The Nuremberg Interviews (62 page)

“The social program of the NSDAP had its good points and was honestly intended. On December 1, 1943, Hitler said that after the war was won, the position of the German workers in the state would be elevated for the first time. I remember Hitler’s own words: ‘The German worker made no mistake in relying on me.’ It is clear to me that my class — the middle class — would have disappeared whether Hitler won or lost.

“Planned economy is used in Germany at present by the occupying powers. It is done in all countries with the exception of the United States, and sooner or later your country will get around to it. For example, there are the questions of wheat, gold, silver. If the U.S.A. wants to sell two hundred pounds of wheat for five marks, and Russia will sell the same amount of wheat for three marks, then you can easily see that free economies cannot exist. It would take only a few such instances and the entire stock exchange would break down.”

Erich von Manstein
1887–1973

Erich von Manstein, general field marshal, was a professional soldier and skillful strategist. A dispute with Hitler over war strategy on the eastern front and over his own command led to his dismissal in March 1944. He was sentenced in 1949 by a British military court to eighteen years’ imprisonment; that was commuted to twelve years. He was released in May 1953.

This fifty-eight-year-old man, Erich von Manstein, has been interviewed several times in the past. He was born November 24, 1887, in Berlin. He stated that he had not grown up there because his father was an officer and his family moved to various parts of Germany. He was reared in various garrisons, wherever his father happened to be stationed.

He is a tall man, about six feet in height, well developed and well nourished. He wears a black patch over the right eye, which had been operated upon for a cataract several years ago. He has been the main organizer of the defense of the general staff and the driving spirit behind the other field marshals and generals imprisoned in Nuremberg. It was Manstein who delegated various roles to these officers in the preparation of the defense of the general staff.

His past history was uneventful. As a child he had frequent sore throats and attacks of tonsillitis. His tonsils were removed for the first time three years ago, although they had been “clipped” previously. As a young child he had measles, and at the age of nineteen a severe attack of scarlet fever without sequelae.

At the age of forty-five, about thirteen years ago, he began to develop
fogginess of vision in both eyes. The right eye was worse than the left and in 1944 the right lens was removed by an ophthalmologist in Breslau. He could no longer read with the right eye, except with strong glasses. The left eye is better than the right, but also foggy. He was advised by his ophthalmologist that the left eye should not be operated upon because if it were, he would have to wear glasses constantly.

About twelve years ago he began to suffer from neuralgia of the neck. This has become worse and more frequent as time has gone on, especially in bad weather or following a sore throat. In general, he said that even today he considered himself to be in good health.

He began his education at the age of six years in Strasbourg, in Alsace. His father was stationed there at that time in the German garrison. He attended the gymnasium from 1896 until 1900, when he joined the cadet corps in Lübeck. He eventually transferred to Lichterfelde, near Berlin, from which he graduated in 1906 at the age of nineteen. He entered the army as a cadet.

In 1907 he became a lieutenant of the Third Guard Regiment. In 1914 he was at the front with the same unit and was severely wounded in the left shoulder and left knee. The sciatic nerve in the left knee was nicked but except for some slight weakness of the left leg, it healed satisfactorily. The left shoulder was not permanently affected. As a result of these wounds, he was in the hospital for six months. In 1915 he was transferred to an army corps. In 1916 he entered the general staff as a captain in the field, serving in Poland, Serbia, and France. He became the first general staff officer in the border guard against Poland. He served with troops in the 100,000-man army. In 1928 he became a major in the War Ministry in Berlin, where he remained until 1932.

In the fall of 1932 he was stationed in Pomerania. In 1934 he returned to Berlin as chief of staff of Military District III (Third Division). The commander of that unit was Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, who was later connected to the
Attentat
of July 20, 1944. “Witzleben was a friend of mine — a perfect gentleman. He had good judgment, that is, not for the masses but for officers. He was a very polite and kind man, clever, but not ambitious and not particularly diligent. One should not go so far as to call him lazy but he was not particularly fond of hard work. He was a competent military man as far as his abilities and character were concerned.”

I asked Manstein whether he was surprised at Witzleben’s complicity
in the July 20, 1944, affair. “I didn’t approve of the
Attentat
because when one is in a war one can’t take the responsibility for a revolution in the interior. However, in July 1944, Witzleben had no command. He was sick and had been retired. He was about sixty years old. He had been chief commander in the West during the campaign against France and had served well. He had to leave the army in 1942 or ‘43 because of his health.”

Manstein’s next position was chief of the operational section of the general staff in 1935. Werner von Fritsch was commander in chief, and General Ludwig Beck was in command of the general staff itself. “The cleverer of the two men was Beck; the stronger personality was Fritsch. These two men were the best officers we had. They were the best of my superiors. I can’t say how they would have been in a war, but in time of peace they were certainly the best.”

Manstein related how Beck was retired in 1938 because he did not favor the attack on Czechoslovakia. Fritsch was removed from his post in February 1938, also because of ideological differences with Hitler, and he participated in the war against Poland voluntarily. Manstein had no comment as to whether Fritsch’s death in Poland was accidental, suicidal, or otherwise.

“Fritsch, Beck, and myself had to leave our positions in the high command in February 1938.”

In 1932 Manstein had become a colonel. Later he achieved the rank of major general, and on April 1, 1938, he became lieutenant general. When the war started in 1939 he was in command of a division in Silesia. At the time, Manstein was chief of the general staff of Rundstedt, who commanded Army Group South in Poland. After the war in Poland was over, the high command of this army group was transferred to the West and Rundstedt commanded the forces on the frontiers of Belgium and Luxembourg. Manstein was Rundstedt’s chief of staff until February 1940.

In 1940 Manstein commanded an army corps. In June, he was promoted to general of infantry. He was in France until March 1941, after which he commanded a panzer corps which had been newly formed in Germany. Although Manstein was not an authority on panzer warfare, he considers that he later became one during the Russian campaign.

At the start of the war against Russia he was at the north front in charge of the aforementioned panzer corps. It was his outfit which began
the attack in East Prussia. He remained in that position until September 1941, when he took command of the Eleventh Army in Ukraine, replacing that army’s former commander in chief, Schobert, who had been killed in action. Manstein stayed in this position until November 1942, at which time his staff was changed automatically to that of Army Group Don. “I had command of Army Group Don. In February 1942, I was again promoted, to colonel general, after I had conquered Crimea. On the first of July, 1942, I became field marshal after I led the forces that conquered Sebastopol. That was a very difficult battle because of the tremendous resistance offered by the Russians and because of the rocky terrain of the natural fortress of Sebastopol.”

In November, the Army Group Don underwent changes and became known as Army Group South. This reshuffling was done after the German Sixth Army under Friedrich Paulus had been encircled in the battle against Stalingrad. “I was the officer with the highest command in Russia. My new army, known as Army Group South, consisted of the Sixth Army of Paulus, which was already partly encircled, plus two Romanian armies and a small panzer army. Paulus was my subordinate but I had little if any contact with him. In reality Paulus received orders from Hitler, who advised him not to withdraw.”

I asked Manstein whether it was possible at that time for Paulus’s army to withdraw. He replied, “In the first days it was possible. However, after the encirclement there was too much risk, especially in winter, to attempt to withdraw.” Did Manstein believe that Hitler’s order to Paulus to fight to the last was a reckless, foolish order? Manstein’s face hardened and he glared with his one uncovered eye, but answered in a steady, monotonous voice, “No. If Paulus’s army had capitulated before the end, the Russians would have had the advantage of withdrawing forces against Paulus and against the southern front, where I had only two Romanian armies. Therefore, the resistance of the Sixth German Army, even to the death of the last man, was necessary.”

Did Manstein mean that it was necessary despite the fact that it would cost so many lives, as Paulus had testified before this tribunal a few months ago? He replied with the same cold monotony, “Yes. Lives would have been lost anyway. And the breakthrough of the Russians at that time would have meant the loss of the war and the complete defeat of Germany.

“I tried at that time to relieve the Sixth Army, of which I was supreme
commander, above Paulus, by counterattacks — but it was not possible. I gave the order finally for the Sixth Army to break out, but then Paulus said it was too late and not possible. Hitler did not want the Sixth Army to break out at any time, but to fight to the last man. I believe that Hitler said if the Sixth Army tried to break out, it would be their death.”

Did you agree? “Well, perhaps a part of the Sixth Army personnel would have been able to escape, but of course, without weapons — therefore, I wanted to do this in order to save some lives. However, it might have also occurred that they would perish in the cold even if they had escaped the trap.”

What kind of a man was Paulus, in your opinion? “A very clever man though perhaps not a very strong character.” Did you always think that of him? “Yes. It would have been his duty at the time he saw the danger ahead to take the responsibility on his own shoulders and try to break through to the rear.” Did Paulus give up instead? “No. Instead, he went to Hitler and asked if he could be permitted to try to break through to the rear, and Hitler said he should remain at Stalingrad and be annihilated. My criticism of Paulus is that he should not have asked Hitler. He should have done it on his own hook. That is why I say Paulus was not a very strong character, because to make a decision like that during war takes a strong personality.”

I thought that Manstein was more or less contradicting himself. Didn’t he state a moment ago that Paulus should stay to the end and fight? Now he seemed to be saying that Paulus should have broken through to the rear without asking any questions of his superiors. Just what did Manstein mean? “What I meant to say was that Paulus should have broken out to the rear before he was encircled. I mean that once Paulus was encircled, he should not capitulate but should fight to the end. In that sense I agreed with Hitler.”

Did Paulus finally capitulate? “No. His army was conquered in the course of battle. About 90,000 men were captured, and in our estimation only 20,000 or 25,000 of these men remained alive.” Paulus said in court that because of Hitler’s order, about 100,000 men were killed due to freezing and battle, because of fighting to the last. “In my estimation there were about 200,000 men in total in Paulus’s army. I figure that 100,000 probably died as a result of wounds or freezing.”
¹

Did this tremendous loss of lives depress you at the time? “Of course. For myself, as a leader with the responsibility for 100,000 people, the
spiritual burden was very great. But I blame Paulus to a certain extent for not taking some responsibility himself and breaking out to the rear before he was encircled, despite Hitler’s wishes. On the other hand, I agree with Hitler that once Paulus was encircled, he should stand ground and fight as he did, despite the loss of life, because if he capitulated it would have meant the defeat of Germany then and there.”

Manstein said that in March 1944, he was recalled and retired to his home in Silesia. I asked him what the reason for this had been. He replied enigmatically, “Officially I don’t know. I assume it was the controversy concerning leadership between myself and Hitler. I was in a constant feud with Hitler about leadership ever since I took command of the army group until the end. The chief of the general staff, General Kurt Zeitzler, told me that the orders at that time were dictated mainly by Himmler and Goering.”