The Nuremberg Interviews (32 page)

I asked Keitel whether he was a close friend of Blomberg’s. “Yes. I knew Blomberg when I was still a captain. We served together during the First World War, and that was one of the reasons I came to Blomberg in 1934–35. Blomberg was four years older than me. He became an officer in 1897 and I became one in 1901. I saw Blomberg here before he died. He had suddenly become very old.”

I knew that the subject of Blomberg was a touchy one for Keitel. He disliked talking about his old friend because of the scandal connected with the latter’s having married a woman of questionable morals many years his junior. However, I asked Keitel what sort of man Blomberg was, generally speaking. “He was a gentleman and a good man. I liked him very much. From a military standpoint he was good and efficient. I felt very sorry when he left the army in 1938. That was the beginning of my unhappy time as a soldier. I was not prepared for this position. I was suddenly called to take over without having had time to think things over.

“Prior to February 1938, when I became chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Hitler didn’t even know me. Blomberg recommended me for this position.”

I asked Keitel for a brief description of his education. “I never attended military school. But I was transferred to the general staff in 1915 during the First World War and was with it from 1915 to 1934, with the exception of about four years. I was always concerned with organization. I therefore believed that in 1938 Hitler wanted to use my experience as an organizer of troops. Instead, six weeks later, the first military and warlike campaigns began, of which previously I actually knew nothing. My ideal to become a farmer always remained a dream.

“Before 1938 I saw Hitler but didn’t ever really know him. I saw him on maneuvers in 1935, and a couple of times in 1938 with Blomberg, but I had never spoken to him. After 1938 I was with Hitler, and saw him at least once a week, when I was called over to sign my name to orders and directives. Most of the time Hitler was in Berchtesgaden and I was in Berlin.

“When the Austrian thing began, I saw him February 1, and he said not a word as to what he really wanted.
²
I was ordered there but I didn’t know what for. It’s almost impossible to imagine today how things really were.”

Keitel seemed as dignified and composed as ever, but his hands were trembling. I said that something seemed to be bothering him, and I wondered what caused it. His hands had not shaken until he made the last remark about how inconceivable things were in Hitler’s times.

“I realize that you talk with all the defendants and probably with the other generals here in the witness wing. The conditions under which the generals met Hitler one after the other were quite different and you will obtain a different picture from each. I can only tell you my experiences. I can see today that perhaps I was much too uncritical in my entire character. I had been in many adjutant and general staff positions, but of course always with professional soldiers, whose education was also my own. Therefore all the things which Hitler told me were, to my viewpoint, the orders of an officer. In 1938 I had been an officer for thirty-six years already. I would have led a division far better than that job.

“As chief of staff under Hitler, one had a position which was impossible. One had a superior officer who was a politician and not an officer — a man who had quite different basic viewpoints from mine. If I had had one year’s time in which to get to know Hitler, things in many ways would have turned out far differently.

“But one has to recall that on February 4, 1938, I took over the job — a position which never even existed before. Really I was a chief of staff without responsibility and without knowing what Hitler really wanted, and without being told by him.

“I was to lead the staff more or less and do what Hitler wanted. In addition, Hitler was no officer, and lacked education, and was a revolutionary. In the army he wanted to change things constantly. And then, in the first few weeks, came the large political actions, the Austrian question, and at the end of April the Czech question. That was a bare eight weeks after the beginning of my activity.

“And so one fell from one event to another — like a man staggering from one thing to another without becoming fully conscious and without the ability to think things over. Developments followed too quickly. That was the way things proceeded.

“Five times I asked for my release. Each time I was refused with the
sharpest words. And because of my inner feelings it was impossible for me to pretend to be sick.”

I asked him what he thought, in general, from today’s perspective, of Hitler. I remarked that if I recalled correctly, during his defense, Keitel called Hitler a genius.

He said with some deliberation: “Yes. He was a genius in my conception. To me a genius is a man with such extensive ability to look into the future, with a tremendous ability to feel things, with such extensive knowledge of historic and military matters — that I want to use the word in reference to Hitler. Besides, I’m a simple soldier, and nothing convinces a soldier more than success. All through the summer of 1938 I repeatedly told him that there should not be a war with Czechoslovakia for any price because it would be mischievous. Hitler told me always to calm down, that there would be no war. Hitler said he needed a stronger army as a means to success. This, too, was a success. There was no war. But during that time I asked for my release.

“After things had turned bad and there were reverses, I said to myself: Where I stand, I stand. One can only be killed in one spot.

“It isn’t right to be obedient only when things go well; it is much harder to be a good, obedient soldier when things go badly and times are hard. Obedience and faith at such time is a virtue.

“But I often had the sharpest and harshest clashes with Hitler. But had I taken my life, I wouldn’t have improved things, because this demon went ahead with whatever he wanted and succeeded.”

Did he consider Hitler a demon? “Yes. He was a demonlike man, possessed of inordinate willpower, who, whenever he had something in his mind, had to accomplish it. Hitler had charm, loved children, charmed women. But in political respects he would stop at nothing. In other respects he had soft and touching emotions.

“Just as he could be terribly brutal in following up political ideas, so he could be humanely sensitive for the feelings of individuals, for the individual human life. At least that was my impression.

“However, I never heard of the brutality during the war. There was never a word of the Jewish persecutions or murders. Hitler was a great psychologist in that instance. He knew he could not ask such things of a gentleman and an officer — not even mention the ideas.

“No matter what Hitler said, he spoke with a fine feeling for the particular circle which he addressed. For example, he spoke quite differently
to a group of officers than to a group of party leaders. And what he said to either of those two groups, he never said to the people or the Reichstag. His speeches were always timed and tuned to the feeling of the people to whom he spoke at the particular time.

“That was one of his greatest abilities — his power to convince others by speech. Before soldiers he always mentioned the noble traditions of the German soldier. In his study there were three pictures — Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Helmut Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke.”

I said that Rundstedt had told me that Moltke would turn in his grave at Hitler’s military tactics, particularly his tactics in the so-called Rundstedt Offensive, which Rundstedt said should be known as the Hitler Offensive.

Keitel replied: “It’s true. It wasn’t the Rundstedt Offensive, it was all Hitler’s idea. I said that last September in an interrogation. Rundstedt did not want it — he disapproved of it. Hitler would have made Rundstedt high commissioner of the army if he had not been too old in 1938. Hitler respected Rundstedt highly. For example, when Rundstedt came to visit Hitler, Hitler actually went to the door to greet him, and escort him upstairs personally. He was the only general Hitler ever treated with so much respect. It was an honor paid only to Rundstedt, an outward politeness indicating the great respect Hitler had for Rundstedt’s ability, although Hitler never considered Rundstedt a National Socialist. That was one thing he never demanded of any of us.

“Hitler always said that he selected generals because of their abilities, and not because of their political beliefs. Hitler said: ‘I demand three things of my officers and generals. One, ability for their position; two, that they report the situation to me truthfully; and three, they must be obedient.’ Those were Hitler’s three demands.

“Originally there was a difference of opinion between Rundstedt and Brauchitsch. Hitler and Rundstedt had a conference and Rundstedt left for home in peace. The second time, Rundstedt became ill while serving on the western front. He wrote me a letter, asking that I inform Hitler that he was sick and could not bear the responsibility if something important happened. Both times Hitler asked him to take command again.

“Brauchitsch was active until December 9, 1941. He served as chief from February 4, 1938, until December 9, 1941. He was high commander of the army. Then Hitler assumed that title himself. A field marshal in
Germany is always active and cannot retire technically, but Brauchitsch, just like Blomberg, served no more after 1941. Brauchitsch had a bad heart, at least that is what he told me. In the winter of 1942–43 he was very ill. Every second day the state of his health had to be reported to Hitler. We thought he would die, but he must have a strong constitution because he recuperated.”

Constantin von Neurath
1873–1956

Constantin von Neurath was German foreign minister from 1932 to 1938, and appointed Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia after Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. Found guilty at Nuremberg of conspiracy to commit crimes, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, he was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He served eight years in Spandau prison and was released in 1954 for reasons of health.

The old man, Constantin von Neurath, was sitting on his cot, wearing a plain black coat, dark trousers, and new shoes. The laces were removed (as with all defendants’ clothes) but were tied by a small lace on the upper part. He spoke in a hesitant manner with a certain of degree of stuttering.

The interview with Neurath was carried out in English, which he spoke well, but not fluently. His German is not fluent either, for that matter — with frequent hesitation and phrasings. I showed him a copy of his biography, only a half page, which he had written on October 9, 1945, shortly after arriving at the Nuremberg prison. He recalled it and said, “Well, it’s a brief version of life, isn’t it?” I agreed.

What sort of town was Kleingladbach, his birthplace? “Not a town, just a tiny village with a population of four hundred in which my father and grandfather lived. My wife now lives there near it. It is close to
Stuttgart.” He was born on February 2, 1873. He had no real grandchildren. His only son, age forty-four, married a widow and he has one stepchild, a daughter. “I often regret having no grandchildren.”

He asked me what I thought of the trials — more or less reversing the usual questioning. I remarked that things seemed to be speeding up. “Yes, they should be over by Wednesday. All we can do is wait and see.” He smiled anxiously.

What about the organizations? “Quite artificial — the case versus organizations — especially as far as general staff. You have a general staff in your country, too. The party organizations are a different story, but not every block leader in the party is guilty either. The same with the SS, SD, and SA. The Nazis had one great fault. They overorganized everything. In general, I think the indictment against organizations is poor.”

He asked me whether I’d ever read Neville Henderson’s
Failure of a Mission: Berlin, 1937–1939
. I said that I had. “It’s a good book. It shows you really how conditions were in 1937–39. Not so good was the book by William Dodd, your ambassador.
¹
He never did seem to understand reality. He was a professor of history at a university. And like most professors, didn’t know politics and the world. He spoke fluent German and my English was sufficient. But I also asked that he bring his secretary with him — he often failed to understand what we were talking about. That is — he was like all — not a realist. I haven’t read his diary, which was put out by his children after his death, but I can assure you it’s not worth reading, from the excerpts I’ve seen from it at the trial.”

Service in the government? “I left office in 1916 because I didn’t agree. In 1918, President Friedrich Ebert, a socialist, called me back. I’m not a socialist, but more conservative. I was appointed by Ebert as ambassador in Copenhagen and later was ambassador in Rome. One party government after another. Chancellor Gustav Stresemann was liberal. Later, I followed my duty to my country, not to party. That was my line. When old Hindenburg came in 1925, I was then ambassador in Rome after the death of Stresemann. Hindenburg asked me to become foreign minister. I declined because I did not belong to a party and I could not become foreign minister for him without a party’s support. I was sent to London for the second time as ambassador. London in 1930 had been my first post. In 1930 I was ambassador, and after two years, in 1932, Hindenburg called me to become foreign minister, so-called — the
cabinet parties couldn’t agree to form a government. I couldn’t refuse. Papen was chancellor, but I didn’t know him or the other ministers. When Papen’s cabinet was replaced by Kurt von Schleicher’s government, the Nazis had become very strong, with 230 seats in a short time in 1932, but I was there in the cabinet as the delegate of Hindenburg, not as a party member. At the end of January 1933, again there was a crisis. Hitler came to power as part of a coalition government.
²
I asked Hindenburg to let me go back to London, where the king of England asked for me to come back, but Hindenburg said no. It was my duty to stay. He made it a condition to Hitler that I remain for the time being. Already Hindenburg was ill, and he made me promise to stay there after his death as long as I could with my conscience.