded the right to set up the new governments. Later, Stalin tried to purge Tito's regime but found it would not purge. Tito temporarily pulled Yugoslavia away from the Russian orbit but remained openly devoted to Marxism in spite of generous U.S. economic aid.

Russia also found a highly favorable condition for her schemes in the Eastern European countries. As a result of the military campaigns carried out by Soviet troops during the final phase of World War II, Red forces occupied all of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and most of what is now East Germany.

The Soviet strategy for the "peaceful" conquest of these countries prior to withdrawing the Red troops was to encourage the creation of coalition governments including only left-wing parties. This gave the impression that these nations had some semblance of representative government. The next step was to maneuver Communists into all key governmental positions. The third and final step was to force all parties to join in a "monolithic bloc" with the Communist leaders assuming complete dictatorial power.

Through this carefully executed maneuver the complete subjugation of all these countries was completed by 1949. The Communist Iron Curtain came clanking down on all their western borders and the free world found itself completely cut off from any contact with these former allies who represented approximately 100 million people.

At this same time there also came to the free world powers one of the most bitter lessons they had to learn in dealing with World Communism -- the loss of China.

After fighting the Japanese militarists for fourteen years, China had approached the end of World War II with high hopes. The war had been fought under a dictatorship led by Chiang Kai-shek but his Nationalist Government had promised to set up a democratic constitution as soon as national unity would permit. As the war ended Chiang Kai-shek ordered the restoration of civil rights and inaugurated freedom of the press.

The Chinese leaders knew their greatest threat to peace was the small but well-trained army of Chinese Communists in the northwest; nevertheless, they went right ahead with their plans for a constitution which would allow the Communists, full representation but would require them to disband their armed forces. There was confidence that a representative government could be worked out for all parties in China if armed insurrection were eliminated. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek invited the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, to come to the capital and see if they could reach a peaceful settlement of their difference.

Mao came. He promised to cooperate in setting up a democracy but Chiang Kai-shek and his aides were not at all impressed with his superficial display of professed sincerity. Chiang later promised his nervous associates that he would never relinquish his dictatorial powers until he was completely satisfied that the government was safely in the hands of a substantial majority of the people -- not just some noisy militant minority.

An early blow to China's hopes for a post-war peace came when it was learned that back in February, 1945, British and American diplomatic leaders at Yalta had agreed to give Russia extensive property rights in Manchuria if the Soviets would join in the war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was outraged by this unilateral arrangement (China was never consulted) and he never ceased to blame much of the subsequent disaster on this initial blunder.

The Yalta agreement allowed Russia to come racing into Manchuria (and North Korea) just six days before the Japanese capitulated. After a typically brutal Russian occupation, the Soviet troops fixed the Communist grip on this territory which the Japanese had extensively industrialized and which was one of the richest agricultural regions in all China. In fact, it was Manchuria that the Nationalists were expecting to use as the working base in bolstering China's battered economy.

However, after taking Manchuria, Stalin suddenly and unexpectedly agreed to withdraw his troops and recognize the Nationalist Government of China as the legal sovereign of that territory providing China would acknowledge Russia's property rights in Manchuria which Stalin had previously demanded at Yalta. This consisted of half ownership in the Manchurian railroads and the right to lease Port Arthur as a Russian naval base. Under strong pressure from the United States and Great Britain, China signed this agreement with Russia on August 14, 1945.

Almost immediately Chiang Kai-shek knew this was a serious mistake. The treaty was nothing but a Russian tool of strategy which legally codified the mistakes at Yalta. As Chiang Kai-shek had feared, the Russians operated the Manchurian railroads as though they owned them outright. They not only set up a naval base at Port Arthur, but arrogantly refused to allow the Chinese to use their own port of Dairen. Instead of evacuating Manchuria, the Soviets began looting the entire region of all its heavy industry and shipping it to Russia as "war booty." This represented a stunning blow to China's future economic recovery.

But even more important than this was the Russians' strategy of delaying the removal of their troops by various pretexts until the Chinese Communists could come in from the northwest and occupy Manchuria. As the Communists came in, the Russians turned over to them the vast quantities of ammunition and war material which they had seized from the Japanese.

Consequently, when the Nationalists arrived to take over Manchuria, they were outraged to find that the Chinese Communists were already dug in. Immediately civil war loomed up as an inescapable consequence.

All of this was happening right at the time the Nationalists were trying to prepare China for a constitutional form of government. On his own initiative Chiang had set May 5, 1946, as the first meeting of the Chinese National Assembly in which all parties were to take part. But, of course, this entire program to unify and democratize China was seriously jeopardized by the outbreak of war in Manchuria. At this point the U.S. diplomats decided to take a hand.

They had planned the United Nations to preserve world Peace and had insisted from the beginning that the Red leaders were potentially peaceful and had no territorial ambitions. Assuming this to be true they denounced Chiang for resisting the Chinese Reds. They accused him of creating new world tensions. General George C. Marshall was therefore sent over to China to stop the civil war.

General Marshall arrived in January, 1946. What happened after that is a long series of incidents, each one tragically demonstrating the error of trying to incorporate the ideas of world revolutionists within the framework of representative government.

The Communists demanded a coalition government but insisted on keeping their own private army. They wanted a voice in the government of all China, but would not allow the central government to have a voice in the affairs of Communist-occupied areas of China. They agreed to a cease-fire and then launched aggressive attacks as soon as it served their own advantage to do so. They agreed to help set up a State Council representing all parties and then advised at the last moment that they would not participate.

When the date for the first National Assembly was postponed so the Communists could participate, they used it as an excuse to accuse Chiang Kai-shek of setting the new date without proper authorization. After a second postponement, with the Communists still refusing to participate, the National Assembly finally convened on November 15, 1946, and a democratic constitution was approved and adopted on Christmas Day. But the Communists would have no part of it.

Chiang Kai-shek became completely convinced that the Communists would never negotiate a peaceful settlement but were out to win the whole domain of China by military conquest. He also believed the Communists could never represent the interests of China because their policies were created and imposed upon them by Moscow.

Time was to prove this analysis correct, but U.S. diplomatic strategists were the last to be convinced -- and then only after the Chinese mainland had been lost. Furthermore, Chiang could not convince the U.S. diplomatic corps that he was justified in striking back when the Communists attacked him. When he tried to regain the territory recently seized by Communists, it was described in Washington as "inexcusable aggression."